SYLLABUS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS
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MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

SYLLABUS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BY

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ISSUED BY

THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1925

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Set up and electrotyped.
Published January, 1925.

Printed in the United States of America by
J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK

FOREWORD

In its effort to realize the aim of its existence, viz.: "the development of international good-will by means of educational agencies," the Institute of International Education has published a number of booklets that have received hearty commendation both in the United States and foreign countries. These booklets, however, have been primarily for the benefit of foreign students coming to study in the United States or of American students going abroad to study in foreign countries, e.g. the *Guide Book for Foreign Students in the United States* or the *Opportunities for Graduate Study in Great Britain.* But the great majority of American students do not go abroad to study and few American colleges give courses adequate enough to enable students to understand the difficult problems that confront men today in their international relations. In the hope that such a need might be partially supplied, the Director of the Institute determined, if possible, to publish a syllabus and bibliography on international relations which because of its adequacy, accuracy and objectivity, would command the approval not only of college teachers but of the public in general and might result in its being used not only by college classes but also by forums, women's clubs, labor unions and other organizations.

The Director invited a group of teachers at Columbia University each of whom was engaged in teaching some branch of the subject to advise with him on the project, viz.: Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes, Parker T. Moon, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Edward M. Earle, Lindsay Rogers and J. Montgomery Gambrill, and Dr. Isaiah Bowman, the Director of the American Geographical Society. They were enthusiastic about the idea. It was at once agreed that Professor Moon should draw up the syllabus and present a part of it to the group once a week for criticism. This was done throughout a whole scholastic year. It means much for the accuracy and impartiality of the syllabus that such a group of specialists should have collectively considered and criticized it, section by section. Acknowledgment should also be made of the excellent services of Miss Mary Evelyn Townsend of Teachers College in assisting in the preparation of the bibliographical references for Parts One to Five and Part Nine. The Director feels that the great amount of time and effort given to the syllabus by Professor Moon has been more than justified by the result and he is confident that its publication will have as a consequence a greatly increased attention given to the study of international relations.

Mention should perhaps also be made that the same group of scholars

has in preparation a companion volume to the syllabus. It will present some of the most significant aspects of the subject not adequately covered by textbooks now available and will be organized in such a manner as to appeal to the general reader as well as the college student.

STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, *Director.*

The Institute of International Education,
522 Fifth Avenue, New York,
January, 1925.

PREFACE

To say that democracy cannot successfully direct the foreign policies on which our national security and prosperity, our lives and fortunes, depend, unless democracy is intelligent and informed regarding international relations, would be a truism scarce worthy of attention, had it not been so gallantly ignored in this country. What Lord Curzon said of British foreign affairs could be applied with equal truth to our own—"they touch the life, the interest, and the pocket of every member of the community." The Great War proved it; each year of peace adds proof on proof. Fortunately, however, there are many who, realizing this fact, desire to inform either themselves or others on the subject of international relations. For them this book was prepared, to serve as a friendly and not too opinionated guide.

Two ideas have determined the general plan and scope of the outline. First, international relations must be viewed as a whole. There is a purely diplomatic approach to the subject; there is an "economic interpretation"; there is also a legal, and a political, and a psychological, and a sociological, and a geographical, and an historical interpretation. Each contributes its share of truth. None, by itself, is sufficient. The purpose of this syllabus is to bring these diverse aspects of the subject together, so far as may be. The task was not easy; the subject is too big for facile mastery. But if the synthesis here attempted proves to be helpful or illuminating, the author will be rewarded for his pains, and perhaps pardoned for venturing into fields not his own.

The second idea was that conflicting viewpoints, together with the relevant facts, should be presented impartially, in such a way as to lead naturally to discussion of problems. The reader or student or teacher is left free to form independent conclusions. This method of procedure has a very great advantage for those who may use the syllabus. For the author it has a disadvantage. It exposes him to those critics who seek to condemn by quoting a phrase here and there, wrested from its context. Perhaps this is the place to declare that the opinions set forth in different parts of the syllabus run the whole gamut from jingoism to pacificism; many are not the author's opinions, but they are included merely because intelligent students should, and intelligent citizens must, grapple with them. It is difficult to conceive how a fair study of the subject as here outlined could fail to develop an enlightened spirit of patriotism along with an intelligent appreciation of foreign affairs.

The syllabus is designed primarily for a one-year course affording a comprehensive survey of the history as well as the economic, geographic,

sociological and other aspects of international relations. As a suggestion which may perhaps be of service to teachers giving such a course for the first time, *Schedule A* (below) shows how the outline may be covered in 85 classroom hours. For each meeting of the class the required reading to be assigned to students is indicated. In consideration of the needs of colleges possessing but modest libraries, the required reading is confined to a few easily available books. Where larger libraries are at hand, the topical references in the syllabus itself offer a richer choice of materials, including some of the more authoritative specialized literature, as well as convenient textbooks.

On the other hand, it is possible to cover the entire subject, less intensively, in shorter general courses. *Schedule B* suggests a basis for a course of two hours a week for two semesters, that is, approximately fifty hours in all. *Schedule C,* for a course of twenty-five hours, represents a maximum of compression. Lecturers or discussion groups having still less time at their disposal will probably achieve more fruitful results if, instead of attempting further condensation, they select a single part of the outline for study.

It is hoped that the outline will be found sufficiently suggestive, and the topical references adequately elastic, to serve the needs of those who prefer to devote an entire course to the intensive study of a single phase, rather than to a general survey of international relations. For example, Part Three on Imperialism and World Politics or Part Five on the History of International Relations would in itself provide material for a separate course, and Parts Two, Six, Eight, Nine and Ten might likewise be suitable for courses. In fact, the author has so used Parts Three, Five and Six.

If, despite the modest intentions with which it has been prepared, this syllabus should be employed in graduate study, the more detailed works and source materials cited in the references will presumably be substituted for textbook treatments. Since in a comprehensive outline it is obviously impossible to give exhaustive bibliographies, the author frankly admits that for the use of graduate students many deficiencies in the citation of source material will have to be remedied by the instructor.

In selecting maps for use in connection with the syllabus, teachers will find useful the small but excellent pamphlet entitled *A Selection of Material on the New Geography,* by Lt. Col. Lawrence Martin, distributed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, as No. 1 of its "Bibliography Series."

The author is deeply indebted to the group of friendly critics, namely Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society, and his colleagues, Professors Joseph P. Chamberlain, Edward M. Earle, James M. Gambrill, Carlton J. H. Hayes, and Lindsay Rogers, who at Dr. Duggan's invitation met together once a week during the better part of a year, to offer their amiable but searching criticism of the manuscript; to them the author owes the correction of many a sin of omission or of commission. The author acknowledges also

a large debt of gratitude to Miss Mary Evelyn Townsend, of Teachers College, who unsparingly gave time and skill to aid in the preparation of the bibliographical references for Parts One to Five and Nine. Professors Hayes, Rogers, Chamberlain, Earle, and Duggan, Dr. Bowman, and also Professors William R. Shepherd, Sidney B. Fay, and Harry Elmer Barnes, have most helpfully read various portions of the proofs, and detected numerous errors and oversights that had escaped the author's eye.

PARKER THOMAS MOON.

New York,
January, 1925.

SCHEDULES

SCHEDULE A (85 HOURS)

1. Part One. I. **Poole,** chs. 1-2.
2. Ill. **Hughan,** chs. 13, 15.
3. III. Lecture.
4. Part Two. I, II-A. **Gooch,** *Nationalism,* to be finished by assignment 14.
5. II-B. **Toynbee,** ch. 4.
6. II-C. **Hughan,** ch. 14.
7. II-D. Article in *Pol. Sci. Quart.* as cited.
8. II-E. **Zangwill,** ch. 11.
9. II-F. **Zimmern,** chs. 1-4.
10. G-K. **Novicow** entire.
11. III. **Hayes and Moon,** ch. 30.
12. IV. Special topics to be assigned to individual students.
13. V. **Temperley,** V, ch. 2.
14. VI. Discussion. Complete **Gooch,** *Nationalism.*
15. Part Three. I-II. **Hayes,** 547-51, and **Viallate,** 1-18.
16. III-IV. **Viallate,** 19-54, and **Lippmann,** ch. 11.
17. V. **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* ch. 2, or *Empire and Commerce,* ch. 3.
18. VI. **Lucas,** 134-49, 176-207.
19. VII. **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* 138-227.
20. VIII. *ibid.,* 67-137, 325-30.
21. IX. **Earle,** chs. 4-6.
22. X. **Bowman,** 450-89.
23. XI. **Bowman,** 43-54, and **Viallate,** 72-91.
24. XII. **Hayes,** 560-86, and **Bowman,** 490-519.
25. XIII. **Bowman,** 520-31.
26. XIV. **Viallate,** 55-72, and one of other references cited.
27. XV. **Bowman,** chs. 32-3.
28 XVI, XVII. **Viallate,** 92-123.
29. XVIII, XIX. **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* 315-37.
30. XX. *Current History* article as cited.
31. XXI-XXII. **Viallate,** 163-9.
32. Part Four. I-II
33. III-IV.
34. V-VI.

} **Page, Enock, Morel,** or **World Peace Foundation** pamphlets entitled *"The Staggering Burden."*

35. Part Five. I. Lecture.
36. II. **Gooch,** *History of Modern Europe,* 32-72.

37. IV. **Gooch,** 156-187.
38. V-VII. **Gooch,** 188-231.
39. IX-X. **Gooch,** 337-47.
40. XI. **Gooch,** 374-97.
41. XII. **Gooch,** 348-68.
42. XIII-XV. **Gooch,** 392-426.
43. XVI. **Gooch,** 458-85.
44. XVII-XVIII. **Gooch,** 485-9, 500-510.
45. XIX. **Gooch,** 510-31.
46. XX. **Gooch,** 532-59.
47. III, VIII, XXI, **Fish** as cited or lecture.
48. Part Six. I-II. **Hayes,** *Great War,* or *Modern Europe,* 727-44, or **Gooch,** 560-619.
49. III-IV. **Hayes,** *Great War,* or *Modern Europe,* 744-55, or **Gooch,** 619-58.
50. V-VI. Lecture or individual assignments.
51. 52. } VII. **Gooch,** ch. 19, or **Hayes,** ch. 33.
53. 54. } VIII. **Hayes** as cited or *These Eventful Years,* I, 115-46.
55. Part Seven. I. **Bowman,** ch. 2.
56. II. **Bowman,** ch. 3.
57. III. **Bowman,** ch. 5.
58. VI. **Bowman,** ch. 10.
59. VII. References as cited.
60. Part Eight, I. Review **Viallate,** chs. 1, 4, and **Fisk and Peirce,** 115-57.
61. II. **Fisk and Peirce,** chs. 5, 7.
62. II. **Fisk and Peirce,** ch. 12.
63. II. *These Eventful Years,* ch. 82.
64. III-A. **Culbertson,** 1-10.
65. III-B-1. **Culbertson,** 162-73.
66. III-B-2, 3. **Tower** article and **Leith** article as cited.
67. III-B-C. Special assignments for individual reports.
68. III-D-G. **Culbertson,** 75-98.
69. IV. **Culbertson,** 113-24.
70. V. **Viallate,** 55-63, **Culbertson,** 99-112.
71. VI. *These Eventful Years,* chs. 19-20.
72. VI. Individual assignments and discussion.
73. VII. **Fisk and Peirce,** ch. 18.
74. VIII. Review and discussion.
75. Part Nine, I. **Poole,** 1-40.
76. II, III. **Poole** as cited.
77. IV-V. **Poole** as cited or **McBain and Rogers, ch. 7.**
78. VI-VIII. **Poole** as cited.
79. IX. Review and discussion.
80. Part Ten, I-IV. **Duggan,** 18-49, or **Hughan,** chs. 2, 7.

81. } V. **World Peace Foundation** pamphlets as cited or **Hughan,** chs.
82. } 8-11.
83. VI-VII. **Hughan,** chs. 3, 4, 12.
84. VIII-X. **Poole** or **Hughan** as cited.
85. XI. Review and discussion.

SCHEDULE B (50 HOURS)

1. Part One. **Hughan,** ch. 13.
2. Part Two, I, II-A, B. **Hughan,** chs. 15-16.
3. C, D. **Hughan,** ch. 14, and article in *Pol. Sci. Quart.*
4. E-L. **Gooch,** *Nationalism.*
5. III. **Hayes and Moon,** ch. 20, or **Duggan** as cited.
6. IV. Topics to be assigned separately to individual students.
7. V-VII. **Temperley,** V, ch. 2, and **Lippmann,** ch. 5.
8. Part Three, I-III. **Viallate,** 1-54.
9. IV. **Lippmann,** ch. 11.
10. V-VIII. **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* ch. 2.
11. IX-X. **Bowman** as cited.
12. XI-XIII. **Bowman** as cited.
13. XIV. **Viallate,** 63-72, and **Beard,** ch. 8.
14. XV. **Bowman,** chs. 32-3.
15. XVI-XVII. **Lippmann and Bowman** as cited.
16. XVIII. **Woolf,** 315-51.
17. XIX-XXII. *Current History* article.
18. } Part Four. **Page,** or **Enock,** or **Morel,** entire, or **World Peace**
19. } **Foundation** pamphlets.
20. Part Five. I. **Hayes,** ch. 30.
21. II. **Gooch,** 32-72.
22. IV. **Gooch,** 156-87.
23. IX, X, XIV. **Gooch,** 337-47, 389-97.
24. XV-XVIII. Lecture and special individual assignments.
25. XIX. **Gooch,** 510-31.
26. XX. **Gooch,** 532-59.
27. XXI. **Fish** as cited, or lecture.

28 to 34. Part Six. Same as for Schedule A, assignments 55-59.

35. Part Seven, I. **Bowman,** ch. 2.
36. II. **Bowman,** ch. 3.
37. VII. References as cited.
38. Part Eight, I. **Viallate,** chs. 1, 4 (review), and **Fisk and Peirce,** 15-35.
39. II. **Fisk and Peirce,** 36-57.
40. III. **Culbertson,** 1-10, 162-73.
41. IV. **Culbertson,** 113-24.
42. V-VI. **Viallate,** 55-63, and *These Eventful Years,* chs. 19-20.
43. Part Nine, I-III. **Poole,** 93-107, 30-4, 170-4, 184-9.
44. IV-IX. **Poole** or **McBain and Rogers,** as cited in IV.

45–50. Part Ten. Same as for Schedule A, assignments 80-85.

SCHEDULE C (25 HOURS)

1. Part One. **Hughan**, ch. 13.
2–3. Part Two. **Gooch**, *Nationalism*, and **Lippmann**, ch. 5.
4–6. Part Three. **Woolf**, *Economic Imperialism*, and **Hayes** as cited.
7. Part Four. **Page** or **World Peace Foundation** pamphlets.
8. Part Five. **Hayes**, ch. 30, and general discussion or lecture.
9. Part Six, I-VI. **Hayes**, ch. 31.
10. VII. **Hayes**, ch. 33.
11. VIII. *These Eventful Years*, I, 115-46.
12. Part Seven, I-VI. Lecture.
13. VII. **Bowman** as cited.
14–18. Part Eight as in Schedule B, assignments 38-42.
19–20. Part Nine as in Schedule B, assignments 43-4.
21–25. Part Ten, as in Schedule A, assignments 80-84.

HOW TO USE REFERENCES

Bibliographical references are given at the beginning of the section to which they apply. Easily available brief treatments which may well be assigned to students for required reading are indicated by an asterisk (*). Books suitable for the student's additional reading are marked by a cross (‡). Other references are chiefly to more difficult or specialized works and are included for the use of teachers or students who desire more thorough knowledge of the subject. In the General Bibliography at the end of the volume will be found the title, date and place of publication, and publisher of each book cited in the syllabus.

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SYLLABUS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYLLABUS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTE: This section is intended to provoke thought, to raise questions but not to answer them, and incidentally to acquaint the student with terms to be used later and with the scope of the inquiry. Technical details may be used as illustrations, but it is not intended that either the subject or the student should be exhausted, at this point.

PROBLEMS TO BEAR IN MIND:

(1) Is the existing system of international relations based on logic, or on history, or on geographic, racial, and economic realities?

(2) Do the facts coincide accurately with popular notions of "independence," "sovereignty," "national honor," "national prosperity," "equality of nations," etc.

(3) Are the elements of international relations simple enough to be grasped easily by the "average man" without special study?

A. PRELIMINARY QUESTION: WHAT ARE "NATIONS"?

References:—* **Hicks,** *The New World Order,* 3-16. * **Hall,** *Outline of International Law,* 6-15. ‡ **Oppenheim,** *International Law,* Part I, ch. i. **Lawrence,** *International Law,* 47-94. ‡ **Hershey,** "Recognition of de facto governments," in *Amer. Jour. International Law,* XIV, 499 ff. ‡ **Temperley,** *History of the Peace Conference,* V. 157-162. **S. H. Allen,** *International Relations.* **Burns,** *International Politics.* **Willoughby,** *The Nature of the State,* ch. ix. **Merriam,** *History of the Theory of Sovereignty.* **Laski,** *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty.* **Willoughby and Fenwick,** *Types of Restricted Sovereignty.* **Le Fur,** *Races, nationalités, états. Statesman's Year Book* for status of individual countries. Further bibliography in **Hershey, Hicks,** etc., and Part 2, below.

1. In theory:—International relations are relations among "nations," also called powers or sovereign states. A nation, power or sovereign state is defined (popularly) as a government possessing supreme political power over a definite amount of territory; or a people having such a government. All full-fledged nations or sovereign states are (popularly) supposed to possess sovereignty or complete independence, *i.e.,* the right to govern themselves and conduct their own foreign relations without interference by any superior authority.

2. In fact:—A list of sovereign states or nations is given, not to be memorized, but to show the approximate number, and to demonstrate the difficulty of applying the above-mentioned standards to the concrete facts.

(*a*) Sovereign states in Europe (29):—Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia (officially styled The Serb, Croat, and Slovene State).

(*b*) Sovereign States in America (21):—Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (not fully independent but generally regarded as sovereign), Dominican Republic (subject to control by U. S. in certain matters, but generally regarded as sovereign), Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti (like Dominican Republic), Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua (somewhat like Dominican Republic), Panama (controlled by U. S. to some extent but regarded as sovereign), Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

(*c*) Sovereign states in Asia (9):—Afghanistan, China, Hejaz, Japan, Nepal (controlled by Great Britain to some extent), Oman, Persia, Siam, Turkey.

(*d*) Sovereign states in Africa (2):—Abyssinia, Liberia.

(*e*) Other states, of subordinate or doubtful rank:

Andorra (self-governing republic under joint suzerainty of the head of the French state and of the Bishop of Urgel).

Free City of Danzig (under protection of League of Nations; foreign relations controlled by Poland).

Holy See (the Pope has power over the Vatican and Lateran buildings and gardens and villa of Castel Gandolfo, and enjoys the right to send and receive ambassadors, make treaties, etc., yet is often not included among sovereign powers).

Iceland ("independent" kingdom, with same king as Denmark; foreign relations controlled by Denmark).

Irish Free State (self-governing Dominion, yet not entirely independent of British Empire).

Saar Basin (neutral state under international governing commission appointed by League of Nations).

San Marino (republic under Italian protection).

Canada (self-governing Dominion with separate membership in the League, yet not entirely independent of British Empire).

Australia (same).

New Zealand (same).

Union of South Africa (same).

Egypt (kingdom, granted "independence" by Great Britain in 1922, subject to reservations regarding Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, protection of foreign rights, defense of Suez Canal).

Bhutan (foreign affairs controlled by Great Britain).

Mesopotamia or Iraq ("independent" kingdom under British mandate).

Kerak or Trans-Jordania (ruled by an Arab Amir but under British supervision).

Asir, Yemen, Nejd and Hasa, Jebel Shammar, Koweit, etc. (supposedly independent states or emirates in Arabia, more or less under British influence or control).

Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Tatar Republic, Khiva, and Bokhara (more or less self-governing republics, included in "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" with Soviet Russia).

B. Equality (Theoretical) and Inequality (Actual) of Nations

References:—* **Hicks,** 8-12. * **Lawrence,** *International Law,* Part II, ch. iv. Also references under A.

1. Theoretical equality:—All sovereign states are supposed to be equal in rights and dignity. "The fundamental postulate of international law is the equality of states"—Secretary Hughes, in *Proceedings of Amer. Acad. Pol. Sci.,* XI, 454.
2. Actual inequalities:—
   (*a*) Inequalities in size, population, wealth, and military and naval strength, and political, social and economic organization.
   (*b*) Distinction between Great Powers and others: the Great Powers before the War of 1914 were Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, United States, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary has been destroyed, and the rank of Germany and of Russia is somewhat doubtful.
   (*c*) Lack of complete independence by some nations which are nevertheless usually regarded as sovereign—*e.g.,* Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, subject to the U. S. A. in certain matters.
   (*d*) Exercise of formal, recognized control by Great Powers over weak countries having their own native governments: *e.g.,* Zanzibar, Uganda, Malay States, about 700 "native states" in India, all under British control; Tunis and Morocco, under French control. Such states are called protectorates.

C. Nature of Relations Among Nations (detailed treatment in parts 9, 10).

References:—* **Poole,** *Conduct of Foreign Relations,* chs. i-ii. * **Walsh,** *History and Nature of International Relations,* chs. by Duggan, Scott, and Moore. **Potter,** *Introduction to the Study of International Organization,* Part II. **Hicks,** chs. i, xv. **Satow,** *Guide to Diplomatic Practice.* Additional bibliography in parts 9, 10, below.

1. Diplomacy—official dealings between diplomatists acting in behalf of their respective governments (detailed treatment in Part 9).
   (*a*) Formalism of public diplomacy, illustrated by:
      (i) elaborate hierarchical gradation of diplomatic officials and representatives—foreign ministers, ambassadors, papal legates or nuncios, envoys, ministers plenipotentiary, peace commissioners, chargés d'affaires, secretaries of legation, attachés, consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, political agents, etc. Each grade distinguished from others by differences of dignity, function, and authority.

(ii) elaborate system of diplomatic etiquette.

(iii) elaborate technical terminology, for example—treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, *démarche*, ultimatum, note, *note verbale*, representations, *pourparlers, entente, détente*, alliance, *rapprochement*, recognition *de facto* and *de jure*, ratification, *casus belli, casus foederis, status quo*, etc.

(*b*) Secret diplomacy, ranging from informal secret "conversations" to formal secret treaties of alliance.

(*c*) Wide scope of subjects dealt with by diplomacy, for example—concessions to build railways or prospect for oil, compensation for injuries suffered by individuals, location of boundaries, regulation of opium traffic, postal agreements, extradition of criminals, etc.

2. International conflicts.

(*a*) Habitual use of threats to support diplomatic policies, for example—naval demonstrations, mobilization, ultimatums.

(*b*) Severance of diplomatic relations as a relatively grave manifestation of displeasure, often a prelude to war.

(*c*) Armed intervention, reprisals, boycotts, etc., without declaration of war.

(*d*) War as the ultima ratio.

3. International administrative cooperation (treated in detail in Part 10).

(*a*) Exemplified in numerous existing public international unions, commissions, and bureaus, and in private international associations.

(*b*) Largely lacking in contentious matters about which international economic conflicts arise, for instance—oil concessions.

4. Unofficial international relations—private trade, travel, etc.

II. FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES UNDERLYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Geographic Realities.

References:—‡ **Brunhes,** *Human Geography.* **Brunhes and Vallaux,** *La Géographie de l'histoire.* ‡ **George,** *Relations of Geography and History.* **Holdich,** *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making.* **Fleure,** *Human Geography in Western Europe.* **Favignière,** *Geography and World Power.* **Semple,** *Influences of Geographic Environment.* **Lieut.-Col. L. Martin,** *The New Geography* (convenient selected bibliography of maps and books).

1. Geographic divisions and political boundaries: are states natural geographic units?

Note: At this point it is necessary only to raise this question, not to settle it. To be more concrete, one may ask: Is Great Britain a geographic unit? Is Canada more closely connected with Great Britain than with the U. S.? Is the Rhine a natural frontier for France? Is there a geographic reason why Maine and California should belong to the same nation? (See also Part Two, II, B.)

2. Land and people.

Note: This section may be developed *ad lib.*, but is intended only as a preliminary discussion to stimulate interest and provoke thought.

(*a*) Limitation in amount of habitable land.
(*b*) Uneven distribution of population—compare density of population in Great Britain, Canada, United States, Belgium, Japan.
(*c*) "Land Hunger," one of the primitive causes of war, for example —wars between savage tribes for the possession of hunting grounds.
(*d*) Problem: are emigration, trade, industry, and economic imperialism modern substitutes for primitive land hunger?

3. Diversity of geographic environment, a cause of social and economic differences among nations, for example—compare Arabia and Belgium, Central Africa and Germany, Russia and England.
4. Artificial modification of effects of geographic environment, for example—influence of railways in promoting unification of United States; influence of steam navigation in lessening effect of distance and promoting desire for colonies, spreading European civilization, facilitating exchange of surplus products; deforestation and irrigation; etc.

B. Economic Realities (detailed treatment in Part 8, below).

References:—* **Hughan,** *International Government,* ch. xiii. * **Culbertson,** *Raw Materials,* ch. i. ‡ **Dickinson,** *Causes of International War.* ‡ **Duggan,** *League of Nations,* article by Glenn Frank. **Brailsford,** *War of Steel and Gold.* **Howe,** *Why War?* **Smith,** *Industrial and Commercial Geography.* **Chisholm,** *Handbook of Commercial Geography.* **U. S. Geological Survey,** *World Atlas of Commercial Geography.* **Finch and Baker,** *Geography of the World's Agriculture.* **Bowman,** *The New World,* 9, 10, maps.

1. Problem: do economic interests coincide with political division of world into independent nations?
   (*a*) "International" trade a matter of exchanges among private persons, not among nations.
   (*b*) Prosperity of persons in one country often dependent on conditions in other countries.
      (i) foreign investments—consult the daily newspaper list of foreign stocks and bonds bought and sold in your own country.
      (ii) foreign trade as the livelihood of persons engaged in exporting, importing, and shipping business, and of retailers, laborers, bankers, etc., dependent on such business.
      (iii) production for foreign markets as a source of profit for farmers, cattle-growers, lumbermen, manufacturers, mine-owners, and of wages for laborers engaged in such production, and of income for storekeepers and professional men dependent on above-mentioned classes.
      (iv) imported raw materials indispensable in some industries, for example—Mexican sisal hemp for binder-twine, Malayan rubber for tires, etc.
      (v) foreign trade a cardinal factor in determining price levels and cost of living, for example—effect of fluctuations of foreign trade on cost of living in America between 1914 and 1923.
   (*c*) National boundaries disregarded by international syndicates and other combinations in some fields of business enterprise.

2. Problem: can nations be economically independent or self-sufficient? (Merely sketched here; developed in Part 8.)
   (*a*) Uneven distribution of important minerals, *e.g.*, coal, iron, oil, ferro-alloys, copper.
   (*b*) Diversity of climate and soil, resulting in diversity of agricultural products, and hence dependence of temperate regions on tropical countries for coffee, cocoa, cotton (to a large extent), rubber, bananas, etc.
   (*c*) Economy of regional specialization and mass production impossible without extensive interchange of products.
   (*d*) Trade as a partial substitute for conquest or migration: "surplus" population of European nations made possible by trade.
3. Importance of worldwide economic intercourse as chief form of actual contact between people of different nations.
4. Nationalist efforts to secure economic advantages by political means, as a chief cause of international rivalry, antagonism, and conflict. (Merely sketched here; developed in Parts 3 and 8.)
   (*a*) Tariffs and "tariff wars."
   (*b*) Maintenance of high wages in countries like the United States and Australia often a popular motive for tariffs or for exclusion of immigrants.
   (*c*) Political attempts to acquire undeveloped countries as colonies, protectorates, or spheres of influence, for economic benefit.
   (*d*) Political support of attempts to obtain economic privileges in foreign countries, for example—railway concessions, oil concessions, mines, loans to backward governments, etc.
   (*e*) Nationalist efforts to secure economic advantages usually beneficial to relatively small number of persons directly, but important to large numbers indirectly.

C. Cultural Realities.

References:—**Burns**, *History of International Intercourse*. **Krehbiel**, *Nationalism, War and Society*, ch. xv, and references there given.

1. Worldwide exchange of scientific knowledge, inventions, literature, art, music, fashions, etc.
2. Travel and foreign study as important modes of unofficial international relations.
3. Religious beliefs and organizations transcending national frontiers, for example—Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism. (See Part 2, II-E.)
4. Tendency of political leaders to emphasize cultural uniformity within a nation and diversity among nations—at variance with above-mentioned facts.

D. Psychological Realities.

References:—* Hughan, *International Government*, ch. xv. Other references given below, Part 2, II-A.

1. Human race equipped with certain fundamental instincts or tendencies to action, such as gregariousness, sex, pugnacity, acquisitiveness, fear.
2. Precise nature and list of instincts not scientifically certain.

3. Instincts important as mainsprings of human action, in international relations as well as in other departments of life.
4. Instincts practically unchangeable.
5. Expression of instincts subject to rational control.
6. The psychological problem of international relations—frank recognition of power of man's irrational instincts, coupled with recognition of need for rational control of their expression.

III. IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Interdependence of People in Different Nations, as Shown Above, Especially in
   1. Economic affairs.
   2. Culture.
B. Economic Cost of War (a few illustrative statistics, Part 4).
C. Human Cost of War (**Dumas and Vedel-Peterson,** *Losses of Life*).
D. Cost of Preparation for War (Part 4).
E. Peril of War as a Penalty for Mistakes of Foreign Policy.
F. Hence, Importance of Intelligent Foreign Policy.

PART TWO

NATIONALISM, TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS, AND WAR

General references:—One or more of the following may be assigned for textbook use: **Hayes and Moon,** *Modern History,* chs. v. xx. **G. P. Gooch,** *Nationalism.* **J. Oakesmith,** *Race and Nationality.* **W. B. Pillsbury,** *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism.* **W. Lippmann,** *The Stakes of Diplomacy,* esp. ch. v. **P. B. Potter,** *International Organization,* ch. iv. **Ramsay Muir,** *Nationality and Internationalism.* **R. Seton-Watson** and others, *The War and Democracy,* ch. i. **A. Zimmern,** *Nationality and Government.* **J. H. Rose,** *Nationality in Modern History.* Other valuable material is found in: **H. E. Barnes,** article on "Nationalism" in *Encyclopedia Americana* (1919 ed.) XIX, 743-65. **S. P. Duggan** (ed.), *The League of Nations,* ch. ix. **J. Bryce,** *Essays and Addresses in Wartime,* ch. viii. **H. G. Wells,** *Outline of History,* 939-63. **E. B. Krehbiel,** *Nationalism, War and Society.* **R. Johannet,** *Le Principe des Nationalités.* **I. Zangwill,** *The Principle of Nationalities.* **A. F. Pollard,** *Factors in Modern History,* 1-25. **A. Toynbee,** *The New Europe,* chs. i-iii, and *Nationality and the War.* **G. E. Partridge,** *The Psychology of Nations,* esp. ch. v. **T. Ruyssen,** *The Principle of Nationality.* **L. Le Fur,** *Races, Nationalités, Etats.* **C. J. H. Hayes,** article on "The War of the Nations" in *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* Dec. 1914. **M. Vaussard,** *Enquête sur le nationalisme.*

I. PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF TERMS

A. Difficulty and Significance of this Analysis.

1. Words such as "patriotism," "nation," "national," and "nationalism" constantly used, but difficult to define.
2. Confusion of words an indication of confusion of thought.
   (*a*) "Nationalism," "patriotism," and "loyalty," often used as synonyms, sometimes as antonyms—examples:
      (i) "Nationalists" in France—extremely patriotic and loyal.
      (ii) "Nationalists" in Philippines not "loyal" to U. S. or "patriotic" toward America.
   (*b*) Multiplicity of meanings assigned to "nationalism" (below).
3. Nationalism, though difficult to analyze, the chief form of modern political loyalty, and probably the most important factor in international relations.

B. Meanings of the Word "Nation."

1. Derivation—from "natio" (Latin), meaning birth, race, people.
2. In diplomacy and international law—an independent country or sovereign state.

3. An aggregation of persons who are, or are supposed to be, members of the same "race," speaking the same language.
4. An aggregation of persons who are sufficiently united among themselves and different from others, in ideals, traditions, institutions, religion, etc., to be regarded as having a right to be an independent political community (compare Krehbiel, p. 1, footnote).

C. Meanings of "Nationalism."

1. Loyalty to the state to which one is subject, and desire for the security, prosperity, and greatness of that country—also called "patriotism."
2. Tendency to insist on uniformity of language, religion, etc.; to take intense pride in the national language, customs, institutions.
3. Desire of subject peoples who speak languages different from those of their rulers to obtain political independence or to unite with an already existing state in which their language prevails.
4. Desire to enlarge the state by including all regions where the "national" language is prevalent, or regions considered to be historically, geographically, ethnically, or economically, part of the "nation."

D. Discussion.

1. Inconsistency of different kinds of nationalism.
2. Desirability of clear analysis.

II. ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM

A. Human Nature and Nationalism—A Psychological Analysis.

References:—* **Partridge,** ch. v. * **Hughan,** chs. xv-xvi. * **Wallas,** *Our Social Heritage,* ch. iv; *Human Nature in Politics,* Part II, ch. iv. * **Zangwill,** ch. vii. ‡ **Pillsbury,** chs. 2, 3, 6, 7. ‡ **Trotter,** *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* **McDougall,** *Social Psychology.* **Davies,** *National Evolution,* ch. i. **Herbert,** *Nationality and Its Problems,* chs. ii-iii. **Le Bon,** *The Psychology of Peoples.* **Le Fur.**

1. Nationalism not a primary instinct.
   (*a*) Human instincts the same among men of all ages, in all stages of progress.
   (*b*) Nationalism (especially second and third meanings) distinctively modern; hence, not an instinct.
2. Nationalism a product of several instincts.
   (*a*) Primarily, gregariousness or the "herd instinct."
   (*b*) Pugnacity, or the fighting instinct.
   (*c*) Egoism or self-preservation, self-aggrandizement, etc.
      (i) Nationalism always most intense in time of danger, when instinctive desire for self-preservation is broadened to include desire for group preservation, even at cost of self-sacrifice.
      (ii) Egoistic desire to be powerful, important, respected, is satisfied to some extent by membership in a powerful nation. Same impulse gratified still more in case of individual leaders or statesmen.
   (*d*) Submission, or tendency to follow leaders.

3. Nationalism not the only form of expression for these instincts—for example, gregariousness is displayed also in college spirit, fraternities, etc.
4. Problems for discussion.
   (*a*) Why are these instincts displayed in this particular way?
   (*b*) Is the emotional excitement aroused by these instincts an obstacle to exercise of reason in foreign affairs?
   (*c*) Can or should the expression of instincts in nationalism be guided by reason?

B. Geography and Nationalism (compare Part I, II-A).

References:—* **Dominian,** *The Nationality Map of Europe.* * **Gilfillan,** article in *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* Sept., 1924. * **Toynbee,** *The New Europe,* ch. iv. **Holdich,** *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making.* **Holdich,** *Boundaries in Europe and the Near East.* Also references in Part I, II-A, above, and in **Dominian.**

1. Importance of geographic factors in nationalism.
   (*a*) Partial geographic isolation important in formation of nations.
      (i) Distance from England as a factor in American independence.
      (ii) Separation from Continent as a factor in British independence.
   (*b*) Geography important in determination of national boundaries.
      (i) Atlantic and Pacific as boundaries of U. S.
      (ii) Pyrenees as a wall between France and Spain.
      (iii) The Danube between Bulgaria and Rumania.
   (*c*) Geographic conditions of national development.
      (i) Virtual impossibility of a populous industrial nation in the Sahara.
      (ii) Natural importance of agriculture in Russia and U. S.
2. Difficulty of explaining nationalism on basis of geography alone.
   (*a*) Earth not divided into geographic units identical with nations.
   (*b*) International boundaries often purely artificial.
      (i) Between Canada and U. S. west of Great Lakes.
      (ii) Between Belgium and France.
      (iii) Between Bolivia and Argentina.
      (iv) Between Spain and Portugal.

C. Race and Nationalism.

References:—* **Finot,** *Race Prejudice,* Part I, ch. i. * **Hughan,** ch. xiv. ‡ **Boas,** *Mind of Primitive Man,* chs. i-iii, v. **Kroeber,** *Anthropology.* **Wissler,** *Man and Culture.* **Goldenweiser,** *Early Civilization.* ‡ **M. Grant,** *Passing of the Great Race,* Part II. **Josey,** *Race and National Solidarity,* ch. ii. **Stoddard,** *Rising Tide of Color.* **Commons,** *Races and Immigrants in America.* **Gobineau,** *Inequality of Human Races.* ‡ **Oakesmith,** *Race and Nationality.* **Woodworth,** "Comparative Psychology of Races," *Psychological Bulletin,* XIII, 388-96. **C. Mitchel,** *Evolution and the War,* ch. iii. **Keith,** *Nationality and Race.* **H. S. Chamberlain,** *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.* **Ripley,** *Races of Europe.* **Dixon,** *Racial History of Man.* **Gehring,** *Racial Contrasts.* **Myres,** *Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political Science.* **Stoddard,** *Racial Realities in Europe.* **Wertheimer,** *The Pan-German League.* **Fischel,** *Der Panslawismus.*

1. Nations as racial units.
   (*a*) Widespread popular belief that a nation is, or should be, a racial unit—*i.e.*, a group descended from common ancestors, and therefore united in kinship, language, and racial characteristics. Examples: popular use of expressions such as "our forefathers," "Irish wit," "Irish blood," "Anglo-Saxon," "French temperament," "English common sense," "German thoroughness," etc.
   (*b*) The foregoing belief as outgrowth of the idea of the tribe, which in early times was often genuinely united by blood relationship. Derivation of word "nation" from word-stem meaning "birth" as an indication of this emphasis on kinship.
   (*c*) Tendency of each nation to consider itself racially superior to others—examples: German belief that French were an inferior race; popular American attitude toward aliens as inferiors.
   (*d*) Belief in "survival of fittest" as applied to nations—hence belief in war as means of eliminating "unfit" or weaker nations—hence emphasis on military strength as sign of "fitness"—such beliefs based on misinterpretation of Darwin's biological hypothesis. (‡ **Novicow,** *War and Its Alleged Benefits,* ch. iv. ‡ **Nasmyth,** *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.* **Jordan,** *War and the Breed.*)
   (*e*) Historical evidence that nations are not pure racial units—examples: history of invasions and racial intermixture in England, Italy, France, Germany, Balkan peoples; immigration and mixture of races in the United States.
   (*f*) Diversity of physical characteristics within a nation as an evidence of mixed ancestry—examples: blonds and brunets, long heads and short heads, tall and short statures, found in France, in Germany, in England, etc.
   (*g*) National characteristics explicable in part by geographic environment (supposed laziness of Africans due in part to climate, thrift of Scots due partly to need of thrift in such a country, enterprise of Americans due partly to opportunity for pioneers in immense undeveloped land).
   (*h*) National characteristics perhaps partly a result and partly a cause of differences in religion, literature, art, social customs, government, and economic conditions—examples: Chinese conservatism due partly to ancestor-worship, German thoroughness due partly to educational system; aggressive self-assertion often a reaction from oppression, analogous to "inferiority-superiority complex" in individuals.
   (*i*) Differences of national characteristics often exaggerated if not mythical—common sense not an exclusive possession of Englishmen, wit lacking in at least a few Irishmen, "Slavic melancholy" not characteristic of all Russians, "love of almighty dollar" not a peculiar American trait, Frenchmen not invariably polite.
   (*j*) Popular belief in national characteristics often based on novels and dramas (the "villain" usually a foreigner), on individual peculiarities of rulers (German ruthlessness), on superficial impressions of travellers (alleged immorality of French people, as shown by gay life in Paris), on superficial judgment of

political institutions (fickleness of French, supposed to be proved by frequency of cabinet changes).

(*k*) Difficulty of discovering any particular set of hereditary characteristics peculiar to one nation and displayed by all members of that nation—for example: try to discover what peculiar characters are shared by all Americans but not by Englishmen, Germans, etc.

2. The linguistic conception of race.

(*a*) Tendency to regard all nations speaking cognate or closely similar languages as closely related in blood, *i.e.*, as racial groups—examples: popular conception that all peoples speaking Slavic languages are Slavs by race; that Germans, English, Americans, Scandinavians, and Dutch are members of Teutonic race; that France, Italy, Rumania, Spain, and Portugal are "Latin" nations, etc.

(*b*) Importance of this tendency in international relations—Pan-Slavism influential in Russia's foreign policy before 1917; Pan-Germanism important in German politics before War; movement to unite or ally the English-speaking or "Anglo-Saxon" peoples; belief of Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain that Germany, England, and America were natural allies.

(*c*) Such beliefs due in part to philological and anthropological doctrines prevalent in 19th century—idea prevalent in 19th century that cognate languages were derived from the same primitive language, and hence afforded clue to ancestry of existing nations.

(*d*) Difficulty of reconciling this view with diversity of physical types among persons speaking same language—examples: English spoken by persons of all colors; Gaelic spoken by tall blonds and short brunets; etc.

(*e*) Error of assuming that language shows ancestry—language of conquerors often adopted by conquered people; language of owners often adopted by slaves.

3. Racial classifications based on physical characteristics.

(*a*) Scientific meaning of "race"—an aggregation of persons having in common certain hereditary characteristics which distinguish them from others and which seem to indicate descent from same ancestors.

(*b*) Present-day scientific classification of races based on physical characteristics such as stature, shape of skull, texture of hair, color of hair, skin, and eyes, etc.

(*c*) Major racial divisions of mankind.

(i) White or Caucasian.

(ii) Yellow or Mongolian.

(iii) Black or Negro.

(iv) Red or American Indian (included in Mongolian by some writers).

(v) Australoid (not recognized as separate race by some writers).

(*d*) Subdivisions of white race in Europe.

(i) Nordic (dolichocephalic blonds of northern Europe).

(ii) Mediterranean (dolichocephalic brunets of Mediterranean region).

(iii) Alpine (brachicephalic, medium blonds, of Central Europe).

(*e*) Lack of identity between such classifications and national and linguistic divisions.

(*f*) Uncertainty of racial classifications—differences of opinion even as to major divisions; doubt as to whether Nordic and Mediterranean are really separate races.

(*g*) Lack of adequate data for generalizations concerning mental differences among races—average intelligence of whites greater than that of negroes by American army intelligence tests, but some negroes superior to average of whites; such tests still in experimental stage; difficulty of making scientific test; difficulty of testing intelligence in such a way as to be fair to persons who lack education and familiarity with language.

(*h*) Fallacy of judging hereditary mental and moral characteristics of a race by its present political weakness and cultural backwardness—examples: European "Nordics," now so highly esteemed, were barbarians 2,000 years ago, when Chinese were highly civilized; negroes in United States more civilized than their kinsmen in Africa; Germans regarded as idealistic and unpractical in 18th century, but materialistic and practical in 20th.

D. Language and Nationalism.

References:—* **Dominian,** *The Nationality Map of Europe* (supplement: language map of Europe). ‡ **Gilfillan,** article in *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* Sept. 1924. ‡ **Buck,** "Language and the Sentiment of Nationality," in *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.,* Feb. 1916. ‡ **Toynbee,** *The New Europe,* ch. v. **Grant,** Pt. I, chs. v-vi. **Fleure,** *The Peoples of Europe.* **Muller,** *Les Langues dans l'Europe Nouvelle.* **Blagoyevitch,** Pt. I, ch. ii, sect. ii. **Guérard,** *Short History of the International Language Movement.* **Dominian,** *Frontiers of Language and Nationality.* Also general references above.

1. Language as a basis of national claims.

(*a*) Possession of a "national" language the chief and most frequent argument of subject nationalities claiming right to political independence—examples: Poles, Czechoslovaks, Armenians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Esths, Letts, Finns, Germans (in 19th century) and Italians (in 19th century).

(*b*) Language as chief basis of irredentism—Italian claims to certain Austrian territories ("Italia Irredenta," before the Great War); Greek demand for union of all Greek-speaking populations with Greece; German desire for inclusion of Austria in Germany. (Detailed treatment below, section IV.)

(*c*) Language used by Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as chief basis for redrawing map of Europe; maps showing language of inhabitants of various districts used as means of indicating extent of just nationalistic claims.

(*d*) Difficulties—lack of clear-cut linguistic boundaries; conflicts between linguistic boundaries and "natural" or geographic boundaries, economic interests, strategic interests, historical claims, etc. (Concrete instances in section IV, below.)

(*e*) Inconsistency of claims based on language—logically, Italian

claims if based on language should include Corsica and part of Switzerland; France should annex southern Belgium and western Switzerland; for further instances consult map in **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, p. 331, or **Dominian,** *op. cit.*

2. Patriotism and language uniformity.
   (*a*) Strong tendency to regard language uniformity as necessary to national unity.
      (i) Russian attempts to force Russian language on Poles, Ukrainians, etc., before 1917.
      (ii) German attempts to restrict use of Polish language in Prussian Poland, before War.
      (iii) Attempts of Irish patriots to revive Gaelic.
      (iv) Belief of many that "Americanization" means learning English.
   (*b*) Importance of language uniformity.
      (i) In promoting national solidarity.
      (ii) Danger of lack of uniformity—minorities often disloyal. Example: Czechoslovaks disloyal to Austria in 1918.
      (iii) Tendency of language minorities to demand autonomy or independence. Examples: Catalonians in Spain; Flemings in Belgium.
   (*c*) Exceptions to the rule of language uniformity very numerous.
      (i) Switzerland.
      (ii) Belgium.
      (iii) Breton language in French Brittany.
      (iv) Welsh and Gaelic in Great Britain.
      (v) Small minorities in almost every nation.
   (*d*) Unfortunate effects of governmental measures to compel language uniformity: tendency of minority to become defiant.
      (i) Alsace-Lorraine.
      (ii) Poland.
      (iii) French Canada.
3. National languages and international intercourse.
   (*a*) Diversity of languages as an obstacle to mutual understanding, to commerce, to exchange of scientific works, literature, etc., among nations.
   (*b*) Considerable amount of time devoted to acquisition of even the principal national languages as a heavy demand on limited time available in colleges.
   (*c*) Tendency on the part of small nations to insist on use of their own languages, thus increasing above-mentioned difficulties.
   (*d*) Disadvantages of this policy for small nations—necessity of learning a more widely used language for business, scientific and cultural purposes; difficulty of publishing books in a language read by few people; advantage of having wider market for books, newspapers, etc.
   (*e*) Advantage of linguistic diversity—tendency toward development of different types of literature in different countries; hence, rich diversity of culture among nations.
   (*f*) Relatively small progress made by movements for an international language—the Esperanto movement. (**Guérard,** *Short History of the International Language Movement.*)

4. Historical significance of language factor in nationalism.
   (*a*) Most modern European national languages derived from "vernaculars," or popular spoken tongues, which may be traced back into middle ages.
   (*b*) Such vernaculars not fixed or rigid, during middle ages and early modern period, but ever changing—examples: compare Old French and Modern French, compare early Anglo-Saxon, Chaucer, and Shakespeare.
   (*c*) Several vernaculars often found side by side, during middle ages, in countries now regarded as nations—Anglo-Saxon, Norman French, and Old English, in England; Langue d'oc and Langue d'oïl and Breton, in France; Castilian, Catalan, and other dialects in Spain; Low German, High German, Middle German, in Germany; etc.
   (*d*) Substitution of vernaculars for Latin as written languages, in early modern times (especially 1300-1700 A.D.)
   (*e*) Influence of printing press (invented about 1450 A.D.)—in cheapening books, hence enlarging reading public, hence increasing reason for use of vernaculars, hence standardizing vernaculars.
   (*f*) Influence of great works of literature, printed in vernacular languages, in standardizing languages—Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Rabelais, Calvin, Montaigne, Chaucer, Spenser, King James Bible, Luther, Cervantes, etc.
   (*g*) Establishment of strong kingdoms in England, France, and Spain, in early modern times, as a step toward principle that each State should be a people with a national language of its own.
   (*h*) Attempts of eighteenth-century monarchs of above-mentioned countries to conquer peoples of different language, as a proof that principle was not yet clearly recognized.
   (*i*) Emphasis on principle of language-nationalism by Italian and German patriots in 19th century, who desired to create strong German and Italian nations comparable to England, France, etc.
   (*j*) Increasing popularity of belief that each language group should be an independent nation, in 19th and 20th centuries, especially among "would-be" nations.
   (*k*) Foregoing incomplete historical sketch as a partial explanation of present belief in language as basis of nationalism, and of lack of logical consistency in application of principle.
5. Sociological explanation of language-nationalism.
   (*a*) Uniformity of language as a factor tending to promote "like-mindedness" (similarity of ideas, traditions, etc.).
   (*b*) Tendency of "like-minded" persons to feel sense of common interest, or group consciousness.
   (*c*) Tendency to regard persons speaking a foreign language as "unlike" or different, and hence to feel that they should not belong to the group.
   (*d*) Operation of instinct of gregariousness guided by above-mentioned "like-mindedness," as well as by simple fact that speaking same language is strong bond.
6. Language and race (see above, C, 2).
7. Problems.

(*a*) Is the principle of political independence for every language-group justifiable and expedient?
(*b*) Is language uniformity within a nation necessary? Desirable?
(*c*) If desirable, how best may it be obtained?

E. Religion and Nationalism.

References:—The special topics suggested in the following section of the syllabus may be looked up in **Hayes,** *Modern Europe, Encyclopædia Britannica, Catholic Encyclopedia,* or other general works, using index. In addition, the following are of interest: ‡ **Matthews,** *Patriotism and Religion,* lecture 2. ‡ **Zangwill,** ch. xi. **Blagoyevitch,** Pt. I, ch. ii, sect. iii. **Jastrow,** *Zionism.* **Stoddard,** *The New World of Islam.* **Kallen,** *Zionism and World Politics.* **Mecklin,** *The Ku Klux Klan.*

1. Historical importance of religion as a factor in development of nationalism.
   (*a*) Organization of Protestant Churches in 16th and 17th centuries on national basis.
      (i) Anglican Church—the Church of England.
      (ii) Presbyterian Church—the Church of Scotland.
      (iii) Dutch Reformed Church—Netherlands.
      (iv) Lutheranism strongly German at outset (but unable to win allegiance of all German states).
      (v) Lutheran State Church in Denmark, established by Danish King.
      (vi) Lutheran State Church in Sweden, established by Swedish King.
   (*b*) Increased religious nationalism in Catholic countries during same period.
      (i) Papal concordats with rulers of Spain, France, etc., granting monarchs greater control over ecclesiastical appointments and religious affairs.
      (ii) Strong tendency, continuing down into 19th century toward religious nationalism, especially in France.
   (*c*) Intensification of national sentiment by religious antagonism in dynastic wars of early modern times.
      (i) Feeling of Englishmen that Protestantism was at stake in wars between English and Spanish monarchs.
      (ii) Feeling of Spaniards that in wars of Philip II Spain was acting as champion of Catholic religion.
      (iii) Denmark and Sweden as champions of Protestantism in Thirty Years' War.
   (*d*) Tendency to regard opposition to the national church as treason to national government, in early modern times.
      (i) Persecution of Catholics and of non-Anglican Protestants by Queen Elizabeth.
      (ii) Expulsion of Moors and Jews from Spain.
      (iii) Similar tendencies in many other countries.
   (*e*) Establishment of independence of Russian Church in 16th century.
      (i) Russian Church previously part of Eastern or Orthodox Church, under patriarch of Constantinople.
      (ii) Patriarch of Moscow independent head of Russian

Church, after 16th century.

(iii) Russian national Church as powerful factor in welding Russia into a patriotic nation.

2. More recent instances of religious factor in nationalism.
   (*a*) The Ku Klux Klan and the belief that Catholics and Jews are not genuine Americans.
   (*b*) In Poland.
      (i) Anti-semitism.
      (ii) Polish claim to Lithuanian and White Russian territory at time of Peace Conference of 1919, based partly on contention that said territories were Roman Catholic, hence pro-Polish.
      (iii) Plebiscite held in Mazuria (southern part of East Prussia) in 1920—Polish-speaking Lutherans voted for Germany.
   (*c*) In Ireland.
      (i) Catholic opposition to English Protestantism one factor in preservation of Irish national spirit.
      (ii) Majority of Irish Protestants opposed to Irish Nationalism; majority of Irish Catholics in favor of it.
   (*d*) In Balkans.
      (i) Quasi-independent (technically, autocephalous) national Church in each Balkan nation.
      (ii) Membership in Greek Orthodox Church formerly regarded as indication of Greek nationality.
      (iii) In claims to disputed territory (notably Macedonia) religion often regarded as chief test of nationality.
   (*e*) Turkey.
      (i) Until recently, persons converted to Mohammedanism were accepted as Turks by Turks; religion the test of nationality.
      (ii) Recent tendency to make Turkish language, rather than religion, the test.
   (*f*) Armenians—Armenian national Church.
   (*g*) Russia—attempts of government (before 1914) to "Russify" minorities by compelling them to become Russian Orthodox Christians.
   (*h*) Japan—Shintoism as a national religion.
   (*i*) Jews and Zionism.
   (*j*) Moslems and Pan-Islamism—"The Holy War" and its nationalistic purposes.
3. Evidence to the contrary.
   (*a*) Lack of religious uniformity in the United States—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews alike patriotic.
   (*b*) Germany—German nationalism shared by Protestants and Catholics.
   (*c*) France—Protestant minority very patriotic; likewise Jews.
   (*d*) Switzerland—Catholic minority patriotic.
   (*e*) Ireland—some Protestants united with Catholics in demand for Home Rule (before 1916), and in Sinn Fein movement subsequently.
   (*f*) India—Hindus and Moslems alike in Nationalist movement.
4. Problem—is religious uniformity essential to nationalism?

F. Nationalism and Community of Ideals, Customs, Traditions, etc.

References:—General references above. Also: ‡ **Zimmern,** chs. i-iv. ‡ **Dixon,** *Americanization.* ‡ **Ohlinger,** *Their True Faith and Allegiance.* **Curtius,** *Maurice Barrès und die geistigen Grundlagen des französischen Nationalismus.* **Mitchel,** *Evolution and the War,* chs. iv-v. **Blagoyévitch,** Part I, ch. ii, sect. vii. **Hill,** *Americanism, What Is It?* **A. van Gennep,** *Traité comparatif des nationalités.*

1. Social customs and nationalism.
   (*a*) Particular social customs, such as celebration of certain festivals, often regarded as indication of nationality in Balkans.
   (*b*) Revival of folksongs, folk-dances, and old social customs a marked feature of nationalist agitation among peoples aspiring to become independent—example: revival of old Irish festivals, costumes, games, etc., by Sinn Feiners.
   (*c*) Peculiar national folk customs and costumes characteristic of smaller European nations; not of Great Powers.
2. National institutions.
   (*a*) Tendency in some nations to regard respect for certain political or social or economic institutions as essential to national patriotism.
      (i) Efforts of Indian Nationalists, 1920-1923, to revive use of spinning wheel as a national institution of India.
      (ii) Agitation against national army by French Syndicalists before Great War considered unpatriotic.
      (iii) Criticism of the Constitution considered unpatriotic by many Americans.
   (*b*) Difficulty of ascertaining which institutions are essential to national patriotism.
      (i) French monarchists, opposed to the existing Republican Constitution, nevertheless ardent patriots.
      (ii) Opposition to American Constitution, at the period of its adoption, by persons of undoubted patriotism; and amendment of the Constitution, subsequently, by patriotic statesmen and popular majorities.
      (iii) Lack of agreement among nations, and among citizens of same nation, as to what are essentials.
   (c) Problem: is patriotism concerned with particular institutions?
3. National ideals.
   (*a*) Widespread belief that nations possess different ideals—example: democracy and liberty the ideals of America.
   (*b*) Tendency to prohibit or punish persons who oppose or conduct propaganda against national ideals—example: the Lusk laws in New York State.
   (*c*) Popular belief that national ideals are more important than language or race as basis of patriotism.
   (*d*) Difficulty of ascertaining national ideals—examples:
      (i) "Democracy" possible of many interpretations; not officially defined as an ideal; questioned by a few advocates of intelligence tests; opposed by anarchists and some others; not unanimously regarded as national ideal in America.
   (*e*) Difficulty of selecting any national ideal that will be unique for one nation—if democracy is national ideal, should one be loyal

to the most democratic nation, even though it be a foreign nation; or to all democratic nations?

(*f*) Additional exercise for students: prepare a list of the Great Powers, indicating if possible the national ideals of each.

4. Another way of viewing the problem.
   (*a*) Institutions and ideals considered not as badges of any particular nation, but as means by which nations may achieve greater happiness, prosperity, and justice.
   (*b*) Institutions, ideals, and customs not less valuable considered as means of obtaining happiness.
   (*c*) Hence, duty of patriots to preserve beneficial institutions and ideals, and if possible improve them.
   (*d*) Insistence upon rigid adherence to specific institutions or principles as a barrier to self-improvement—example: advocacy of spinning wheel and hand-weaving by Indian Nationalists.

G. History and Nationalism.

References:—**Hausrath, A.**, *Treitschke: His Doctrine of German Destiny and of International Relations.* ‡ **Robinson**, *The New History*, 40-3. **Guilland**, *Modern Germany and Her Historians.* **Stewart and Desjardins**, *French Patriotism.* Also general references above.

1. Nationalism stimulated by historians.
   (*a*) Examples of patriotic historians of 19th century—Treitschke, Von Sybel, Macaulay, Green, Seely, Michelet, Palacky, Bancroft.
   (*b*) Tendency of such historians to stimulate pride in past glories of nation, resentment of past wrongs to nation, belief in nation's great mission and destiny.
2. Tendency toward exaltation of past achievements, battles, wars, heroes, and statesmen of the nation.
   (*a*) Exaltation of German heroes and victories in German schools; similar tendency in France; in the United States.
   (*b*) Tendency to regard non-laudatory statements about past heroes of wars of the nation as unpatriotic and harmful—example: bill proposed in New York State legislature, 1923, against use of textbooks containing derogatory statements about American Revolution, War of 1812, or heroes of the Revolution.
3. Tendency toward perpetuation of international hatred by history.
   (*a*) Example: French and Belgian textbooks written after Great War, describing Germans as savages.
   (*b*) Memory of English persecutions kept alive among Irish by history.
4. History as a basis of national aspirations.
   (*a*) History frequently used as an argument for independence by subject nations—examples: Poles used argument that Poland was once an independent state; Czechoslovaks claimed Austria had usurped authority over them; Italians, before unification, pointed to ancient glory of Rome; Greeks inspired by ancient history.
   (*b*) Claims to territory often based on history—examples: French claim to Alsace-Lorraine; Greek claim to Constantinople; Italian claim to Dalmatia; Danish claim to Schleswig; Peruvian claim to Tacna and Arica (below, section IV).

H. Economic Interests and Nationalism.

References:—See Part 8.

1. Economic interests as a factor in attempts of subject nations to obtain independence.
   (*a*) Subject peoples usually oppressed by economic restrictions—examples: refusal of England to permit India to protect Indian cotton weavers by high tariff; Irish complaint that Irish industries were strangled by England; etc.
   (*b*) Subject peoples often aggrieved by heavy taxes.
2. Widespread belief that nation should protect and promote business interests of its citizens—tariffs, subsidies, protection of investments abroad, maintenance of consular service to aid business enterprise abroad, etc.
3. Large percentage of international conflicts concerning economic interests such as trade, concessions, ownership of mineral regions, colonies, etc. (See Part 8.)
4. Fallacy of concluding that nationalism is merely a result of economic interests—popular support of private business interests usually based on patriotic sentiment, not on desire for personal gain.
5. Economic nationalism in the light of fundamental economic realities (see Part 1, sect. II-B).

I. Democracy and Nationalism.

References:—**Temperley** (editor), *History of the Peace Conference*, II, 264-268. **Blagoyévitch**, Part 1, ch. ii, sect. vi. See also general references above, and Part 9, below.

1. Widespread belief that fundamental basis of nationalism is the will of the people, i.e., democracy.
   (*a*) Assertion of the right of a people to establish its own government—by American Declaration of Independence; by French Revolution; by innumerable subsequent revolutions.
   (*b*) Modern name for this right—"national self-determination."
   (*c*) Consistency of this belief with democracy.
   (*d*) Practical difficulties—danger of secessions, difficulty of plebiscites. Should small districts be allowed self-determination?
   (*e*) Theoretical difficulties—people not ordinarily asked if they wish to be patriotic; allegiance ordinarily determined by birth, not choice; patriotism older than modern democracy.
2. Democracy a potent element in nationalism.
   (*a*) Establishment of democracy transferred allegiance from king to nation—illustration: more intense patriotism of French people after French Revolution.
   (*b*) Revolutions for national independence often coupled with struggle for democracy; hence, intensification of national patriotism by addition of democratic aspirations.
   (*c*) Loyalty to a democratic nation an enlargement of loyalty to ourselves.
3. Nationalism sometimes in conflict with democracy.
   (*a*) Denial of democracy to subject peoples by democratic mother-countries—France, England, etc., because of French and English nationalism.

(*b*) Triumph of nationalism over democracy in German Empire, 1871-1918.

(*c*) Wars, or sometimes less extreme appeals to nationalism, occasionally used by statesmen in past to prevent democratic revolution or lessen opposition to autocracy—Russia; Louis Napoleon; etc.

J. Propaganda and Nationalism. (Note: Propaganda is used in a broad sense, with no derogatory implication.)

References:—* **Krehbiel,** *Nationalism, War, and Society,* 13, 242-9. **Scott,** *Patriots in the Making.* **Reisner,** *Nationalism and Education.* **Stewart and Desjardins,** *French Patriotism.* **Demartial,** *La Guerre de 1914, Comment on mobilisa les consciences.* Also references for Part 9, III, below.

1. Importance of popular education in teaching patriotism.
2. Influence of press in arousing national feeling.
3. Patriotic societies such as German Navy League, Pan-German League, National Security League, D. A. R., etc.
4. Army and navy officers as advocates of nationalism.
5. Political leaders as spokesmen of nationalism.

K. War and Nationalism.

References:—* **Novicow.** ‡ **Krehbiel,** ch. ii. Other general references above, and Part 4, below.

1. Nationalism most intense in war, or in danger of war.
2. Nationalism stimulated by war.
3. Hence, war an important element in nationalism.

L. Problem for discussion: Is nationalism based upon any one, or several, or all, of above-mentioned elements?

III. NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS A CAUSE OF CONFLICT

General references:—* **Hayes and Moon,** *Modern History,* ch. xx. ‡ **Duggan,** *League of Nations,* ch. ix. **Bowman,** *The New World,* passim. **E. Wittmann,** *Past and Future of the Right of National Self-Determination.* **Wambaugh,** *Monograph on Plebiscites.* Also general references for Part 2.

A. Meaning of National Self-Determination.

B. Historic Instances.

1. Dutch War of independence, 16th century.
2. American War of independence.
3. Revolt and independence of Belgium, 1830.
4. German struggle for national unity and independence, 1813-71.
5. Liberation and unification of Italy, 1859-71.
6. Independence of Norway, 1905.
7. Self-determination of Balkan nations.

C. Contemporary European Instances.

1. Poland.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** 328-33, 349-56. **Haskins and Lord,** *Some Problems of the Peace Conference,* 153-72. ‡ **House and Seymour,** *What Really Happened at Paris,* ch. iv. **Hazen,** *Europe Since 1815,* II, ch. xl. **Toynbee,** *Nationality and the War,* 50-80, 281-94. **Phillips,** *Poland.* **Blagoyévitch,** Part 2, ch. 3. **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office Handbook on *Russia, Poland, etc. These Eventful Years,* ch. 46.

(*a*) Condition from 1815 to 1914.
(*b*) The case for independence.
  (i) Historic.
  (ii) Linguistic.
  (iii) Religious.
  (iv) Geographic.
  (v) Economic.
(*c*) Achievement of independence, 1918-19.
(*d*) Aggressiveness of the new republic.
(*e*) Importance in general European international relations.

2. Czechoslovakia.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** 231-48. **Hazen,** II, ch. xxxix. **Toynbee,** ch. iii. **Benes,** *Bohemia's Case for Independence.* **Cisar and Pokorny,** *The Czechoslovak Republic.* **Great Britain,** Foreign Office Handbooks, *Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia, Hungarian Ruthenia. These Eventful Years,* ch. 45.

3. Hungary.

Special references:—* **Hayes and Moon,** 603-7. * **Bowman,** ch. xii. **Toynbee,** ch. iv. **Drage,** *Austria-Hungary,* ch. vi. **Seton-Watson,** *Racial Problems in Hungary.* **Horvath,** *Modern Hungary.*

4. Baltic nations—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** 357-75. ‡ **Temperley,** *Peace Conference,* VI, 284-310. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today, The Baltic and Caucasian States.* **Toynbee,** 339-58. **Great Britain,** Foreign Office Handbooks, nos. 44, 47, 48, 50. * **Townsend,** *The Baltic States* (Syllabus No. X, Inst. of Int. Educ.). **A. Ruhl,** *The New Masters of the Baltic. These Eventful Years,* ch. 47.

5. Ukrainia and other south-Russian border states.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** 376-82, 395-408. **Butler,** *The New Eastern Europe,* ch. 7. **Rudnitsky,** *Ukraine.* **Dennis,** *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia,* chs. viii, ix. **Great Britain,** Foreign Office Handbook, *The Ukraine.*

6. Yugoslavia.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** 249-59, 273-7. **Toynbee,** ch. v. **Schevill,** *History of the Balkan Peninsula,* ch. xxx, 503-8. **Temperley,** *History of Serbia.* **Hazen,** II, ch. xlii. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today: Yugoslavia.* **Baerlein,** *Birth of Yugoslavia.* **Mousset,** *Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes.* **Blagoyévitch,** Pt. 3, ch. vi. **Great Britain,** Foreign Office Handbook, *The Jugoslav Movement. These Eventful Years,* ch. 48.

7. Rumania.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** ch. xv. **Schevill,** ch. xxiii, 508-11, 463. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today: Bulgaria and Rumania.* **Seton-Watson,** *Rumania and the Great War.* **Hazen,** II, ch. xli. **Blagoyévitch,** Pt. 3,

ch. viii. *Foreign Affairs,* June 1924, "The Bessarabian Dispute, Map and Note." **Temperley,** *Peace Conference,* IV, 213-36.

8. Albania.

Special references:—* **Bowman,** ch. xvii. **Schevill,** 463-6, 474, 479. **Great Britain,** Naval Intelligence Division, *Handbook of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania;* Foreign Office Handbook, *Albania.* **Godart,** *Albania.* **Chekrezi,** *Albania Past and Present.*

9. Ireland.

Special references:—* **Hayes and Moon,** 638-45. * **Bowman,** 30-5. **White,** *The Irish Free State.* **Monypenny,** *The Two Irish Nations.* **Turner,** *Ireland and England.* **Phillips,** *The Revolution in Ireland: A History of the Years 1906-1923.*

D. Non-European Instances.

1. The Transcaucasian peoples—Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan.
References:—* **Bowman,** 450-61. **Toynbee,** 385-98. *International Conciliation,* No. 138. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today: The Baltic and Caucasian States,* 172-242.
2. Egypt (see Part 3, VIII-G).
3. India (Part 3, XI-B).
4. Korea (Part 3, XII-K).
5. Persia (Part 3, X).
6. Arabs (Part 3, IX).
7. Filipinos (Part 3, XIII-F).

E. Discussion of the Problem.

1. Universality and intensity of the spirit of national self-determination.
2. Tendency of national self-determination in Europe to produce increasing number of small national states.
   (*a*) Cultural value of small states.
   (*b*) Economic difficulties created by multiplicity of tariffs, etc.
   (*c*) Increased dangers to peace, in view of aggressive temper of newly emancipated small nations.
   (*d*) Difficulty of guaranteeing existing frontiers while any potential nations remain to be freed.
   (*e*) Language groups which have not yet asserted the right of self-determination—e.g., Bretons, Basques, Welsh, Gaelic Scots, etc.
3. Difficulty of drawing line between national self-determination and "secession."
4. Problem: is there any solution?

IV. NATIONAL IRREDENTISM AS A CAUSE OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS

General References:—‡ **Haskins and Lord,** *Some Problems of the Peace Conference.* * **Bowman,** *The New World.* ‡ **House and Seymour,** *What Really Happened at Paris.* **Stoddard and Frank,** *Stakes of the War.*

A. Meaning of "Irredentism"—desire on the part of citizens or government of an independent nation to "redeem" (i.e. annex) regions

which are believed to belong to that nation by right, but which are part of some other independent state or states.

B. Contemporary European Instances—"sore spots."

1. Italian irredentism in conflict with Austro-German and Yugoslav irredentism.

Special References:—* **Bowman,** 129-36, 259-72. **Haskins and Lord,** 244-61. **House and Seymour,** ch. vi. **Stoddard and Frank,** ch. x. **Russell,** "The Fiume-Adriatic Solution" in *Quarterly Review,* May 1924. **Marinelli,** "The Regions of Mixed Populations in Northern Italy," *Geogr. Review,* VII (1919) 128-48. **Hazen,** II, ch. li. **Blagoyévitch,** Part 3, ch. 5. **Cocks,** *The Secret Treaties,* sect. iv, ch. ii. **Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* I, ch. iii. Gt. Britain, Foreign Office Handbooks on *Austria-Hungary, Austrian Littoral, Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume, Dalmatia, Trentino and the Adige.*

(*a*) "Italia Irredenta" before the Great War.
  (i) Regions under Austro-Hungarian rule claimed by Italy.
  (ii) Reasons for Italian claims.
  (iii) Influence on international relations—potential cause of conflict between Italy and Austria-Hungary.

(*b*) Italian irredentism in the Great War.
  (i) Italian irredentist demands as set forth in secret Treaty of London, 1915.
  (ii) Additional demand for Fiume, at Peace Conference, 1919.
  (iii) Italian withdrawal from Peace Conference, 1919.
  (iv) Terms of the peace treaties affecting Italian demands.

(*c*) Conflict between Italian and Austro-German irredentism.
  (i) Cession to Italy, by Treaty of St. Germain, of portion of German-speaking Tyrol in addition to Italian-speaking "Trentino"; justification on principle of "strategic frontiers."
  (ii) Futile protests of Austro-Germans in ceded territory.
  (iii) Efforts of Italian Fascisti to Italianize Austro-Germans.

(*d*) Conflict between Italian and Yugoslav irredentism.
  (i) The difficulty about Istria, Gorizia, and Gradisca.
  (ii) The Fiume problem—linguistic, geographic, economic, strategic.
  (iii) Conflicting claims to Dalmatia.
  (iv) Conflicting claims to islands off Dalmatian coast.
  (v) The compromise effected by the Treaty of Rapallo, 1920.
  (vi) Cession of Fiume to Italy, 1924.

2. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslav irredentism.

Special references:—* **Schevill,** Balkan Peninsula, 455-62. **Drage,** *Austria-Hungary,* 595-650. **Baerlein,** *Birth of Yugoslavia,* I, ch. iv. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today: Yugoslavia,* Pt. iv. **Stoddard and Frank,** ch. xi. **Blagoyévitch,** Pt. 3, ch. vi. Gt. Britain Foreign Office Handbooks on *Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carniola,* etc., *The Jugoslav Movement.*

(*a*) Historical background: occupation (1878) and annexation (1908) by Austria-Hungary.
(*b*) Basis of Yugoslav opposition to Austro-Hungarian ownership.
(*c*) Importance as cause of great crisis of 1908-9 and as immediate occasion for Great War in 1914.
(*d*) Settlement in 1918-19.

3. Alsace-Lorraine and French irredentism.

Special References:—* **Bowman**, 80-1. ‡ **Haskins and Lord**, 75-116. **House and Seymour**, 45-8. **Stoddard and Frank**, ch. ii. **Blagoyévitch**, Pt. 3, ch. 1. **Loreburn**, *How the War Came*, ch. iii. **Hazen**, *Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule*. **Phillipson**, *Alsace-Lorraine*. **Gt. Britain**, Foreign Office Handbook, *Alsace-Lorraine*.

(*a*) Importance of the Alsace-Lorraine question, from 1871 to 1918, as a cause of Franco-German hostility and a menace to the peace of Europe.
(*b*) Historical claims.
  (i) From the German point of view.
  (ii) From the French point of view.
(*c*) Linguistic and ethnic claims.
(*d*) Economic motives and mineral resources.
(*e*) Strategic considerations.
  (i) As a reason for the German annexation in 1871.
  (ii) As a reason for the French re-annexation in 1919.
(*f*) Refusal of France to permit a plebiscite.
(*g*) Settlement by the Treaty of Versailles, 1919.

4. The Saar Basin.

Special References:—* **Haskins and Lord**, 132-50. * **Bowman**, 84-6. ‡ **House and Seymour**, 56-66. **Osborne**, *The Saar Question*. **Gt. Britain**, Foreign Office Handbook, *Lorraine and the Saar Minefields*. **Priou**, *Le Territoire du Sarre*. **W. R. Bisschop**, *The Saar Controversy*.

(*a*) Economic, historical, and strategic arguments presented by France.
(*b*) The language and desires of the inhabitants.
(*c*) The compromise adopted in the Treaty of Versailles.
(*d*) As a German "Irredenta."

5. The "Left Bank" (of the Rhine).

Special References:—* **Haskins and Lord**, 117-32. * **Bowman**, 82-4. ‡ **Cocks**, *The Secret Treaties*, ch. vi. **Babelan**, *Le Rhin dans l'histoire*. **Gt. Britain**, Foreign Office Handbooks, *Bavarian Palatinate*.

(*a*) Demands of French patriots, before, during, and after Great War, for annexation of Left Bank.
(*b*) Attitude of French government during war, as indicated by secret treaty of Feb. 1917; Left Bank to be "neutral" state occupied by French troops.
(*c*) Allied occupation, under Treaty of Versailles, and continued agitation for separation of Left Bank from Prussia.
(*d*) German irredentist attitude.
(*e*) The arguments for and against French aims.

6. The Ruhr Basin (see below, Part 8).
7. The Belgian frontier.

Special References:—* **Bowman**, 123-5. ‡ **Haskins and Lord**, 54-71. **Stoddard and Frank**, ch. i. **House and Seymour**, 43-5. **Putnam**, *Luxemburg and Her Neighbors*. **Gt. Britain**, Foreign Office Handbooks on *Belgium, Question of the Scheldt, Luxemburg and Limburg*.

(*a*) Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet.
(*b*) Belgian request (at Paris, 1919) for Dutch Limburg and Zealand Flanders, refused by Netherlands.
(*c*) The question of Luxemburg.

8. Slesvig (Schleswig).

References:—* **Bowman**, 174-6. **Haskins and Lord**, 37-47. **Stoddard and Frank**, ch. iii. **Larson**, article in *Amer. Hist. Review*, XXIV, 227 ff. **Blagoyévitch**, Pt. 3, ch. ii.

(*a*) Conquest by Austria and Prussia, 1864.
(*b*) Annexation by Prussia.
(*c*) The Prussian policy of Germanization in Schleswig, and Danish opposition.
(*d*) The plebiscites of 1920.

9. Poland's eastern frontier.

References:—* **Bowman**, 333-6. ‡ **Haskins and Lord**, 195-198. ‡ **House and Seymour**, ch. iv. **Stoddard and Frank**, ch. vi. Also above III-C-1.

(*a*) Difficulty of drawing just frontier based on linguistic, geographic, or religious facts.
(*b*) Desire of Poles to restore historic greatness of Poland.
(*c*) Failure of Paris Peace Conference to define eastern frontier.
(*d*) The Russo-Polish War of 1920 and its result, the Treaty of Riga.
(*e*) The Russo-Polish border as a menace to peace.

10. The Vilna and Suwalki regions.

References:—* **Bowman**, 335-6. **Stoddard and Frank**, ch. vii. *Record of Political Events*, 1921, 1922, 1923 (use index).

(*a*) Basis of Polish claims.
(*b*) Basis of Lithuanian claims.
(*c*) Seizure by Poland.
(*d*) Action of the League.
(*e*) Present situation.

11. Danzig and the Polish "Corridor."

References:—* **Bowman**, 336-343. ‡ **Haskins and Lord**, 172-184. **Gt. Britain**, Foreign Office Handbook, *East and West Prussia*. **Blagoyévitch**, Pt. 3, ch. 3, sect. 5. See League of Nations *Official Journal*, for reports on administration of Danzig.

(*a*) Difficulty of solving the problem on basis of language or race (consult map, **Bowman**, *The New World*, 339).
(*b*) Historical, economic, geographic, and strategic reasons for Polish claims.
(*c*) Terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
(*d*) German dissatisfaction with the settlement.
(*e*) The plebiscite in West Prussia (Marienwerder district).

12. Mazuria.

References:—* **Bowman**, 345, 346. **Haskins and Lord**, 185. **Gt. Britain**, F. O. Handbook, *East and West Prussia*.

(*a*) The conflict between religious and linguistic-racial affiliations of Protestant Poles in Mazuria.
(*b*) Result of the plebiscite.

13. Upper Silesia.

References:—* **Bowman**, 345-6 and 347 (map). **Blagoyévitch**, Pt. 3, ch. iii, sect. 6. **Osborne**, *Problem of Upper Silesia; Upper Silesian Question and Germany's Coal Problem. Record of Political Events*, 1921, 1922, 1923 (use index).

(*a*) Percentages of German and Polish inhabitants.

(*b*) Importance of economic resources.
(*c*) Decision of the peace conference.
(*d*) Result of the plebiscite.
(*e*) Importance of the dispute as a cause of international antagonism.

14. Teschen.

References:—* **Bowman,** 346-7. **Toynbee,** 261-72.

(*a*) Importance of coal mines.
(*b*) Conflict of Polish and Czechoslovak claims, leading to hostilities during Peace Conference of 1919.
(*c*) Division by Council of Ambassadors, 1920—a Solomon's judgment.

15. Eastern Galicia.

References:—* **Bowman,** 343-5. * **Haskins and Lord,** 189-195. **Blagoyévitch,** Pt. 3, ch. 3, sect. 8. **Gt. Britain,** F. O. Handbook, *Austrian Poland.*

(*a*) Poland's historical claims to Eastern Galicia.
(*b*) The linguistic situation; percentages of Poles and Ruthenians.
(*c*) Polish claim that Poles are cultured element.
(*d*) Ruthenian resentment of Polish rule.
(*e*) Importance of oil resources.
(*f*) Hostilities between Poles and Ruthenians at close of Great War, as an indication of the bitterness of the dispute.
(*g*) Annexation by Poland.

16. Memel.

References:—* **Bowman,** 166, 194, 357. **Gade,** "The Memel Controversy," *Foreign Affairs,* March 1924. *Current History,* May 1924, 233-8.

(*a*) Condition before the Great War—part of Prussia.
(*b*) Lithuanian claims to Memel.
  (i) On basis of language.
  (ii) As necessary seaport for Lithuania.
(*c*) Cession of Memel to Allies by Germany, 1919.
(*d*) Seizure by Lithuanians, and cession by Allies, 1923.
(*e*) The Davis Report.

17. German districts in Czechoslovakia.

References:—* **Bowman,** 231-248 (maps and incidental references). * **Haskins and Lord,** 216-222. **Stoddard and Frank,** ch. viii. **Seton-Watson,** *German, Slav, and Magyar.* **Gt. Britain,** F. O. Handbook, *Bohemia and Moravia.* Also above, C-2.

(*a*) Inclusion of three million German-speaking inhabitants in Czechoslovak Republic, by Peace Conference.
(*b*) German argument that German-speaking districts on borders of Bohemia and Moravia and Austria Silesia should be left under German or Austrian rule, by principle of self-determination.
(*c*) Czechoslovak arguments for including said districts in Czechoslovakia: historical, economic, strategic.

18. Burgenland.

Reference:—*Record of Political Events, 1922,* p. 85.

19. Ulster.

Reference:—Above, III-C-9.

(*a*) Similarity between Irish attitude toward exclusion of Ulster from the Irish Free State, and attitude of Irredentists on Continent.

(*b*) Ulster's case for exclusion from self-governing Ireland.

(i) Religion.

(ii) Fear of oppressive taxation, or of economic discrimination if industrial Ulster were included in predominantly agricultural Ireland.

(iii) Historical, ancestral, political reasons.

(iv) Right of Ulster to exercise self-determination.

(*c*) The Irish case for including Ulster.

(i) Geographic unity.

(ii) Historical unity.

(iii) Division of Ireland into two states as a handicap to economic progress.

(iv) Argument that Ulstermen of Scottish and English ancestry are intruders.

(v) Existence of majorities in some districts, and large minorities in others, favorable to Irish unity.

(*d*) Intensity of the dispute: illegal training of volunteer armies by Ulstermen and by Irish Nationalists, on eve of Great War; Ireland on verge of civil war in 1914.

(*e*) Establishment of Northern Irish Government, 1920.

(*f*) Status of Northern Irish Government since creation of Irish Free State; the boundary dispute.

(*g*) The Ulster problem as an illustration of difficulty of applying principles of national self-determination.

20. Transylvania and the Rumanian borderlands.

References:—* **Bowman,** 278-287. **Buchan,** *Nations of Today: Bulgaria and Rumania,* chs. 8, 12. **Stoddard and Frank,** ch. xiv. **Gt. Britain,** F. O. Handbooks, *Transylvania and the Banat, Bessarabia, Bukovina.*

(*a*) Inclusion of important Magyar and German colonies in Rumania by annexation of Transylvania to Rumania, 1919.

(*b*) Inclusion of additional Magyar districts by Rumanian annexation of border counties west of Transylvania.

(*c*) Annexation of mixed populations in Bukovina and in the eastern part of the Banat.

(*d*) Bessarabia.

21. Macedonia.

References:—* **Bowman,** 316-17. **Collins,** "The Macedonian Tangle," *Contemporary Review,* vol. 125, p. 445.

(*a*) Mixture of races, languages, and religions in Macedonia.

(*b*) Rival claims of Greeks, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Turks, Albanians before 1912.

(*c*) Partition in 1913, mainly between Greece and Serbia; and consequent Bulgarian irredentist resentment.

22. Thrace.

References:—* **Bowman,** 318. * **Haskins and Lord,** 281-286. **Mills and Chussachi,** *The Question of Thrace. Record of Political Events, 1923* (use index).

(*a*) As a Bulgarian irredenta, before 1912 (First Balkan War).

(*b*) Partly regained by Turkey, 1913 (Second Balkan War).
(*c*) Western (Bulgarian) and Eastern (Turkish) Thrace ceded to Greece by Treaty of Sèvres, 1920.
(*d*) Turkish recovery of Eastern Thrace, 1922-3.
(*e*) Turkish and Bulgarian Irredentism as regards Western Thrace since 1920.

23. Dobrudja.

References:—**Bowman,** *The New World,* 290. **Stoddard and Frank,** ch. xv. **Commène,** *La Dobrudgea* (Rumania's claims). **Markov,** *Bulgaria's Historic Rights to the Dobrudja.*

(*a*) Rumanian annexation of most of Dobrudja after Russo-Turkish War, 1878.
(*b*) Rumanian annexation of additional section after Second Balkan War, 1913.
(*c*) Dobrudja as a Bulgarian Irredenta.
(*d*) Economic and strategic reasons for Rumanian retention of Dubrudja.

24. Crete.

References:—**Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 509-510. **Schevill** (use index).

(*a*) Crete as a Greek Irredenta, under Turkish rule, before 1912.
(*b*) Union of Crete with Greece, 1912.

25. The Dodecanese.

References:—**Bowman,** 320-1. **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office Handbook, *Greece and the Cyclades and Northern Sporades.* **Volonakis,** *The Island of Roses and Her Eleven Sisters, or the Dodecanese.*

(*a*) Condition before 1911—Greek population under Turkish rule.
(*b*) Italian military occupation during Tripolitan War.
(*c*) The peace settlement of 1920.
(*d*) Cession to Italy by Treaty of Lausanne, 1923.

26. Cyprus.

References:—**Bowman,** 326. **Luke,** *Cyprus Under the Turks.* **Gt. Britain,** F. O. Handbook, *Cyprus.*

(*a*) Condition before 1878—Greek population under Turkish rule.
(*b*) British occupation, 1878.
(*c*) British protectorate, 1914.
(*d*) British offer, during Great War, to cede Cyprus to Greece.
(*e*) Cyprus as a Greek irredenta.

27. Albania.

Reference:—**Bowman,** 144, 309, 311-312, 324-6. (Also above, III-C-8.)

(*a*) Irredentist quarrels between Albanians and Yugoslavs regarding northeastern borders of Albania.
(*b*) Irredentist quarrels between Greece and Albanians regarding Northern Epirus (southern Albania).
(*c*) Italian interests in Albania.

28. Eastern Karelia.

Reference:—**Bowman,** 370.

29. Klagenfurt.

References:—**Bowman,** 209. **Bryce,** "The Klagenfurt Plebiscite," *Geogr. Journal,* vol. 60, p. 112.

30. Slovakia and Ruthenia.

References:—**Haskins and Lord,** 237-8. **Gt. Britain,** F. O. Handbooks on *Slovakia* and *Hungarian Ruthenia.* **Baerlein,** *Over the Hills of Ruthenia.* Also III-C-2.

(*a*) Inclusion of Presburg, former capital of Hungary, and of several Magyar districts in Czechoslovakia.
(*b*) Inclusion of half-million Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia, creating a potential Ukrainian irredenta.
(*c*) Inclusion of Slovakia in Czechoslovakia perhaps due more to Czech irredentism than to Slovak desires.

31. Aland Islands.

References:—**Bowman,** 374. League of Nations, Official Journal, special supplement no. 1, *The Aland Islands Question.* **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office Handbook on *The Aland Islands.*

(*a*) Swedish claims based on language, history, strategy.
(*b*) Finnish claims, based on history and strategy.
(*c*) Bitter dispute at close of Great War.
(*d*) Settlement by League of Nations.

Note: The above is not an exhaustive list, long as it may seem. It includes only some of the better known cases, but there are numerous other, less important, "sore spots" in Europe.

C. Similar Non-European Instances.

1. The Tacna-Arica dispute and other Latin-American boundary conflicts.

References:—**Bowman,** 570-581; *Supplement,* 43, 107. **Borchard,** "The Tacna-Arica Controversy," *Foreign Affairs,* vol. I, 29 ff.

2. Shantung as a Chinese irredenta, 1914-23 (see Part 3, XXI-I, J).
3. Other non-European instances treated below, under Part 3.

D. Discussion of the Problem of Irredentism.

1. Importance of irredentism as a cause of international antagonism—may be illustrated by

(*a*) French hostility to Germany since 1871 (Alsace-Lorraine).
(*b*) Austro-Prussian war against Denmark, 1864 (Schleswig-Holstein).
(*c*) Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
(*d*) Balkan wars of 1912-13.
(*e*) Sĕrajevo crisis of 1914 (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
(*f*) Italian, Rumanian, Bulgarian intervention in Great War.
(*g*) Conflicts since the Great War.
  (i) Poland and Russia, regarding eastern Polish frontier.
  (ii) Poland and Lithuania regarding Vilna.
  (iii) Poland and Germans regarding Upper Silesia.
  (iv) Poles and Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia.
  (v) Magyars and Austrians, regarding Burgenland.
  (vi) Greeks and Turks, regarding Thrace and Smyrna.

2. Criticism of irredentist arguments.
(*a*) The argument based on language or race.
  (i) Impossibility of redrawing map strictly according to language or according to race (consult map, **Hayes** and **Moon,**

Modern History, 584-5, or any good map of Europe according to language, noting lack of clear-cut divisions, large number of "language islands," and overlapping of languages).

(ii) Criticism of the principle itself (review II-C, D, above).

(*b*) Arguments based on history.

(i) Impossibility of allowing each nation to possess every territory it ever possessed in the past.

(ii) Criticism of the argument itself (review II-G, above).

(*c*) Economic arguments.

(i) Impossibility of giving every nation sufficient supplies, in its own territory, of mineral resources and other raw materials.

(ii) Difficulty of giving each nation ownership of all main lines of transportation used by its citizens.

(iii) Difficulty of giving each nation an "outlet to the sea."

(iv) General criticism of the principle (treated in more detail in Part 8, compare also II-H, above).

(*d*) Religious argument.

(i) Impossibility of applying consistently and universally the argument used by Poles, Greeks, and others that religion should be taken as test of nationality in disputed areas.

(ii) Criticism of the principle (review II-E, above).

(*e*) The principle of "natural boundaries."

(i) Difficulty of consistent application of principle (for example, in North America).

(ii) Criticism of principle (review II-B, above).

(*f*) The principle of "strategic frontiers."

(i) Criticism of the principle.

(ii) Danger of imperilling, instead of assuring, national security by annexing territory for strategic purposes (the example of German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine fortresses).

(*g*) The principle of popular desires.

(i) Desires of the people in disputed areas often regarded as conclusive.

(ii) Difficulty of ascertaining such desires fairly (see 4, below).

(iii) Possibility that popular desires may change.

3. Impossibility of satisfying all irredentist claims.

(*a*) Large number of overlapping claims (consult **Bowman,** *The New World,* map, p. 4).

(*b*) Inconsistency of irredentist arguments, for example.

(i) Czechoslovak claims (during Peace Conference) to all of Bohemia (review B-17, above) based on history, regardless of language; German claims based on language.

(ii) Czechoslovak claims to Slovakia based on language, regardless of history; Magyar claims based on history.

4. The plebiscite as a proposed solution.

References:—**Wambaugh,** *Monograph on Plebiscites.* **Temperley,** *History of the Peace Conference.*

(*a*) Occasional employment of plebiscites to settle territorial questions before the Great War.

(*b*) Plebiscites since the Great War.
(*c*) Theoretical advantages of the plebiscite.
(i) Provides a single principle or standard (compare 3-*b*, above).
(ii) Fundamentally democratic.
(*d*) Practical difficulties.
(i) Question whether large or small districts should be used, for example—Should all Ireland vote as a unit, or should Ulster be allowed to vote separately? Should a single town, such as Fiume, be allowed to vote itself out of one country into another?
(ii) Danger of unfair practices—intimidation, bribery, importation of voters, etc.
(iii) Possibility of peaceful conquest of a country, or part of it, by immigrants, if they outnumber natives.
(iv) Possibility, if small voting districts are used, that too many irregular frontiers and even political "islands" may be created.
(v) Existence, after plebiscite, of discontented minority.
5. Other solutions?

V. NATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES

A. Connection with Self-Determination and Irredentism.

1. Discontent on the part of racial, linguistic, or religious minorities often fostered by irredentism or by hope of self-determmination—for example:
(*a*) Agitation of pan-Serbian societies in Austria-Hungary before 1914.
(*b*) Agitation of Greek, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav irredentists in Macedonia, before Balkan Wars.
2. Persecution of such minorities often motivated by fear of irredentism or of self-determination—for example:
(*a*) Persecution of Yugoslavs in Austria-Hungary before 1914.
(*b*) Persecution of Poles in Prussia before 1914.
3. Irredentism usually stimulated by such persecution.
(*a*) Failure of persecution to preserve unity of Austria-Hungary.
(*b*) Failure in the case of Prussian Poland.
4. The vicious circle—irredentism, persecution, more intense irredentism.

B. Some Pre-war Minority Problems.

1. "Prussianization" policies in Prussian Poland, Northern Schleswig, and Alsace-Lorraine.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 419. ‡ **C. D. Hazen,** *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule.* ‡ **Bülow,** *Imperial Germany,* Pt. 1, ch. iv. ‡ **Dawson,** *Evolution of Modern Germany,* ch. xxiii.

2. "Russification" policies of Russian government as applied to Poles, Lithuanians, Esthonians, Letts, Finns, Ukrainians, Armenians, etc.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 470-3. **Hazen,** *Europe Since*

1815, I, 601-3. **Butler,** *The New Eastern Europe*, 7-23, ch. v. Compare III-C-1, 4, 5, III-D-1, and IV-B-9, above.

3. "Turkification" policies applied by Ottoman government to Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Arabs, etc.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Modern Europe*, II, 527. **Schevill,** *History of the Balkan Peninsula*, 462-6, **Hazen,** II, 645-647.

4. Minorities in Austria-Hungary.

References:—**Hayes,** *Modern Europe*, II, 433-4. **Hazen,** II, 138-151, chs. ix, xx.

(*a*) Magyarization policies of Hungarian government, applied particularly to Rumanians, Slovaks, Yugoslavs.

(*b*) More liberal but still oppressive treatment of Czechs, Yugoslavs, Ruthenians, Poles, and Italians by Austria.

5. Minorities in the United Kingdom.

(*a*) Failure of British attempt to amalgamate Irish nation with Great Britain (details unnecessary in this connection).

(*b*) Contrast between Irish discontent and loyalty of Scots and Welsh.

6. The Jewish minority.

Reference:—**Raisin,** *History of Jews.*

(*a*) Persecution in some countries, particularly Russia and Rumania.

(*b*) Tolerance in other countries, for example, United States and England.

C. Minority Problems in Europe Since the Great War.

References:—* **Temperley,** *Peace Conference*, V, ch. ii. ‡ **House and Seymour,** *What Really Happened at Paris*, 204-223. ‡ **Rosting,** *"Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations," Amer. Jour. Internat. Law*, vol. 17, p. 641. **Duparc,** *La Protection des minorités de race, de langue, de religion.* **Lucien-Brun,** *Le Problème des minorités devant le droit international.*

1. Solution of many problems by territorial changes—emancipation of Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, etc.

2. Existence of numerous discontented minorities despite these changes—review IV-B-1, 4, 5, etc. (Consult statistics in **Temperley,** *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 155.)

3. The minority provisions of the peace treaties.

D. The Minority Problem in the United States.

References:—‡ **Bowman,** *Supplement to the New World*, 10-25. **Drachsler,** *Democracy and Assimilation; the Blending of Immigrant Heritages in America*, chs. i, ii, vi, vii. **Hill,** *Americanism*, ch. i. **Commons,** *Races and Immigrants in America.* **Lauck and Jenks,** *The Immigration Problem.* **Dixon,** *Americanization.* **Ross,** *The Old World in the New.* **Park and Miller,** *Old World Traits Transplanted. The World Tomorrow*, V, no. 3 (March 1922), discussing "The Negro and the White." **Evans,** *Black and White in the Southern States.* **Brawley,** *Social History of the American Negro.* **Tannenbaum,** *Darker Aspects of the South.* **Gulick,** *American Democracy and Asiatic Citizenship.*

1. Negro, European immigrant, and Asiatic minorities, in the United States.

(*a*) The negro minority.

(i) Contrast between European policy of political discrimination against minorities, and American policy as expressed in Fifteenth Amendment.

(ii) Discrimination against negro minority in practice.

(iii) Increase of race antagonism after Great War.

(*b*) Minorities of European descent.

(i) Pre-war policy of permitting immigration with slight restrictions; tolerance of foreign languages; religious freedom with only sporadic outbreaks of hostility toward religious minorities; unique success in assimilating European immigrants and winning their loyalty; contrast with failure of Prussianization, Russification, etc.

(ii) Agitation against hyphenated Americans during Great War.

(iii) Agitation for "Americanization" since the Great War.

(iv) Restriction of immigration; Immigration Laws of 1921 and 1924.

(v) Discussion of this reversal of American policy.

(*c*) Asiatic minorities.

(i) Chinese Exclusion Act.

(ii) Virtual exclusion of Japanese by Gentlemen's Agreement.

(iii) Abrogation of Gentlemen's Agreement by immigration law of 1924.

(iv) The Japanese in California.

Number.

California land and school laws discriminating against Japanese.

Effect of anti-Japanese agitation on relations between Japan and the United States.

2. Discussion of "Americanization," and of such movements as Ku Klux Klan, in light of European experience.

VI. NATIONALISM AND WAR

Note:—The most important topics mentioned below are to be considered in detail elsewhere in the course. They are brought together here to give a bird's-eye view of the relation between nationalism and international conflicts.

A. Nationalism as the Cause of Wars of Independence or Self-Determination (see III, above)—for example:

1. War of Dutch Independence.
2. War of American Independence.
3. Irish revolt of 1782.
4. Peninsular War of Portugal and Spain (aided by England) against Napoleon.
5. German "War of Liberation" against Napoleon.
6. Greek War of Independence.
7. Belgian War of Independence, 1830.
8. The Italian wars of independence, from time of Metternich to 1866.
9. Revolutions during and after Great War of 1914.

B. Nationalism as the Cause of Irredentist Conflicts and Wars (review IV, above)—for example:

1. Italy's entry into the Great War, 1915, to free Italia Irredenta.
2. Rumania's entry into the Great War, 1916, to free Transylvania.
3. Turkish war against Greeks, 1920-22, to free Smyrna and Thrace.
4. Polish war against Russia, 1920.

C. Nationalism as the Emotional Basis of Imperialism and Imperialist Wars (to be treated in Part 3, below).

D. Nationalism as the Emotional Basis of Economic Conflicts Among Nations (to be treated in Part 8, below).

E. Nationalism and the Use of Force to Protect Citizens.

1. Generally accepted belief that a nation should protect its citizens against injury in foreign countries.
2. "Intervention," or use of military or naval force on a small scale, often without a formal declaration of war, as the frequent result of this belief—for example:
   (*a*) American intervention in Mexico.
   (*b*) Boxer War.

F. Nationalism and Wars in Defense of National Honor.

1. Frequent use of the phrase "protection of our national honor" as justification for war.
2. Elasticity of this phrase—**Perla,** *What is National Honor?*
   (*a*) Belgium's defense of her neutrality in 1914 generally regarded as a matter of national honor.
   (*b*) Austria's refusal of arbitration or mediation in 1914, officially stated to be a matter of national honor.
   (*c*) Italy's seizure of Corfu, 1923, to protect national honor.
   (*d*) Avenging insults to the flag (usually in the case of backward peoples) considered a matter of national honor.
   (*e*) Fulfilment of treaty obligations sometimes considered a matter of national honor.
   (*f*) What is national honor?

G. Nationalism as the Basis of Militarism and Navalism (to be treated in Part 4, below).

1. Large armies and navies generally considered necessary for national defense and maintenance of national prestige.
2. Militarism and navalism potent indirect causes of war (to be considered later).

H. The Place of War in Nationalist Thought and Feeling.

1. Most nations theoretically opposed in principle to aggressive wars, but willing to fight wars for the right or for self-defense.
2. Willingness of more extreme nationalists in all countries to accept slogan—"My country right or wrong."
3. Willingness to fight for one's country the supreme manifestation of patriotism, according to nationalist view.

4. Intensification of nationalism during war.
5. Enshrinement of exploits and heroes of past wars in song, oration, poem, and pageant, in monument and memorial, as highest examples of national patriotic devotion.
6. This attitude, however natural and justifiable, as an obstacle to plans for the abolition of war.

VII. THE QUESTION OF CONTROL

A. Nationalism a Complex Phenomenon, as Above Indicated.

B. Diverse Elements and Manifestations of Nationalism Not Always Mutually Consistent and Logical, Because Nationalism Is Composite of Many Ideas and Emotions, as shown in II, above.

C. Some of the Ideas and Tendencies Frequently Connected With Nationalism Dangerous, as shown in sections III-VI, above.

D. Problem for Consideration: Is Rational Criticism and Control of the Trouble-Making Aspects of Nationalism Desirable or Feasible?

1. Necessity for rational control of emotional and instinctive impulses in private life (*e.g.*, control of appetite, control of anger, control of speed mania in automobilists) as an analogous problem, perhaps suggesting proper attitude toward nationalism.
2. Uselessness of emotional and extreme reactions either for or against nationalism: Nationalism too deeply rooted in men's hearts and minds to be destroyed or "abolished" by radical anti-nationalists; and too strong to need uncritical emotional defense—hence the problem, if there is one, is a problem of rational control.

PART THREE

IMPERIALISM AND WORLD POLITICS

General References:—The most useful general accounts suitable for textbook use are: **C. J. H. Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 547-678. **L. Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism* (a very brief anti-imperialist survey). **A. Viallate,** *Economic Imperialism and International Relations* (excellent on economic aspects). **J. A. Hobson,** *Imperialism* (the classic indictment of imperialism, incisive but not up to date). **A. Wright,** *The Romance of Colonisation* (brief, readable sketch, primarily concerned with British business interests). **H. A. Gibbons,** *Introduction to World Politics* (comprehensive but inaccurate). **F. Marvin,** *Western Races and the World.* On Africa one may use as a mainstay one of the following: **L. Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (detailed but not comprehensive, anti-imperialist). **E. D. Morel,** *The Black Man's Burden* (also anti-imperialist and less detailed than Woolf). **Sir Charles Lucas,** *Partition and Colonization of Africa* (recent, thoughtful, pro-British, and deficient on historical aspects). **Sir H. H. Johnston,** *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (authoritative, rather detailed for a textbook, not up to date). **N. D. Harris,** *Intervention and Colonization in Africa* (less authoritative but perhaps more readable). On Asia, one may well use the brief sketch in **Hayes,** supplemented by additional reading as indicated below, or **Gibbons,** *New Map of Asia,* if library facilities do not permit utilizing a number of books. In parentheses are given references to a volume entitled *Imperialism and World Politics* by P. T. Moon, now under preparation, which will be designed to cover this part of the syllabus.

Among the innumerable other general surveys more or less useful for reference or research, the following should be made available if possible: **A. G. Keller,** *Colonization* (a sociological study not including France and England). **H. C. Morris,** *History of Colonization,* 2 vols. (antiquated comprehensive outline). **Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,** *De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (a standard French work). **Veit Valentin,** *Kolonialgeschichte der Neuzeit* (a scholarly but brief German outline). **Alfred Zimmermann,** *Kolonialpolitik* and *Die europäischen Kolonien,* 5 vols. (an elaborate history). **G. Roloff,** *Geschichte der europäischen Kolonisation.* **D. Schäfer,** *Kolonialgeschichte.* **H. Friedjung,** *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus,* 3 vols. (a detailed history of imperialist diplomacy from 1884 to 1914). **J. Darcy,** *Cent Années de rivalité coloniale* (patriotic French study of Anglo-French rivalry). **C. P. Lucas,** *Historical Geography of the British Colonies* (a very comprehensive British classic, giving much about non-British ventures). **P. Reinsch,** *Colonial Administration.* **L. Verlane,** *La Méthode de colonisation.* **A. Ireland,** *Tropical Colonization* and *Far Eastern Tropics.* **J. W. Jeudwine,** *Studies in Empire and Trade.* **E. Hertslet,** *Map of Africa by Treaty.*

I. INTRODUCTION

SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon,** ch. i). * **Hayes,** II, 547-551. * **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* 1-13. ‡ **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* part 1. ‡ **Hobson,**

1-29. ‡ **Culbertson,** *Raw Materials,* 1-7. ‡ **W. R. Shepherd,** "The Expansion of Europe," in *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* vol. 34, pp. 43 ff., 210 ff., 392 ff.

A. Meaning of Imperialism.

1. In general—desire for domination over subject peoples and extensive territories, i.e., for empire.
2. In particular—tendency of modern industrial nations, chiefly since 1870, to seek possession or control of backward, non-industrial, non-European countries and peoples.

B. Far-reaching Significance of Imperialism.

1. Vast extent of non-European territories acquired by imperialist nations between 1870 and 1914.
   France—about 4 million sq. mi.
   Great Britain—between 3 and 4 million sq. mi.
   Germany—about 1 million sq. mi.
   Italy—about 600,000 sq. mi.
   Japan—about 122,000 sq. mi., not counting spheres of influence.
   Russia—extensive annexations and spheres of influence in Asia, exact area undefined.
   United States (since 1867)—716,740 sq. mi.
   Belgium—about 900,000 sq. mi.
2. Prevalence of imperialism.
   (*a*) Before the War: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary (?), Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, United States.
   (*b*) Since the War:
      (i) Germany and Austria-Hungary eliminated as imperialist powers, at least temporarily; Russian imperialism given new form by Bolshevism.
      (ii) Imperialism of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, intensified in certain aspects, though subjected to new restraints and operating under more subtle forms.
3. Importance in international relations (merely a suggestion; details in Parts 5-6-7).
   (*a*) As an influential and sometimes dominant factor in policies of Great Powers.
   (*b*) As cause of numerous international crises and wars—Fashoda, Kruger telegram, Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, Boer War, Russo-Japanese War, etc.
   (*c*) As primary factor in formation of Triple Entente.
   (*d*) As one of chief causes of Great War.
   (*e*) As a prominent feature of Allied and German war-aims.
   (*f*) As cause of continued antagonism and international rivalry for oil, concessions, etc., since the War.
4. Economic importance (a preliminary suggestion; details later).
   (*a*) Increasing dependence of industrial nations on Asiatic, African, and Latin-American countries for raw materials and markets.
   (*b*) Investment of billions of dollars in colonies and backward countries.
   (*c*) Far-reaching consequences of introduction of machinery and employment of native labor in Asia and Africa.

(i) Probable great increase of world's production.
(ii) Possible Asiatic competition with more expensive European and American labor.
(iii) Possible rebellion of natives against European employers.

5. Effect on non-European peoples.
   (*a*) Inhumane exploitation of natives in many cases.
   (*b*) Partial Europeanization in culture.
   (*c*) Gradual economic and political Europeanization.

II. HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

References:—(**Moon**, ch. ii). * **Hayes**, II, 547-550. * **Viallate**, v-18. **Culbertson**, 2-6. **Robinson**, *British Empire*, chs. ii, vii, ix, xi. **Valentin**, 1-17. **Wright**, *Romance of Colonisation*. **Beer**, *Old Colonial System*. **Bruce**, *Broadstone of Empire*. ‡ **Schuyler**, "Rise of Anti-Imperialism in England," *Pol. Sci. Quart.*, XXXVII, 440-471, and "The Climax of Anti-Imperialism in England," *Pol. Sci. Quart.*, XXXVI, 537-560. **Pratt**, *Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest*. **Leroy-Beaulieu**, première partie, livre premier. **Lenin**, *Der Imperialismus*. **Grunzel**, *Economic Protectionism*. **Fisk and Peirce**, *International Commercial Policies*, chs. i-iv. General references above.

A. Insignificance of Europe in Relation to the World, Prior to 15th Century.

B. First Phase of European Expansion, From 15th to 18th Century (mere summary intended).

1. Economic aspects.
   (*a*) Belief of monarchs and statesmen, in 16th and 17th centuries, that colonies, shipping, and commerce were desirable for strong economic-military state.
   (*b*) Eighteenth century mercantilism as a refinement of this idea in light of economic progress.
      (i) Improved transportation, making commerce in bulky goods profitable.
      (ii) Increased manufactures of Western Europe, seeking markets.
      (iii) Difficulty of finding European markets for manufactures produced in most countries.
      (iv) Hence desire for monopolistic control of colonial markets.
      (v) Emphasis on precious metals, hence desire to obtain bullion and raw materials from colonies.
      (vi) Emphasis on shipping and sea-power.
2. Importance of non-economic factors, especially:
   (*a*) Religion.
   (*b*) Ambition of national monarchs.
   (*c*) Spirit of adventure.
3. Collapse of the old mercantilist system.
   (*a*) Destruction of French colonial empire, 1763.
   (*b*) Disruption of English colonial empire, 1783.
   (*c*) Revolt of Spanish-American colonies, c. 1810-24.

(*d*) Separation of Portugal and Brazil, 1822.
(*e*) Growth of belief that colonies inevitably fall away from mother country on reaching maturity.

C. Industrial Revolution and Anti-Imperialism in England.

1. Altered economic situation, approximately 1815-75.
   (*a*) Europe England's largest market for cheap machine-made cloth and hardware.
   (*b*) Restriction of colonial trade for mother-country's exclusive advantage no longer necessary.
   (*c*) Open door in world markets desired by English manufacturers.
2. Altered economic doctrines.
   (*a*) The Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and classical political economy.
   (*b*) Rise of free trade movement in England—Cobden, Bright, and the "Manchester School."
   (*c*) The "Little England" movement, and opposition to colonial expansion on economic grounds.
   (*d*) Influence on prominent statesmen—Bright, Gladstone, even Disraeli (in younger days).
3. Altered political doctrines.
   (*a*) Growth of political liberalism, to which oppression of colonies was repugnant.
   (*b*) Growth of political individualism, opposed to governmental interference in economic life.
4. Rise of similar doctrines in Continental Europe.
5. Some illustrations of the new viewpoint.
   (*a*) Reluctance of English government to annex Fiji, Natal, New Zealand.
   (*b*) Gladstone's Midlothian campaign.
   (*c*) Bismarck's no-colony policy in 1870's.

D. Political and Economic Foundations of Imperialism.

1. The new economic situation, toward close of 19th century.
   (*a*) Competition for markets.
      (i) Machine-industry now developed in Continental Europe and U. S., in competition with England.
      (ii) New industrial countries adopting tariff protection for "infant industries" (compare Part 8, II).
      (iii) Increased volume of mechanical production—"surplus manufactures."
      (iv) Hence, quest of colonial markets.
   (*b*) Improved communications.
      (i) Steam transportation by rail and water now becoming really important.
      (ii) Hence, possibility of increased commerce with colonies.
      (iii) Growth of desire for naval bases.
      (iv) Beginnings of rivalry for railway concessions in backward countries.
   (*c*) Increasing demand for tropical and subtropical raw materials and foodstuffs, by increasingly industrial nations.
   (*d*) Accumulation of capital.

(i) Cause—large profits from factory industry, mines, rent, etc., under capitalist system.

(ii) Result—investment of capital increasingly in colonies and backward countries, to obtain higher interest or larger profits than at home.

(iii) Protection of investments as one of chief factors in imperialist expansion.

2. European emigration.
3. New politico-economic doctrines.
   (*a*) Political doctrine of nationalism.
   (*b*) Economic nationalism or neo-mercantilism, expressed in:
      (i) Tariff protectionism.
      (ii) Social legislation.
      (iii) Economic imperialism.

III. REVIVAL OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon**, ch. iii). * **Woolf**, *Empire and Commerce*, ch. iii. * **Viallate**, 19-54. **Gooch**, 99-114. ‡ **Ward and Gooch**, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, ch. ii. ‡ **Robinson**, *British Empire*, ch. xi. ‡ **Townsend**, *Origins of Modern German Colonialism*, esp. chs. i, vi-viii. **Von Hagen**, *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik*, 42-173. **Roumens**, *L'Impérialisme français*, ch. iii. **Dubois and Terrier**, *Un Siècle d'expansion coloniale*, 373-97. General references.

A. England.

1. Growth of imperialist agitation in 19th century (*cf.* J. R. Seeley and his *Expansion of England*).
2. Disraeli as an imperialist.
3. New vigor in imperialist expansion after 1874.
4. Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism.
5. Chamberlain and his followers.

B. France.

1. Napoleon III as a precursor of imperialism.
2. Rise of imperialist agitation after 1870.
3. Beginnings of aggressive imperialist policy about 1880.
4. Gradual triumph of imperialist doctrines.

C. Germany.

1. Growth of imperialist agitation against Bismarck's anti-colonial policy in 1870's.
2. Bismarck's conversion and beginnings of German colonial empire in 1880's.
3. Intensification and popularization of imperialist doctrines under William II.

D. Belgium.

1. The rôle of Leopold II.
2. Belgium as a vehicle for French imperialist finance.

E. Italy.

1. Disappointment at French seizure of Tunis, 1881.
2. Unsuccessful imperialism of Depretis and Crispi in 1880's and 1890's.
3. Popular enthusiasm for imperialism in 20th century.

F. Russia.

1. Historic tendency to eastward expansion.
2. Historic pressure toward Constantinople.
3. Intensification of these policies in 19th and 20th centuries.

G. Other Imperialist Nations.

1. Netherlands and the retention of an old empire.
2. Portugal's attempt to rebuild her colonial empire in Africa.
3. Spain's efforts to retain fragments of empire.
4. Japan's imperialism in the Far East.
5. Imperialist tendencies of the United States (see below).

IV. DYNAMICS OF IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon,** ch. iv). * **Hayes,** II, 550-560. * **Lippmann,** *Stakes of Diplomacy,* ch. xi. * **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* 15-36. ‡ **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* ch. iii. ‡ **Hobson,** *Imperialism.* ‡ **Townsend,** chs. ii-v. ‡ **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway,* chs. iii, v, vi. **Patton,** *The Business of Missions.* **Speer,** *Missions and Modern History.* **Pavlovitch,** *Foundations of Imperialist Policy.* **Lenin,** *Der Imperialismus.* **Leroy-Beaulieu,** *deuxième partie, livre premier.* **Von Hagen,** 1-41. **Zimmermann** and other general references. Interesting source material in biographies such as those of Sir Harry Johnston, David Livingstone, H. M. Stanley, C. R. Flint, Karl Peters.

A. Active Interest-Groups.

1. Business groups.
   (*a*) Exporters and their subsidiaries—especially cotton and steel groups. (Analyze exports of England to India as shown by *Statesman's Year Book* or *Statistical Abstract.*)
   (*b*) Importers and their subsidiaries (Analyze imports of England from Egypt and India; of U. S. from Philippines).
   (*c*) Certain manufacturing interests.
      (i) Industries dependent on colonial markets or raw materials.
      (ii) Armament and affiliated industries.
      (iii) Makers of uniforms, telegraph and railway material, and other supplies directly used by government in colonies.
   (*d*) Shipping interests.
   (*e*) Investors and bankers—for example, Deutsche Bank.
2. Military and naval groups—advocates of imperialism for strategic defense, acquisition of naval bases, etc.
3. Colonial officials and their families—Sir Harry Johnston, Lord Milner, etc.
4. Missionaries—*e.g.,* Livingstone, Fabri.
5. Adventurers—*e.g.,* Rajah Brooke in Sarawak.

6. Explorers—*e.g.*, Stanley.
7. Statesmen—*e.g.*, Disraeli, Chamberlain, Ferry, McKinley, Roosevelt.

B. Popular Motives.

1. Fear—hence desire for:
   (*a*) Naval bases or strategically situated regions to protect the mother-country or its possessions.
   (*b*) Control of raw materials needed in war.
   (*c*) Guaranty of future economic prosperity by possession of colonies.
2. Surplus population fallacy (Japan, Germany, Italy).
   (*a*) Popularity of idea that colonies are needed as outlets for surplus population.
   (*b*) Unreality of the idea in practice (compare below, Part 8, IV).
3. Popular belief in national economic solidarity—hence readiness to support private business interests of fellow-citizens as opposed to foreigners.
4. Popular desire for national greatness, prestige, honor.
   (*a*) Belief that a great nation must maintain its prestige by protecting its citizens and their property in other countries.
      (i) German seizure of Kiaochow to avenge murder of missionaries.
      (ii) Boer War to protect British in Transvaal.
   (*b*) Desire to have an empire as large as that of other nations.
      (i) German desire for "a place in the sun."
      (ii) Italian willingness to spend millions on a relatively barren but impressively extensive African empire.
   (*c*) Desire to punish atrocities or insults to the flag—"Remember the Maine"—as a motive often indirectly leading to imperialist annexations.
   (*d*) Unwillingness to be humiliated by allowing some other nation to obtain a disputed territory—Franco-German quarrel over Morocco.
5. Aggressive altruism.
   (*a*) Kipling's conception of "The White Man's Burden," and English pride in English humanitarianism applied to India.
   (*b*) French "mission civilisatrice" in Africa.
   (*c*) German belief in extension of "Kultur" to Africans.
   (*d*) American pride in sanitary, educational and other reforms in Philippines and Caribbean; Wilson's Mexican policy of "shooting men into self-government."

V. IN CENTRAL AFRICA

References:—(**Moon,** chs. v, vii). * **Lucas,** ‡ 9-76, * 76-99, * 163-175. * **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* ch. ii. ‡ **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* 51-8, 228-312, 330-7. ‡ **Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* 15-23, 109-147. ‡ **Johnston,** chs. viii, x-xii, xiv. ‡ **Harris,** chs. i-iii, v, and pp. 108-119. **Keltie,** *Partition of Africa,* chs. viii-x, xiii, xv, xviii. ‡ **Bowman,** *The New World,* 553-8. **Rose,** *Development of European Nations,* pt. 2, 268-98. **Keith,** *Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act.* ‡ **Stanley,** *The Congo and the Founding of Its Free State; Through the Dark Continent; How I Found*

Livingstone. **Wack,** *Story of Congo Free State.* **P. Daye,** *L'Empire colonial belge.* **Payen,** *Belgique et Congo.* **Great Britain,** Foreign Office, *Handbooks on Belgian Congo, Liberia, French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa, British West Africa, Nigeria, Gold Coast, Kenya, Tanganyika, Togoland, Cameroon,* etc. **Lewin,** *The Germans and Africa.* **Calvert,** *The German African Empire.* **Giordani,** *The German Colonial Empire.* **Zimmermann,** *The German Empire of Central Africa.* **Peters,** *Die Gründung von Deutsch-Ostafrika.* **Pfeil,** *Zur Erwerbung von Deutsch-Ostafrika.* **Calvert,** *The Cameroons.* **Lugard,** *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.* **O'Neil,** *The War in Africa,* chs. ii, v, vi. **Challaye,** *Le Congo français.* **Bruel,** *L'Afrique équatoriale française.* **Sonolet,** *L'Afrique occidentale française.* **Lucas,** *Historical Geography,* vol. III *West Africa,* by **A. B. Keith.** ♯ **Beer,** *African Questions at the Peace Conference,* 1-286. **Keller,** 543-91. **J. H. Harris,** *Dawn in Darkest Africa.* **R. Ronze,** *La Question d'Afrique.* **Zimmermann, Hertslet,** and other general works as above. **C. S. Osborn,** *Madagascar.*

A. Historical and Geographic Background.

1. Geographic survey of Africa.
2. Small extent of European possessions prior to 1870.
3. Importance of slave trade and anti-slavery movement.
4. Influence of missionaries, explorers and merchants as precursors of Imperialism.

B. Story of the Congo Basin.

1. Stanley, Leopold, and the founding of the Congo Free State.
2. Competition of French, Portuguese, British, and German interests in the Congo basin.
3. The Berlin Conference, 1884-5, the Berlin Act, and the Brussels Act.
4. Exploitation of native labor in the Congo Free State, 1885-1908.
5. Belgian annexation of the Free State, and reforms, 1908-1923.
6. Acquisition and exploitation of French Congo (**Morel**).
7. Potentialities of the Congo region.

C. The East Coast of Central Africa.

1. The situation before the "scramble."
   (*a*) Portuguese possessions.
   (*b*) Empire of the sultan of Zanzibar.
   (*c*) Mackinnon and British interests.
2. Karl Peters and the founding of German East Africa.
3. British East Africa and Anglo-German rivalry.
4. The Anglo-German agreement of 1890.
5. French acquisition of Madagascar.
6. Development and exploitation of East Africa, 1890-1914.
7. The Great War, elimination of Germany, and territorial redistribution.

D. The West Coast.

1. West Africa and the slave trade before 1870.
2. German acquisition of Kamerun, Togoland, and South West Africa.
3. Triangular rivalry of England, France and Germany, up to 1914.
4. Elimination of Germany by Great War.
5. Survey of possessions, policies and potentialities.

VI. IN SOUTH AFRICA

References for A-D:—(**Moon**, ch. ix). * **Hayes**, II, 626, 634, 650-4. * **Lucas**, 134-49, 176-207. * **Johnston**, 254-61, 281-94. * **Harris**, 177-99, 211-3. * **Bowman**, 35-43, 156-64. ‡ **Morel**, 36-67. ‡ **Robinson**, *British Empire*, 357-75. **Marvin**, *Western Races and the World*, chs. x-xi. **Michell**, *Life of Cecil Rhodes*. **Fuller**, *Cecil John Rhodes*. **Williams**, *Cecil Rhodes*. **Harris**, *The Chartered Millions*. **J. Edgar**, *History of South Africa*. **Worsfold**, *Union of South Africa*. **Lucas**, *Hist. Geog.*, vol. IV, pt. 3. **Oxford Survey**, III, *Africa*. **Bryce**, *Impressions of South Africa*, esp. 99-182. **Theal**, *South Africa*. **Cana**, *South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union*. **Bryce** and others, *Briton and Boer*. **Hone**, *Southern Rhodesia*. **Plaatje**, *Native Life in South Africa*. **Weinthal**, *Story of the Cape to Cairo Railroad*. **Hobson**, *The War in South Africa*. **Doyle**, *The Great Boer War*. *Memoirs of Paul Kruger*. ‡ **Egerton**, *British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century*, 181-92. **O'Neil**, *The War in Africa*, ch. iv.

A. Geographic and Historical Background.

1. Geographic environment and native races.
2. Dutch settlement of Cape Colony.
3. British conquest of the Cape, and the Boer Trek.
4. Settlement and British annexation of Natal.

B. Cecil Rhodes as an Empire-Builder.

1. His philosophy of British imperialism.
2. His business interests.
3. The Bechuanaland Protectorate.
4. The Lo Bengula concession and the British South Africa Co.
5. The Jameson Raid.

C. The Boer War, 1899-1902.

1. The Boer republics and Gladstone.
2. The franchise dispute.
3. Economic causes.
4. The war and its result.

D. British South Africa Since 1902.

1. Self-government and federation of the four colonies.
2. Attitude of the Boers—the loyal majority and the Nationalist minority; the Boer Rebellion of 1914; Boer Nationalism since 1914.
3. The negro problem.
4. The problem of Indian immigrants.
5. Conquest of German South West Africa (below).
6. Present condition of Rhodesia.

E. German South West Africa.

Special references:—* **Harris**, ch. iv. ‡ **Calvert**, *German African Empire*, 1-107. **Antonelli**, *L'Afrique et la Paix de Versailles*, ch. iii. ‡ **Townsend**, *Modern German Colonialism*, 165-9. **Von Hagen**, *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik*, bk. IV, sects. 1-6, 9, 15, 17. Other books on German colonies given under V, above.

1. Missionary and commercial origins.
2. Bismarck's diplomacy.
3. Extension by agreement of 1890.
4. Economic development and native uprisings.
5. Conquest by British.

F. Mozambique and Angola—Portuguese Colonies.

Special references:—‡ **Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* ch. xi. ‡ **Gibbons,** *New Map of Africa,* ch. xiii. **Theal,** *Portuguese in South Africa.* **Harris,** *Portuguese Slavery.* **Cadbury,** *Labour in Portuguese West Africa.* **Maugham,** *Portuguese East Africa.* **Great Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbooks on *Angola* and *Mozambique.*

1. Revival and extension of Portugal's old claims, in 1880's.
2. Anglo-German agreements for demarcation of spheres of influence in Portuguese colonies.
3. Economic development.

G. Review and Discussion of Southern African Problems.

VII. IN ABYSSINIA AND SUDAN

References:—(**Moon,** ch. viii). * **Lucas,** 100-5. * **Harris,** 330-56. ‡ **Bowman,** 62-5, 556-7. ‡ **Woolf,** 138-227. **Hanotaux,** *Fachoda.* **Alype,** *L'Ethiopie et les convoitises allemandes.* **Castonnet Des Fosses,** *L'Abyssinie et les Italiens.* **Martin,** *The Sudan in Evolution.* **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbooks, *Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, Abyssinia, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,* etc. **C. F. Rey,** *Unconquered Abyssinia.*

A. Geographic Environment and Native Races.

B. French Expansion in Western Sudan and Plan of Transcontinental Empire.

C. Italian Footholds in Eritrea and Somaliland and Unsuccessful Attempt to Conquer Abyssinia.

D. Relation of Eastern Sudan to British Interests in Egypt and Cape-to-Cairo Scheme.

E. The Clash Between British and French Imperialism at Fashoda.

F. The Sudan Under British Rule.

G. The Anglo-French-Italian Agreement Regarding Abyssinia.

VIII. IN NORTHERN AFRICA

General references:—(**Moon,** ch. x). * **Lucas,** 105-33. ‡ **Bowman,** 54-62, 105-18. * **Johnston,** 196-238. ‡ **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* 69-137, 325-30. ‡ **Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* 69-101. ‡ **Harris,** chs. ix-xiii.

A. Geographic Survey and Native Races.

B. Condition at Beginning of 19th Century.

C. French Conquest and Development of Algeria.

Special references:—**Casserly,** *Algeria Today.* **Gautier,** *L'Algérie et la métropole.* **Picquet,** *La colonisation française dans l'Afrique du nord.* **Leroy-Beaulieu,** bk. ii, ch. v. **Le Marchand,** *L'Europe et la conquête d'Alger.*

D. French Conquest of Tunis.

Special references:—‡ **Gooch,** *Modern Europe,* 59-67. **Crispi,** *Memoirs,* II, ch. ii. **Picquet. D'Estournelles de Constant,** *La Politique française en Tunisie.*

1. Importance of economic and strategic motives.
2. Method: "punitive expedition" and protectorate.
3. Influence on formation of Triple Alliance.
4. Tunis under French rule.

E. The Clash of Interests in Morocco.

Special references:—‡ **Gooch,** *Modern Europe,* 340-68, 458-83. **Siebert,** *Entente Diplomacy,* ch. x. **Morel,** *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy.* **Bishop,** *Theodore Roosevelt.* **Albin,** *Le 'coup d'Agadir.'* **Tardieu,** *La Conférence d'Algéciras.* **Tardieu,** *Le Mystère d'Agadir.* **Caillaux,** *Agadir.* **France,** *Livres jaunes, Affaires du Maroc.* **Great Britain,** *White Books on Morocco;* Foreign Office Handbooks on *French Morocco* and *Spanish Morocco.* **Touron,** *Notre Protectorat marocain.* **Tarde,** *Le Maroc école d'energie.* **Taillis,** *Le Nouveau Maroc.* **Picquet,** *Le Maroc.*

1. Value of Morocco.
2. Delcassé's policy of penetration.
3. French secret agreements with Italy, England, and Spain, 1900-4.
4. The Morocco crisis of 1905.
5. The Algeciras Conference of 1906.
6. The Casablanca incident and Franco-German agreement of 1909.
7. French military intervention and the crisis of 1911.
8. The Franco-German agreement of 1911.
9. Morocco a French protectorate, 1912-23.
10. The Spanish zone.
11. The Tangier question.

F. Italian Conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

Special references:—‡ **C. Schanzer,** "Italian Colonial Policy in Northern Africa," *Foreign Affairs,* March 1924. **Barclay,** *The Turco-Italian War.* **Lapworth,** *Tripoli and Young Italy.* **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbook, *Italian Libya.* **P. d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota,** *Espansionismo italiano odierno,* I, 38-62.

1. Influence of financial interests and patriotic sentiment.
2. Diplomatic preliminaries—agreements with France, Germany, Austria, etc.
3. The occasion: the Morocco crisis of 1911.
4. The Turco-Italian War.

5. Difficulties of Italians in "Libya" since 1912.
6. Extension of hinterland after Great War.

G. English Imperialism in Egypt.

Special references:—**Rose,** *Development of European Nations,* II, chs. iv-vi. ‡ **Chirol,** *The Egyptian Problem.* ‡ **Cromer,** *Modern Egypt.* **Milner,** *England in Egypt.* **Low,** *Egypt in Transition.* **Blunt,** *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt.* **Weinthal,** *Cape to Cairo Railroad.* **Freycinet,** *La Question d'Égypte.* **Labry,** *La Révolution égyptienne.* **Adam,** *L'Angleterre et l'Égypte.*

1. The Suez canal, cotton, finance, and the Cape-to-Cairo plan as reasons for British interest.
2. Anglo-French financial control in the seventies.
3. English occupation, 1882.
4. Egypt under Cromer.
5. The British protectorate, 1914.
6. Egyptian rebellion and "independence."
7. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (above, VII).

IX. IN THE NEAR EAST

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xi). * **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (the best detailed treatment, of the imperialist issue in the Near East), esp. chs. iv, vi, x, xii. ‡ **Earle,** "The Turkish Petroleum Company, A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy," *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* June 1924. ‡ **Toynbee,** "The East After Lausanne," *Foreign Affairs,* Sept. 1923. ‡ **Loder,** *The Truth About Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria.* ‡ **Bowman,** *The New World,* 65-76, 102-105, 409-49, and *Supplement,* 95-104; also "The Mohammedan World," *Geographical Review,* Jan. 1924. **Lybyer,** *Question of the Near East* (Inst. of Int. Educ., syllabus no. VIII). **Cocks,** *The Secret Treaties,* chs. i, iii. **Schevill,** *Balkan Peninsula,* 438-553. **Price,** *Rebirth of Turkey.* **Stoddard,** *New World of Islam.* **Toynbee,** *Western Question in Greece and Turkey.* **Eversley and Chirol,** *The Turkish Empire.* **Marriott,** *The Eastern Question.* **Abbott,** *Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers.* **P. Rohrbach,** *Die Bagdadbahn.* **J. Ancel,** *Question d'Orient.* **Driault,** *La Question d'Orient.* **Pinon,** *L'Europe et la jeune Turquie.* **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbooks on *Anatolia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine, Zionism, Armenia, Caucasia, Mesopotamia,* etc. **Amer. Assoc. Int. Concil,** *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923. Report of the Foreign Policy Association on the Lausanne Treaty. Current History,* VIII, 485-95 (Chester Concession). **Bing,** "Turkey and Chester Inc.," *New Republic,* XXXIV, 290-2. **House and Seymour,** *What Really Happened at Paris,* ch. viii (by Westermann). **E. M. Earle,** *Problems of the Near East* (an excellent bibliography). Also references on oil, Part 8, III, below.

A. Background.

1. Geographical, racial, religious.
2. Rise of nationalities and conflicting interests of Great Powers before 1878.
3. The Berlin Congress of 1878.
4. Conditions in the 1880's.

B. German Imperialism and the Bagdad Railway.

1. Growth of German interests in Turkey.
2. Genesis of Bagdad Railway scheme.
3. Analysis of concession or charter of 1903.
4. Economic and political significance of the project.

C. Conflict of Imperialist Interests.

1. British, French and Russian opposition to the Bagdad Railway.
2. Young Turk Revolution and the Bosnian crisis.
3. Potsdam agreement.
4. Imperialist interests in Balkan wars of 1912-13.
5. The ill-fated bargains of 1913-14.
   (*a*) Franco-German convention of Feb. 15, 1914.
   (*b*) Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913.
   (*c*) Anglo-German convention of 1914.
6. Relation of conflicting imperialist interests to outbreak of Great War.

D. The Partition of Turkey.

1. Proposed partition of Turkey by secret agreements during war.
2. The Treaty of Sèvres and the mandates.
3. The Nationalist revolution and the Treaty of Lausanne.
4. The Chester Concession and the battle of oil interests.
5. The status of the Bagdad Railway.

X. IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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4. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.
5. The Russo-German Potsdam agreement, as regards Persia.
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2. Shuster's mission, his defeat, and "The Strangling of Persia."
3. Political and economic retardation.

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2. As spoils—the Anglo-Russian secret treaty of 1915.

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   (*a*) Non-ratification of Anglo-Persian treaty.
   (*b*) Independence of Afghanistan, 1921.
4. The American financial adviser to Persia.
5. The Anglo-Persian and American oil companies.

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   (*a*) Significance of the Act of 1876.
   (*b*) Significance of removal of capital from Calcutta to Delhi.
3. Rounding out the Indian empire.
   (*a*) Consolidation of British power in India in 19th century—British India and the native states.
   (*b*) Eastward expansion—Lower and Upper Burma.

(*c*) Northward expansion.
  (i) Assam.
  (ii) Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.
  (iii) The Tibetan buffer state (compare X-C).
(*d*) The northwestern frontier.
  (i) Sind and Punjab.
  (ii) Baluchistan.
  (iii) Kashmir.
  (iv) The North West Frontier Province.
  (v) Afghanistan as a buffer state (compare X-C).
  (vi) British interests in Persia (compare X).
(*e*) British policy of controlling adjacent islands, naval bases, and maritime approaches to India.

4. Economic aspects.
   (*a*) Increasing importance of India as a British market and effect of British competition on Indian cotton industry.
   (*b*) Growth of British investments and introduction of machinery.
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   (*f*) Taxation.
   (*g*) The question of emigration.
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   (*a*) Rise of Indian nationalism and the Congresses.
   (*b*) The Morley Act.
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5. Importance in American world policy.

C. The Spanish War and American Imperialism.

Special references:—* **Robertson,** *History Latin American Nations,* ch. viii. **Id.,** *Hispanic American Relations with the United States.* ‡ **G. Stuart,** *Latin America and the United States.* **S. G. Inman,** *Problems in Pan-Americanism.* **J. H. Latané,** *The United States and Latin America,* esp. ch. ii. **E. Root,** *Latin America and the United States.* **Cardenas y Echarte,** *La Politica de los Estados Unidos en el continente americano.* **E. Kimpen,** *Die Ausbreitungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten,* part 3. **A. Demangeon,** *America and the Race for World Dominion.* **Scott Nearing,** *The American Empire.* **F. H. Giddings,** *Democracy and Empire.* **C. R. Fish,** *The Path of Empire.* **R. F. Pettigrew,** *The Course of Empire.* **H. Levy,** *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als Wirtschaftsmacht.* **F. Carraballo y Sotolongo,** *El Imperialismo norte-americano.* **P. M. Brown,** *American Intervention in Central America.* **C. E. Martin,** *The Policy of the U. S. as regards Intervention.* **U. S. Tariff Commission,** *Colonial Tariff Policies,* 571-629. **W. T. Colyer,** *Americanism a World Menace.* **J. F. Rhodes,** *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations.* **C. S. Olcott,** *Life of McKinley.* **J. B. Bishop,** *Theodore Roosevelt.* **F. A. Ogg,** *National Progress.* **P. Bonilla,** *The Wilson Doctrine.* **E. Robinson and V. West,** *Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson.* **J. B. Scott,** *Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policy.* **B. J. Hendrick,** *Walter Hines Page,* I, 180 ff. **E. J. Burton,** *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War.* **B. A. Reuter,** *Anglo-American Relations During the Spanish-American War.* **H. E. Flack,** *Spanish-American Diplomatic Relations Preceding the War of 1898.* **J. B. Moore,** *Principles of American Diplomacy,* 246-69, 365-419. **J. B. Moore,** *Digest,* VI, 368-604, 714-15. **C. R. Fish,** *American Diplomacy,* chs. 31, 34. **J. H. Latané,** *From Isolation to Leadership,* chs. 7-8. **Id.,** *America as a World Power.* **A. C. Coolidge,** *The U. S. as a World Power.* **S. G. Inman,** "Imperialistic America" in *Atlantic Mo.,* July, 1924. **W. Weyl,** *American World Policies,* chs. iv, v, xv. **W. F. Johnson,** *American Foreign Relations.* **R. G. Adams,** *History of the Foreign Policy of the U. S.* **H. H. Powers,** *America Among the Nations.* **I. Fabela,** *Los Estados Unidos contra la libertad. The World Tomorrow,* Nov., 1924. **U. S.,** Department of State and Department of Commerce, official bulletins and other public papers.

1. Reasons for American abstention from worldwide scramble for colonies in 1880's.
2. Industrial development and rise of imperialist tendencies, in last quarter of 19th century.
3. Rise of Pan-Americanism—resemblance to European "sphere of influence" policies.
4. The Spanish-American War—causes and consequences.
5. Policies of Roosevelt and Taft—the "big stick" and intervention; dollar diplomacy and receiverships.
6. The Wilson policy.
   (*a*) Wilson's anti-imperialist principles and the "new Pan-Americanism."
   (*b*) Actual imperialist advances (below, D).
7. The Harding-Hughes policy.

D. Progress of American Imperialism in Mexico and the Caribbean Region.

References:—See C, also General References, above, and *Reader's Guide* for articles in periodicals.

1. In Mexico.
   (*a*) Growth of American economic interests in Mexico, especially oil, and rivalry with British oil interests.
   (*b*) Wilson and civil war in Mexico.
      (i) Domestic causes.
      (ii) Wilson's opposition to Cowdray oil interests regarding recognition of Huerta (see **Hendrick**).
      (iii) Wilson's intervention at Vera Cruz.
      (iv) The punitive expedition and Pancho Villa.
      (v) Carranza's constitution and the oil interests.
   (*c*) Continuation of the oil controversy under Harding's administration.
   (*d*) The agreement of 1923 and recognition of the Obregón government.
2. Central America and the Panama Canal.
   (*a*) Panama and the canal.
      (i) Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.
      (ii) Hay-Herran Treaty.
      (iii) The Panama Revolution and the canal zone lease.
      (iv) Significance of the canal, strategic and economic.
      (v) The canal as stimulus to further acquisitions.
   (*b*) U. S. and the Central American Federation.
   (*c*) The Nicaragua treaty.
   (*d*) Costa Rica—failure of Tinoco's attempt to grant concessions to British.
   (*e*) Intervention in Honduras, 1924.
   (*f*) The Salvador loan agreement, 1923.
   (*g*) General dominance of American economic and naval interests in Central America.
3. Cuba.
   (*a*) Independence—with the restrictions of the Platt Amendment.
   (*b*) The right and practice of American intervention.
   (*c*) Predominance of American economic interests.
4. Porto Rico.
   (*a*) Annexation.
   (*b*) Material progress under American rule.
   (*c*) Agitation of natives for constitutional rights and autonomy.
5. Haiti.
   (*a*) Reasons for Wilson's intervention, 1915.
   (*b*) The treaty of 1915.
   (*c*) Haiti as a virtual protectorate.
6. Dominican Republic.
   (*a*) Roosevelt and the American financial receivership.
   (*b*) Occupation by American marines, 1916-24, and American insistence on increased powers of control.
7. Purchase of the Danish West Indies.
   (*a*) Strategic reason.
   (*b*) Financial cost.
   (*c*) Discontent in the islands.
8. Colombia.
   (*a*) Antagonism after Panama revolution (above).
   (*b*) The "blackmail" treaty.

(*c*) American policy regarding oil, railway and harbor concessions in Colombia.

9. Venezuela.
   (*a*) Cleveland and the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, 1895.
   (*b*) Roosevelt and the Venezuelan debt crisis, 1903.
   (*c*) Oil and mining interests.
   (*d*) Instability of government.

E. Discussion.

1. The case for American imperialism in Mexico and the Caribbean region.
   (*a*) Economic.
      (i) Predominance of American over other foreign commercial interests.
      (ii) Large American investments in plantations, mines, oil wells, industries, and government loans.
      (iii) Tendency of private interests to demand governmental protection, to prevent damage to property in revolutions, or to obtain favorable conditions for business.
      (iv) Difficulty of economic development without some form of foreign control to prevent disorders.
   (*b*) Strategic.
      (i) Desire to control naval bases near Panama Canal.
      (ii) Desire for naval control of Caribbean.
   (*c*) Humanitarian.
      (i) Wilson's idea of teaching Latin-Americans self-government.
      (ii) Sanitary work in American dependencies.
      (iii) Lack of education for masses in Caribbean countries.
2. The case against American imperialism.
   (*a*) Imperialist interventions contrary to American principles of government.
   (*b*) Economic and other disadvantages of antagonizing larger Latin American nations.
   (*c*) Tendency of Europeans to regard U. S. as "hypocritical."
   (*d*) Argument that sanitary and other improvements are outweighed by cost of interventions, brutality to natives, etc.
   (*e*) Argument that imperialism is caused by selfish private interests.
   (*f*) Indignation of negroes in U. S. at intervention in Haiti and Dominican Republic.
   (*g*) General arguments, below, XVIII.

XV. REVIEW OF COLONIAL POLICIES AND POSSESSIONS OF THE CHIEF IMPERIALIST NATIONS

General References:—(**Moon,** ch. xvii). * **Bowman,** chs. 32-3. **P. Reinsch,** *Colonial Administration* and *Colonial Government.* **U. S. Tariff Commission,** *Colonial Tariff Policies,* ch. i. **A. Ireland,** *Tropical Colonization* and *The Far Eastern Tropics.* **C. H. Stigand,** *Administration in Tropical Africa.* **Leroy-Beaulieu,** livre deuxième, ch. iii. **Verlane,** *La*

Méthode de colonisation. **Valentin,** *Kolonialgeschichte.* **A. Zimmermann,** *Kolonialpolitik* and *Die europäischen Kolonien.*

A. Imperial Britain.

Special References:— **Bowman,** ch. 2. * **Robinson,** *British Empire,* chs. 24-5. ‡ **H. E. Egerton,** *Short History of British Colonial Policy* and ‡ *British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century. Oxford Survey,* vol. VI. **E. Jenks,** *Government of the British Empire.* **A. B. Keith,** *Responsible Government in the Dominions.* **Id.,** *Dominion Home Rule in Practice.* **L. Curtis,** *The Commonwealth of Nations* and *The Problem of the Commonwealth.* **R. Jebb,** *Colonial Nationalism.* **Id.,** *The Britannic Question.* **J. Bryce,** *Modern Democracies,* passim. **J. R. Seeley,** *Expansion of England.* **N. Angell,** *If Britain is to Live.* **Great Britain,** *Resources of the Empire Series.* **L. C. G. Knowles,** *Economic Development of the Overseas Empire.* **A. B. Keith** (ed.), *Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1763-1917.* **Lucas,** *The Empire at War.* **Demangeon,** *Empire britannique.* **H. Gunn** (ed.), *The British Empire* (12 vols.). References on special colonies above.

1. Extent and richness of British possessions and spheres of influence.
2. Policy of colonial self-government.
   (*a*) Full application in Dominions.
   (*b*) Partial application in India.
   (*c*) Diversified but undemocratic methods in other dependencies.
3. Colonial administration and natives.
   (*a*) Flexibility of British native policy.
   (*b*) Relatively high quality of British administrative personnel.
   (*c*) Humanitarian tendencies of imperial government's policies.
   (*d*) Tendency toward friction between Downing Street and local colonial officials regarding treatment of natives; also regarding Indian emigration.
   (*e*) Opposition to slavery but lack of clear-cut policy regarding compulsory labor.
4. Economic.
   (*a*) Traditional English policy of free trade and open door.
   (*b*) Growth of tariff preference among Dominions, and introduction in a number of Crown Colonies.
   (*c*) Strong agitation in England and in self-governing Dominions for imperial economic policy (regarding raw materials, shipping, loans, tariff preference, etc.) discordant with traditional liberal principles.
   (*d*) General success in economic development of dependencies.
5. Imperial defense.
   (*a*) Problem of reconciling imperial unity in military and naval policy with independent spirit of Dominions.
   (*b*) Utilization of Indian troops but general disapproval of militarization of negroes.
   (*c*) Control of naval bases such as Malta, Singapore, etc.
   (*d*) Recent policy of securing oil reserves for navy (compare below, Part 8, III-B-1-*e*).
6. Imperial representation and federation problems (below, Part 7, I).
   (*a*) Dominion self-government coupled with revived imperialism as causes of recent agitation regarding imperial federation, imperial representation, and imperial conference schemes.

(*b*) Difficulties inherent in imperial federation and imperial parliament schemes.
(*c*) The imperial conferences in practice.
(*d*) Problem of ultimate participation of other colonies.

7. The policy of expansion.
   (*a*) Contrast between anti-expansionist utterances of many British statesmen and actual acquisitiveness of British Empire.
   (*b*) Explanation of the contrast—conflict between aggressiveness of Dominions, colonial officials, business interests, etc., and anti-expansionist theories of other classes.
   (*c*) Tendency toward more subtle forms of control, as in Egypt, under post-bellum conditions.
8. Regional consolidation.
   (*a*) Policy of creating great regional colonial groups—the Dominions as federations.
   (*b*) Policy of grouping numerous subsidiary possessions under the Government of India.
   (*c*) Policy of entrusting relatively unimportant possessions to the Dominions for administration.

B. Imperial France.

Special References:—‡ **Bowman,** ch. iii. **Roumens,** *L'Impérialisme français,* ch. vi. **Dubois and Terrier,** *Un Siècle d'expansion coloniale,* 1031-51. **A. Sarraut,** *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises,* 83-142, 278-358. **L. Vignon,** *Un Programme de politique coloniale.* **Zimmermann,** vol. IV. **Verlane,** *La Méthode de colonisation.* **W. M. Sloane,** *Greater France in Africa.* **L. Hubert,** *Une Politique coloniale; le salut par les colonies.*

1. Extent and value of possessions.
2. Relations between France and dependencies.
   (*a*) Representation of some dependencies in French Parliament.
   (*b*) Limited application of local representative government.
   (*c*) Centralized control through colonial administrators responsible to Paris; contrast with British.
   (*d*) Extensive use of protectorate system.
3. Native policy.
   (*a*) Avoidance of rigid methods of cultural assimilation.
   (*b*) Skilful introduction of French civilization with minimum disturbance to native institutions.
   (*c*) Lack of race prejudice and race discrimination.
4. Defense policy.
   (*a*) Militarization of Africans.
   (*b*) French policy of territorial consolidation and strategic railways in Africa, contrasted with British policy of naval bases and waterways.
   (*c*) Problem of naval control of West-Mediterranean communications between France and North-African dependencies.
5. Economic policy.
   (*a*) Policy of closed door and tariff assimilation, except where forbidden by international agreements.
   (*b*) Relatively slower rate of economic development of colonies, compared with British, but recent increase of vigor in economic policy.

C. Imperialist Italy.

Special References:—‡ **Bowman,** 140-4. ‡ **Keller,** 517-31. **G. Assereto,** *L'Italia e le sue colonie.* **P. d'Agostinō Orsini di Camerota,** *Espansionismo italiano odierno.* **C. Schanzer,** article in *Foreign Affairs,* March 1924. **E. Lémonon,** *La Politique coloniale de l'Italie.*

1. Relatively small extent and value of colonies.
2. Expansionist policy of Italian patriots.
   (*a*) Interest in Albania, Anatolia, and Abyssinia, as possible regions for imperialist economic penetration.
3. Administration and native policy.
   (*a*) Centralized control by minister of colonies.
   (*b*) Introduction of local parliaments, with equal rights for natives, in Libya.
   (*c*) Moslem antagonism, especially in Libya.
4. Economic policy.
   (*a*) Relatively poor resources, and hence small economic progress, of Italian colonies.
   (*b*) Large expenditures of Italian government in colonies.
   (*c*) Agitation of patriots for more ambitious policy of governmental assistance to economic enterprise in colonies.
   (*d*) Tariff assimilation (below, Part 8).
5. Desire to find colonial outlets for emigration as a special factor in Italian imperialism.

D. Japan.

Special References:—‡ **Bowman,** ch. 31. * **Buell,** ch. i. **Chung,** *Case of Korea.* **Japan,** *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen.* **R. Hayden,** article in *Foreign Affairs,* March 1924. **O. Rutter,** *Through Formosa.* See also references under XII.

1. Extent and value of possessions.
   (*a*) Japanese colonies and mandates.
   (*b*) Spheres of influence in China—Manchuria, Eastern Mongolia, Fukien, Shantung.
2. Expansionist policy.
   (*a*) Record of annexations and attempted annexations.
   (*b*) Policy of imperialist penetration and control in China, especially in Manchuria, Shantung, and in eastern Siberia.
3. Policy of administrative assimilation.
4. Economic policy.
   (*a*) The closed door.
   (*b*) Direct governmental control of some industries, and indirect control through quasi-public monopolistic companies in others.
5. Emigration, and the settlement of colonists in possessions.
6. Complaints of Koreans against Japanese methods.

E. Pre-War Germany.

Special References:—‡ **Beer,** *African Questions,* 9-37. ‡ **Keller,** 531-595. **Valentin,** *Kolonialgeschichte,* ch. 10. **Hagen,** *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik.* **Zimmermann,** *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik.* **P. Rohrbach,** *Das deutsche Kolonialwesen.* **Great Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbooks on *German Colonization* and *Treatment of Natives in the German Colonies.* Also topic V, above.

1. Administration.
   (*a*) Bismarck's chartered company system and its failure.
   (*b*) Reforms under Stuebel and Dernburg.
2. Culture and the natives.
   (*a*) Exaggerated enthusiasm of some imperialists for imposition of Culture on natives.
   (*b*) Strong race prejudice, expropriation of natives from land, bureaucratic methods, and rigid regulations as reasons for serious native rebellions.
   (*c*) Policy of using compulsory native labor on German-owned plantations, instead of encouraging free native production.
3. Economic policy.
   (*a*) Relatively poor results of plantation system in German Africa.
   (*b*) Attempts to introduce cultivation of tobacco, coffee, cotton, etc.
   (*c*) Expectation of future development as compensation for relatively small value of German colonies in 1914.
4. Policy of imperialist economic penetration in non-German lands, especially:
   (*a*) Turkey (see X).
   (*b*) China (Shantung).

F. Russia.

Special References:—‡ **Bowman,** 403-8, 473-6. **P. Rohrbach,** *Russissche Kolonisation in Asien.* **A. Krausse,** *Russia in Asia.* **Vambéry,** *Western Culture in Eastern Lands.* **M. P. Price,** *Siberia.* **Russia Colonization Bureau,** *Atlas of Asiatic Russia* (in Russian). ‡ **Pasvolsky,** *Russia in the Far East,* ch. ii. **Dennis,** *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia,* esp. chs. x-xii. **Lenin,** *Der Imperialismus.*

1. Imperialist policies of pre-war Russia.
   (*a*) The colonization of Asiatic Russia by traders, Cossacks, exiles, and agricultural settlers—contrast with tropical colonies of other powers.
   (*b*) Russian railways in Siberia and Central Asia as arteries of imperialism.
   (*c*) "Peaceful penetration" of Manchuria, Mongolia, Persia.
   (*d*) Imperialist diplomacy in Near East, and designs on Constantinople and Turkish Armenia.
2. Bolshevik policies.
   (*a*) The Bolshevik view of imperialism as latest stage of decadent capitalism.
   (*b*) Renunciation of concessions and other imperialist rights in Persia and China.
   (*c*) Use of Red troops to spread Bolshevist principles in border states, and affiliation of these states with Soviet Russia.
   (*d*) Use of propaganda, diplomacy, and money to stir up Asiatic races against capitalism and imperialism.

G. Portugal.

References:—**Keller,** ch. iii. ‡ **Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* ch. xi. ‡ **Bowman,** ch. vii. **A. Marvaud,** *Le Portugal et ses colonies.* **Zimmermann, I. Vasconcelos,** *Colonias portuguesas.* **K. Simon,** *Spanien und Portugal als See- und Kolonialmächte.*

(*a*) Relatively inefficient and oppressive administration.
(*b*) Economic backwardness.
(*c*) British economic penetration of Portuguese colonies.

H. Belgium.

References:—**Bowman,** 124-8. Also topic V, above.

1. Cruel exploitation of Congo by concessionaire companies under Leopold II.
2. Reformed administration since 1908.

I. Dutch Imperialism in the East Indies.

Special References:—**Bowman,** 176. ‡ **Keller,** ch. xii. **C. Day,** *Dutch in Java.* **Zimmermann,** V. Also topic XIII-B, above.

1. Oppressive administration of Dutch East India Co. in 17th and 18th centuries, and its failure.
2. Innovations under temporary British possession—Raffles.
3. The "culture system" and forced labor.
4. Gradual abandonment of culture system.
5. Recent growth of anxiety regarding naval defense of colonies.

J. Spanish Imperialism.

Special References:—**Bowman,** 154-5. ‡ **Keller,** esp. ch. ix. **Zimmermann, I. Simon.**

1. Decline of Spanish imperialism.
   (*a*) Great achievements of Spanish colonization in earlier centuries.
   (*b*) Loss of most Spanish American colonies in early 19th century.
   (*c*) Later loss of Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines.
   (*d*) Sale of Spanish Micronesia to Germany.
2. Small extent of remaining Spanish colonies.
3. Costliness and relatively poor results of recent Spanish imperialism in Spanish Morocco.
4. Determination of Spanish military leaders to regain prestige as successful imperialist nation.
5. Spanish attitude regarding Tangier.

K. Colonial Policies of the United States.

References:—Above, under topics XIII-F and XIV.

1. Extent and value of the empire of the United States.
   (*a*) Actual possessions—Porto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, Philippines, Virgin Is., etc.
   (*b*) Caribbean and Central American countries more or less under control of U. S. (above, XIV-D).
2. Colonial self-government.
   (*a*) The gradual increase of Filipino self-government, and the promise of ultimate independence.
   (*b*) Status of the other possessions.
   (*c*) Policy of permitting Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and other dependent states to remain nominally "independent," with more or less American supervision and right of intervention.

3. Economic.
   (*a*) Vigorous economic development of American dependencies.
   (*b*) The closed door—tariff assimilation or preference.
   (*c*) Policy of asserting right to veto foreign concessions in Caribbean region.
   (*d*) Predominance of American private business interests in commerce and production of American dependencies.
4. Cultural and humanitarian.
   (*a*) Strong belief in American cultural and racial superiority.
   (*b*) Hence, remarkably vigorous development of education, with aim of Americanizing natives; contrast with French adaptability.
   (*c*) Exceptional efficiency in police, sanitation, and material progress.

XVI. IMPERIALISM AS A CAUSE OF WAR

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xviii). * **K. Page,** *War, Its Causes, Consequences and Cure,* ch. i. * **W. Lippmann,** *Stakes of Diplomacy,* 71-128. **F. C. Howe,** *Why War.* **J. Bakeless,** *Economic Causes of Modern War,* chs. ii-iv. **J. M. Clark, Hamilton,** and **Moulton,** *Readings in the Economics of War,* 22-57. **Krehbiel,** pt. 1, ch. ii. **O. T. Crosby,** *International War: Its Cause and Its Cure,* chs. 32-36, 40, 41. **B. Russell,** *Why Men Fight.* **G. L. Dickinson,** *Causes of International War.* **E. D. Morel,** *Africa and the Peace of Europe.* **F. Delaisi,** *Oil, Its Influence on Politics.* **A. Fabrie-Luce,** *La Victoire* (*Les Documents bleus, No. 11*). **P. Perreau-Pradier and M. Besson,** *L'Effort colonial des Alliés.*

A. Review of Wars Directly Caused By Imperialism Since 1870.

B. Importance of Imperialism as a Cause of War in General.

C. Importance of Imperialism as a Cause of the Great War in Particular.

1. Rivalry between German imperialism in the Near East and Entente aims, as background of Serajevo incident.
2. Alinement of powers in crisis of 1914 largely influenced by agreements such as Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 regarding Persia, Anglo-French agreement of 1904 regarding Morocco and Egypt, Anglo-Japanese alliance for protection of Asiatic possessions, Austro-German solidarity in attempt to dominate Near East.
3. Earlier imperialist quarrels, such as Morocco crises, as important factors in aggravating enmities and stimulating militarism, hence as indirect causes of Great War.
4. Importance of imperialist causes of war, shown by war aims of Germans and by secret treaties among Allies during war (see Part 6, II-F).

D. Imperialism as a Potential Cause of Future Wars.

XVII. EFFECTS OF IMPERIALISM ON NON-EUROPEAN PEOPLES

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xix). * **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce,* 337-68. **J. A. Hobson,** *Imperialism,* 235-304. ‡ **Bowman,** 532-9, 547-51. **Morel,**

Black Man's Burden, 163-214. **H. H. Johnston,** *The Backward Peoples and Our Relations with Them.* **Johnston,** "Race Problems in the New Africa," *Foreign Affairs,* June 1924. **P. Nielsen,** *The Black Man's Place in South Africa.* **W. C. Willoughby,** *Race Problems in the New Africa.* **W. D. Weatherford,** *The Negro From Africa to America.* **T. L. Stoddard,** *The Rising Tide of Color.* **Stoddard,** *The New World of Islam.* **H. M. Hyndman,** *Awakening of Asia,* **E. C. Moore,** *West and East.* **M. Anesaki,** *Religious and Social Problems of the Orient.* **P. Reinsch,** *Colonial Government* and *Colonial Administration.* **T. J. Jones,** *Education in Africa.* **Macdonald,** *Trade Politics and Christianity.* **L. Alston,** *The White Man's Work in Asia and Africa.* **A. Ireland,** *Tropical Colonization.* **A. Demangeon,** *L'Empire britannique,* bk. iii. **A. H. Snow,** *The Question of Aborigines.* **P. Rohrbach,** *Deutsche Kolonialwirtschaft.* ‡ **Beer,** *African Questions,* 179-88, 249-58, also 27-45, 221-37, 269-78. **E. Baillaud,** *La Politique indigène de l'Angleterre.* **J. K. Vietor,** *Geschichtliche u. kulturelle Entwickelung unserer Schutzgebiete.* **M. S. Evans,** *Black and White in South East Africa.* **Great Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbook, *Treatment of Natives in German Colonies.*

A. Conflict of Opinions on This Subject.

1. Imperialist belief in beneficial effects (Kipling's "White Man's Burden," etc.).
2. Anti-imperialist belief that effects are injurious (Morel, Woolf, Hobson).
3. Fallacy of general approval or disapproval; desirability of scrutinizing good and evil effects impartially.

B. The Twin Problems of Land and Labor in Backward Tropical Colonies.

1. Failure of natives to understand European conception of private ownership of land; consequent difficulty when government grants land, or natives "sell" land, to whites; general tendency toward expropriation of natives.
2. Difficulty of obtaining native labor without compulsion; the gradual abolition of slavery; Leopold's methods in Congo; analogous methods elsewhere; the Dutch "culture system;" expropriation of natives from land as one method of obtaining labor; taxation as a supplementary method; peonage; contract labor; use of coolies in Fiji Islands; difficulty of applying this method in Africa; importance of labor problem for production, progress, and even peaceful rule.
3. Solutions proposed by anti-imperialists such as Woolf and Morel.
4. Success of non-compulsory labor, coupled with native land-ownership, in western Africa (**Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* 182-9).
5. Relation of land and labor problems to commerce—impossibility of selling large quantities of European manufactures to landless and impoverished natives.

C. Diverse Economic Effects on More Highly Developed Peoples Such as Those of India, Egypt, China, Philippines (review, above).

D. The "Civilizing Mission" in Practice.

1. Relatively small amount spent on education in many possessions such as India, Congo, etc.

2. Ambitious educational programs in some colonies, *e.g.*, Philippines.
3. Relatively small attention given by governments to missionary work as compared with economic exploitation.
4. Tendency of Occidental imperialism to break down native institutions, customs and ethics.
5. Difficulty of immediate assimilation of European culture by natives.
6. Difficulties experienced by European and American administrators and educators in attempting to adapt western institutions to native needs.

E. The Problem of Self-Government.

1. Among more advanced peoples—the rise of nationalism and liberalism and gradual extension of autonomy—India, Egypt, Philippines, Persia, China, Turkey.
2. Among savage and semi-civilized peoples.
   (*a*) Direct administration by white officials as one method of government.
   (*b*) Indirect control through native chieftains as an alternative.
   (*c*) Difficulty of self-government.

F. Other Aspects of the Native Problem.

1. Spread of European diseases and vices.
2. International regulation of slave trade, liquor and arms traffic, etc.
3. Broad significance of the cultural blending of European and non-European civilization.

XVIII. COSTS AND PROFITS OF IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xx). * **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 670-5. * **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce in Africa,* 315-51. ‡ **Ireland (A.),** *Tropical Colonization,* 84-127. * **Hobson (J. A.),** *Imperialism,* 30-45, 100-115. ‡ **Angell (N.),** *The Great Illusion.* ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings in the Economics of War,* chs. v-vi. ‡ **U. S. Tariff Commission,** *Colonial Tariff Policies,* 70-79. **R. Delacourt,** *Relations économiques de la France avec ses colonies,* 29-107. **A. Sarraut,** *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises,* 143-277. **Agostino Orsini di Camerota,** *Espansionismo italiano odierno,* I. *La nostra economia coloniale.* 63-306. **P. Rohrbach,** *Wie machen wir unsere Kolonien rentabel?* **G. Drage,** *Imperial Organization of Trade.* **H. H. Asquith,** *Trade and the Empire.* **V. Bérard,** *British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy.* **Culbertson,** *Raw Materials.* See also Part 8.

A. The Taxpayer's Account.

1. Government expenditure for conquests.
2. Government subsidies to non-self-supporting colonies.
3. Government expenditure for suppression of colonial insurrections
4. Maintenance of larger army and navy to protect colonies, or to give nation sufficient diplomatic prestige to demand colonies.
5. Cost of imperialist wars.
6. Is there any direct return on above items?
7. Is there any indirect return?

B. The Commercial Balance Sheet.

1. Problem for investigation: does trade follow the flag? Does a colony trade exclusively or mainly with the mother-country? (Figures may be found in *Statesman's Year Book*, or British *Statistical Abstract*, or other statistical publications and in *Colonial Tariff Policies*.)
2. How important, relatively, is colonial trade? (Figures in *Statesman's Year Book*, etc.; calculate percentage of exports to colonies in relation to total exports.)
3. How much of this colonial trade would be lost if possession of the colony were transferred to another power? Or surrendered to natives themselves?
4. Is it worth while to incur enmity of a Great Power, and endanger or diminish trade with such a power, in order to gain a colony? (Compare French exports to Morocco and to Germany, before war and now.)
5. Is it worth while to fight a great war for the sake of gaining commerce of a colony? Or, from a commercial viewpoint alone, for the sake of retaining a colony? (Calculate how long it would take to defray England's war debt, about seven billion pounds, out of the profits of English trade with India, assuming the profits to be as high a percentage of the total trade as you think probable.)

C. Private Profit and Loss.

1. Foregoing calculations based on theory of "national" or collective gains and expenditures; error of ignoring fact that some individuals make profits greater than costs, while others pay costs greater than gains.
2. Review of private interests profiting directly from imperialism (review IV-A, above).
3. Conflict of private interests.
   (*a*) Conflict of interest between exporter, who desires to sell goods to natives, and industrial investor who desires cheap native labor.
   (*b*) Conflict of interest between domestic and colonial producer of competing articles—for example: competition between cotton mills in India and in Lancashire; between sugar producers in Cuba and in United States.
   (*c*) Conflict of interest between domestic consumer, who wishes low prices, and domestic producer, who in some cases wishes colonial markets to absorb surplus product and thus maintain higher prices.
   (*d*) Conflict of interest between domestic borrower, who desires low interest rate, and domestic capitalist, who invests in colonies at higher rate.

D. Other Items—error of drawing hasty conclusions from foregoing, without considering other advantages or disadvantages of imperialist policies.

XIX. LABOR AND IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xxi). **T. T. Tsing,** *Labor and Empire,* esp. ch. v. **P. Kellogg and A. Gleason,** *British Labour and the War,* pt. 2, ch. ix, pt. 3, ch. xiii, app. iv. **P. Snowden,** *Labour and the New World,* ch. xii. **R. Macdonald,** *Foreign Policy of the Labour Party.* **S. Gompers,** *American Labor and the War,* 335-8, 354-8, 365-77. **H. M. Hyndman,** *Awakening of Asia.* **N. Lenin,** *Der Imperialismus.* **M. Pavlovitch,** *Foundations of Imperialist Policy.* **Scott Nearing,** *The American Empire,* ch. xix.

A. Beginnings of Competition Between European-American and Asiatic-African Labor; Rapid Increase of Factories and Mines in Asia; Probability of Increasing Competition; Importance of This Factor in Any Estimate of Future Problems.

B. Attitude of American Labor Leaders Toward Imperialism.

C. Attitude of European Labor Leaders. (See Resolution of Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, 1918, in **Clark, Hamilton and Moulton,** *Readings in the Economics of War,* 614-6.)

D. Bolshevist Attitude.

E. Significance of Labor's Attitude for Future World Politics.

XX. THE MANDATE SYSTEM—A SOLUTION?

References:—(**Moon,** ch. xxii). *Article XXII of Covenant (in **Hayes,** *Great War,* appendix). ‡*Statesman's Year Book,* 1923, p. xxviii. ‡ **Baker (R. S.),** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* ch. xv. **Morel,** *Black Man's Burden,* 215-241. **Woolf,** *Economic Imperialism,* ch. iv. ‡ **Temperley,** *Peace Conference,* VI, 500-523. ‡ **R. Buell,** "Backward Peoples Under the Mandate System," *Current History,* June, 1924. ‡ **F. Marvin,** *Western Races and the World,* ch. xii. **F. D. Lugard,** *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa,* ch. iii. ‡ **International Conciliation,** no. 166. **G. L. Beer,** *African Questions at the Peace Conference.* **E. Antonelli,** *L'Afrique et la paix de Versailles.* **Ciociceanu,** *Les mandats internationaux.* **League of Nations,** official publications.

A. Origin of the Mandate System.

B. Application to Former German and Turkish Territories.

1. Class A Mandates—Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria.
2. Class B Mandates—Former German colonies of East Africa, Togoland and Cameroon.
3. Class C Mandates—Former German colony of South West Africa and islands in the Pacific.

C. Analysis of Mandate Provisions.

D. Criticism of Mandate System.

1. Application only to former enemy territories.
2. Doubtful sincerity of Great Powers accepting mandates.

(*a*) The suspicion that the mandate system is "camouflage" for imperialist annexation.
(*b*) Treatment of mandated territories by mandate-holding Powers in many respects as if former were ordinary possessions.
3. Failure of mandate system to solve problems of raw materials and of open door.

E. Potentialities of Mandate System.

1. Value of the idea of trusteeship.
2. Possible development of the practice of holding mandatory powers responsible to Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations.
3. Value of publicity of reports.
4. Proposal that mandate system be extended to all tropical colonies.
5. Proposal of British radicals that League be given power to ration out raw materials from colonies to consuming nations.

XXI. THE AMERICAN OPEN DOOR POLICY vs. IMPERIALISM

References:—(**Moon**, ch. xxiii). * **Buell**, *Washington Conference*, chs. ix-x. **Clark, Hamilton and Moulton**, *Readings*, 54-6. **Latané**, *From Isolation to Leadership*, ch. v. **T. Dennett**, "American Policy in the Far East," *Current History*, July 1923. **T. Dennett**, *Americans in Eastern Asia*. **E. T. Yen**, *The Open Door Policy*. **S. Tomimas**, *The Open Door Policy*. **M. Bau**, *The Open Door Doctrine*. **U. S. Tariff Commission**, *Colonial Tariff Policies*, 26-8, 35, 78-9. **Culbertson**, *Raw Materials*. Compare also Part 8. Also current newspapers and periodicals on concessions, etc.

A. Origin and Development of the Open Door Policy.

B. Wilson's Expansion of Open Door Policy.

1. Mobile speech—against concessions in Latin America.
2. Attempt to generalize—item III in Fourteen Points.

C. The Open Door in Mandates.

1. Terms of the mandates, as respects open door.
2. American protests against alleged violation of open door in regard to Mesopotamian oil, on the part of England and France.

D. Attempt to Extend and Enforce Open Door Principle in the Far East, by the Washington Conference.

E. American Advocacy of the Open Door in Negotiations with Turkey at Lausanne Conference.

F. American Inconsistencies.

1. Preferential tariffs in Cuba and other satellite states.
2. Tariff arrangements regarding Philippines and other possessions.
3. Attempts of American concession-hunters to gain monopolistic privileges in Siberia, Turkey, and elsewhere.

G. Significance of the Issue.

XXII. REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

Reference:—(Moon, ch. xxiv).

A. Great Importance of Imperialism from 1870 to Present.

1. Effects on natives (above, XVII).
2. Effects on expansion of industry and commerce (above, XVIII).
3. Effects on international relations, alliances, ententes, wars (above, XVI).
4. Effects on domestic politics (see below, Part 9).
5. Non-speculative nature of these effects—definiteness of importance of imperialism to "average man" in terms of prosperity, taxes, wars, burdens of armament, tropical commodities such as rubber.

B. Much Greater Potentialities, for Good or for Evil, as Regards Future, in View of Intensification of Imperialist Control and Rivalry, and of Labor Competition. Imperialism Perhaps the Greatest Problem of the Twentieth Century.

C. Discussion of the Problem.

1. Proposed panaceas and their inexpediency.
2. Need of distinguishing between desirable and undesirable results, and adjusting policies to secure maximum of former and minimum of latter.
3. Fundamental importance of intelligent realism; of sane public opinion.
4. More or less practical proposed reforms for discussion (Note: These are representative proposals for discussion; they are not advanced as author's opinions).
   (*a*) Extension of Open Door principle by negotiation and international agreements.
   (*b*) Extension of publicity regarding colonial administration, through Mandate Commission of League, or some substitute international commission.
   (*c*) Extension of mandate system to all tropical colonies.
   (*d*) Increased reliance on international intervention (as in Boxer War) instead of national intervention (as in Mexico, or in Morocco) to suppress disorders and protect life and property in turbulent regions.
   (*e*) Complete substitution of international for national protection of life and property of Europeans and Americans in tropical and other backward regions; advantages; difficulty of persuading all nations to adopt such a principle.
   (*f*) Gradual transfer to League of Nations of all colonies not inhabited by whites; impossibility of persuading imperialist nations to relinquish colonies at present.
   (*g*) International rationing of colonial raw materials; theoretical advantages; practical obstacles.
   (*h*) Special training for prospective colonial administrators.

PART FOUR

MILITARISM AND ARMAMENTS

General references:—The best general, brief discussions which may be used as texts are: **A. G. Enock,** *The Problem of Armaments.* **O. T. Crosby,** *International War: Its Cause and Its Cure.* **G. L. Dickinson,** *War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure.* **R. M. Johnston,** *Arms and the Race.* **F. W. Hirst,** *The Political Economy of War.* **G. H. Perris,** *A Short History of War and Peace.* **Kirby Page,** *War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure.* **E. D. Morel,** *Military Preparations for the Great War.* See also innumerable pamphlets issued by the American Society for International Conciliation and the World Peace Foundation; also a *Selected List of References and Magazine Articles on Disarmament, Cost of Armaments and War,* prepared in the Library of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

I. OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN ARMAMENTS

References:—General references above. Also: * **Hirst,** chs. i-iv. * **Johnston,** chs. i-iv. **Perris,** chs. vi-x. ‡ **Morel.** ‡ **Newbold,** *How Europe Armed for War.* ‡ **Krehbiel,** *Nationalism, War and Society,* ch. xiv and bibliography.

A. Mass Participation—"The Nation in Arms."

Special References:—**J. H. Rose,** *Nationality in Modern History,* chs. i-ii. **Sir Charles Watson,** *Universal Service.* **C. von der Goltz,** *A Nation in Arms.* **E. F. Henderson,** *Germany's Fighting Machine.* General references above.

1. Relatively small size of medieval feudal armies and early modern mercenary armies.
2. Increase of royal armies by autocratic monarchs of 17th and 18th centuries—*e.g.,* Louis XIV and Frederick the Great.
3. The *levée en masse* in the French Revolution and under Napoleon.
4. Development of Prussian universal service system in 19th century.
5. Adoption of universal service by Great Powers (except Gt. Britain and U. S.) and some small powers.
6. Significance.
   (*a*) Direct participation of whole population, instead of aristocrats or professional soldiers alone, in modern war.
   (*b*) Immense economic cost (below).
   (*c*) Superiority of nations with largest populations, unless counterbalanced by superior organization or scientific equipment.

B. Application of Science to Warfare.

Special References:—* **Enock,** ch. v. **Ivan Bloch,** *The Future of War.* ‡ **W. Irwin,** *The Next War.* **World Peace Foundation,** *The Staggering Burden of Armament,* ch. ii. **C. R. Gibson,** *The War Inventions.*

1. Improvement of rifles, artillery, armor, explosives, etc., in 19th century.
2. New applications of science in Great War—military aviation, tanks, improved explosives, poison gas, liquid fire, etc.

3. Remarkable scientific developments since the Great War.
4. Effect of applied science in making war more costly and destructive.
5. Uncertain value of armaments, in view of possibility of new inventions and new methods.

C. Industrialism in Warfare.

Special References:—* **Enock,** 60-88. * **Clark, Hamilton and Moulton,** *Readings,* ch. viii. **I. Bloch,** *Future of War.* **G. B. Clarkson,** *Industrial America in the World War.* Also references above, and III, below.

1. Modern war as a stupendous industrial enterprise.
2. Industrial strength as a potent factor in military success.
3. Recent tendency of nations to seek national control of raw materials, key industries, and industries producing war materials (compare Part 8).
4. Profitableness of war for certain industries, and recent agitation for "conscription of industry" in case of war.
5. Industrial character of modern war as a factor tending to break down distinction between military and "civilian" population in wartime.

D. Propagandist Character of Modern War.

Special Reference:—*Encyclopædia Britannica,* XXXII, "Propaganda." Compare Part 6, VI-C.

1. Importance of "morale" in view of A and C, above.
2. Wide scope and ingenious methods of propaganda in Great War.
3. Tendency of propaganda to inflame enmities, making post-bellum reconciliation difficult.
4. Tendency of propaganda in countries waging aggressive war to obscure the facts and deceive the people.
5. Tendency of propaganda to give distorted view of military defeats and successes, making popular judgment of chances of success impossible.

II. GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS BEFORE 1914

A. Growth of Armies.

Special References:—* **Morel,** * **Newbold,** and other general references above. **Duggan,** *League of Nations,* 122. **K. Page,** 30-32 (table).

1. Standing armies of the Great Powers.*

	1895	1910	1914	Population 1914§
Germany	585,000	634,000	812,000 †	68,000,000
Austria-Hungary ..	349,000	327,000	424,000	52,000,000
Italy	238,000	288,000	318,000	36,000,000
Russia	910,000	1,200,000	1,300,000	174,000,000
France	572,000	634,000	846,000 ‡	40,000,000
Great Britain	369,000	255,000	250,000	46,000,000§
Japan		230,000	250,000 §	54,000,000
United States		81,000	105,000	99,000,000

* It is difficult to obtain reliable statistics for comparison, because of lack of uniformity as regards inclusion of commissioned officers, colonial troops, soldiers on leave, militia, etc. The columns for 1895 and 1910 are from publications of the U. S. Army. Figures for 1914 from *Statesman's Year Book.* War strength was uncertain and elastic. Germany's war strength was estimated from 3 to 5 millions, Russia's from 5 to 7, Italy's 1,400,000. France actually mobilized 3,781,000 in Aug., 1914, and Great Britain 733,000.

† Army law of 1913 provided for 870,000 but had not been completely fulfilled.

‡ Including colonial troops. § Excluding colonies.

2. Important army bills on eve of Great War.
   (*a*) Germany—army laws of 1912 and 1913.
   (*b*) France—"Three Year Service Law."
   (*c*) Russia—Reorganization of army 1909-12. Law of 1913.
   (*d*) Austria-Hungary—Law of 1912.
   (*e*) Agitation for conscription in England.
   (*f*) Increases in several smaller states.

B. Increased Naval Armament.

Special References:—* **Enock,** 25-32, 174-8. **A. Hurd and H. Castle,** *German Sea Power.* **E. Protheroe,** *The British Navy.* **J. Leyland,** *The Royal Navy.* **H. Asquith,** *The Genesis of the War.* **A. T. Mahan,** *Influence of Sea Power.* **Haldane,** *Before the War.* **Tirpitz,** *My Memoirs.* **World Peace Foundation,** *Staggering Burden.* **Churchill,** *The World Crisis.*

1. Britain's historic position as mistress of the sea.
2. Inauguration of new era in 19th century by use of iron and steel ships.
3. British naval rivalry with France and Russia before 1904, and England's two-power standard.
4. German naval laws of 1898 and 1900, and beginning of Anglo-German naval rivalry.
5. The "Dreadnought" (1906) and the competition in dreadnought and superdreadnought types.
6. Failure of Hague Conferences to limit armaments.
7. Failure of Anglo-German negotiations in 1912-13, and of Col. House's mission in 191 (see **Hendrick,** *Life and Letters of W. H. Page*) for limitation of naval armaments.
8. The British policy of "two keels to one."
9. Naval agreements among the Entente Powers.
10. Relation of the U. S. to Japanese and European naval armaments.
11. Relative size of navies in 1914.

C. The "Staggering Burden"—The Increasing Cost of Armaments.

Special References:—* **Enock,** 32-40, 100-13, 179-85. **World Peace Foundation,** *The Staggering Burden.* Other references above. ‡ **Duggan,** 122.

III. REASONS FOR GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARISM

References:—* **Enock,** 1-23. * **Krehbiel,** pt. 1. * **Page,** ch. 1. ‡ **P. Kerr and L. Curtis,** *Prevention of War,* chs. 1-3. ‡ **R. M. Johnston,** *Arms and the Race,* ch. v. **Crosby,** chs. 25-6, 30-9, 60-1. A few of the innumerable justifications of militarism may be found in: **Grumbach,** *Germany's Annexationist Aims.* **William II,** *The Kaiser's Memoirs,* ch. ix. **F. von Bernhardi,** *Germany and the Next War.* **Mahan,** *Armaments and Arbitration.* **J. H. Cramb,** *Imperial Britain.* **H. Maxim,** *Defenseless America.* **T. Roosevelt,** *America and the World War,* esp. ch. x. **K. Pearson,** *National Life from the Standpoint of Science.* **G. C. Coulton,** *The Main Illusions of Pacifism.* **J. H. Jones,** *Economics of War and Conquest.* For pacifist criticisms of militarism, see: * **Norman Angell,** *Arms and Industry,* ch. v, *The Great Illusion,* and other works. **F. W. Hirst,** *Political Economy of War,* esp. ch. v. **F. Howe,** *Why War.* **Newbold,** *How Europe Armed for War.* **E. D. Morel,** *Military Prepara-*

tions for the Great War. **G. H. Perris,** *The War Traders.* **P. Snowden,** *Dreadnaughts and Dividends.* **N. Brailsford,** *War of Steel and Gold.* **D. S. Jordan,** *War and Waste,* also "Interlocking Directorates of War" in *World's Work,* July 1913, p. 278. **Streit,** *Where Iron Is.* **G. L. Dickinson,** *The Choice Before Us,* chs. 5-8. **G. Nasmyth,** *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.* ‡ **J. Novicow,** *War and Its Alleged Benefits.* Also of interest are: **J. Langdon Davies,** *Militarism in Education.* **G. E. Partridge,** *Psychology of Nations,* part 1. ‡ **C. J. H. Hayes,** "The War of the Nations," *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* Dec. 1914. **A. C. Pigou,** *Political Economy of War,* ch. 3. And general references above.

A. Aggressive Nationalism and Imperialism (see Part 2, section VI, and Part 3, section XVI).

B. Desire for Security.

1. The increasing dread of war.
   (*a*) Increase of nationalistic and imperialistic rivalry.
   (*b*) Augmented dangers to common people, due to larger scale of military operations, improvement of destructive technique, and loss of local economic self-sufficiency.
2. Popular belief in armaments as guarantees of security.
   "Preparedness is the best insurance against war."—Major-General Wood (quoted by Krehbiel).
   "The German army is vitally important not only for the existence of the German Empire, but also for the very life and independence of the German people themselves, since Germany is, as a matter of fact, surrounded by other nations of which each possesses an army practically as strong as that of Germany herself."—Lloyd George, Jan. 1, 1914.
   (*a*) The British navy as a guarantee of Britain's security.
   (*b*) Repeated declarations by German statesmen that German army and navy were defensive; military expenditure as "peace insurance."
3. Paradoxes of defensive armament.
   (*a*) Each nation's armament regarded by that nation as defensive; by other nations, as aggressive, for example:
      (i) French army law of 1913 passed largely because Germany was considering army increases.
      (ii) French army law of 1913 used by German militarists as indication of aggressive designs of France, and hence as reason for passing German army law of 1913.
   (*b*) Failure of defensive armaments to guarantee security.
      (i) Occurrence of greatest war in history at time of greatest military preparation in history, 1914.
      (ii) Best-prepared nations involved in the Great War.
   (*c*) Tendency of armaments to breed suspicion and hostility.

C. The "Balance of Power" Between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

1. European Great Powers aligned in two rival coalitions, 1907-14 (see below, Part 5).
2. Increase of strength of either coalition a cause of intense anxiety, and still greater increase of armament, on the part of the other.

D. Influence of Professional Interests.

1. Tendency of military and naval officers to believe in necessity and desirability of large armaments (General Bliss a notable exception).
2. Efforts of munitions-makers to promote competitive armament,—for example: press propaganda and political wire-pulling by Krupp interests in Germany before 1914, to secure army increases; sale of warships and arms by private manufacturers to potential enemies of their own country, as a legitimate business enterprise.

E. Sociological Justification of Militarism and War.

1. Argument that universal military training is valuable for health and general morale of citizens (*The Kaiser's Memoirs*, 223-5).
2. Argument that war is a biological necessity, leading to survival of fittest, in harmony with Darwinian conception of evolution (see Hayes' article and Novicow).
   (*a*) Typical exponents of this view—Bernhardi, Cramb.
   (*b*) Arguments against this view.
      (i) Darwinism applies to survival of individuals; not states.
      (ii) Many of best individuals selected by conscription and killed by war; destruction of the biologically "fit."

IV. EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BEFORE 1914

References:—* **Hayes**, II, ch. xxx. ‡ **Page**, ch. i. **N. Angell**, *Foundations of International Polity*. ‡ **Munroe Smith**, *Military Strategy vs. Diplomacy* and *Militarism and Statecraft*. **G. L. Dickinson**, *Causes of International War*. **Morel** and other works cited above. **Ward and Gooch**, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 340-54, 429-38, 456-70. **R. Muir**, *Short History of the British Commonwealth*, Bk. IX, ch. ix, Bk. XII, ch. iii. See also Part 3, XVI and Part 5, XIX and XX.

A. Relation of Armaments to Alliances and Ententes.

1. Impossibility, for any one nation, of maintaining sufficient armaments to protect it against any conceivable alliance of other powers.
2. Hence, tendency of Great Powers to form coalitions—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente (see below, Part 5).
3. Hence, increased danger of war—each nation liable to be involved in war by quarrels of its allies, as well as its own.
4. Hence, greater need of armament.

B. Armaments as an Obstacle to Conciliation by Diplomacy.

1. Possession of strong armaments as a temptation to aggressive diplomacy.
   (*a*) German diplomacy before the war often aggressive and uncompromising (details later).
   (*b*) French diplomacy after the war, often reliant on force rather than conciliation (details later).

2. Use of mobilization as a threat in diplomatic disputes.
   (*a*) Meaning of mobilization.
   (*b*) Examples.
      (i) Mobilization of Serbian army against Austria in Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 (details of crisis later).
      (ii) Mobilization of British army against Boers in franchise dispute in 1899 (above, Part 3).
      (iii) Mobilization of Russian and Austrian armies in Balkan crisis of 1913 (below, Part 5).
      (iv) Mobilization of Russian army in crisis of July, 1914 (below, Part 5).
3. Mobilization as an obstacle to peaceful conciliation.
   (*a*) Importance of speed in mobilization, especially in case of Germany before 1914.
   (*b*) Psychological effect of mobilization.
   (*c*) Russian mobilization in 1914 as Germany's reason for declaring war.
4. Difficulty of correlating military and diplomatic policies and neglect of such correlation. (See **Oliver,** *Ordeal by Battle;* **N. Angell,** *The Dangers of Half-Preparedness;* **Mahan,** *op. cit.*)

C. Tendency to Over-Confidence in Armaments.

1. Lack of accurate information among common people as to relative strength of armaments.
2. Tendency to be either unduly pessimistic and panicky, or unduly optimistic and confident, regarding one's own army and navy.
3. Illustration of danger—German confidence in 1914 and its result.

D. Growth of Spirit of Militarism.

V. EFFECTS DURING THE GREAT WAR

References:—* **Enock,** 60-88. ‡ **C. J. H. Hayes,** *Brief History of the Great War,* esp. chs. ii, iii, ix, xiii. **W. McPherson,** *Short History of the Great War.* **P. Azan,** *Warfare of Today.* **G. White and H. Harper,** *Aircraft in the Great War.* **D. W. Johnson,** *Battlefields of the World War.* **J. Pierrefeu,** *Plutarch Lied.* **C. R. Gibson,** *War Inventions.* **I. F. Marcossen,** *The Business of War.* **E. Middleton,** *The Kingdom of the Air.* **R. Recouly,** *Foch.* **W. Churchill,** *The World Crisis.* Compare references on war in Part 6.

A. Advantage of Military and Naval Preparedness, in Early Stages of War.

1. German ability to invade France.
2. British ability to dominate the seas.

B. Lessened Advantage, in Later Stages.

1. Ability of Britain and United States to raise and train armies, given sufficient time.
2. Necessity for unexpected changes in equipment and methods, after beginning of war.
   (*a*) Armies of 1914 not trained and equipped for intensive trench warfare.

(*b*) Improved types of artillery invented during war.
(*c*) Gas, liquid fire, tanks, etc., introduced during the war.
(*d*) Importance of aviation underestimated at beginning of war.

3. Decisive importance of economic resources, scientific technique, manpower, and morale, in a protracted war.

C. Enhanced Power and Influence of Military and Naval Leaders.

1. Tendency of military and naval leaders to assume greater authority in time of war, illustrated in the extreme case of Ludendorff's virtual dictatorship in Germany.
2. Inability of military leaders, oftentimes, to understand importance of diplomatic, legal, and political forces.
   (*a*) German invasion of Belgium, a fatal diplomatic error, committed at the demand of military authorities.
   (*b*) German submarine warfare, another case of bad judgment.
3. Tendency of military leaders to insist on peace terms that are good from military point of view, but dangerous politically.
   (*a*) Ludendorff's insistence, before German defeat, on the military necessity of annexations.
   (*b*) Tendency of Marshal Foch and other military authorities to favor separation of Left Bank from Germany, and other politically unwise measures.
   (*c*) Difficulty of combining expert political and expert military knowledge in a single person.

VI. ARMAMENTS SINCE THE GREAT WAR

References:—* **Enock,** pt. 3. * **International Conciliation,** *The Reduction of Armaments* (no. 188); *Washington Conference* (no. 172). * **World Peace Foundation,** *The Staggering Burden of Armaments.* * **Inst. of Int. Educ.,** *The Limitation of Armaments* (Syllabus no. XII). ‡ **Page,** ch. iii. ‡ **Buell,** *Washington Conference,* chs. v, vii. **F. Nitti,** *Decadent Europe.* **League of Nations,** numerous official publications on armaments.

A. Militarism Unabated.

1. Armies of Great Powers.

	1914	1922 *	Population 1922
Germany	812,000	100,000 †	60,000,000
Austria	424,000	30,000 ‡	6,428,000
Hungary		35,000 ‡	8,000,000
Italy	318,000	210,000	39,000,000
Russia	1,300,000	600,000	132,000,000
France	846,000	736,000 §	41,000,000
Great Britain	250,000	225,000	43,000,000
U. S. A.	105,000	145,000	106,000,000
Japan	250,000	250,000	60,000,000

* Figures from *Statesman's Year Book.*
† By peace treaty; actual strength, including armed police and private organizations, much larger than 100,000.
‡ Limited by peace treaty.
§ Including colonials; subsequently reduced.

2. Armies of smaller powers.

	1914	1922	Population 1922
Poland		275,000	27,000,000
Czechoslovakia		150,000	13,600,000
Yugoslavia	58,000	127,000	12,000,000
Greece	60,000	150,000	5,500,000
Rumania	130,000	200,000	17,000,000

B. Navalism Stimulated.

1. The 1916 program of the U. S., to create "a navy equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the world."
2. The Japanese "Eight-eight program," adopted in 1920.
3. Great Britain's program of "post-Jutland" super-dreadnoughts.

C. Cost of Armaments After the War.

1. Government expenditures for army and navy in 1922 as compared with 1913-14 (calculated in American dollars, according to exchange rates prevailing at the time).

	1913-14	1922
British Empire	$ 661,000,000	$1,073,000,000
France	349,000,000	461,000,000 *
Italy	181,000,000	123,000,000
Japan	96,000,000	367,000,000
Total	$1,287,000,000	$2,024,000,000

* Not including cost of Army of Occupation, which is charged to Germany.

2. Universality of heavy military expenditures in Europe, even including many small states.
3. Employment of millions of men in armies and navies, and in production of armaments, a heavy economic drain during difficult period of reconstruction.

D. Attempts to Reduce Armaments Since 1918.

1. The League of Nations.
   (*a*) Article 8 of the Covenant.
   (*b*) Investigations conducted by the League.
   (*c*) Naval conference of 1924.
   (*d*) Attempts to formulate plans for regional disarmament.
   (*e*) Protocol drafted in 1924 to prevent aggressive war and make possible limitation of armaments by conference to be held in 1925.
2. Washington Arms Conference.
   (*a*) Restrictions on naval armaments.
   (*b*) Failure to limit armies, air armaments, submarines and smaller naval craft.
3. Difficulty of disarmament without "moral disarmament"; need of security; difficulty of obtaining security while international enmities prevail; significance of League as attempt to promote "moral disarmament."

VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

References:—**H. N. Brailsford,** *After the Peace,* ch. iii. **W. Irwin,** *The Next War.* **V. H. Rutherford,** *Militarism After the War.* **J. F. C. Fuller,** *The Reformation of War.* **N. Angell,** *The Fruits of Victory.* **C. Levermore,** *Reduction of Armaments and a Treaty of Guarantee.* **J. A. Hobson,** *Democracy After the War.* **I. Fisher,** *League or War.*

A. Review of Arguments for Armaments.

B. Review of Arguments Against Armaments.

C. Discussion of Proposed Remedies, Wise and Otherwise.

1. The proposal to abolish all armaments.
2. The proposal to outlaw war.
3. The proposal to abolish private manufacture of munitions.
4. The plan outlined in Article 8 of the Covenant.
5. The possibility of additional agreements such as the Washington Naval Agreement.
6. The League of Nations plan, coupling agreement to preserve peace with limitation of armaments.

D. Increasing Peril of Chemical Warfare.

PART FIVE

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO 1914

General References:—The best recent survey available as a textbook is **G. P. Gooch,** *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919.* The best brief textbook treatment is **C. J. H. Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II (revised ed.), ch. xxx. Other texts, more or less useful, are: **R. B. Mowatt,** *The European States System* (very brief) and *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1915* (longer, but decidedly biassed, although moderately well documented). **J. A. R. Marriott,** *Europe and Beyond* (an able post-bellum textbook survey). **A. L. Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New, 1876-1922.* **C. Seymour,** *Diplomatic Background of the War* (admirable on certain topics, but invalidated on others by post-bellum revelations). **H. Stannard,** *The Fabric of Europe.* **D. P. Heatley,** *Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations.* **F. M. Anderson and A. S. Hershey,** *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1870-1914* (manual prepared for Peace Commission, now invalidated in some points by recent revelations).

Some of the more useful detailed treatments and studies of broad aspects of the period are: **B. Schmitt,** "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914" in *Amer. Historical Review,* Apr. 1924 (excellent on the twelve years covered). **A. Debidour,** *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin.* **E. Bourgeois,** *Manuel historique de la politique étrangère.* **E. Brandenburg,** *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege* (using German archives). **H. Friedjung,** *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, 1884-1914.* **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.* **B. Schmitt,** *England and Germany, 1740-1914.* **E. Lémonon,** *L'Europe et la politique britannique.* **E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès,** *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre* (a post-bellum work, using much unpublished material). **G. P. Gooch,** *Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914* (brief but admirable). **G. Stuart,** *French Foreign Policy* (convenient, though less authoritative than above). **A. Tardieu,** *France and the Alliances* (valuable for French viewpoint, but superseded by recent publications). **Schefer,** *D'une guerre à l'autre.* **F. Rachfall,** *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik, 1871-1914.* **V. Valentin,** *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, 1890-1918.* **P. Rohrbach,** *Germany's World Policies.* **E. Reventlow,** *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888-1914,* for German chauvinist viewpoints. **Montgelas,** *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage* (a short post-war review of the new evidence). **Hans Plehn,** *Bismarcks auswärtige Politik* (excellent). **S. Korff,** *Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half-Century.* **Welschinger,** *L'Alliance franco-russe.* **A. F. Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy.* **Morhardt,** *Les Preuves.* **W. Windelband,** *Die auswärtige Politik der Grossmächte, 1494-1919.* On Asiatic and American relations see Part 3, XII-XIV.

Some of the more notable collections of source-material:—*Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914* (German official documents, 36 volumes), edited by **J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, F. Thimme. A. F. Pribram,** *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. German White Book: Responsibility of the Authors of the War.* **R. Marchand** (ed.), *Un Livre Noir* (Russian documents). **E. Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets* (Russian documents). **B. Schwertfeger** (ed.), *Zur europäischen Politik, 1897-1914* (Belgian documents). **H. Bernstein** (ed.), *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence* (between William II and Nicholas II). **B. Siebert and G. Schreiner,** *Entente Diplomacy and the World.* **France,** official *"livres jaunes"* on *L'Alliance franco-russe, Les Accords franco-italiens, Affaires du Maroc, Affairs balkaniques,* and other subjects. **Gt. Britain,** *British and Foreign State Papers,* and Cmd. papers on special topics. **U. S.,** *Treaty Series* and *Foreign Relations.* Similar publications by other nations. **Hertslet,** *Map of Europe by Treaty.* **D. P. Myers,** *Manual of Collections of Treaties.* A few of the documents contained in these works have been published by the **Carnegie Endowment** in *International Conciliation* and by **The World Peace Foundation,** especially vol. I, no. 4 of the latter's serial, *A League of Nations,* containing brief history and texts of the European alliances. **B. F. Schwertfeger,** *Die diplomatischen Akten,* is a guide to *Die grosse Politik.*

Of innumerable memoirs the following are the most representative: **W. S. Churchill,** *The World Crisis, 1911-1918.* **Viscount Haldane,** *Before the War.* **Sir T. Barclay,** *Thirty Years, Anglo-French Reminiscences.* **H. von Eckardstein,** *Ten Years at the Court of St. James.* **R. Poincaré,** *Origins of the War.* **R. Viviani,** *As We See It.* **Bismarck,** *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (3d vol. trans. as *The Kaiser vs. Bismarck*). **William II,** *My Memoirs.* **B. von Bülow,** *Imperial Germany.* **T. von Bethmann-Hollweg,** *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg.* **E. Jäckh** (ed.), *Kiderlen-Wächter.* **Conrad von Hötzendorf,** *Aus meiner Dienstzeit.* **J. von Szilassy,** *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie.* **M. Bogicevic,** *Causes of the War.* **G. Giolitti,** *Memoirs.* **Crispi,** *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi.* **Witte,** *Memoirs.* **Baron Rosen,** *Forty Years of Diplomacy.* **Djemal Pasha,** *Memories of a Turkish Statesman.* **B. Hendrick,** *Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page.* **Bishop,** *Theodore Roosevelt.* **Monypenny and Buckle,** *Disraeli.* **Morley,** *Gladstone.* **Fitzmaurice,** *Granville.* **Whates,** *Third Salisbury Administration.* **Cecil,** *Salisbury.*

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

References for A and B:—**Mowatt,** *The European States System.* ‡ **Hayes and Moon,** *Modern History,* ch. v. ‡ **Potter,** *International Organization,* 42-59, 84-9. ‡ **Walsh,** *International Relations,* 93-116. **R. Muir,** *Nationality and Internationalism,* ch. i. **G. P. Gooch,** *Nationalism,* chs. i-iii. **J. H. Rose,** *Nationality in Modern History,* chs. i-iii. **J. A. R. Marriott,** *Europe and Beyond,* ch. i, and *The European Commonwealth,* chs. i, ii, iv, xv. **A. Sorel,** *L'Europe et la Révolution française* (for reference). **Windelband,** *Auswärtige Politik der Grossmächte.*

References for C and D:—**Mowatt,** *European Diplomacy,* chs. i-xii. **Schmitt,** *England and Germany,* ch. vi. **Ward and Gooch,** II, bk. 2, chs. i-ii. **E. Fueter,** *World History,* bk. iv. **W. A. Phillips,** *Confederation of Europe.* **W. P. Cresson,** *The Holy Alliance,* and *Diplomatic Portraits.* **Munroe Smith,** *Bismarck and German Unity.* **Hazen, Lord, and Thayer,** *Three Congresses.* **Debidour,** I, II. **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge Hist. of British Foreign Policy,* II.

A. Rise of the Modern State System, the Basis of Contemporary International Relations.

1. Contrast between modern system of international relations and
   (*a*) Relations between small city-states in ancient Greece.
   (*b*) Domination of civilized European world by Roman Empire.
   (*c*) Medieval conditions.
2. Gradual rise of national states as units of international relations.
   (*a*) Beginnings in later Middle Ages and 15th-16th century.
   (*b*) Recognition of the new order in Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis.*
   (*c*) The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as marking the beginning of the era of national states (a more or less arbitrary, but convenient landmark).

B. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.

1. Alignment of Continental autocracies against Revolutionary France; liberalism and democracy as menaces to the peace of Europe.
2. Alignment of England with Continental autocracies, and importance of English seapower in ultimate defeat of France.
3. Remarkable awakening of popular patriotism and popular interest in wars; warfare no longer a personal affair of Kings.

C. Autocratic Diplomacy Versus Nationalism and Liberalism, from 1814 to 1850.

1. Desire for peace and order after Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
2. Tendency of other powers to regard Revolution as menace to peace and order, and France as hotbed of Revolution.
3. Metternich as the guiding genius of autocratic diplomacy in effort to preserve peace and old régime after 1814.
4. Disregard of incipient nationalism and liberalism by Congress of Vienna.
5. Failure of Holy and Quadruple Alliances to preserve status quo completely.
   (*a*) Canning and England's growing aloofness from Continental autocracy.
   (*b*) The Monroe Doctrine.
   (*c*) The French and Belgian Revolutions of 1830.
   (*d*) Divergence between liberal western Europe and the east-European autocracies, clear-cut by 1830.
   (*e*) The revolutionary movement of 1848—success in France and failure in central Europe.

D. Growing Influence of Nationalism and Industrial Revolution on Diplomacy During Mid-Victorian Period.

1. Importance of nationalism in diplomacy.
   (*a*) Bismarck's diplomacy and unification of Germany.
   (*b*) Cavour's diplomacy and unification of Italy.
   (*c*) Louis Napoleon's diplomacy, as an expression of ambitious French nationalism.
   (*d*) The American Civil War as an expression of awakening nationalism.

2. Effects of Industrial Revolution.
   (*a*) As a factor stimulating nationalism (see above, Part 2).
   (*b*) Increased importance of economic interests in diplomacy.
      (i) Palmerston's policy of giving diplomatic support to English commercial interests.
      (ii) Opening of China and Japan to trade (see Part 3).
      (iii) Growing commercial interests as one reason for French intervention in Mexico and in Indo-China.

II. ERA OF BISMARCKIAN DIPLOMACY, MILITARISM, AND ALLIANCES, 1867 TO 1890

General References:—* **Mowatt,** chs. 23-5. * **Seymour,** chs. i-ii. * **Schmitt,** ch. vi. * **Marriott,** ch. ii. * **Munroe Smith,** *Bismarck.* **Anderson and Hershey,** sections 1-2. **A. C. Coolidge,** *Origins of the Triple Alliance.* **W. H. Dawson,** *The German Empire.* **Ward and Gooch,** III, bk. 4, ch. ii. **J. V. Fuller,** *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith.* **O. von Bismarck,** *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (first two vols. trans. as *Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman;* third vol., *The Kaiser vs. Bismarck*). **Monypenny and Buckle,** *Life of Beaconsfield.* **J. Morley,** *Life of Gladstone.* **G. Cecil,** *Life of Salisbury.* **G. Robertson,** *Bismarck.* **H. Plehn,** *Bismarcks auswärtige Politik.* **Bourgeois and Pagès,** 151-238. **Debidour,** I, chs. i-iv. **Friedjung,** chs. i-iv. **P. Matler,** *Bismarck.* For research, *Die Grosse Politik.*

A. Introduction.

1. Rise of German nationalism and militarism.
2. Bismarck's policies and nationalistic wars of 1864 and 1866.

B. Bismarck and France.

Special References:—* **Mowatt,** ch. xxiii. * **Anderson and Hershey,** 21-54, 55-9, 128-9. * **Munroe Smith.** ‡ **Gooch,** *Franco-German Relations.* ‡ **Fuller,** chs. vi-viii. **Debidour,** I, ch. iv. **Bourgeois and Pagès,** 151-89. **Bourgeois,** *Manuel,* III, 686-757. **A. Sorel,** *Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemand.* **Plehn,** etc. above. *Die Grosse Politik,* I, VI, ch. 39. ‡ **Lord,** *Origins of the War of 1870.*

1. Relations between Bismarck and Louis Napoleon before 1870.
2. Hohenzollern candidacy, Ems dispatch, and Franco-Prussian War.
3. Isolation and weakness, but quick recovery of France.
4. The Franco-German war scare of 1875.
5. Schnaebele incident.
6. Fear of French revenge as a cardinal factor in German diplomacy.
7. Bismarck's encouragement of French overseas imperialism.

C. Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Conferences.

Special References:—**Pribram,** II, 183 ff. *Die Grosse Politik,* I, ch. 5.

D. The Near Eastern Question and the Berlin Congress.

Special References:—* **Gooch,** ch. i. ‡ **Mowatt,** ch. xxiv. ‡ **Marriott,** ch. iii. ‡ **Marriott,** *The Eastern Question,* ch. xii. ‡ **Fuller,** chs. i-v. ‡ **Anderson and Hershey,** 60-99. **Hazen, Lord, and Thayer,** *Three Con-*

gresses. **Eversley and Chirol,** *The Turkish Empire.* **E. Driault,** *La Question d'Orient.* **Friedjung,** I, 21-35. **Pribram,** II, app. A. **Bourgeois,** *Manuel,* III, 783-816. **Wertheimer,** *Andrássy. Die Grosse Politik,* II, ch. 12.

1. Sketch of the Near Eastern situation in the early seventies.
2. The secret Austro-Russian agreement (Reichstadt agreement of 1876 and treaty of Budapest, 1877)—text given in **Pribram,** *loc. cit.*
   (*a*) Russia to take Bessarabia.
   (*b*) Austria-Hungary to take Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.
4. Treaty of San Stefano.
5. Austria's proposal of a general congress.
6. Beaconsfield's anti-Russian policy and the conventions of 1878 with Russia and Turkey.
   (*a*) Size of Bulgaria to be reduced.
   (*b*) British occupation of Cyprus and guarantee of Turkish possessions.
7. The Congress of Berlin.
   (*a*) Bismarck as host and "honest broker."
   (*b*) British opposition to Russian annexations and to "big Bulgaria."
   (*c*) Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi-Bazar.
   (*d*) Discussion of chief provisions of the peace treaty.

E. Bismarck's System of Alliances.

References:—* **Gooch,** chs. ii-iv and pp. 73-98. ‡ **Mowatt, ch. xxv.** ‡ **Marriott,** ch. iv. **B. Schmitt,** "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* Apr., 1924. ‡ **Pribram,** I, 3-17; II, ch. i; texts of treaties, I, 18-31 and 64-115. ‡ **A. C. Coolidge,** *Origins of the Triple Alliance.* ‡ **Munroe Smith,** *Bismarck.* **Debidour,** I, chs. i-iii. **Fuller,** chs. i, vi, xi, xii. **Goriainoff,** "End of the Alliance of the Three Emperors," *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* Jan. 1918. **H. Rothfels,** *Bismarcks englische Bündnispolitik. Die Grosse Politik,* III, chs. 13-19; IV, chs. 21-9.

1. The Austro-German alliance (1879).
   (*a*) As a sequel to Bismarck's support of Austrian claims at Berlin Congress.
   (*b*) Principal terms.
   (*c*) Renewals.
   (*d*) Importance as cornerstone of Bismarck's system.
   (*e*) Significance from other aspects.
      (i) The alliance as an obstacle to completion of German unification.
      (ii) Danger of involving Germany in Austrian conflicts with Russia regarding Balkans.
      (iii) Secrecy.
      (iv) "Purely defensive" character.
2. The Three Emperors' League of 1881-87.
   (*a*) Provision for benevolent neutrality in case of war between one member and an outside Power.
   (*b*) Provision for Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina "at whatever moment she shall deem opportune."
   (*c*) Provision for eventual union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, which had been separated by Berlin Congress.

(*d*) Provision against dismemberment of Turkey without preliminary agreement.
(*e*) Provision for closing of Straits.
(*f*) Prolongation in 1884 for another three years.
(*g*) Termination, 1887 (see 8, below).

3. The Triple Alliance of 1882.
   (*a*) Italy's reasons for entering the alliance.
   (*b*) Terms.
      (i) General object—to preserve general peace, "to fortify the monarchical principle," and maintain the social and political order (Preamble).
      (ii) Protection against France—Germany and Austria to help Italy if attacked by France; Italy to help Germany if attacked by France (Article II).
      (iii) Mutual assistance in case one member is attacked by two or more Great Powers (Article III).
      (iv) "Benevolent neutrality" in case one member "should find itself forced . . . to make war" against a Great Power which threatens its security (Article IV).
      (v) Secrecy (Article VI).
      (vi) Duration—five years (Article VII).
      (vii) Declaration that treaty is not directed against England.
   (*c*) Analysis: against which Great Powers and for what reasons does the treaty seem to have been made? How well does it accomplish Bismarck's aims?
   (*d*) Renewal in 1887.
      (i) Renewal until 1892.
      (ii) Simultaneous secret treaty between Italy and Austria, promising not to occupy any new territory in Balkans, Turkey, Ægean Sea, or Adriatic Islands without previous agreement for sharing spoils ("reciprocal compensation").
      (iii) Simultaneous secret agreement between Italy and Germany, providing for German aid against France in case France should take Tripoli or Morocco.
   (*e*) Subsequent renewals (1891, 1902, 1912) treated below.
4. Rumania as a satellite of the Triple Alliance (treaties between Rumania and Austria-Hungary, 1883; Germany, 1883; and Italy, 1888).
5. Serbia as a satellite.
   (*a*) Austro-Serbian alliance, 1881.
   (*b*) Austrian diplomatic support of Serbia in Serbo-Bulgarian war, 1885.
   (*c*) Prolongation of Austro-Serbian treaty, 1889.
6. England and the Triple Alliance.
   (*a*) England's need of friendly support.
      (i) Rivalry with France regarding Egypt (see Part 3, and other colonial problems).
      (ii) Rivalry with Russia, in Near East and Central Asia (See Part 3).
      (iii) Lord Randolph Churchill's advocacy of Anglo-German alliance.
   (*b*) Bismarck's desire for English support in the Mediterranean.

(i) French fleet (in 1887) superior to German, Italian and Austrian fleets in Mediterranean; hence, need of England.

(ii) Possibility of conflict with Russia, arising from conflict between Russian and Austrian intrigues in Balkan states (especially in Bulgaria).

(iii) Possibility of an alliance between Russia and France (below).

(*c*) Mediterranean agreements of 1887.

(i) Proposed by Italy and agreed to by England and Austria; partly as a result of Bismarck's diplomatic efforts.

(ii) Terms—English promise of "coöperation" in preventing any other Great Power (*i.e.*, France or Russia) from gaining any new territory on shores of Black Sea, Ægean Sea, Adriatic Sea, or northern coast of Africa. Agreement on policy of maintaining peace and status quo in Near East.

(*d*) Bismarck's overtures for an Anglo-German alliance, 1889.

7. Attachment of Spain to Bismarck's coalition, through Italy.
   (*a*) Spanish fear of possible French attempt to take Morocco.
   (*b*) Italian fear of possible French designs on Tripoli.
   (*c*) Agreement of 1887 on policy of coöperation, by Spain, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.
8. The "Reinsurance Treaty" of 1887 with Russia.
   (*a*) Bismarck's unwillingness to let Russia drift away from his system of alliances, even though he preferred Austria as chief ally.
   (*b*) Tsar Alexander III's refusal to renew Three Emperors' League, which expired in 1887.
   (*c*) Negotiation of secret Russo-German treaty, 1887, as substitute for Three Emperors' League.
   (*d*) Terms of this "Reinsurance Treaty."

(i) Benevolent neutrality in case other member should fight any other Great Power except in case of German attack on France or Russian attack on Austria.

(ii) German recognition of Russia's "preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia."

(iii) Maintenance of status quo in Balkans, unless both nations agreed on changes (safeguard against Austrian aggression).

(iv) Maintenance of closing of Straits (against England).

(v) Secrecy (even from Austria).

(vi) Duration—three years (expiring 1890).

(vii) Effect—disappointing lack of confidence between Russia and Germany.

F. Awakening of Imperialism, and Its Effects on World Politics.

References:—* **Gooch**, 99-114. **Hagen**, *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik. Die Grosse Politik*, vols. viii-xi. Other references and details in Part 3, above, especially sect. III.

(No special treatment is required here, as details have been given in foregoing sections and in Part 3; it is significant, however, to remember, at this point, that the 1880's marked an outburst of imperialist rivalries, some of which, as indicated above, vitally affected European diplomacy.)

G. End of Bismarckian Era, 1890.

References:—* **Gooch**, 188-205. ‡ **Munroe Smith. Bismarck**, *The Kaiser vs. Bismarck*. **Brandenburg**, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege*, 1-16. **Rachfall. Plehn. Debidour**, I, ch. v. **O. Hammann**, *Der neue Kurs*, and *Der Missverstandene Bismarck. Die Grosse Politik*, VI, ch. iii.

1. Accession of William II as German Emperor.
2. Resignation of Bismarck.
3. Contrast between characters and policies of the two.
4. Summary and discussion of Bismarck's achievements.
   (*a*) Unification of Germany.
   (*b*) Skilful maintenance of Germany's position as leading power in Europe.
   (*c*) Defects of Bismarck's policy.
      (i) Responsibility for irreconcilable enmity of France.
      (ii) Danger that Austro-German alliance might draw Germany into inevitable Austro-Russian quarrels (as in 1914).
      (iii) Danger that the rising force of nationalism would shatter Austria-Hungary, the corner-stone of his policy.
      (iv) Danger that irredentism might weaken Italy's loyalty.
      (v) Tendency of Russia, even before 1890, to drift toward an alliance with France.
      (vi) Reliance on militarism and adroit diplomacy.

III. AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE BISMARCKIAN ERA, 1865-1890

References:—* **C. R. Fish**, *American Diplomacy* (revised ed.), chs. xxv-xxvi. ‡ **J. B. Moore**, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 238-47, 339-64. **Coolidge**, *U. S. as a World Power*, ch. v. **W. F. Johnson**, *America's Foreign Relations*. **R. G. Adams**, *History of the Foreign Policy of the United States*. * **Carnegie Endowment**, no. 17, *American Foreign Policy*, 1-17. ‡ **Viallate**, *Economic Imperialism*, 27-31. **Ward and Gooch**, III, 54-71. **Dunning**, *British Empire and the U. S.* **Bourgeois**, *Manuel*, III, 593-605. **Kimpen**, *Ausbreitungspolitik*, 217-264.

A. Relations With Europe.

1. Historic traditions—the Monroe Doctrine.
2. French withdrawal from Mexico; Spanish withdrawal from Santo Domingo and Chincha Is.
3. Difficulties with England—Alabama claims, fisheries disputes, Puget Sound, etc.

B. "Manifest Destiny" and Expansion.

1. The Alaska purchase.
2. Seward and the attempted purchase of the Danish West Indies.
3. Grant and the projected annexation of Santo Domingo.
4. U. S. and Cuba, to 1890.
5. The Nicaragua canal treaty.
6. Projects for annexation of Canada.
7. The doctrine of "manifest destiny."

C. New World Hegemony and Pan-Americanism.

1. Historic background—Monroe Doctrine.
2. Material basis—preëminence of the United States in population, wealth and power, among American nations.
3. Blaine's Pan-Americanism and the Pan-American Conference.
4. United States as mediator in Hispanic-American disputes.

D. Interests in the Pacific and Far East.

1. Effect of westward expansion to California.
2. U. S. and the opening of Japan, China, and Korea.
3. Interests in Samoa.
4. Interests in Hawaii.
5. Seal fisheries and the Behring Sea.

E. United States as a Great Power.

1. The Civil War as a test of national unity and a triumph of nationalism.
2. Rapid economic development after Civil War as a preparation for greater participation in world affairs.
   (*a*) Importance of agricultural exports to Europe.
   (*b*) The "second industrial revolution" in the U. S. and growth of commercial rivalry.
   (*c*) American tariff protectionism and its effect on Europe (compare Part 8).
   (*d*) Financial dependence on European capital, but rapid development of American capitalism, presaging financial independence and expansion.
3. Rapid growth of population, due partly to extensive European immigration, gradually increasing importance of United States.

IV. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE

References:—* **Gooch**, ch. v. * **C. A. Beard**, *Cross Currents*, 12-22. * **World Peace Foundation**, *The Background of the War*, 192-7, 224-225j. * **Mowatt**, 250-4. * **Marriott**, ch. vi. **Korff**, *Russia's Foreign Relations*, ch. 1. ‡ **Anderson and Hershey**, 197-201. **France**, *Livre jaune, L'Alliance Franco-Russe*. **B. Schmitt**, "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Apr. 1924. **H. Welschinger**, *L'Alliance franco-russe*. **Daudet**, *Histoire diplomatique de l'alliance, franco-russe*. **Debidour**, I, chs. v-vii. **Tardieu**, *France and the Alliances*. **Stuart**, *French Foreign Policy*. **Bourgeois and Pagès**, 238-90. **J. J. Hansen**, *L'Alliance franco-russe*. *Die Grosse Politik*, VI, ch. 39; VII, ch. 48.

A. Background.

1. Isolation of France during Bismarck's régime.
2. Obstacles to an alliance between France and Russia.
   (*a*) Apparent irreconcilability of French republicanism and conservative Russian autocracy.
   (*b*) Friendship between Russian and German emperors, despite some distrust and friction.
3. Reasons for Russian inclination toward French alliance in late 1880's.

(*a*) Antagonism between Russian and Austro-German intrigues in Balkans, especially in Bulgaria.
(*b*) Revelation of Austro-German separate treaty to Russian ambassador by Bismarck in 1887.
(*c*) Russian need of money for railway construction, armaments and industry—flotation of Russian loans in Paris, beginning 1887.
(*d*) Tariff and other economic difficulties between Russia and Germany.
(*e*) Mutual rivalry with England.

4. Lapse of the "Reinsurance Treaty" in 1890.

B. Exchanges of Public Visits and Other Diplomatic Amenities Between France and Russia in 1890's.

C. The Alliance.

1. Secret entente, signed in 1892.
2. Secret military convention, drafted in 1892 and signed 1894.
   (*a*) Russian pledge to aid if France should be attacked by Germany or by Italy and Germany.
   (*b*) French pledge to aid if Russia should be attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany.
   (*c*) Modification in 1899.

D. Effect of Dual Alliance.

1. End of French isolation and German supremacy.
2. Balance of Power between Dual and Triple Alliances.
3. Increased insecurity of England, as well as of Germany.
4. In later years, encouragement of French imperialism in Africa and of Russian ambitions in Balkans.

E. Supplementary Naval Agreement (below, XIX).

V. IMPERIALIST RIVALRIES AND BRITISH ISOLATION

References:—* **Gooch**, chs. vi-ix. * **Seymour**, ch. vi. * **Marriott**, chs. vii-viii. **Ward and Gooch**, III, 187-285. **Debidour**, I, chs. viii-x. **Korff**, ch. ii. **Lemonon**, ch. ii, pts. iii, iv. **Friedjung**, I, chs. vi-ix, xi-xiv. **Brandenburg**, chs. iv-vii. B. **Schmitt**, *England and Germany*. **Eckardstein**, *Ten Years at the Court of St. James*. *Die Grosse Politik*, VIII, ch. 51.

A. Traditional "Splendid Isolation" and "Balance of Power" Policies of England.

B. Anglo-French Imperialist Rivalry in the 1880's and 90's.

1. In western Africa (compare Part 3, V).
2. The Egyptian question (compare Part 3, VIII-G).
3. The Fashoda incident as the culmination of rivalry in Sudan and Abyssinia (compare Part 3, VII).
4. In Burma and Siam (compare Part 3, XI-C, D).
5. Newfoundland fisheries and other minor disputes.
6. Intensification of Anglo-French antagonism.

C. Anglo-Russian Imperialist Rivalry.

1. In Near East (compare Part 3, IX).
2. In Central Asia (compare Part 3, X).
3. In Far East (compare Part 3, XII).

D. Anglo-German Relations in the 1890's.

1. Imperialist rivalry prior to 1890.
2. The Zanzibar-Heligoland bargain of 1890.
3. Rivalry in South Africa and the Kruger Telegram.
4. The Anglo-German division of Portuguese colonies into spheres of influence, 1898.
5. Samoa controversy.
6. Bagdad Railway.
7. Failure of Anglo-German alliance projects.
8. Beginnings of English anxiety regarding German commercial and naval rivalry.
9. Irritation of English government by William II's attitude.
10. Press campaign in England against Germany.

E. Anglo-American Difficulties in the 1890's.

1. The Venezuela boundary dispute.
2. The Behring Sea dispute.
3. The Alaska boundary.
4. The Panama Canal question.

F. The Windsor Treaty with Portugal, 1899.

G. English Isolation During the Boer War, and the Proposed Coalition of France, Russia and Germany Against England.

H. Growth of Uneasiness in England, and Desire to Substitute Alliances for Uncomfortable Isolation.

VI. THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

References:—* **Gooch**, 306-8. * **Ward and Gooch**, III, 258-62. **J. B. Scott**, *The Hague Peace Conferences.* **Zorn**, *Die beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen.* **Debidour**, ch. ix. **Friedjung**, I, 272-9. **Hull**, *The Two Hague Conferences.* Compare Part 10.

A. The Invitation by Russia. (N. B. Subsequent disclosure of Russian ulterior motive.)

B. German Opposition to Any Agreement for Limitation of Armies.

C. British Opposition to Agreement Concerning Immunity of Private Property at Sea.

D. Achievements.

1. Ineffective resolution favoring restriction of armaments.
2. Conventions and declarations regarding laws of warfare.

3. Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (compare Part 10).

E. Discussion.

1. Relatively unsatisfactory achievements.
2. Revelation of uncompromising spirit of militarism and navalism.

VII. THE RISE OF A NEW GREAT POWER IN THE FAR EAST

References:—On Japan, see references Part 3, XII. Also: **World Peace Foundation,** *Background of the War*, 202-4, 242-6 (text). *** Gooch,** 331-2. *** Ward and Gooch,** III, 286-93. **Eckardstein,** *Ten Years at the Court of St. James.* **Bernstein,** *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence.* **A. M. Pooley,** *Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi.* **Friedjung,** I, 141-52, 325-40. *Die Grosse Politik,* IX, ch. 57. **A. L. P. Dennis,** *The Anglo-Japanese Alliances.*

A. The Europeanization of Japan and the Sino-Japanese War.

B. Triple Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany After the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

C. Imperialist Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1902 (Compare Part 3, XII).

1. Spheres of influence.
2. Leased ports.
3. The open door principle.
4. German encouragement of Russian imperialism in Far East.
5. English and Japanese fear of Russo-German policy.

D. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

1. Japanese negotiations with Russia and England.
2. Discussion of an alliance with Germany and England.
3. The Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty of 1902.

VIII. THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS, 1890-1908

References:—*** Beard,** *Contemporary American History*, ch. viii. **‡ Fish,** *American Diplomacy*, 391-448, 454-8. **J. F. Rhodes,** *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, 44-131, 247-78, 302-22. **‡ Moore,** 246-64. **‡ Coolidge,** chs. vi-viii. **Latané,** *America as a World Power.* **Ward and Gooch,** III, 222-7. **Bishop,** *Theodore Roosevelt.* **Friedjung,** I, ch. xi. **Kimpen,** *Ausbreitungspolitik*, 264-326. **Dunning,** *British Empire and U. S.* **Dennett,** *Americans in Eastern Asia.* **Keim,** *German-American Political Relations.* Also above, III, and Part 3, XII to XV.

A. Reasons for Increased Participation of U. S. in World Affairs (above, III-E).

B. The Hawaiian Revolution and Cleveland's Opposition to Annexation.

C. The Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895.

D. McKinley and the Outburst of American Imperialism.

1. The Spanish War and resulting acquisitions.
2. Annexation of Hawaii.
3. Annexation of Samoa.
4. The Open Door doctrine for China.
5. European apprehensions concerning sudden aggressiveness and economic rise of U. S.

E. Roosevelt's Foreign Policy.

1. The Panama canal.
2. The Venezuela incident.
3. Financial control over Dominican Republic, and growth of "dollar diplomacy."
4. The "big stick" for unruly neighbors.
5. Mediation in Russo-Japanese War and Morocco Crisis (below).
6. Participation in European Conferences.
   (*a*) Algeciras (below).
   (*b*) The Hague Conference of 1907 (below).
7. Roosevelt's endeavor to mollify growing anti-Japanese spirit and his secret agreement with Japan (*Current History*, Oct. 1924, pp. 15-21).
8. The fleet's cruise round the world.

IX. ITALY'S RECONCILIATION WITH FRANCE

References:—* **Gooch**, 345-7. **Pribram**, I, 150-63, 221-35; II, ch. iii, v, and app. C. **Friedjung**, I, ch. xv. **World Peace Foundation**, *Background of the War*, 201-2. **France**, *Livre jaune, Les Accords franco-italiens*. **R. Pinon**, *L'Empire de la Méditerranée*. **Giolitti**, *Memoirs*.

A. Italian Imperialism and the Triple Alliance.

1. Recognition of Italian imperialist interests in Tripoli and Cyrenaica in renewals of Triple Alliance, 1891 and 1902.
2. Conflict between these Italian interests and growing German interest in peaceful penetration of Turkey.

B. Italy and France.

1. Antagonism after French seizure of Tunis, 1881.
2. Reasons for rapprochement.
   (*a*) Desire of France to detach Italy from Triple Alliance and also to gain approval of French designs on Morocco.
   (*b*) Desire of Italy for French sanction of Italian designs on Tripoli.
   (*c*) Growth of anticlericalism in France, removing Italian fear of French intervention in favor of papacy.
   (*d*) Growing liberalism in Italy and sympathy with republican France.

(*e*) Revival of Italian irredentist enmity to Austria, and rivalry with Austria in Albania.

3. The secret exchange of letters between Italy and France, 1900.
   (*a*) French repudiation of designs on Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
   (*b*) Italian consent to French policy in Morocco.
4. The secret neutrality agreement of 1902.
   (*a*) Italy to remain neutral in case of attack by another Power on France or in case of French declaration of war "as the result of direct provocation."
   (*b*) Reciprocal pledge by France.

C. English Approval of Italian Aims; England Virtually an Unofficial Partner in Franco-Italian Mediterranean Entente.

X. THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

References:—**Gooch**, 337-47. * **Marriott**, 189-201. * **Mowatt**, ch. xxvii, 268-72. **World Peace Foundation**, *Background of the War*, 204-5, 226-34 (text). ‡ **Brandenburg**, ch. viii. **Anderson and Hershey**, 282-8. * **Ward and Gooch**, III, 305-18. **Bourgeois and Pagès**, 290-6. **E. D. Morel**, *Morocco in Diplomacy*. **Lémonon**, chs. v-ix. **Debidour**, I, 187-96. **Friedjung**, I, 385-414. **Tardieu**, *France and the Alliances*. **G. Stuart**, *French Foreign Policy*. **J. L. De Lanessan**, *Histoire de l'Entente Cordiale franco-anglaise*. **Barclay**, *Anglo-French Reminiscences*. Compare Part 3, VIII.

A. Anglo-French Antagonism Before 1904.

1. Traditional enmity of France and England.
   (*a*) Hundred Years' War.
   (*b*) Colonial Wars, 1689-1763.
   (*c*) French aid of American revolution.
   (*d*) English hostility during Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.
   (*e*) Lingering bitterness and distrust on both sides.
2. Modern imperialist rivalry.
   (*a*) French resentment of English occupation of Egypt.
   (*b*) French humiliation in Fashoda incident.
   (*c*) Competition for control of railways in Abyssinia.
   (*d*) Boundary disputes in western and central Africa.
   (*e*) Disputes regarding French fishing rights in Newfoundland.
   (*f*) Disputed claims on borders of Siam.
   (*g*) Rival claims in New Hebrides.
   (*h*) Rival interests in Morocco.
   (*i*) French alliance with Russia, rival of England in Asia and Near East.
3. Other causes of antagonism.
   (*a*) English dislike of Catholicism.
   (*b*) English belief that French were "fickle," "volatile," "unreliable," doctrinaire (largely because of frequency of revolutions and, since 1871, of cabinet changes).
   (*c*) English belief that French were immoral and "decadent."
   (*d*) Popularity of idea that "Teutonic" peoples were superior to "Celtic" and "Latin" races.

B. Reasons for "Rapprochement" of France and England, 1900-1904.

1. Persons—Delcassé, Paul Cambon, Edward VII, Lansdowne, Dilke.
2. Growing English suspicion of Germany (above, V-D).
3. Reluctance to be involved in Far Eastern conflicts of Russia (ally of France) and Japan (ally of England).
4. Desire of England to gain a free hand in Egypt.
5. Desire of France to gain a free hand in Morocco.

C. Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of 1903, as a Prelude to the Entente.

D. The Agreement of April 8, 1904.

1. Settlement of minor colonial disputes.
   (*a*) Newfoundland fishing rights.
   (*b*) Boundaries in western Africa.
   (*c*) New Hebrides.
   (*d*) Siam.
   (*e*) Madagascar.
2. Provisions of public "declaration" concerning Egypt and Morocco.
3. Provisions of secret articles concerning Egypt and Morocco.

E. The Significance of the Entente Cordiale.

1. Distinction between entente and alliance.
2. Technical preservation of England's "free hand" and "isolation," but virtual solidarity with France against Germany.
3. Strengthened position of France; hence, more aggressive policy in Morocco.
4. Weakened position of Germany; hence, desire to undermine loyalty of Russia, or of England, to France.

XI. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

References:—* **Gooch**, 374-97. * **Marriott**, ch. ix. **Korff**, *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia*, chs. i, iii. **Korff**, *Russia's Foreign Relations*, 61-9, 75-92, 159-61. **S. B. Fay**, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Czar," in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Oct. 1918. **H. Bernstein**, *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*. **A. S. Hershey**, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*. **K. Asakawa**, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict*. ‡ **Ward and Gooch**, III, 330-8. **Bishop**, *Theodore Roosevelt*, I, chs. xxxi, xxxii. **Brandenburg**, ch. ix. **Friedjung**, I, ch. xvii; II, ch. xviii. **Bourgeois and Pagès**, 297-320. **Debidour**, I, 265-77; II, 1-32. Compare Part 3, XII.

A. Review of the Russo-Japanese War (see Part 3, XII).

B. Roosevelt's Mediation and the Portsmouth Peace Conference.

C. Russo-German Relations.

1. The Willy-Nicky correspondence.
2. Germany's attitude at time of Dogger Bank affair.

3. The Bjorkoe Treaty of 1905.
4. Failure of William II's attempt to detach Russia from France.

D. Effects on England's International Relations.

1. Preservation of English neutrality and the Entente Cordiale.
2. Renewal (1905) of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
   (*a*) Pledge of active assistance, instead of mere neutrality in case one member should be involved in war in defense of its possessions in Far East or (added in 1905) India.
   (*b*) British recognition of Japan's paramount rights in Korea.
3. Favorable attitude of English government toward amicable settlement of Anglo-Russian conflicts of interest.

E. The Morocco Crisis of 1905 (next section) as an Indirect Result of Russia's Defeat.

XII. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905 AND THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

References:—* **Gooch**, 348-68. * **Marriott**, ch. x, 201-14. ‡ **Loreburn**, *How the War Came*, 74-85. ‡ **Ward and Gooch**, III, 338-48. **Anderson and Hershey**, 332-41. **Stuart. Morel**, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*. **Bishop**, *Theodore Roosevelt*. **Debidour**, II, 32-63, 96-102. **Bourgeois and Pagès**, 320-7. **Tardieu**, *Conférence d'Algéciras*. **France**, *Livres jaunes, Affaires du Maroc*. German *Weissbuch* on Morocco. British Cmd. paper, *Morocco No. 1* (1906). **Brandenburg**, ch. 9. **Friedjung**, II, chs. xix-xx. Compare Part 3, VIII.

A. Review of Moroccan Question (Part 3, VIII-E).

B. International Setting of the Crisis of 1905.

1. German desire to break up Entente Cordiale.
2. Weakness of Russia.
   (*a*) Russo-Japanese War.
   (*b*) Internal revolution.

C. The Crisis and the Alliances.

1. Unexpected vigor of English diplomatic support of France (cf. Asquith's denial that England offered to land 100,000 men in Holstein).
2. French acceptance of German-Moroccan demand for conference.
   (*a*) Delcassé's opposition, and resignation.
   (*b*) Desire of French financiers, socialists, pacifists, to avoid war.
   (*c*) Danger of war to France, without Russian military aid.
   (*d*) Roosevelt's secret intervention.
3. French diplomatic victory at Algeciras Conference.
   (*a*) Diplomatic solidarity of France, England, and Russia.
   (*b*) Italian solidarity with Entente Powers (see above IX).
   (*c*) Favorable attitude of smaller Powers.
   (*d*) Privileged position of France and Spain, by the Act of Algeciras.
4. Anglo-French naval and military "conversations," 1906.

5. Anglo-Belgian military conversations, 1906.
6. Anglo-Russian discussions at Algeciras leading to agreement of 1907 (see XIV).

XIII. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

References:—* **Gooch,** 427-33. ‡ **Ward and Gooch,** 349-55. **A. P. Higgins,** *The Hague Peace Conferences.* **J. B. Scott,** *The Hague Peace Conferences.* **Friedjung,** II, ch. xxii. **Debidour,** II, ch. iii. Compare Part 10.

A. British Attempt to Include the Question of Limitation of Armaments as an Indication of British Reluctance to Continue Naval Competition with Germany.

B. German Refusal, as a Recognition of English Solidarity with France and Russia, and as a Cause of Increased English Suspicion of Germany. (Compare the Kaiser's *Daily Telegraph* interview, Oct. 28, 1908, in *The Kaiser's Memoirs,* p. 118.)

C. Juridical Aspects of the Conference (treated in Part 10).

XIV. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

References:—* **Gooch,** ch. xi. ‡ **World Peace Foundation,** *Background,* 205-12, 235-42 (text). ‡ **Schmitt,** ch. ix. * **Seymour,** 159-65. * **Mowatt,** 272-3. **Anderson and Hershey,** 360-1. * **Korff,** *Russia's Foreign Relations,* ch. ii. ‡ **Ward and Gooch,** 356-65. ‡ **Schmitt,** "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* Apr. 1924. **Debidour, II,** ch. v. **Lemonon,** ch. x. **Friedjung,** II, ch. xxii. **Brandenburg,** ch. x. **Siebert,** *Entente Diplomacy.* **J. A. Farrer,** *England Under Edward VII.*

A. Previous Antagonism Between England and Russia.

1. Imperialist rivalry in the Near East and Asia.
2. Hostile attitude of English liberals toward Russian autocracy.

B. Factors Drawing Russia and England Together.

1. Skilful French diplomacy.
2. Common suspicion of Germany.
3. Russian defeat in Russo-Japanese War.
   (*a*) Russia less dangerous to Britain, and more in need of Britain.
   (*b*) Partition of Manchuria between Russia and Japan.
   (*c*) Tsar's promise to establish a Duma, making Russia less obnoxious to English liberals.
4. Recognition, by some statesmen, of advantages to be gained by substituting coöperation for deadlock in imperialist aims in Asia.

C. The Anglo-Russian Agreement or Convention of August 1907.

1. Terms regarding Persia.
2. Terms regarding Afghanistan.
3. Terms regarding Tibet.

D. The Reval Interview, 1908.

1. Visit of English sovereign to Tsar at Reval.
2. Announcement in press of Anglo-Russian agreement regarding Macedonia.
3. Significance as an indication of reconciliation of English and Russian Balkan policies, supplementing convention of 1907.

E. Nature of the Triple Entente.

1. France and Russia united by alliance of 1892-3.
2. France and England united in "entente" based on Egypt-Morocco agreement of 1904, supplemented by military-naval conversations of 1906.
3. England and Russia united by "entente" based on agreement of 1907.
4. Japan as England's ally and virtually fourth member of Entente.

XV. THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION AND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

References:—* **Gooch,** ch. xii. * **Marriott,** ch. ix. * **Mowatt,** 274-8. ‡ **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers,* etc., 217-29. ‡ **Anderson and Hershey,** 371-89. ‡ **Bulow,** *Imperial Germany,* 50-4. **Marriott,** *Eastern Question,* ch. xv. **Debidour,** II, 113-24. **Friedjung,** II, chs. xxiv-xxv. **Brandenburg,** ch. xii. ‡ **Siebert and Schreiner,** 229-72. ‡ **A. F. Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918.* ‡ **Schevill,** *Balkan Peninsula,* ch. xxix. **M. E. Durham,** *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle.* **Seton-Watson,** *The Southern Slavs.* **W. Miller,** *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors.* **Izvolsky,** *Memoirs.* **Bogicevic,** *Causes of the War.* **Szilassy,** *Untergang der Donaumonarchie.* **Schwertfeger,** III. **Sosnosky,** *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns.* **Molden,** *Alois Graf Aehrenthal.* **Conrad von Hötzendorf,** *Aus meiner Dienstzeit.* **Driault,** *La Question d'Orient.* **R. Pinon,** *L'Europe et la jeune Turquie.* **Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets.* Compare also Part 3, IX.

A. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

B. Intention of Young Turks to Restore Ottoman Authority in Macedonia, Crete, Bulgaria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

C. Proclamation of Bulgarian Independence, October 5, 1908.

1. Previous understanding with Vienna.
2. Turkish demand for indemnity.
3. Russian diplomatic championship of Bulgaria and settlement of indemnity question.

D. Proclamation of Union of Crete with Greece.

1. Greek irredentism, regarding Crete, before 1908.
2. Cretan proclamation of union with Greece, October 12, 1908.
3. Turkish refusal to recognize union.
4. Attitude of Great Powers.

E. Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.

1. Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1878.
2. Provision for eventual annexation, in secret treaty of Three Emperors' League (see above, II-E-2-*b*).
3. Izvolsky-Aehrenthal secret bargain—Buchlau conversations.
4. The annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina.
5. Russian opposition.

F. Relations Between Austria and Serbia.

1. Conflict between Yugoslav irredentism and Austrian aggression, as the fundamental element in the situation.
2. Earlier Serbian policy of alliance with Austria (see II-E-5) abandoned after Serbian revolution of 1903.
3. The tariff war ("pig war") between Austria and Serbia, 1905-7.
4. Culmination of grievances in 1908.
   (*a*) Serbian protest against annexation of Bosnia.
   (*b*) Serbian demand for outlet to Adriatic.
   (*c*) Serbian and Austrian mobilization.

G. The European "Bosnian Crisis" of 1908-9.

1. Demand for an international conference by Russia, England, Italy, and France.
2. Austrian settlement with Turkey, Jan. 1908.
   (*a*) Turkish recognition of annexation.
   (*b*) Restoration of Novi-Bazar to Turkey.
   (*c*) Conference of all Powers rendered "unnecessary."
3. Continued danger of war between Austria and Serbia, backed by Russia.
4. German threat to Russia ("shining armor").
5. Serbian promise to recognize annexation and live "on good terms" with Austria.
6. Significance.
   (*a*) Austro-German diplomatic triumph.
   (*b*) Intense resentment in Serbia and Russia.
   (*c*) Russian lack of confidence in Anglo-French support.
   (*d*) Russian intrigues in Balkan states after 1908.

XVI. THE AGADIR CRISIS

References:—* **Gooch,** ch. xiv. * **Anderson and Hershey,** 401-7. * **Seymour,** 184-93. ‡ **Loreburn,** *How the War Came,* 86-111. **Morel,** *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy.* ‡ **Schmitt,** *England and Germany,* 228-40, 303-45. **Debidour,** II, 125-63. **Tardieu,** *Le mystère d'Agadir.* **Caillaux,** *Agadir.* **Marchand,** *Livre Noir.* **Siebert,** 577-612. **Bourgeois and Pagès. Brandenburg,** ch. xiv. **Friedjung,** III, ch. xxix. Compare XII, above, and Part 3, VIII.

A. Preliminaries.

1. Review of situation after 1906.
2. Casablanca affair.

3. Franco-German convention of Feb. 8, 1909.
4. French occupation of Fez.

B. The Crisis.

1. German secret demand for "compensation."
2. Dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir and demand for Congo.
3. English support of France (N. B. Lloyd George's speech).
4. Danger of war.
5. The settlement—Franco-German agreement of Nov. 1911.
6. Caillaux's secret negotiations with Germany.

C. The Sequel.

1. Partition of Morocco between France and Spain, 1912 (Part 3).
2. Opportunity for Italian attack on Turkey (below).
3. Intensification of hatreds and fears, and increase of armaments.
4. Anglo-French naval agreement (below).

XVII. THE TURCO-ITALIAN WAR

References:—* **Gooch**, 485-9. * **Anderson and Hershey**, 417-8. **Brandenburg**, 332-8. **Friedjung**, III, ch. xxx. **Barclay**, *The Turco-Italian War*. **T. Tittoni**, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*. **Wm. Miller**, "The Foreign Policy of Italy," *Quart. Rev.*, Apr. 1916. Compare Part 3, VIII.

A. Preliminary Secret Agreements.

1. With Germany and Austria.
2. With France, England, and Russia.

B. International Aspects of the Tripolitan War.

1. Reluctant consent of Austria and Germany to Italian attack on Turkey, especially assault on Dardanelles.
2. Strained Franco-Italian relations.
3. Italian victory and the peace terms.
4. Turkey's weakness as the occasion for attack by Balkan nations (below).

XVIII. THE BALKAN WARS

References:—* **Gooch**, ch. xv. * **Seymour**, ch. x. * **Anderson and Hershey**, 421-44. ‡ **Loreburn**, 47-52. * **Marriott**, ch. xii. * **Schevill**, 469-81. **Durham**, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*. **R. W. Seton-Watson**, *Southern Slav Question*. **J. G. Schurman**, *The Balkan Wars* (needs supplementing with more recent works). ‡ **Pribram**, *Austrian Foreign Policy*. **G. Hanotaux**, *La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe*. **Debidour**, II, 163-217. **Brandenburg**, ch. 16. **Friedjung**, III, chs. 33-38. ‡ **Siebert**, 273-435. **Bogicevic**, *Causes of the War*. **Marchand**, *Livre Noir*. **Conrad von Hötzendorf**, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*. **France**, *Affairs Balkaniques* (*Livre Jaune*.) **Gueshoff**, *The Balkan League*.

A. The Balkan Alliance.

1. Nature and purpose of the alliance.
2. Russia as sponsor of the alliance.

B. Failure of the Concert.

1. General fear of disturbance in Balkans as peril to peace.
2. Joint note to Balkan allies.
   (*a*) Promise to promote reforms in Macedonia.
   (*b*) Threat to veto territorial changes.
3. Collective note to Turkey, demanding reforms in Macedonia.
4. Outbreak of war despite these efforts.

C. The Balkan Wars.

1. Military success of Balkan allies.
2. The Albanian crisis, Dec. 1912—Jan. 1913.
   (*a*) Austrian and Italian objections to Serbian outlet to Adriatic through Albania.
   (*b*) Russian diplomatic support of Serbia and partial mobilization against Austria; Austrian counter-mobilization.
   (*c*) Serbian consent to independent Albania and demand for compensation in Macedonia.
3. Montenegrin crisis, April-May 1913.
   (*a*) Austria's opposition to Montenegrin siege of Skutari.
   (*b*) Montenegro's renunciation of Skutari at bidding of Great Powers.
4. Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, terminating first war.
5. Second Balkan War.
   (*a*) Dispute over division of Macedonia.
   (*b*) Serbo-Greek alliance against Bulgaria.
   (*c*) Austrian encouragement of Bulgaria.
   (*d*) Outbreak of Second Balkan War, June 1913.
   (*e*) Entry of Turkey and Rumania, against Bulgaria.
   (*f*) Treaty of Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1913.

D. Austrian Proposal to Take Action Against Serbia.

1. Necessity, under Triple Alliance, of previous agreement with Italy.
2. Proposal to Italy for "defensive action" to prevent further aggrandizement of Serbia (Aug. 9, 1913, according to Giolitti's speech; but more probably July 9, as in **Pribram**, II, 176-7).
3. Italy's refusal to sanction the plan.

E. Summary of Effects.

1. Triple Alliance weakened by defeat of its protégés, Turkey and Bulgaria.
2. Austrian fear that Rumania's loyalty to Triple Alliance (see above, II-E-4) was being undermined by Russian diplomacy.
3. Enlargement and aggressiveness of Serbia, Austria's potential enemy and Russia's protégé.
4. Strengthening of Serbia by alliance with Greece.
5. Austrian fear of Serbian irredentism and pan-Slavism.
6. Austro-German fear of "encirclement."

7. Aggravation of nationalist enmities in Balkans, menacing peace.
8. Anxiety and nervousness of European governments.

XIX. SECRET DIPLOMACY AND IMPERIALIST BARGAINS ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR

References:—* **Gooch,** 510-31. ‡ **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers,* etc., ch. x, and "The Secret Anglo-German Convention," *Pol. Sci. Quart.,* March 1923. ‡ **C. A. Beard,** *Cross Currents,* chs. i-iii. ‡ **Schmitt,** "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* April 1924. ‡ **Pribram,** *Secret Treaties,* II, 143-78, 222-5. **Munroe Smith,** *The Disclosures from Germany.* **E. D. Morel,** *Pre-War Diplomacy.* **Montgelas,** *Leitfaden.* **Marchand,** *Livre Noir.* **Brandenburg,** chs. 15, 17. **Friedjung,** III, ch. 31. **Siebert,** 613-734. **Converset,** *Les trois ans de diplomatie secrète.* **Bissolati,** *La politica estera della Italia.*

A. Attempts to Strengthen the Triple Alliance.

1. Renewal of Triple Alliance Treaty, Dec. 1912, with additional protocol providing for Austro-Italian coöperation in maintaining status quo in Albania and Novi-Bazar.
2. Naval agreement, June 1913, between Germany, Italy, and Austria, providing for joint naval action, especially in Mediterranean, in case of war.
3. German military mission to Turkey, Oct. 1913.

B. Attempts to Consolidate the Triple Entente.

1. Russo-French secret convention, July 1912, for naval coöperation.
2. Poincaré's secret assurance to Isvolsky (Russian ambassador) that "if Russia makes war, France will also make war," Nov. 17, 1912.
3. Anglo-French secret agreement of Nov. 1912, to discuss measures to be taken if a third Power should threaten war.
4. Negotiations for Anglo-Russian naval agreement, 1913-14.
5. Joffre's visit to Russia, Aug. 1913.
6. Visit of President Poincaré and Premier Viviani to Russia, July 1914. to strengthen Russo-French solidarity.

C. Anglo-Belgian Military Conversations of 1912.

D. Attempts to Reconcile Interests of Opposing Coalitions.

1. Secret bargains regarding the Bagdad Railway (**Earle**).
   (*a*) The Potsdam agreement, 1910, between Russia and Germany.
   (*b*) The Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913.
   (*c*) The Franco-German convention of Feb. 1914.
   (*d*) The projected Anglo-German agreement, June 15, 1914 (never ratified).
2. The secret Anglo-German bargain regarding spheres of interest in Portuguese African colonies (**Lichnowsky,** *My London Mission*).
3. Failure of projected Anglo-German naval and neutrality agreement, 1912 (**Haldane,** *Before the War*).
   (*a*) Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin, 1912.

(*b*) German proposal for reciprocal pledge of neutrality in case other party became involved in war; English refusal.

(*c*) Refusal of Germany to accept British Two-Power naval standard or to restrict navy without above-mentioned neutrality agreement.

4. Hope of Triple Alliance (as shown in additional protocol to Triple Alliance Treaty of 1912) to gain England's support of Triple Alliance policy regarding northern Africa.
5. Confidence of Triple Entente regarding Italy's unwillingness to fight against France, as shown in secret conversations between French president and Russian ambassador in Paris, 1912.
6. Generalizations.
   (*a*) Prevalence of secret diplomacy, not altogether harmonious with public diplomacy.
   (*b*) Apparently unreliable nature of the alliances and ententes, in view of constant danger of secret bargains between members of opposing coalition—examples:
      (i) Austrian suspicion of Italy's disloyalty (**Pribram**).
      (ii) French fear of pro-German intrigues by Witte and reactionaries in Russia (**Bourgeois and Pagès**, p. 5).

E. Armament Increases (See Part 4, II-IV).

XX. THE SERAJEVO CRISIS AND OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR

References:—Brief general accounts in English: * **Gooch**, ch. xvi (one of the best). * **Hayes**, II (rev. ed.), 711-8 (best short textbook account), and article in *These Eventful Years*, I, ch. v (best summary in light of recent evidence). ‡ **G. P. Gooch**, "Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy," in *Journal of British Institute*, Jan. 1923. ‡ **H. E. Barnes**, "Assessing the Blame for the World War," in *Current History*, May 1924 able survey of new data), and discussion by various contributors in *Current History*, June 1924. ‡ **S. B. Fay**, "New Light on the Origin of the War," *Amer. Hist. Review*, July and Oct. 1920, and Jan. 1921 (scholarly discussion chiefly of German and Austrian documents). ‡ **B. Schmitt**, "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," in *Amer. Hist. Review*, Apr. 1924 (critical discussion of recent evidence). ‡ **C. A. Beard**, *Cross-Currents*, chs. i-iii (able interpretation). **F. Neilson**, *How Diplomats Make War* and *Duty to Civilization* (brief assaults on wartime versions). Older versions, which may be significantly compared with present views: **Seymour**, chs. xi-xii. **O. P. Chitwood**, *Immediate Causes of the Great War*. It is impossible to list all important detailed discussions, but the following are among the most useful for students who desire more than the above summaries.

Diplomatic documents: official publications shortly after outbreak of war, conveniently collected in **J. B. Scott** (ed.), *Diplomatic Documents*, or in **E. R. von Mach**, *Official Diplomatic Documents*. German documents disclosed since war, in *Deutschland Schuldig? Deutsches Weissbuch;* **M. Montgelas and W. Schücking** (ed.), * *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum*

* English translation published by Carnegie Endowment, 1924, under title, *Outbreak of the World War*.

Kriegsausbruch; and *Die Grosse Politik* (1870 to 1914). Austrian documents in **R. Gooss** (ed.), *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges;* English translation, *Official Files Pertaining to Pre-War History,* and **Pribram,** *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary.* Russian disclosures in **G. von Romberg,** *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book;* **E. Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets;* **Marchand,** *Un Livre noir;* **Siebert and Schreiner,** *Entente Diplomacy and the World;* additional documents are still being published by Russian government. Belgian documents in **B. H. Schwertfeger,** *Belgische Aktenstücke* and *Zur europäischen Politik.* Numerous documents in **Bourgeois and Pagès,** *Les Origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre.* Chronological arrangement of documents in **B. W. v. Bülow,** *Die ersten Stundenschläge des Weltkriegs.*

British discussions and memoirs: ‡ **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* III, 486-508 (recent and scholarly). ‡ **Loreburn,** *How the War Came,* esp. chs. v-ix (critical of Grey). **E. D. Morel,** *Truth and the War* (radically critical). **H. Asquith,** *Genesis of the War* (ex-premier's self-defense, contributing little). **Haldane,** *Before the War* (on Anglo-German negotiations). **Lord Fisher,** *Memories and Records,* and **W. S. Churchill,** *The World Crisis,* revealing attitude of British navalists. **G. Buchanan,** *My Mission to Russia.* Older accounts, now obsolete but interesting in contrast with above, are: **J. W. Headlam,** *History of Twelve Days,* and **G. Murray,** *Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey,* and **C. Oman,** *Outbreak of the War.*

French discussions: **C. Appuhn and P. Renouvin,** *Introduction aux Tableaux d'histoire de Guillaume II.* **Bourgeois and Pagès,** *Les Origines et responsabilités de la grande guerre* (most important French argument, with many unpublished documents). **Debidour,** II, ch. viii (by a celebrated historian). **R. Poincaré,** *Origins of the War* (the ex-president's apologia). **R. Viviani,** *As We See It* (ex-premier's brief). **A. Pevet,** *Les Responsables de la guerre* (a radical criticism). **Col. Converset,** *Les Trois Ans de diplomatie secrète* (pacifist presentation). *Revue d'histoire de la guerre mondiale* (quarterly). **G. P. Gooch,** *Franco-German Relations* (a judicious British interpretation). **F. Bausman,** *Let France Explain* (a severe and not too scholarly American indictment of France). **Recouly,** *Les Heures tragiques d'avant-guerre.* **Morhardt,** *Les Preuves.*

Russian policy: **S. Korff,** *Russia's Foreign Relations* (brief popular presentation by Russian-American scholar). **S. Dobrorolsky,** *Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee* (important disclosures on Russian mobilization). **R. Höniger,** *Russlands Vorbereitungen zum Weltkriege.* **Major G. Frantz,** *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg.* **P. Renouvin,** "La mobilisation russe" in *Les Cahiers des droits de l'homme,* May 10, 1923 (penetrating French analysis of Russian evidence). Compare memoirs of ambassadors in Russia, namely, **Buchanan,** *My Mission to Russia;* **M. Paléologue,** *An Ambassador's Memoirs;* **Pourtalès,** *Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden.* **W. A. Suchomlinov,** *Erinnerungen.*

German discussions: **E. Brandenburg,** *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege,* chs. 18-19 (recent analysis of documents). **F. Rachfall,** *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik, 1871-1914* (important recent survey). **M. Montgelas,** *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage* (moderate and scholarly). **V. Valentin,** *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, 1890-1918,* esp. ch. x. (one of the best German accounts). **K. Kautsky,** *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern* (a socialist arraignment, somewhat invalidated by subsequent disclosures). **William Hohenzollern,** *Comparative Tables of Historical Events* (the ex-kaiser's

unconvincing argument). **G. von Jagow,** *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* (ex-foreign minister's defense). **K. Helfferich,** *Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges* (vol. I of *Der Weltkrieg*). **B. W. von Bülow,** *Die Krisis,* and **Reventlow,** *Politische Vorgeschichte des grossen Krieges* (patriotic German attempts to refute criticisms). **Bethmann-Hollweg,** *Reflections on the World War.* **William II,** *The Kaiser's Memoirs.* **H. von Moltke,** *Erinnerungen.* **O. Hammann,** *Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges,* etc. **W. von Schoen,** *Memoirs of an Ambassador.* **Pourtalès,** *op. cit.* (interesting memoirs). **Carnegie Endowment,** *Official German Documents* (records of an official post-bellum investigation). Valuable current contributions in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* (periodical).

On Austrian policy: **F. Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy* (scholarly and recent). **R. Gooss,** *Das Wiener Kabinet und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges.* **H. Kanner,** *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik.* **J. von Szilassy,** *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie.* **Fraknoi,** *Die Ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges.* **J. Andrassy,** *Diplomacy and the War.* **A. Hoyos,** *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz.* **Conrad von Hötzendorf,** *Aus meiner Dienstzeit.* **A. Dumaine,** *La dernière ambassade de France en Autriche.*

Also: **Bogicevic,** *Causes of the War;* **Friedjung,** *Zeitalter des Imperialismus III,* and **S. Stanojevic,** *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs,* for light on Balkan intrigue leading to the assassination. **T. Tittoni,** *Il giudizio della storia sulla responsibilità della guerra.*

A. The Serajevo Assassination, June 28, 1914.

1. Facts of the assassination.
2. Popular indignation in Austria-Hungary.
3. Political significance—review of fundamental antagonism between
   (*a*) Serbian irredentism, backed by Russian Pan-Slavism.
   (*b*) Austro-Hungarian anti-national imperialism, backed by German militarism.
4. Austria's charges against Serbia.

B. The Month of Suspense, June 28 to July 23.

1. Austria's secret plans.
   (*a*) Decision to punish Serbia.
   (*b*) Desire to create a pro-Austrian alliance of Balkan nations.
2. The German promise of support.
   (*a*) Blanket promises of support by Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg, July 5.
   (*b*) The alleged "Potsdam Council."
3. Secret preparation of ultimatum by Austria.
4. Unsuspecting ignorance on part of general public.

C. The Austrian Ultimatum, July 23, 1914.

1. Terms.
2. Failure of Entente's request for extension of time.
3. Serbian reply, July 25.
4. Austrian rejection of Serbian reply.
5. Mobilization of armies by Austria and Serbia.

D. The Rejection of Mediation.

1. Russian demand for modification of Austrian terms.
2. Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation by other Great Powers.
3. Uncompromising attitude of Germany and Austria.
   (*a*) Statement that Austria's "national honor" was at stake.
   (*b*) Desire for "localization of the conflict."
4. Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, July 28.
5. Bethmann-Hollweg's efforts to restrain Austria, July 28-29.
6. Austrian offer to negotiate with Russia, July 30 (too late).

E. Germany and Russia.

1. Russian mobilization.
2. Pressure of German militarists on German government to take action.
   (*a*) German military plans for war on two fronts.
   (*b*) Importance of time element in German plans.
   (*c*) Bethmann-Hollweg's consent to Moltke's advice.
3. The ultimatum to Russia.
4. German declaration of war against Russia.

F. Germany and France.

1. The obligations of France.
   (*a*) The Dual Alliance.
   (*b*) Promise of French ambassador to Russia, July 24, that France would fulfill obligations.
2. German ultimatum to France.
3. The reply.
4. German declaration of war.
5. German attempt to obscure the facts by false charges against France.

G. Belgium and Luxemburg.

1. The German pre-war plan of campaign—through Belgium, Luxemburg, and Holland.
2. Modification of plan—respect of Dutch neutrality and postponement of invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg.
3. Invasion of Luxemburg.
4. Invasion of Belgium.
   (*a*) Moltke's insistence and Bethmann's scruples.
   (*b*) The ultimatum.
   (*c*) Actual invasion.
   (*d*) German attempts to justify this action.
   (*e*) Invasion of Belgium as one cause of ultimate defeat.

H. England and Germany.

1. German hope of English neutrality.
   (*a*) Lichnowsky's optimistic view of Anglo-German relations.
   (*b*) Recent Anglo-German coöperation in Balkan crisis.
   (*c*) Reconciliation of imperialist aims by projected agreements of June 1914.
2. England's obligations.
   (*a*) Nature of Entente.

(*b*) Anglo-French agreement of 1912.
(*c*) Guarantee of Belgian neutrality.
3. England's interests.
(*a*) Balance of power.
(*b*) Security of Channel coasts.
(*c*) Economic.
4. Sir Edward Grey's policy in the crisis.
(*a*) Efforts to secure peaceful settlement by diplomacy.
(*b*) Efforts to preserve freedom of action.
(i) Repeated refusals to promise support to France and Russia, July 24 to August 1.
(ii) Warnings to Germany, July 29, July 31, etc.
(iii) Refusal to state terms on which England would remain neutral, in reply to German inquiries of July 29, August 1, and August 3.
(*c*) Promise to support France if German fleet should attack French coasts or shipping, August 2.
(*d*) Speech to Parliament, August 3.
(i) England not bound by treaty.
(ii) Obligations of honor and interest.
(*e*) Demand that Germany respect Belgian neutrality, August 4.
(*f*) Declaration of war, night of August 4-5.
5. German expressions of surprise and chagrin.
6. Differences of opinion in British cabinet, and influence of Conservatives on cabinet.

I. Italy's Neutrality.

1. Italian contention—non-applicability of Triple Alliance.
2. Obligation to remain neutral, under secret agreement with France.
3. Neutrality and secret bargaining (compare Part 6, II-D).

J. Japan and Germany.

1. Japanese obligations under Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
2. Japanese declaration of war.
3. Japanese imperialism as a cause of entry into the war (see Part 3, XII).

K. The Line-Up in August 1914.

1. Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary.
2. Entente Powers—Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan.

L. Discussion.

1. Relation between immediate causes and general causes—nationalism, imperialism, militarism, secret diplomacy.
2. Contrast between war-time and post-war versions of immediate causes of war (see especially **Beard**, *op. cit.*).
3. Contrast between Lloyd George's statement, Aug. 4, 1917, that Allies were fighting against a "conspiracy," and later statement, Dec. 23, 1920, that the war was something into which the statesmen "glided,

or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it."

4. Lack of machinery for prevention of war.
   (*a*) Difficulty of communications by means of ambassadors, code telegrams, etc.
   (*b*) Statement of Lord Grey, that a League of Nations might have averted the war.
5. Germany's guilt as the theoretical basis of the reparation, financial and economic, and other punitive terms of peace treaty.

XXI. UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS FROM 1908 TO 1914

References:—**C. R. Fish**, 448-53, 459-90. **Moore,** chs. 8, 10. **Ogg,** *National Progress,* chs. 14-17. **Kimpen,** 326-57 and other general works cited above, VIII; Part 3, XII-XIV; Part 7, VII. **Bishop,** *Theodore Roosevelt.* **Hendrick,** *Life and Letters of W. H. Page.* **Dodd,** *Woodrow Wilson.* **Lawrence,** *Woodrow Wilson.* **Latané,** *From Isolation to Leadership.* **Robinson and West,** *Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson,* 3-43.

A. The Roosevelt and Taft Administrations.

1. The Japanese immigration question and the Gentlemen's Agreement.
2. Open door policy, railway ventures, and consortium negotiations in relation to China.
3. Dollar diplomacy in Caribbeans and Central America.
4. Pan-Americanism.

B. The Beginning of Wilson's Administration.

1. The Mexican problem.
2. Caribbean problems.
3. The new Pan-Americanism.
4. The canal tolls controversy.
5. The House secret mission to Germany and England regarding limitation of armaments.

PART SIX

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1914

General References on the War:—Textbooks: **C. J. H. Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II (revised), ch. 31 (best brief summary). **C. J. H. Hayes,** *Brief History of the Great War* (best one-volume treatment in English). **G. P. Gooch,** *Modern Europe,* 560-696 (admirable). **A. F. Pollard,** *Short History of the Great War* (one volume by an English scholar, excellent but inferior to foregoing). *These Eventful Years,* I, chs. 2-8. **Frothingham,** *History of the War.* **General Thévenet,** *La Grande Guerre.* There are numerous less valuable short surveys.

Longer accounts in English:—**J. Buchan,** *History of the Great War,* 4 vols. **F. Simonds,** *History of the World War* (3 vols.). **J. E. Edmonds,** *History of the Great War.* **C. E. Fayle,** *History of the Great War* (from British official records). **London Times,** *Times Documentary History of the War.* **N. Y. Times,** *Current History.* **F. Halsey** (ed.), *Literary Digest History of the World War.* **Great Britain,** *Chronology of the War.* **E. Lavisse** and others, *Histoire de la France contemporaine,* vol. IX, *La grande guerre et conclusion* (excellent). **A. Aulard** and others, *Histoire politique de la grande guerre* (scholarly analysis of political aspects). **M. Barrès,** *Chronique de la guerre* (14 vols.). *Revue d'Histoire de la guerre mondiale* (quarterly review). **H. Stegemann,** *Geschichte des Krieges* (4 vols.). **K. Helfferich,** *Der Weltkrieg.* **M. Schwarte,** *Der Grosse Krieg* (10 vols.). *Deutsche Geschichtskalendar* (serial).

Diplomatic aspects:—**Gooch,** *op. cit.* **G. L. Dickinson** (ed.), *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims.* **F. S. Cocks,** *The Secret Treaties.* **F. Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy* (includes much on general diplomacy). **G. de Manteyer,** *Austria's Peace Offer.* **A. L. Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New* (unsatisfactory on the War). **E. Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets.* **Mermeil,** *Les négotiations secrètes. L'Intervento dell'Italia nei documenti segreti dell'Intesa.* **V. Valentin,** *Deutschland's Aussenpolitik 1890-1918.* Also general histories above and memoirs below.

Naval:—**Sir J. Corbett,** *Naval Operations* (2 vols.). **W. Churchill,** *The World Crisis* (2 vols.). **Fisher,** *Memories* and *Records.* **Jellicoe,** *The Grand Fleet.* **W. S. Sims,** *The Victory at Sea.* **A. von Tirpitz,** *My Memoirs* (2 vols.). **R. Scheer,** *Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War.* **Frothingham,** *Naval History.*

Additional memoirs and biographies:—**R. Recouly,** *Foch.* **P. Painlevé,** *Comment j'ai nommé Foch et Pétain.* **Sir Geo. Arthur,** *Lord Kitchener.* **Viscount French,** *"1914," The Memoirs of Field Marshal Viscount French.* **G. A. B. Dewar** and **J. H. Boraston,** *Sir Douglas Haig's Command.* **Sir W. Robertson,** *From Private to Field Marshal.* **P. E. Wright,** *At the*

Supreme War Council. **Sir Ian Hamilton,** *Gallipoli Diary.* **L. Cadorna,** *La Guerra alla fronte italiana.* **H. von Moltke,** *Erinnerungen.* **E. von Falkenhayn,** *The German General Staff.* **P. von Hindenburg,** *Out of My Life.* **E. von Ludendorff,** *Ludendorff's Own Story* and *Kriegführung und Politik.* **H. von Kuhl,** *Der deutsche Generalstab.* **Conrad von Hötzendorf,** *Aus meiner Dienstzeit.* **L. von Sanders,** *Fünf Jahre Turkei.* **Djemal Pasha,** *Memories.* Among the innumerable memoirs and biographies of politicians and diplomats: **E. T. Raymond,** *Lloyd George.* **D. Lawrence,** *Woodrow Wilson.* **T. von Bethmann-Hollweg,** *Reflections.* **K. von Hertling,** *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei.* **O. Czernin,** *In the World War.* **J. Andrassy,** *Diplomacy and the War.* **L. Bissolati,** *La politica estera.* **L. Klotz,** *De la guerre à la paix.* **T. Jonescu,** *Some Personal Impressions.* **J. H. von Bernstorff,** *My Three Years in America.* **J. Gerard,** *My Four Years in Germany.* **M. Paléologue,** *Ambassador's Memoirs.* **J. Buchanan,** *My Mission to Russia.* **B. Hendrick,** *Walter Hines Page.* **B. Whitlock,** *Belgium.*

Miscellaneous:—**D. W. Johnson,** *Topography and Strategy in the War* and *Battlefields of the World War* (authoritative and interesting study of geographical influences). **Sir P. Gibbs,** *Now It Can Be Told* and *More That Can be Told.* **Sir F. Maurice,** *Intrigues of the War.* **Col. Repington,** *The First World War.* **E. Dane,** *British Campaigns in the Nearer East, 1914-1918.* **E. M. Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway.* **G. F. Abbott,** *Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922.* **E. A. Adamov,** *Les puissances européennes et la Grèce* (Bolshevist disclosures). **S. Korff,** *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia.* **Bevan,** *German Social Democracy and the War.* **D. Schwertfeger** and others, *Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs.* **P. Scheidemann,** *Der Zusammenbruch.* **A. Krauss,** *Ursachen unserer Niederlage.* **S. Grumbach,** *Das annexionistische Deutschland.* **J. T. Shotwell** (ed.), *Economic and Social History of the World War* (an international series of valuable monographs).

On the participation of the United States see below III-C.

I. FIRST PHASE OF THE GREAT WAR: FAILURE OF MILITARY PLANS IN 1914

A. The French Plan of Campaign.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 29. ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 972-5. **Pierrefeu,** *Plutarch Lied.* **General * * *,** *Plutarque n'a pas menti.*

1. Emphasis of pre-war strategists on advantage of taking offensive.
2. French plan ("Plan XVII") to invade Alsace-Lorraine.
3. Failure of French invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, Aug. 1914.

B. Failure of German Strategy in 1914.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 21-57. ‡ **Gooch,** 560-2. ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 975-82; XXXI, 851-61; XXX, 888-97. **French,** *"1914."* **R. Kann,** *Le plan de campagne allemand de 1914.* **Edmonds,** *Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914.* **Moltke,** *Erinnerungen.* **Falkenhayn,** *The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914-1916.* **Kuhl,** *Der deutsche Generalstab.* **Kluck,** *The March on Paris.*

1. The von Schlieffen plan of campaign.
2. Failure of the German plan in 1914.
   (*a*) Refusal of Italy to aid her allies.
   (*b*) Delay due to Belgian resistance.

(*c*) Unexpected promptness of English assistance to France.
(*d*) Unexpected speed of Russian mobilization and Russian advance in the East.
(*e*) The Battle of the Marne.
(i) Relative strength of the opposing armies.
(ii) Importance of the French flanking maneuver from Paris.
(iii) Importance of Foch's generalship.
(iv) Significance as a decisive battle.

3. Significance of the campaign of 1914 in the West.
(*a*) As a commentary on the wisdom of yielding to "military necessity." (**Munroe Smith,** *Militarism and Statecraft.*)
(*b*) Disappointment of hopes for speedy victory.
(*c*) Advantages (especially economic) gained by Germany through invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg, and France.
(*d*) Beginning of the deadlock on the Western Front.
(i) New technique of trench warfare.
(ii) Importance of munitions.
(iii) Importance of manpower, and beginnings of agitation for conscription in England.

4. Campaign of 1914 in the East.
(*a*) Russian invasion of East Prussia and Galicia.
(*b*) Battle of Tannenberg and Hindenburg's rising prestige.
(*c*) Failure of Austria to crush Serbia.

C. Significance of British Sea-Power in 1914.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* ch. vi. ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 1066-72. **Tirpitz,** *My Memoirs.* **Churchill,** *The World Crisis,* I. **Corbett,** *Naval Operations.* **Frothingham,** *Naval History.*

1. Inaction of main German battle fleet.
2. Defeat of Admiral von Spee's squadron.
3. Blockade of Germany and destruction of German commerce.
4. Conquest of German colonies.
5. Ability of Allies to obtain supplies and men from overseas.

D. Turkey's Entry Into the War.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 69-73. ‡ **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway,* 275-84. ‡ **Gooch,** 567-70. **Djemal Pasha,** *Memories of a Turkish Statesman.*

II. SECOND PHASE OF THE GREAT WAR
GERMAN SUCCESSES IN EASTERN EUROPE, 1915-16

A. Conquest of Poland, 1915.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 47-55, 99-112. ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXX, 897-908. Also memoirs of **Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Falkenhayn, Czernin, Paléologue, Buchanan. Nowak,** *Der Weg zur Katastrophe.* **Cramon,** *Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse.*

1. Anglo-French expectation of decisive aid from Russia.
2. Mackensen's victories in Galicia, May-June 1915.
3. Hindenburg's great drive—conquest of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

4. Significance.
   (*a*) Economic and military strengthening of Central Powers.
   (*b*) Rise of annexationist agitation in Germany.
   (*c*) Political effect on Russia.

B. Turco-Teutonic Successes in the Near East, 1915-16.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 83-9, 121-42, 181-91. ‡ **Gooch,** 581-9, 567-73, 599-606. ‡ **Earle,** 285-90. ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXX, 798-808; XXXII, 802-19. **Dane,** *British Campaigns in the Nearer East, 1915-1918.* **Djemal Pasha,** *Memories of a Turkish Statesman.* **Churchill,** *The World Crisis,* II. **Hamilton,** *Gallipoli Diary.* **Liman Von Sanders,** *Fünf Jahre Turkei.*

1. Importance of the Near East in the War.
2. Failure of British diplomatic efforts to win aid of Balkan states.
3. The Anglo-French Dardanelles campaign.
4. Bulgaria's entry into the war, October, 1915.
5. Conquest of Serbia, Montenegro, and part of Albania by Central Powers, 1915-16.
6. Greek neutrality and the Saloniki expedition.
7. Russian advance in Transcaucasia, 1916.
8. British disaster at Kut-el-Amara, 1916.
9. Intervention and collapse of Rumania, 1916.
10. Discussion.
    (*a*) Difference of opinion among Allied leaders regarding importance of campaigns in Near East.
    (*b*) Significance of imperialist aspirations of Great Powers (compare F, below).

C. The Deadlock on the Western Front, 1915-16.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 112-20, 148-55, 171-81. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 982-8, 917-25, 510-25; XXXI, 1013 ff. **Churchill,** *The World Crisis,* II, ch. iv. **Dewar and Boraston,** *Sir Douglas Haig's Command.* Also General References on the War, above.

1. Neuve Chapelle and the British lack of munitions, 1915.
2. Ypres and the use of chlorine gas, 1915.
3. Slight Allied gains in Artois and Champagne, Sept., 1915.
4. Battle of Verdun, 1916.
5. Battle of the Somme, 1916, and the first "tanks."
6. Increasing importance of manpower, munitions, aviation, and industrial resources in the "war of attrition" on the Western Front.

D. Italy's Intervention.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 89-97, 156-8, 174-6. ‡ **Gooch,** 572-6. **Buchan. Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 621-2, 595-602. **Giolitti,** *Memoirs.* **Cocks,** *The Secret Treaties.* **Bissolati,** *La politica estera. L'Intervento dell'Italia.* **Italy,** *Green Book.* **Austria-Hungary,** *Second Red Book.* **J. Alazard,** *L'Italie et le conflit européen.* **L. Villari,** *Awakening of Italy.*

1. Reasons for Italy's entry into the war, 1915.
2. Geographic obstacles to Italian military success.
3. Austrian offensive in Trentino, May-June 1916.
4. Italian conquest of Gorizia, August 1916.

E. Cumulative Effects of British Sea-Power.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 76-9, 162-7. ‡ **Churchill,** *The World Crisis,* II, ch. xiv. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 1073-8, 660-7. **Jellicoe,** *The Grand Fleet.* **Scheer,** *Germany's High Seas Fleet.* **Tirpitz,** *My Memoirs.* **Corbett,** *Naval Operations. These Eventful Years,* I, chs. xii-xv.

1. Gradual tightening of blockade of Germany.
2. Completion of conquest of German colonies.
3. Shortage of raw materials and foodstuffs in Central Powers.
4. Augmentation of Allies' resources by men and materials from overseas.
5. Failure of the first German submarine campaign, 1915-16.
   (*a*) The "war zone" proclamation, February 1915.
   (*b*) The Lusitania, May 1915.
   (*c*) American protests and the modification of the campaign.
   (*d*) Controversy in Germany regarding submarine warfare.
6. The naval battle of Jutland, May 1916.

F. War Aims and Peace Overtures, 1915-17.

References:—* **Hayes,** *Great War,* 191-200, 209-12, 92-3, 252-3, 367, 370. ‡ **Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* I, chs. iii, iv. ‡ **Gooch,** 569-70, 574-5, 605, 607-14. **Cocks,** *The Secret Treaties.* **Czernin,** *In the World War.* **Carnegie Endowment,** *Official German Documents.* **Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy.* **Temperley,** I, 166-187; VI, 1-22. **Dickinson,** *Documents Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims. These Eventful Years,* I, ch. vi. See general works on diplomatic aspects, above.

1. Apparent deadlock at end of 1916.
   (*a*) Apparent impossibility of German victory over
      (i) British sea-power.
      (ii) The intrenched Western Front.
   (*b*) Apparent impossibility of Allied victory over
      (i) German intrenched lines in France.
      (ii) German command of agricultural and mineral resources of Poland, Balkans, Turkey, Belgium, Luxemburg, Northern France.
2. The Teutonic "peace drive"—proposal for peace negotiations, Dec. 12, 1916.
3. Refusal by Allies, Dec. 30, 1916.
4. Wilson's note of Dec. 18, 1916.
5. The German reply.
6. The reply of the Allies, Jan. 10, 1917.
7. Secret war aims of the Allies.
   (*a*) Anglo-French agreements for partition of German colonies in Africa.
   (*b*) Anglo-French-Russian agreement of March, 1915, regarding Constantinople, Persia, and oil.
   (*c*) The Treaty of London, April 26, 1915, regarding Italian claims in Tyrol, Gorizia and Gradisca, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, Albania, Adriatic Islands, Dodecanese, Turkey, African colonies, indemnity.
   (*d*) Russo-French agreement of April 26, 1916, regarding Asiatic Turkey.
   (*e*) Sykes-Picot (Anglo-French) treaty of May 9, 1916, regarding Turkey.

(*f*) Secret Russo-Japanese treaty, July 3, 1916.
(*g*) Rumanian treaty of Aug. 18, 1916, regarding partition of Austria-Hungary.
(*h*) Franco-Russian agreement of Feb.-March, 1917, regarding Alsace-Lorraine, Saar Basin, Left Bank, and Russia's western frontier.
(*i*) Pledges to Japan, Feb.-March, 1917, regarding German possessions in Far East.
(*j*) St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, April, 1917, regarding Italy's share in Asiatic Turkey.
(*k*) Comparison of these secret aims with public declaration of Jan. 10, 1917.

8. Secret German war aims (see * **Gooch,** 618).

III. THIRD PHASE—CRUCIAL EVENTS OF 1917

A. The Unrestricted Submarine Campaign.

References:—* **Hayes,** 75-9, 162-4, 213-6, 220-1. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 1078-82; XXXII, 604-9. ‡ **Gooch,** 615. Memoirs of **Tirpitz, Bethmann-Hollweg,** etc. **Sims,** *The Victory at Sea,* and "The Truth About the German Submarine Atrocities," in *Current History. These Eventful Years,* I, ch. xvi.

1. Review of the naval situation up to 1917.
   (*a*) Supremacy of the British high seas fleet.
   (*b*) The British blockade of Germany.
   (*c*) Restricted use of submarine in 1915-16.
   (*d*) Hesitation, vacillation, and political debate in Germany, before decision to play the trump card of unrestricted submarine warfare.
2. The German note of Jan. 31, 1917.
3. What the submarine war was expected to accomplish.
4. Actual accomplishment in 1917.

B. The Russian Revolution, March, 1917.

References:—* **Hayes,** 225-31. ‡ **Gooch,** 620. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 315-22. **S. Korff,** *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia.* Additional references in **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II (revised), 832-3.

1. Nature of the opposition to the Tsar's government.
2. The March Revolution of 1917.
3. Determination of the new government to continue the war.
4. Effect on public opinion in Germany and Austria-Hungary.
5. Increased optimism of Allies.

C. The Intervention of the United States.

References:—* **Hayes,** ch. x. ‡ **Buchan,** III, chs. 74, 81. ‡ **Committee on Public Information,** *How the War Came to America.* **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 891-9. ‡ **Seymour,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (admirable). **J. B. Scott** (ed.), *President Wilson's Foreign Policy* (documentary) and *International Relations Between the U. S. and Germany, 1914-1917* (legal). ‡ **D. Lawrence,** *Woodrow Wilson,* esp. ch. xii (interesting, intimate, biographical). **B. Hendrick,** *Walter Hines Page* (impatience

of an Anglophil ambassador with Wilson's neutrality). **J. S. Bassett,** *Our War With Germany.* **J. B. McMaster,** *The United States in the World War* (2 vols.). **B. Crowell and R. F. Wilson,** *How America Went to War* (6 vols.). **J. K. Turner,** *Shall It Be Again?* (pacifist criticism). **G. B. Clarkson,** *Industrial America in the World War.*

1. America's isolation and neutrality at the beginning of the war.
2. Reasons for American intervention.
   (*a*) The submarine campaign.
   (*b*) German and Austrian intrigues in U. S. and Latin America.
   (*c*) Indignation regarding German autocracy, militarism, "ruthlessness," imperialism, and disregard for international law.
   (*d*) Sympathy for Belgium, France, and England.
   (*e*) Conception of the war as a conflict between autocracy and democracy.
   (*f*) Allied propaganda.
   (*g*) Economic interests—loans, munitions, supplies, shipping, etc.
3. America's War aims as voiced by Wilson.
4. Psychological effects.
5. Economic and military contributions to Allied cause.
6. Intervention of other nations.
   (*a*) Declarations of war by Cuba, Panama, China, Brazil, Siam, Liberia, and Greece in 1917.
   (*b*) Subsequent intervention by Guatemala, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua.
   (*c*) Severance of diplomatic relations by Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Santo Domingo, Uruguay.

D. Continuation of the Military Deadlock in 1917.

References:—* **Hayes,** ch. xii. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 304-8, 603-8; XXXII, 988-91, 811-22. ‡ **World Peace Foundation,** I, no. 7 (*The Supreme War Council*). **Dane,** *British Campaigns in the Nearer East.* ‡ **Earle,** *Turkey, etc.* **Abbott,** *Greece and the Allies.* **Adamov,** *Les puissances européennes et la Grèce.* Memoirs of **Haig, Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Djemal,** etc., and general works above.

1. Allied advances against the Hindenburg line.
2. Allied successes in the Near East.
   (*a*) Maude's campaign in Mesopotamia.
   (*b*) Allenby's campaign in Palestine.
   (*c*) Intervention in Greece.
3. The Italian disaster at Caporetto.
4. Establishment of the Supreme War Council.

E. War Aims and "Defeatism."

References:—* **Hayes,** 287-93, 297-8. ‡ **Gooch,** 626-37. **Dickinson,** *Peace Proposals.* **Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy.* **Manteyer,** *Austria's Peace Offer.* **Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets.* **Bevan,** *German Social Democracy.* ‡ **Encyc. Brit.,** XXX, 339-40.

1. Pope Benedict XV's plea for a "just and lasting peace."
2. Socialist opposition to aggressive war aims; the Stockholm conference.
3. "Defeatism" in France and Italy.
4. The secret Austrian overtures for peace.

F. The Bolshevist Revolution in Russia.

References:—* **Hayes,** 231-254. **Ross (E. A.),** *The Russian Bolshevik Revolution.* **Korff,** *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia.* **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 322-9. **Dennis,** *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia,* chs. i, ii. Bibliography in **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, 832-3.

1. Reasons for the success of the Bolshevist coup d'état.
2. Attitude of the Bolshevists toward war aims.
3. The Russian armistice, and the Brest-Litovsk Peace.
4. Effect on morale of other nations.

IV. FOURTH PHASE—THE DECISIVE STRUGGLES IN 1918

A. The "Fourteen Points" and Allied War Aims.

References:—* **Hayes,** 297-8. ‡ **Gooch,** 643-7. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 1084-5. **Temperley,** *Peace Conference,* I, 189-204. **Seymour,** *op. cit.*

B. The "Peace" Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

References:—* **Hayes,** 254-260, 334-342. ‡ **Gooch,** 638-40. ‡ **Temperley,** I, 221-35. ‡ **Dennis,** chs. ii, iii.

1. The peace terms as an indication of the war aims of the German and Austrian governments.
2. Military effect—release of German troops for Western front.
3. Effect on morale of Germans and of Allies.
4. Allied intervention in Russia.

C. Failure of German Submarine Campaign.

References:—*Encyc. Brit.,* XXXII, 609-12 and references III-A, above.

D. Allied Unity and Victory on the Western Front.

References:—* **Hayes,** 299-334. ‡ **Gooch,** 647-52. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 89-90, 608-12; XXXII, 991-1005. **Wright,** *Supreme War Council.* **World Peace Foundation,** *Supreme War Council.* **Dewar and Boraston,** *Sir Douglas Haig's Command.* **Recouly,** *Foch.* Memoirs of **Ludendorff, Hindenburg,** etc. **Schwertfeger** and others, *Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs.* **Scheidemann,** *Der Zusammenbruch.* **Krauss,** *Ursachen unserer Niederlage.*

1. The German plan for a decisive victory in France.
2. The battles of Picardy.
3. Appointment of Foch as Allied Commander in Chief.
4. The battles on the Aisne and Oise.
5. The battle in Italy—the Piave.
6. The second battle of the Marne.
7. Victorious advance of Allied armies in France.

E. Collapse of Bulgaria.

References:—* **Hayes,** 342-6. ‡ **Gooch,** 652. **Temperley,** IV, 21-6.

1. The Allied advance in Macedonia.
2. The Bulgarian armistice.

F. Collapse of Turkey.

References:—* **Hayes,** 346-8. ‡ **Gooch,** 653. **Dane,** *op. cit.* **L. Thomas,** *With Lawrence in Arabia.*

1. Allenby's invasion of Syria.
2. British advance in Mesopotamia.
3. The Turkish armistice.

G. Defeat and Dissolution of Austria-Hungary.

References:—* **Hayes,** 348-356. ‡**Gooch,** 656-7. **Temperley,** IV, 29-57, 89-119. **Pribram,** *Austrian Foreign Policy.* **Andrassy,** *Diplomacy and War.*

1. Italian victories in October.
2. The armistice.
3. Establishment of revolutionary governments by Czechs, Yugoslavs, Magyars, German Austrians, Poles.

H. German Revolution and Armistice.

References:—* **Hayes,** 356-64. ‡ **Gooch,** 653-5, 657-8. **Temperley,** I, 51-136. **R. Brunet,** *The German Constitution,* ch. i. **S. M. Bouton,** *And the Kaiser Abdicates.* **H. Ströbel,** *The German Revolution and After.* **E. Bernstein,** *Die deutsche Revolution.* **William II,** *The Kaiser's Memoirs,* ch. xii. **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXI, 273. **Carnegie Endowment,** *Preliminary History of the Armistice.* **K. F. Nowak,** *Collapse of Central Europe.*

1. Nature of parliamentary opposition in Germany in 1918.
   (*a*) Opposition of Reichstag majority to annexationist war aims.
   (*b*) Demand of Reichstag majority for constitutional reforms.
   (*c*) Influence of:
      (i) Russian Bolshevism.
      (ii) The "Fourteen Points."
2. Prince Max and the offer to capitulate on basis of the Fourteen Points.
3. Abdication of the Kaiser.
4. Signature of the armistice.

V. THE ARMISTICES

General References:—**Hayes,** (use index). **Temperley,** I, 115-36, 448-96; IV, 120-8.

A. Guarantees of Allied Supremacy.

1. Demobilization of Bulgarian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian armies.
2. Evacuation of territories invaded by Central Powers.
3. Occupation of strategic centers in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary by Allies.
4. Occupation of Left Bank and three bridgeheads by Allies.
5. Surrender of warships and war materials.

B. Preliminary Fulfilment of Secret Treaties and Anticipation of Peace Terms.

1. President Wilson's Fourteen Points (with modifications) as the basis of the German surrender (see Lansing's note of Nov. 5, in **Temperley,** I, 457).

(*a*) Willingness of Allies to make peace on terms of Wilson's speech of Jan. 8, 1918, and subsequent addresses, with following exceptions.

(*b*) Refusal of Allies to bind themselves regarding "freedom of the seas."

(*c*) "Compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

2. Inclusion of reparation clause in German armistice: "Reparation for damage done." (Article XIX.)

3. Allied occupation of territories pledged by secret treaties.
   (*a*) Alsace-Lorraine (compare II-F-7-h).
   (*b*) Left Bank of Rhine (compare II-F-7-h).
   (*c*) Southern Tyrol (Trentino), Gradisca and Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia—pledged to Italy (compare II-F-7-c).
   (*d*) Hungarian evacuation of Transylvania and other regions pledged to Rumania (compare II-F-7-g).
   (*e*) Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Cilicia (compare II-F-6-e).

4. The armistices as a factor in shaping the peace treaties.
   (*a*) Unwillingness of victorious powers to relinquish territories occupied under armistices.
   (*b*) Impotence of vanquished states to refuse peace terms.
   (*c*) Influence of military leaders, in command of Allied forces, for example, desire of Marshal Foch to wrest Left Bank from Germany.

VI. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE WAR

A. International Law and Treaties.

References:—**Temperley,** *History of the Peace Conference,* I, 358-64. **C. Phillipson,** *International Law and the Great War.* **J. W. Garner,** *International Law and the World War.* **J. B. Moore,** *International Law and Some Current Illusions.*

1. Abrogation or suspension, during war, of treaties of commerce and many other treaties between states on opposing sides.

2. The laws of land warfare.
   (*a*) The Hague conventions and other restrictions on methods of land warfare.
   (*b*) Tendency of belligerents to disregard such restrictions—use of "dumdum" bullets, poison and asphyxiating gases, bombardment of unfortified towns, reprisals, etc.
   (*c*) One reason for ineffectiveness of Hague conventions—not all belligerents had agreed to them.

3. The laws of maritime warfare.
   (*a*) The nature of international restrictions on methods of maritime warfare—especially the Treaty of Paris (1856) and the Declaration of London.
   (*b*) Disregard of such restrictions by German submarine warfare.
   (*c*) Disregard of restrictions by British blockade orders, and British rejection of American proposal to adopt Declaration of London as maritime code.

(*d*) Status of Suez Canal and of the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

4. Laws of neutrality.
   (*a*) General nature of rights and duties of neutrals under international law.
   (*b*) Invasion of neutral states—Belgium and Luxemburg; China, Greece and Persia.
   (*c*) Violation of maritime rights of neutrals (above, 3).
   (*d*) Disputes regarding right of neutrals (especially U. S. A.) to furnish belligerents with munitions and supplies.
5. Law versus "military necessity."
   (*a*) The doctrine of military necessity.
   References:—**Fisher,** *Memories.* **Churchill,** *World Crisis.* **Munroe Smith,** *Militarism versus Statecraft.*
   (*b*) The practice of the doctrine (above, 2, 3, 4).
   (*c*) The sanctity of treaties as a war issue.
6. Lack of sanctions as one reason for disregard of international law during Great War.
7. Sanctity of treaties as a war issue.
   (*a*) Popular impression during the War that Allies were defending sanctity of treaties.
   (*b*) Disregard of some treaties by Allies.
   (*c*) Materialistic character of Allied war aims as revealed by secret treaties (above).

B. Military Versus Civilian Control.

References:—**Wright (P. E.),** *At the Supreme War Council,* esp. 97-106. **Maurice (Sir F.),** *Intrigues of the War.* **Churchill (W. S.),** *The World Crisis.* **Ludendorff,** *Kriegführung und Politik.*

1. Great power and influence of general staffs in war.
2. Tendency of military and naval leaders to resent "civilian interference."
3. Tendency of military leaders to assume political powers—especially, virtual dictatorship of Ludendorff in Germany.
4. Tendency of military leaders to place "military necessity" above law or diplomacy (above, A-5).
5. Tendency of military leaders to encourage annexationist aims (above, V).
6. Conversely, interference with military plans by civilians, for political reasons.

C. War Propaganda.

References:—* **Encyclopædia Britannica,** XXXII, 176-185. *These Eventful Years,* I, ch. 17. **Lippmann (W.),** *Liberty and the News.* **Sir Campbell Stuart,** *Secrets of Crewe House.* **Cook,** *The Press in War Time.* **Northcliffe,** *Lord Northcliffe's War Book.* **G. Demartial,** *La Guerre de 1914, comment on mobilisa les consciences.*

1. Some methods of war propaganda.
   (*a*) Official publication of documents to justify entry into war—British White Paper, French Yellow Book, Russian Orange Book, Belgian Gray Books, Italian Green Book, Serbian Blue Book, German White Book, Austrian Red Book, etc.

(*b*) Official and semi-official distribution of propagandist pamphlets —example, The Committee on Public Information and the Red, White and Blue Books.
(*c*) Government and military censorship and control of news.
(*d*) Propaganda speeches.
(*e*) Sending of "missions" and delegations to neutral countries to influence opinion.
(*f*) Distribution of books, pamphlets, newspapers, etc., in neutral countries.
(*g*) Distribution of pamphlets and leaflets behind enemy lines by means of airplanes and balloons.
(*h*) Activities of unofficial patriotic organizations.

2. General tendencies of war propaganda.
(*a*) To give one-sided account of causes of war.
(i) Falsity of German White Book of 1914, proved by later German revelations.
(ii) Incompleteness of Allies' official publications concerning outbreak of war (cf. **Romberg,** *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*).
(*b*) To accuse enemy of atrocities.
(i) Allied accusations of German atrocities in Belgium and France.
(ii) German counter-charges.
(*c*) To accuse enemy of aggressive aims.
(i) Allied accusation: Germany fighting for world domination.
(ii) German accusation: Allies fighting to destroy Germany.
(*d*) To exaggerate successes and suppress or minimize news of defeats.

3. Some dangers of propaganda.
(*a*) Power of government, through propaganda, to gain popular support for an unjust war.
(*b*) Danger of false optimism, created by distortion of military news.
(*c*) Excitement of popular hatreds, making compromise or conciliation difficult at close of war.

4. Value of propaganda.
(*a*) As a means of popular education regarding international affairs.
(*b*) As indispensable means of maintaining morale.
(*c*) As stimulus to democratic idealism (as well as to the opposite).

D. Curtailment of Personal Freedom.

1. Abridgment of individual rights by governments.
(*a*) Military conscription—depriving individuals of freedom to judge war issues for themselves and to dispose of their own lives.
(*b*) Censorship and curtailment of peace-time rights of free press, free speech, and free assembly.
(*c*) Continuance of restrictive measures (*e.g.*, espionage acts) for some time after war.

2. Unofficial interference with personal freedom.
(*a*) Popular pressure on "slackers," real or supposed.
(*b*) Mobbing of "pacifists" and "radicals."
(*c*) Espionage activities of private patriotic organizations.

VII. THE PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1919-1920

General References:—* **Hayes,** *Modern Europe,* II, ch. 33 (revised ed.). * **Carnegie Endowment,** *The Treaties of Peace.* * **Gooch,** *Modern Europe,* ch. xix. * **Encyc. Brit.,** XXXII, 35-47. ‡ **Baker (R. S.),** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement.* ‡ **House (E. M.) and Seymour (C.),** *What Really Happened at Paris.* **Temperley (H. W. V.** editor), *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 vols.). **Lansing (R.),** *The Peace Negotiations; The Big Four and Others.* **Haskins (C. H.) and Lord (R.),** *Some Problems of the Peace Conference.* **Baruch (B. M.),** *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty.* **Keynes (J. M.),** *Economic Consequences of the Peace.* **Tardieu (A.),** *The Truth About the Treaty.* **Hanotaux (G.),** *Le Traité de Versailles.* **U. S. Government,** *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,* U. S. Senate, 1919. **German Government,** *Materialen betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen.* **W. Schücking,** (ed.), *Kommentar zum Friedensvertrage.* **C. T. Thompson,** *The Peace Conference Day by Day.* **G. L. Beer,** *African Questions at the Peace Conference.* **A. L. Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New.* **M. Hankey,** *Diplomacy by Conference.* **Mermeix,** *Le Combat des Trois.* **Lawrence,** *Woodrow Wilson,* ch. xv.

A. Obstacles to the Conclusion of a Just Peace.

1. Secret diplomacy.
   (*a*) The secret treaties (see above, II-F-7).
   (*b*) Conflicting opinions regarding publicity at Paris.
   (*c*) Practical secrecy of negotiations at Paris.
2. Conflicting nationalist aspirations.
   (*a*) Intensification of nationalist demands by war propaganda and by victory.
   (*b*) National self-determination as one of the guiding principles of the conference.
   (*c*) Bewildering conflict of claims based on national self-determination supported by economic, historical, strategic, ethnographic, and other arguments (above, Part Two, III).
3. Imperialism.
   (*a*) Imperialist aims of Japan in Shantung and of Japan and England in Pacific islands.
   (*b*) Imperialist aims of England, France, Italy, in Near East.
   (*c*) Imperialist aims of England, France, Italy, and Belgium in Africa.
4. Militarism.
   (*a*) Maintenance of Allied armies in the field, as a psychological factor militating against moderation.
   (*b*) Tendency of peace-makers to recognize military possession as "nine points of the law" (cf. Armistices, above).
   (*c*) Militarist conception of security—necessity of crippling enemies and obtaining "strategic frontiers," for example:
      (i) Marshal Foch's demand for the Rhine as military frontier.
      (ii) Italian demand for Brenner Pass.

5. Popular desire for impossible reparations.
   (*a*) Popular hope in victorious countries for large indemnities or reparations as means of relief from crushing burdens of taxation and war debt (N.B., opposition to this demand by a considerable part of socialist workingmen).
   (*b*) Demand of French and Belgians, especially, for reparation of damage in devastated areas.
   (*c*) Popular illusion, especially in England and France, regarding Germany's ability to pay indemnity of a hundred billion dollars or more (N.B., promises made by politicians in the British election of 1918).
6. Instablity of the German government.
   (*a*) Danger of a reactionary coup d'état.
   (*b*) Danger of a Bolshevik revolution.
   (*c*) Hence, insecurity of promises of German government.
7. Disorder in eastern Europe.
   (*a*) Outbreak of petty nationalist wars between Poles and Ukrainians, Poles and Czechs, Rumanians and Hungarians, etc.
   (*b*) The Russian situation.
      (i) Continued presence of Allied armies in eastern Siberia and northern Russia.
      (ii) Allied support of counter-revolutionary movements in Russia.
      (iii) Failure of the Prinkipo Conference project.
      (iv) Allied fear of Bolshevism.
   (*c*) Consequent preoccupation of statesmen at Paris with military affairs in eastern Europe and inability to settle boundary disputes in eastern Europe.
8. Domestic politics.
   (*a*) Inability of responsible statesmen at Paris to make conciliatory compromises lest they be considered weak, unpatriotic, or unsuccessful, by the voters at home.
   (*b*) Tendency, in all countries, of opposition parties to criticize negotiators for political reasons.

B. Organization and Personnel of the Paris Peace Conference.

1. Membership.
   (*a*) Exclusion of enemy delegates and of neutrals.
   (*b*) Unequal representation of large and small Allies.
2. Unimportance of plenary sessions.
3. Importance of committees in preparation of treaty.
4. Rôle of the experts.
5. The Supreme Council.
   (*a*) Membership—"The Big Ten," replaced by the "Big Four."
   (*b*) Importance.
      (i) Planning of work.
      (ii) Appointment of committees.
      (iii) Final decision on controversial questions.
6. Presence at Paris of a host of journalists, unofficial "delegations" from subject nationalities, and propagandists, all concerned with the Conference, but not in it.

C. The Treaty of Versailles.

References:—Above, under VII. # *Treaties of Peace* gives analysis (v-lxxvii) of territorial changes, numerous maps, and text of treaty (I, 3-263).

1. Its history in brief.
   (*a*) Preparation of "draft" treaty by committees of Paris Conference.
   (*b*) Perfunctory approval by Plenary Conference.
   (*c*) Presentation to Germans at Versailles.
   (*d*) Modifications in response to German protests.
      (i) Upper Silesia—not ceded outright to Poland, but subjected to plebiscite.
      (ii) Schleswig—plebiscite area reduced in size.
      (iii) Other changes relatively unimportant.
   (*e*) Signature at Versailles, June 28, 1919, by Allies and Germans.
      (i) Criticism by General Smuts.
      (ii) Refusal of Chinese delegates to sign (# Wood, *Shantung Question,* ch. x).
   (*f*) Ratification.
      (i) Ratification by Germany and by principal Allies.
      (ii) Exchange of ratifications, Jan. 10, 1920, bringing treaty into effect.
      (iii) Refusal of ratification by U. S. Senate.
2. The question of Germany's guilt.
   (*a*) Declaration that the war was imposed on the Allies "by the aggression of Germany and her allies" (article 231).
   (*b*) Unwillingness of Germans, since 1919, to regard this as historical truth.
   (*c*) Provision for punishment of William II and others (art. 227-8).
3. Military and naval terms.
   (*a*) Allied occupation of Left Bank and three bridgeheads for 15 years (428 ff).
   (*b*) Limitation of German forces.
      (i) Army—100,000 men (160).
      (ii) Navy—6 battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, no submarines (181, 191).
      (iii) No air forces (198).
   (*c*) Munitions (164 ff).
      (i) Restriction of German supply.
      (ii) Surrender of surplus to Allies.
      (iii) Prohibition of import or export.
   (*d*) Prohibition of poison gas (171).
   (*e*) Interallied commissions of control (203 ff).
   (*f*) Impossibility of curbing peace-time industries that may be useful in war (nitrate, steel, chemicals, etc.)
   (*g*) Prohibition of German fortifications or troops in Left Bank and zone 50 km. east of Rhine (180); also prohibition of all fortifications in zone bordering Baltic Sea (195-6).
4. Territorial terms.
   (*a*) Alsace-Lorraine (51 ff).
   (*b*) Saar Basin (45 ff).
   (*c*) Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet (32 ff).
   (*d*) Schleswig (109 ff).

(*e*) Prussian Poland (87 ff), and Danzig (100 ff).
(*f*) Memel (99).
(*g*) Cession of part of Silesia to Czechoslovakia (83).

5. Other political clauses.
   (*a*) Abolition of Belgian neutrality (31).
   (*b*) Luxemburg's status (40-1).
   (*c*) Abrogation of treaties of Brest-Litovsk (116).
6. German colonial possessions.
   (*a*) Application of mandatory system to German colonies in Africa and Pacific (22, 119-127).
   (*b*) Transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan (156-8).
   (*c*) Germany's renunciation of property and treaty rights in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Bulgaria (118-156).
7. Reparation.
   (*a*) Germany's acceptance of responsibility (231).
   (*b*) Kinds of damage to be included (art. 232 and annex)—N.B., inclusion of pensions to wounded or invalided soldiers and dependents, and allowances to families of mobilized men.
   (*c*) Amount.
      (i) Provision for delivery of bonds for 100 billion gold marks in three instalments on account (235 and annex).
      (ii) Total of Germany's obligation and capacity to pay, to be decided by Reparation Commission (233).
   (*d*) Method of payment.
      (i) Schedule of payments to be fixed by Reparation Commission (232).
      (ii) Reparation Commission empowered to require part payment in ships, coal, dyestuffs, chemical drugs, cattle, machinery and tools, raw materials, etc. (236).
   (*e*) Restitution (in addition to above).
      (i) German promise to return cash seized and all animals, objects, and securities which could be identified as having been taken from Allied countries (238).
      (ii) Special promises to return certain trophies, works of art, Caliph Othman's Koran, and Sultan Mkwawa's skull (245-7).
8. Other financial and economic clauses.
   (*a*) Expenses of armies of occupation to be paid by Germany (248-9).
   (*b*) Confiscation of private German foreign investments and interests.
      (i) Right of Reparation Commission to appropriate property of German investors in railroads, concessions, etc., in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and in ceded territories (260).
      (ii) Liquidation of German private property in Allied countries (297).
      (iii) Liquidation of private debts (296).
   (*c*) Allied commercial rights in Germany.
      (i) Allies to receive most-favored-nation treatment in tariff duties, customs, coasting trade, etc. (264 ff).
      (ii) Protection for trademarks of Allies' products in Germany (274).
      (iii) Protection of Allied citizens against discrimination (276 ff).

(iv) Restitution of Allied citizens' property in Germany (297).

(*d*) Communications.

(i) Freedom of transit for mails, passengers, and commerce through Germany (321-6).

(ii) Allied vessels in German ports and inland waters to receive same rights as German vessels (327).

(iii) Internationalization of portions of Elbe, Oder, Niemen, and Danube rivers (332 ff).

(iv) Most-favored-nation treatment for Allied goods and rolling stock on German railways.

(v) Allied aircraft flying over Germany to enjoy same rights as German aircraft (313-20).

9. Labor.
   (*a*) International Labor Office and Conference (387 ff). (Compare Part 10, VIII, below.)
   (*b*) "General Principles" of labor legislation (427).
10. League of Nations Covenant (to be treated later, Part 10, VII).
11. Protection of France.
   (*a*) Political and strategic elements in the French demand for security.
   (*b*) Anglo-American opposition to French demands for control of Left Bank.
   (*c*) Compensatory promise to protect France—Anglo-French and Franco-American treaties signed June 28, 1919, to protect France against "any unprovoked movement of aggression" by Germany (text in **Temperley,** III, 337 ff).
   (*d*) Refusal of U. S. Senate to ratify, and consequent collapse of plan for joint guarantee of France.

D. The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.

References:—* **Bowman,** chs. xi-xii. ‡ **Temperley,** IV, chs. vii, ix, text in vol. V. **House and Seymour,** chs. v-vi. **Hungary,** *The Hungarian Negotiations.* ‡ *Treaties of Peace,* I, 267-649, text and maps.

1. History in brief.
   (*a*) Preparation of draft treaties by Paris Conference.
   (*b*) Signature of Austrian Treaty at St. Germain and Hungarian Treaty at the Trianon.
   (*c*) Ratification.
2. Military terms.
   (*a*) Limitation of armaments.
      (i) Austrian army—30,000.
      (ii) Hungarian army—35,000.
      (iii) Warships—surrendered to Allies.
      (iv) Air forces—prohibited.
      (v) Munitions—limited quantity.
   (*b*) Supervision by Allied commissions of control.
3. Application of principle of self-determination.
   (*a*) Recognition of new states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, formed out of Austro-Hungarian territory.
   (*b*) Union of Galicia with Poland.
   (*c*) Union of Yugoslav provinces with Serbia.
   (*d*) Union of Transylvania with Rumania.

(*e*) Union of Italia Irredenta with Italy.
(*f*) Union of German West Hungary with Austria.

4. Some violations of the principle.
   (*a*) Provision against union of German-Austria with Germany. (Treaty of St. Germain, art. 88).
   (*b*) Italian annexation of Tyrol up to Brenner Pass, for strategic reasons (compare Secret Treaty of London).
   (*c*) Inclusion of 4 million Germans, 400,000 Ruthenians and 1,000,000 Magyars in Czechoslovakia, largely for economic and strategic reasons.
   (*d*) Inclusion of 3 million Ruthenians in Poland (eastern Galicia).
   (*e*) Inclusion of 1,500,000 Magyars in Rumania.
5. Plebiscite areas.
   (*a*) Klagenfurt.
   (*b*) Teschen, Zips and Orava (subsequently divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland by Ambassadors Conference, without plebiscites).
   (*c*) Oedenburg.
6. The Italo-Yugoslav conflict.
   (*a*) Conflict at the Peace Conference between Italian and Yugoslav claims to Fiume, Istria, Dalmatia, etc.
   (*b*) Wilson's manifesto and the withdrawal of Italian delegates from Peace Conference.
   (*c*) Seizure of Fiume by D'Annunzio.
   (*d*) Silence of Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon regarding assignment of these disputed territories.
   (*e*) Subsequent history below, VIII-A-3-*c*.
7. Economic aspects.
   (*a*) Economic effects of territorial dismemberment of Dual Monarchy—new tariff and passport barriers, currencies, etc.
   (*b*) Liability of Austria and Hungary for reparation of damage done to property of Allied nationals.
   (*c*) Assumption of portions of pre-war debt by the "successor" states.
   (*d*) Other economic provisions mainly similar to those in Versailles Treaty (above).
8. Covenant (as in Versailles Treaty).
9. Labor clauses (as in Versailles Treaty).

E. Treaty of Neuilly.

References:—* **Bowman,** ch. xvi. ‡ **Temperley,** IV, 166-170, 411-5, 44-61, text V, 305-358. ‡ **House and Seymour,** 163-74. **Gibbons,** *Europe Since 1918,* ch. viii. ‡ *The Treaties of Peace,* II, 653-785, text and map.

1. History.
   (*a*) Preparation at Paris Peace Conference.
   (*b*) Signature at Neuilly, Nov. 27, 1919.
   (*c*) Ratification, 1920.
2. Military terms—reduction of Bulgarian army to 20,000.
3. Territorial.
   (*a*) Rejection of Bulgarian claim to parts of Macedonia and Dobrudja.
   (*b*) Cession of Western Thrace to Allies for Greece.
   (*c*) Cession of small districts on Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to Serbia, for strategic reasons.

4. Reparation—2¼ billion francs gold in 37 years.
5. General provisions, as in preceeding treaties.

F. Treaty of Sèvres.

References:—* **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway,* 301-3. * **Bowman,** chs. 24-8. ‡ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* I, ch. iv. ‡ **House and Seymour,** chs. vii-viii. ‡ **Temperley,** VI, 88-103. ‡ *The Treaties of Peace,* II, 789-941, text and maps; I, xxx-xxxiv, explanation.

1. History.
   (*a*) Preparation of draft by Paris Conference and Conference of Ambassadors.
   (*b*) Signature at Sèvres, Aug. 10, 1920.
   (*c*) Refusal of ratification by Turkey.
   (*d*) Subsequent negotiations and replacement of Sèvres Treaty by Lausanne Treaty (see below).
2. Dismemberment of Turkey.
   (*a*) Mandates
      (i) Mesopotamia.
      (ii) Syria.
      (iii) Palestine.
   (*b*) Armenia.
   (*c*) Hedjaz.
   (*d*) Kurdistan.
   (*e*) Renunciation of Cyprus (occupied by English since 1878), Egypt (occupied by English since 1882), rights in Tripoli (conquered by Italy, 1911-12), Tunis (French protectorate since 1881), and rights in Morocco (French protectorate, 1912).
   (*f*) Rhodes and Dodekanesia.
      (i) Cession by Turkey to Italy.
      (ii) Italian promise (in separate Italo-Greek treaty) to cede all except Rhodes to Greece and to hold plebiscite in Rhodes in five years.
   (*g*) Eastern Thrace.
   (*h*) Greek occupation of Smyrna.
3. Economic provisions.
   (*a*) Turkey to sell German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian property in Turkey.
   (*b*) Pre-war concessions to Allied nationals confirmed.
   (*c*) Responsibility of Turkey for indemnities, cost of armies of occupation, and old debts.
   (*d*) Supervision of Turkish finances by Interallied Financial Commission, with power to veto new concessions and loans.
   (*e*) Provisions for freedom of transit, etc., as in foregoing treaties.
4. Control of Straits by international commission.
5. Reëstablishment of Capitulations subject to future reform.
6. Supplementary Tripartite Treaty of Aug. 10, 1920, between England, France, and Italy.
   (*a*) England, France, and Italy to cooperate in Near East.
   (*b*) Tripartite control of Bagdad and Anatolian railways.
   (*c*) Special interests of Italy in southern Anatolia, including Heraclea coal basin.

(*d*) Special interests of France in Cilicia and Kurdistan.

7. Subsequent history (compare VIII-D).

G. The Minorities Treaties.

References:—* **House and Seymour,** ch. ix. ‡ **Temperley,** V, 432 ff (text) and V, 112 ff.

1. Importance of protecting religious and racial minorities (compare Part 2, above).
2. Unwillingness of Great Powers to accept any universal provision for racial and religious equality.
3. Decision of Supreme Council during Paris Peace Conference to require signature of special treaties for protection of minorities in new nations and Balkan states.
4. Signature of minorities treaties by Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Greece.
5. Terms in general.
   (*a*) Complete protection of life and liberty and equal citizenship rights for all inhabitants regardless of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion.
   (*b*) Liberty of public and private worship.
   (*c*) Freedom for minorities to use their own language, maintain schools, etc.
   (*d*) Reference of disputes to World Court.
   (*e*) Guarantee by League of Nations.

H. American Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

References:—**Temperley,** VI, 650-3. *International Conciliation,* No. 170. *Treaty Series,* Nos. 658-660. *The Treaties of Peace,* II, 945-956.

1. Necessity for separate treaties, in view of rejection of Treaties of Versailles, Trianon, and St. Germain by U. S. Senate.
2. Termination of state of war by joint resolution of U. S. Senate and House (signed by President July 2, 1921).
3. Signature and ratification of the separate treaties in 1921.
4. Terms of the German treaty.
   (*a*) U. S. to enjoy all rights, reparations, etc., under armistice and following parts of Treaty of Versailles.
      (i) Part IV, section 1—German colonies.
      (ii) Part V—military, naval and air clauses.
      (iii) Part VI—prisoners and graves.
      (iv) Part VIII—reparation.
      (v) Parts IX-X—financial and economic.
      (vi) Part XI—aviation.
      (vii) Part XII—ports, waterways and railways.
      (viii) Part XIV—army of occupation.
      (ix) Part XV—miscellaneous.
   (*b*) U. S. not bound by:
      (i) Part I—Covenant of League.
      (ii) Parts II-III—territorial changes in Europe.
      (iii) Part IV, sections 2-8—renunciation of German rights in China, Siam, etc.
      (iv) Part XIII—labor clauses.

5. Terms of Austrian and Hungarian treaties—in general similar to German treaty.

I. Some General Aspects of the Peace Settlement.

1. Partial application of liberal principles.
   (*a*) National self-determination.
      (i) In general applied to European territories of defeated Powers.
      (ii) Subject to numerous exceptions on economic, historical, military and naval grounds.
      (iii) Not applied to Asiatic and African territories.
      (iv) Not applied to possessions of victors and neutrals.
      (v) The new map as the nearest approach in history to a national map of Europe.
   (*b*) Freedom of transit and protection against economic discrimination —applied to defeated Powers.
   (*c*) Equal rights for racial and religious minorities—applied to new nations, and Balkan states.
   (*d*) Limitation of armaments—applied to defeated Powers; provided in principle for all members of League in Covenant.
   (*e*) Labor (Part 10, below).
2. General effects.
   (*a*) Destruction of balance of power.
      (i) Elimination of Germany, and Austria-Hungary as Great Powers.
      (ii) Ostracism of Russia.
      (iii) Isolation of U. S.
      (iv) French military supremacy in Europe.
      (v) Discord among victors.
   (*b*) Prevalence of antagonism and conflicting nationalist ambitions.
   (*c*) Increase of militarism among victors and new states (Part 4).
   (*d*) The foregoing conditions as obstacles to maintenance of peace.
   (*e*) The League of Nations (Part 10) as an organization designed to correct these evils.
   (*f*) Aggravation of economic after-effects of war.
3. Widespread dissatisfaction with treaties.
   (*a*) Natural resentment in defeated countries.
   (*b*) Inevitable disappointment of extreme nationalists in victorious and new nations.
   (*c*) Dissatisfaction of numerous liberals, particularly in U. S. and England.
   (*d*) Significance of personalities in controversy over treaties—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau.
   (*e*) Criticism of treaties as a weapon of party politics in England, France, Germany, Italy, United States.

VIII. SINCE THE PEACE CONFERENCE

General References:—No textbook accounts quite meet the needs of this section of the syllabus. **Hayes,** *Modern Europe* II (revised ed.), 792-805, 829-32, 834-66, admirable but brief summary. **Hazen,** *Europe Since 1815* (revised ed.), II, arranged by countries. **Bowman,** *The New World,*

much valuable material, arranged by countries. **Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New,* general but inadequate account. **C. A. Beard,** *Cross-Currents in Europe To-Day,* valuable chapters on economic conditions (iv), Russian relations (vi), America's position (ix). **H. A. Gibbons,** *Europe Since 1918,* comprehensive but more opinionative than factual. **Temperley,** *Peace Conference,* VI, on several topics. Teacher and student will need to rely on articles in *These Eventful Years;* in the supplement to *The New International Encyclopedia;* in annuals such as *The Record of Political Events* (cited as *Record*), *The New International Year Book, The Annual Register,* **Levermore's** *Handbooks of the League of Nations;* in periodicals such as *Foreign Affairs* (quarterly), *Current History* (monthly), *The Nation* (weekly), and others; and newspapers. *Foreign Affairs* gives regularly a list of new books on international affairs and a very valuable guide to source material (official documents). *Europäische Gespräche* (monthly, Germany), gives a useful list of important books and magazine articles.

There are of course innumerable controversial and journalistic books on postbellum affairs. Among the more interesting general surveys are: **Nitti,** *Wreck of Europe* and *Decadence of Europe.* **Brailsford,** *After the Peace.* **Zimmern,** *Europe in Convalescence.* **Caillaux,** *Whither France? Whither Europe?* **Lloyd George,** *Is It Peace?* **Ashmead-Bartlett,** *Tragedy of Central Europe.* **J. Bardoux,** *Lloyd George et la France.* **L. Graux,** *Histoire des violations du traité de paix.* **R. Poincaré,** *Histoire politique* (series). ‡ **F. Kellor,** *Security Against War.*

A. Allied Continuation Conferences and the Unfinished Peace Settlement.

1. Permature adjustment of Peace Conference, leaving following matters unsettled:
   (*a*) Hungarian treaty (above VI-D) and Turkish treaty (VI-F).
   (*b*) Numerous territorial problems—Memel, Eastern Galicia, Bessarabia, Albania, Montenegro, Thrace, Fiume and Dalmatia, eastern frontier of Poland, etc.
   (*c*) Status of Russia and Russian border states.
   (*d*) Terms and distribution of mandates.
   (*e*) Total amount, distribution, and payment of reparations.
2. Continuation of work of peace settlement by various organizations and conferences.
   (*a*) "Continuation conferences" of premiers, i.e. the Supreme Council.
      (i) Membership: premiers of principal Allies, sometimes with representatives of smaller Allies, or American "observer," or technical experts.
      (ii) Meetings: irregular but frequent from 1920 to 1923.
      (iii) Functions: settlement of important problems arising from peace treaties; preservation of Allied solidarity; tendency to usurp functions of League, Reparation Commission and other bodies.
   (*b*) Council of Ambassadors.
      (i) Composition: ambassadors of principal Allies, in Paris.
      (ii) Function: to relieve premiers of less important business arising out of execution and completion of peace settlement.
   (*c*) Reparation Commission.
      (i) Composition: delegates of Great Britain, France, Italy, and of either Belgium, or Japan, or Yugoslavia.

(ii) Function: to determine amount of reparation and schedule of payments.

(*d*) Inter-Allied commissions of control to supervise execution of military, naval and air clauses.

(*e*) Relation to League of Nations (below, Part 10).

(*f*) Occasional other conferences (below, B).

3. Completion of the territorial settlement, chiefly by continuation conferences (*Treaties of Peace,* I, Introduction, and **Bowman,** *New World* with *Supplement;* also **Kellor,** I, 92 ff.).

(*a*) The Hungarian treaty (above, VI-D).

(*b*) The Sèvres treaty and its revision at Lausanne (below, **D**).

(*c*) The Adriatic settlement.

(i) Vain attempts of Supreme Council to arrange compromise between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1920 (**Temperley,** IV, 278-337).

(ii) Treaty of Rapallo, Nov. 12, 1920 (**Temperley,** V, 428).

(iii) Treaty of Rome, Jan. 27, 1924 (*Nation,* Mar. 19, 1924).

(*d*) Albania (*Encyclopædia Britannica,* XXX, 107; *New Int. Encyc.;* **Temperley,** IV, 338-47; or **Bowman**).

(i) Projected Italian mandate.

(ii) Albanian revolt, independence, recognition, and admission to League.

(*e*) Mandates (**Temperley,** VI, 500-23; *Treaties of Peace,* I, xiv-xxv; also compare Part 3, XX).

(*f*) Plebiscites in Schleswig, Silesia, Klagenfurt, Marienwerder, Allenstein (**Temperley,** VI, 556-8, 248, 256, 261-6).

(*g*) Division of Teschen, Orava and Spisz between Poland and Czechoslovakia without the proposed plebiscite (**Temperley,** IV, 348-67).

(*h*) Tacit assignment of Eastern Galicia to Poland (**Temperley,** VI, 245, 266-74).

(*i*) Memel (**Temperley,** VI, 247-8, 283; *Current History,* May, 1924, 233-8; *Foreign Affairs,* March, 1924.

(*j*) Vilna and the Polish-Lithuanian disputed zone (**Temperley,** VI, 309).

(*k*) Settlement of Polish eastern frontier by Russo-Polish war and treaty of Riga (**Temperley,** VI, 274-83, 318-22; *L'Europe nouvelle,* Apr. 7, 1923).

(*l*) Gradual recognition of Russian border states—Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania (**Temperley,** VI, 284-310).

(*m*) Allied recognition of Rumania's annexation of Bessarabia (*Foreign Affairs,* June, 1924; *New Int. Encyc.*).

(*n*) Enlargement of Italian colonies in Africa, in fulfilment of Treaty of London (*New Int. Encyc.,* "Africa").

(*o*) Revision of Shantung settlement by special treaty signed during Washington Conference (below).

4. Enforcement of peace treaties by continuation conferences.

(*a*) Failure to enforce clause for Kaiser's trial, due to Holland's refusal to surrender Kaiser (*Record,* 1920, 5-6).

(*b*) Compromise regarding trial of German war criminals (*Record, 1920,* 6; *Record, 1921,* 1).

(*c*) Dubious success of clauses for disarmament of Germany (**Temperley,** VI, 552-4).
(*d*) Reparations (Part 8-VI).
(*e*) Enforcement of most other treaty provisions.
(*f*) Conflicting policies of France (strict enforcement) and Great Britain (leniency).

B. Other Important Conferences.

1. Washington Conference of 1921-2 (**Buell,** *The Washington Conference; Record, 1922,* 1-9).
   (*a*) Composition.
   (*b*) The naval agreement (compare Part 4).
   (*c*) The Pacific pact (compare Part 3).
   (*d*) Decisions regarding China (compare Part 3).
   (*e*) Resolutions against poison gas and submarine warfare on commerce.
2. Genoa Conference of 1922 (**Temperley,** VI, 328-332; *Record, 1922,* 11-14).
   (*a*) Inclusion of Germany and Russia.
   (*b*) Non-participation of U. S.
   (*c*) Failure to agree on recognition of Russia.
   (*d*) Futility of attempt to accomplish economic reconstruction of Europe without discussing reparation and economic clauses of peace treaties.
   (*e*) The short-term non-aggression pact.
   (*f*) Significance of Russo-German rapprochement, evidenced in Rapallo Treaty.
   (*g*) The growing rift between England and France.
3. The Hague Conference of experts, 1922, on Russia. (**Temperley,** VI, 333-4; *Record, 1923,* 1-2).
   (*a*) Allied claims and Russian counter-claims.
   (*b*) Failure.
4. Lausanne Conferences, 1922-3, on the Near East (below, D).
5. Pan-American Congress, 1923 (*Record, 1923,* 21-2).
6. Baltic Conferences (**Temperley,** VI, 310).
7. Numerous technical conferences. (See Part 8, VI-C-8.)

C. Alliances and Coalitions Since the War.

Special References:—**World Peace Foundation,** VI, no. 2, *Post-War Political Alignments.* **A. Mousset,** *La petite entente.* **League of Nations,** *Treaty Series* for texts of alliances.

1. Effect of the war on pre-war coalitions.
   (*a*) Destruction of Triple Alliance.
   (*b*) Destruction of Franco-Russian Alliance and Anglo-Russian Entente by Russian Bolshevist revolution.
   (*c*) Gradual weakening of Entente Cordiale by Anglo-French differences regarding:
      (i) Reparations and seizure of Ruhr.
      (ii) Policy toward Russia.
      (iii) Near East.
      (iv) Armaments—air armament, naval armament, colored troops, etc.

(v) Sterile proposals for Anglo-French Alliance (below, 2-*c*).

(*d*) Termination of Anglo-Japanese Alliance by Washington Conference agreement on Pacific.

2. New French alliances.

(*a*) French motives for forming alliances.

(i) Unwillingness to rely entirely on League of Nations for security.

(ii) Desire for additional guarantees against Germany.

(iii) Desire of French chauvinists to maintain French supremacy on the Continent.

(iv) Desire to find substitutes for former Franco-Russian alliance.

(v) Opposition to Bolshevism in Russia, and desire to keep Germany and Russia separated (idea of "sanitary cordon," see below, 4).

(*b*) Failure of the proposed Anglo-American pledge to protect France (see VI-C-11, above).

(*c*) Failure of proposed Anglo-French treaty.

(i) British proposal, at Cannes meeting of Supreme Council, Jan., 1922, of Anglo-French treaty.

(ii) Proposed terms:

British aid "in the event of direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by Germany."

Cooperation to enforce terms of Versailles Treaty regarding Left Bank and German disarmament.

Treaty not binding on British Dominions without their consent.

Treaty to last ten years.

(iii) Fall of Premier Briand, who favored treaty.

(iv) Rejection of proposed treaty by Premier Poincaré.

(*a*) Unwillingness to accept a treaty not based on equality; feeling that proposed treaty was beneath French dignity.

(*b*) Fear that France would not have a free hand in other matters.

(v) Subsequent revival of idea in new form.

(*d*) Franco-Belgian military agreement, Sept. 7, 1920.

(i) Nature of agreement—secret agreement signed by French and Belgian chiefs of staff.

(ii) Purpose—officially stated to be "purely defensive" against "an unprovoked aggression" by Germany.

(*e*) Franco-Polish alliance.

(i) Alliances signed Feb. 19, 1921.

Agreement to "act in concert" in case either is "attacked without provocation."

Agreement to cooperate in economic matters and foreign policy.

(ii) Commercial convention signed Feb. 6, 1922.

Admission of French goods to Poland at reduced tariff.

Admission of Polish goods to France at reduced tariff.

(iii) French loan of 400 million francs to Poland.

(iv) Significance:

Military and economic value of alliance to France.
Tendency to stimulate Polish nationalism and militarism.

(*f*) Franco-Czechoslovak alliance.
(i) Military and strategic importance of Czechoslovakia.
(ii) Visit of President Masaryk and Foreign Minister Benes to Paris in 1923, and preliminary negotiations for alliance.
(iii) Conclusion of defensive alliance, Jan. 25, 1924 (*Nation*, Feb. 27, 1924, p. 241).
(iv) French loan to Czechoslovakia.
(v) Czechoslovakia as a connecting link between France and the Little Entente.

3. The Little Entente.
(*a*) Purposes.
(i) To prevent restoration of Hapsburg dynasty in Hungary or Austria.
(ii) To prevent Hungary from attempting to regain lost territory.
(iii) To promote economic coöperation.
(iv) To increase military and political importance, through coöperation, of member states.

(*b*) Nature: a coalition of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, based on separate bilateral treaties and informal understandings.
(i) Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
Defensive alliance against Hungary, August 14, 1920.
Military convention supplementary to above, Aug. 14, 1921.
General political agreement of Marienbad, Aug. 31, 1922.
Mutual political and diplomatic support.
Coöperation in economic, financial, and railway matters.
Approval of Czechoslovak agreements with Rumania, Austria and Poland.
Approval of Yugoslav agreements with Italy and Rumania.
(ii) Czechoslovakia and Rumania.
Defensive alliance against Hungary, April 23, 1921.
Commercial convention, April 23, 1921.
(iii) Rumania and Yugoslavia.
Defensive alliance against Hungary and Bulgaria, July 2, 1921.

(*c*) Relation to general international situation.
(i) Military importance.
Combined strength of standing armies about 500,000, equivalent to a Great Power.
(ii) Close relation to France, through French loans, French military instructors, and Czechoslovak alliance with France.
(iii) Harmony between France and Little Entente on question of enforcing peace settlement of 1919-20.
(iv) The Little Entente as part of "sanitary cordon" against Russian Bolshevism.
(v) The Little Entente as the nucleus of a potential Danube federation.
(vi) Affiliation with Poland (below).

4. "Sanitary cordon" policy.
(*a*) Purpose.

(i) Desire of small states of east-central Europe for mutual protection against Russia.

(ii) Desire of French government to erect "sanitary cordon" or chain of buffer states to isolate Russia from Central and Western Europe.

(*b*) The Franco-Polish alliance (see above) as one element in the plan.

(*c*) The Polish-Baltic entente—Treaty of Warsaw, March 17, 1922.

(i) Members: Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, Finland (Finland signed but did not ratify). N.B. exclusion of Lithuania because of Polish-Lithuanian border conflicts.

(ii) Terms.

Members will not make treaties against each other.

Members will communicate to each other all future treaties with other states.

Guarantee of rights of minorities.

Settlement of all future disputes by peaceful methods.

"Benevolent attitude" toward any member attacked by an outside power.

Confirmation (meaning maintenance?) of existing peace treaties between members and Russia (N.B. Polish treaty of March 18, 1921, gave Poland generous eastern frontier at Russia's expense).

(iii) Significance—Baltic countries linked with Poland for certain purposes, although former had friendly relations with Russia.

(iv) Weakness—Geographic, and economic dependence of Baltic nations on Russia; exclusion of Finland and Lithuania.

(*d*) Poland and Czechoslovakia—Treaty of Prague, Nov. 6, 1921.

(i) Mutual guarantee of territories obtained by peace treaties.

(ii) Benevolent neutrality and free passage of war materials in case either should be attacked.

(iii) Arbitration of all important disputes.

(iv) Close economic relations to be prompted by special agreements.

(v) Significance: Poland linked with Little Entente through Czechoslovakia.

(*e*) Poland and Rumania—Treaty of Bucharest, March 3, 1921.

(i) Provision for mutual assistance in case either should be attacked on eastern frontiers (by Russia).

(ii) Agreement to consult together regarding relations with "eastern neighbors."

(iii) Significance:

Poland linked with Rumania in "sanitary cordon" against Russia.

Mutual resistance of any Russian attempt to regain Bessarabia from Rumania or disputed territories from Poland.

(*f*) Summary: "Sanitary cordon" or chain of small states, including Baltic nations, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, to prevent spread of Bolshevism and to separate Russia and Germany; tendency of member states to militarism and aggressive nationalism; French financial, diplomatic, and military backing for the cordon.

5. Italian ententes.
   (*a*) Italy and Spain (*Current History*, Jan., 1924, pp. 687 f).
      (i) Visit of Spanish king and dictator to Rome, Nov., 1923, resulting in announcement of closer friendly relations between Italy and Spain.
      (ii) Supposed common interests of Spain and Italy.
      Exchange of Spanish raw materials for Italian manufactures.
      Possible combination of Spanish and Italian naval forces as counterpoise to French naval power in Mediterranean.
      Spanish diplomatic support for Italian Adriatic policy, in return for Italian support of Spanish objections to proposed French control of Tangiers in Morocco.
      (iii) Italo-Spanish entente as an obstacle to supremacy of French system of alliances.
   (*b*) Italy and Yugoslavia, treaty of Jan. 27, 1924 (*Nation*, Mar. 19, 1924, 326).
   (*c*) Italy and Czechoslovakia, July 5, 1924 (*N. Y. Times*, July 6, 1924).
   (*d*) Continued negotiations with Little Entente powers in 1924.

D. Near Eastern Affairs Since the War.

References:—* **Earle**, *Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, 300-6, 314-50. * **Bowman**, *The New World, Supplement* (1924), 95-104. **Bowman**, *The New World*, chs. xxiv-xxix. **Price (C.)**, *The Rebirth of Turkey*. **Political Science Quarterly**, *Record of Political Events*, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923 (use index). **Current History** (articles on recent events). Other references, Part 3, IX.

1. Review of salient features of peace settlement (compare VI-F, above).
   (*a*) Dismemberment of Ottoman Empire.
   (*b*) Division of remainder of Turkey into economic spheres of influence.
   (*c*) Subjection of Turkish government to international control in matters of finance, concessions, armament, neutral Straits zone, etc.
   (*d*) Restoration of capitulations.
   (*e*) The Peace of Sèvres as a victory of imperialism over nationalism.
      (i) Disregard of language and sentiments of populations concerned, in dismemberment of Ottoman Empire.
      (ii) Economic and strategic interests of European powers (chiefly England, France, and Italy) as dominant factors in Sèvres settlement.
2. Rise of Nationalist movement in Turkey.
   (*a*) Underlying causes.
      (i) Growth of national consciousness in Turkey, similar to that in China, Persia, Egypt, and other countries subjected to European imperialism. (Compare Young Turk movement, before war, as expression of growing nationalism).
      (ii) Growth of liberialism in Turkey, as in other backward countries (compare Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as expression of liberalism).
      (iii) Desire of Turks to regain control of economic life of their country.

(*b*) Immediate causes.

(i) Indignation aroused by humiliating Treaty of Sèvres.

(ii) Occupation of Smyrna by Greeks, 1919, and subsequent Greek invasion of Asia Minor, with encouragement of British Government.

(*c*) The Nationalist revolution, 1919-1923.

(i) Nationalist conferences at Erzerum and Sivas, 1919.

(ii) Nationalist victory in parliamentary elections, 1919-20.

(iii) The National Pact (*Current History,* Nov., 1922, 280).

Refusal to accept Treaty of Sèvres.

Rejection of financial and judicial restrictions on Independence of Turkey.

Pledge to reunite Cilicia, Mosul, and Turkish Thrace with Turkey.

Fate of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Western Thrace, etc., to be decided by plebiscites.

Turks to have secure possession of Constantinople, but permit freedom of Straits for commerce and communication.

(iv) Establishment of Grand National Assembly at Angora, April, 1920.

(v) Successful defense of Angora against Greek invasion.

(vi) Triumph of Angora Assembly as republican government of Turkey.

Abolition of sultanate, Nov. 1, 1922.

Turkey as a republic.

Abolition of caliphate, 1924.

(*d*) Turkish Nationalist Government's successful resistance to Sèvres Treaty.

(i) Refusal to ratify or recognize Treaty of Sèvres.

(ii) Treaty with Soviet Russia, March 16, 1921, obtaining Russian support for non-recognition of Sèvres Treaty (*Current History,* Nov., 1922, 227).

(iii) Secret treaty with France, March 9, 1921 (*Current History,* XIV, 203).

France to evacuate Cilicia and readjust frontier of Syria (see **Bowman,** *New World, Supplement,* map, p. 99).

French capitalists to have priority in awarding of economic concessions in Cilicia and southern Armenia.

(iv) Secret treaty with Italy, March 13, 1921 (*Current History,* XIV, 204).

Italian promise to support Turkish demands for complete independence and recovery of Thrace and Smyrna.

Italians to exploit Heraclea coal mines and obtain economic advantages in region of Adalia and neighboring provinces.

(v) Treaty of Angora between Nationalist government and France, Oct. 20, 1921 (*Current History,* Jan., 1922, 661).

Peace between Turks and French, and withdrawal of French troops from Cilicia.

Retrocession of Cilicia and strip of territory reaching to Tigris by France to Turkey.

Assignment of part of Bagdad Railway to French capitalists.

Turkish promise to consider favorably French requests for

mine, railway, harbor and river concessions, particularly Arghana copper mines and cotton-growing in Cilicia.

French assistance in organizing Turkish gendarmerie.

British protests against this treaty (*Current History,* Apr., 1922, 58).

(vi) Events leading to Lausanne Conferences (**Temperley,** VI, 31-9).

Turkish victory over Greek invaders, and reconquest of Smyrna, 1922.

Turkish threat to seize Constantinople and Thrace.

Lloyd George's threat to prevent Nationalists' invasion of Europe; reluctance of Dominions to support him.

Divergence between French and British policy.

Mudania Armistice, permitting Nationalists to retain Smyrna and assume administration of Constantinople and Turkish Thrace; new peace treaty to be negotiated by international conference.

(*e*) The Lausanne Conferences.

(i) Failure of first Lausanne Conference, Nov. 22, 1922-Feb. 4, 1923.

Refusal of Turks to accept economic, financial, and judicial proposals of Allies. "I refuse to accept economic slavery for my country."—Ismet Pasha.

(ii) Success of second Lausanne Conference, April 22, 1923-July 24, 1923.

Signature of Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, making peace between Allies and Turkey.

(iii) Chief features of the Lausanne peace settlement (Bowman, *The New World, Supplement, pp.* 98-104; *Current History,* Oct., 1923, 87-102 (summary of treaty); British Parliamentary Paper, *Cmd., 1929 (1923), Treaty Series No. 16,* contains text; *Cmd. 1814 (1923), Turkey No. 1,* gives proceedings of Conference. *Treaties of Peace,* II, 959-1052, text.)

Renunciation by Turkey of all claims to Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Dodekanesia, Rhodes, Castellorizo, Cyprus, Egypt, Tripoli (as in Treaty of Sèvres).

Recovery by Turkey of Smyrna, Turkish Armenia, Cilicia (as in Angora Treaty, above), Eastern Thrace (almost as before 1914), and complete sovereignty over Constantinople.

Anglo-Turkish dispute regarding ownership of Mosul region (N.B. value chiefly in oil resources) to be settled by separate negotiations or referred to Council of League of Nations. (Subsequently negotiations failed and the dispute was referred to the League Council.)

Greek inhabitants of Turkey to be exchanged for Turkish inhabitants of Greece (by separate convention).

Provisions for protection of non-Moslem minorities in Turkey, to be placed under guarantee of League.

Abolition of capitulations (as Turks demanded) and Turkish promise to engage European legal counselors and institute judicial reforms to safeguard rights of foreigners.

Freedom of Straits for merchant ships in peace; for

neutral merchant ships in war; and for limited number of warships.

Mutual renunciation of war indemnities.

Reciprocal restoration of property rights and interests owned by Allied citizens before Oct. 29, 1914 (Turkey's entry into Great War).

Maintenance of pre-war concessions.

(iv) The United States and the Lausanne settlement (*Current History*, Oct., 1923, Foreign Policy Association, *Report on the Lausanne Treaty*).

Refusal of U. S. to participate in Lausanne Conferences. on ground that U. S. and Turkey were not at War.

Representation of U. S. at Lausanne Conferences by "observers."

Signature of separate Turco-American Treaty at Lausanne, August 6, 1923, incorporating many features of the general treaty of Lausanne.

(*f*) The Near East after Lausanne (*Current History*, current numbers and *Record*, 1924).

E. Russia, Poland, and Eastern Europe.

Special References:—**Hayes,** *Modern Europe*, II, ch. 34. **Temperley,** I, 221-35, VI, chs. ii, iii, esp. pp. *311-334. ‡ **Dennis,** *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*. **Korff,** *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia*.

1. Separate peace of Brest-Litovsk (1918) with Germany.
2. Failure of Allied punitive measures against Soviet government.
   (*a*) Non-recognition, 1917-1924.
   (*b*) Blockade, 1917-1921.
   (*c*) Military intervention in Siberia, Murmansk, Archangel (1918-1922).
   (*d*) Encouragement of counter-revolutionary movements.
3. The Peace Conference and Russia.
   (*a*) The abortive project for a Prinkipo conference.
   (*b*) Nullification of the Brest-Litovsk treaties.
   (*c*) Inability of Peace Conference to settle eastern frontiers of Poland and Rumania, or decide status of former Russian border states.
4. Trade agreements and lifting of the blockade (1921).
5. The Genoa and Hague conferences (above, B-2, 3).
6. Recognition of Russia.
   (*a*) Recognition de jure by Labor Government of England, 1924, and the subsequent London conference of 1924.
   (*b*) Subsequent recognition by Italy and several other nations.
   (*c*) French hesitation and recognition.
   (*d*) Non-recognition policy of the United States.
7. The former Russian border states.
   (*a*) Baltic states—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
      (i) Recognition of their independence by Russia.
      (ii) Russian policy of propaganda, trade agreements, disarmament proposals.
      (iii) Russo-Finnish dispute over E. Karelia.
      (iv) The Aland Islands controversy between Finland and Sweden.

(*b*) Russia and Poland.
  (i) Failure of peace conference to fix frontier.
  (ii) Russo-Polish War.
  (iii) Treaty of Riga.
(*c*) Russia and Bessarabia.
  (i) Annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania.
  (ii) Acquiescence of Allies.
  (iii) Russian protests.
(*d*) Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia, and Caucasus in Russian Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

8. Russia and Asia.
(*a*) Inclusion of Siberia in Russia after overthrow of anti-Bolshevist governments and withdrawal of Allies.
(*b*) Soviet Russia and Mongolia.
(*c*) The Russo-Chinese treaty, 1924, and American objections.
(*d*) Central Asia.
(*e*) Russian policy toward Persia since 1917.
(*f*) Russia and the Near East.
  (i) Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow, March 16, 1921.
  (ii) Russian objection to opening of Straits, at Lausanne Conference.

F. Other Affairs.
1. The Corfu Crisis (see **World Peace Foundation, VI**, no. 3, *The Corfu Crisis*).
2. The League of Nations (Part 10-VII).
3. The World Court (Part 10-X).
4. Reparation (Part 8-VI).
5. The Ruhr (Part 8-VI and Part 2-IV-B-3 to 6).
6. Armaments (Part 4).
7. Far East (Part 3-XII).
8. Tangier (Part 3-VIII).
9. U. S. and Latin America (Part 3-XIV and Part 7-VII).
10. Oil diplomacy (Part 8-III-B-1).

PART SEVEN

SUMMARY REVIEW OF POLICIES OF GREAT POWERS

I. THE BRITISH EMPIRE

References:—* **Bowman,** *The New World,* ch. ii. **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* III (standard treatment). **N. W. Rowell,** *British Empire and World Peace,* part 2. **Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New.* **J. A. Farrer,** *England Under Edward VII. Foreign Affairs,* Mar., 1923, 69-84. Current articles in *Round Table* (quarterly). **E. Grigg,** *The Greatest Experiment in History.* Other references, Part 5 and Part 3-XV-A.

A. Imperialism (compare Part 3-XV-A).

B. Industrialism (compare **N. Angell,** *If Britain Is to Live*).

1. Inability of Great Britain to support population by agriculture; hence importance of raw materials and markets for British industrial population.
2. Hence importance of preserving empire, and persistent tendency of imperialists (especially in Unionist Party) to advocate imperial tariff preference.
3. Conflicting interests as regards Europe.
   (*a*) Necessity of prosperous Europe (N.B. Germany and Russia) as market for British manufactures, hence:
      (i) Tendency to advocate leniency toward Germany, to permit German economic recovery.
      (ii) Restoration of trade relations, and then of diplomatic relations with Russia, despite French opposition.
   (*b*) Fear of industrial rivalry.
      (i) Pre-war jealousy of German industrial progress.
      (ii) Post-war fear of Franco-German iron and steel combination as a possible result of Ruhr occupation.

C. Fear of Aggressive Militarism on Continent of Europe.

1. Historic instances—resistance to Napoleon; balance of power policy in 19th century; entente against German militarism in 20th century.
2. Since the war.
   (*a*) British support of League of Nations, as a bulwark against military domination of the Continent by one aggressive power.
   (*b*) British advocacy of reduction of military armaments (N.B. Lord Robert Cecil).

(*c*) Suspicious attitude toward French military and air armaments (above).

(*d*) Increased danger of Continental militarism to England, because of longer range artillery and air forces, which lessen value of English Channel as a protecting barrier.

D. Naval Supremacy.

References:—See Part 4, especially **Protheroe,** *The British Navy.* **H. Asquith,** *Genesis of the War.* **W. Churchill,** *World Crisis.* **Lord Fisher,** *Memories.* **Buell,** *Washington Conference,* ch. v.

(*a*) Importance for defense:

(i) Of British isles, not protected by a large army, and dependent on overseas food.

(ii) Of overseas possessions.

(*b*) Economic importance.

(i) To safeguard British shipping and commerce.

(ii) To protect imperialist economic interests.

(*c*) Importance in British diplomacy.

(i) Historic struggles against Spanish, Dutch, and French naval rivalry.

(ii) The "two-power" standard.

(iii) German naval rivalry as one reason for British ententes with France (1904) and Russia (1907).

(iv) Preservation of naval supremacy as an important issue of the Great War.

(v) Refusal to accept Wilson's 2nd point, "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas alike in peace and war . . ."

(*d*) Acceptance of naval equality with the United States, at Washington Conference of 1921.

(i) As a significant departure from historic policy of supremacy.

(ii) As a result of financial difficulties after the war.

(iii) As a mark of tendency toward solidarity with U. S.

(*e*) New factors which may fundamentally affect British naval policy.

(i) Growing importance of military and naval aviation.

(ii) The submarine.

(iii) The League of Nations.

E. Britain and Islam.

References:—‡ **Bowman,** "The Mohammedan World," *Geogr. Review,* Jan., 1924. **Eversley and Chirol,** *Turkish Empire.* **L. Stoddard,** *New World of Islam.*

1. Necessity of conciliating Mohammedan sentiment, in view of large Mohammedan population of British Empire.
2. Difficulty of reconciling this aim with:
   (*a*) Dismemberment of Ottoman Empire.
   (*b*) British rule over Mohammedan populations.
3. Attempts to conciliate Islam.
   (*a*) Grants of partial independence to Egypt and Mesopotamia.
   (*b*) Benevolent attitude toward Kingdom of Hejaz.
   (*c*) Abandonment of war-time aim of ousting Turks from Constantinople.

(*d*) Efforts to avoid antagonizing Mohammedans in Palestine, while fostering Zionism.

4. The Caliphate question in 1924.

F. The British Dominions in International Relations.

References:—‡ **Temperley,** VI, 335-67. **A. B. Keith,** *Responsible Government in the Dominions* and *Dominion Home Rule in Practice.* **L. Curtis,** *Problem of the Commonwealth,* **R. Jebb,** *Colonial Nationalism.* **Lucas,** *The Empire at War.* **Great Britain,** *Imperial Conference 1923, Cmd. 1987* and *1988. Imperial Economic Conference 1923, Cmd. 1990* and *2009. Foreign Affairs,* Dec., 1922, 83 ff, Sept., 1923, 12 ff. *Round Table* (quarterly).

1. Tendency of Dominions toward independent nationalism.
   (*a*) Virtually complete self-government in practice.
   (*b*) Separate membership in League of Nations.
   (*c*) Tendency toward separate signature of treaties.
      (i) Separate signature of Treaty of Versailles by Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India (not a Dominion, but in many respects treated like one).
      (ii) Provision in proposed treaty for defense of France (above) and in some other treaties, that obligations shall not be binding on Dominions unless ratified by them.
      (iii) Signature of Halibut Fishery Treaty with U. S. by representative of Canada alone, 1923.
      (iv) Division of opinion as to independent treaty-making power of Dominions.
   (*d*) Tendency toward separate diplomatic representation of Dominions.
      (i) In Peace Conference.
      (ii) In League of Nations Assembly.
      (iii) In post-war conferences.
      (iv) Question of separate Canadian representation at Washington.
      (v) Separate representation of Irish Free State.
   (*e*) Divergent interests of Dominions and Mother Country, especially as regards:
      (i) Oriental immigration and treatment of Indians.
      (ii) Tariff protection for infant industries of Dominions.
      (iii) British free trade policy, based on industrialism, versus Dominions' demand for preferential treatment of their agricultural products in British market.
      (iv) Participation in European affairs.
   (*f*) Tendency toward development of "nationalism" in each of Dominions.
2. Counter-tendency toward solidarity of Empire and Dominions in foreign policy.
   (*a*) Loyalty to Crown, to British Empire, to British institutions, and to solidarity of English-speaking peoples, as opposed to development of separate Dominion nationalism.
   (*b*) Demand of Dominions for share in Imperial foreign policy, as opposed to tendency toward separate foreign policies.
      (i) Resolution of Imperial Conference of 1917 favoring "right of Dominions and of India to an adequate voice in foreign policy."

(ii) Tendency of British government to consult with Dominion premiers regarding major questions of foreign policy.

(iii) Tendency of British government to conciliate Dominions by modifying foreign policy in accordance with their wishes—for example, abandonment of Anglo-Japanese alliance, after war, in deference to attitude of Dominions (and of United States); modification of Lloyd George's anti-Turkish policy in deference to India; etc.

3. Tendency of Dominions to emphasize League of Nations, as preferable to entanglement in purely European alliances or coalitions.
4. The British Empire as a virtual league of nations within the League of Nations.

G. The Labor Party.

(**R. Macdonald,** *Foreign Policy of the Labor Party.*)

II. FRANCE

References:—**Bowman,** *The New World,* ch. iii. **Hazen,** *Europe Since 1815* (revised), II, ch. xlvii. **Nitti,** *The Decadence of Europe.* **H. Oncken,** *The Historical Rhine Policy of the French.* **J. Bardoux,** *Lloyd George et la France.* **G. P. Gooch,** *Franco-German Relations.* **G. Stuart,** *French Foreign Policy.* **R. Viviani,** *As We See It.* **Curtius,** *Maurice Barrès.* **C. J. Street,** *The Treachery of France.* **Bausman,** *Let France Explain.* Other references in Part 3-XV-B, Part 5, and Part 6.

A. Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Frontier.

1. Historic importance of the French drive toward "the Rhine frontier" —as shown in efforts of Louis XIV, French Revolution, Napoleon I, Napoleon III, to extend France to Rhine.
2. German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as a primary cause of French diplomatic manœuvres against Germany, 1871-1914.
3. Recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, with Saar Basin, and detachment of Left Bank from Germany, as war-aims of France in Great War, as shown by secret agreement of Feb.-March, 1917, with Russia.
4. Virtual domination of Left Bank, and encouragement of separatist movement there, by France, since Peace Conference.
5. Elements in this policy.
   (*a*) Historic traditions.
   (*b*) Popular French belief that control of Left Bank is necessary for French security against Germany.
   (*c*) Economic interests, especially need of coal from Saar Basin and Ruhr (right bank) to smelt Lorraine iron.

B. Policy of Alliances.

1. Before the war, necessity of alliances to offset Germany's superior man-power and military strength, and to diminish dominant influence of German diplomacy in European affairs.
2. Since the war.
   (*a*) Alliances with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and patronage of Little Entente.

(*b*) Utility of such alliances.
(i) To compensate for loss of Russia as an ally and for weakening of Entente Cordiale.
(ii) To prevent spread of Russian Bolshevism.
(iii) To prevent war of revenge by Germany.
(iv) To support dominant position of France on Continent.

C. Colonial Empire.

1. Economic and sentimental basis of French imperialism (Part 3).
2. Importance in French diplomacy.
3. Reliance on colonial troops to supplement man-power resources of small and stationary population of France.
4. Policy of commercial monopoly of colonial trade—protective tariffs against non-French imports into French colonies; export duties.
5. Conciliation of Moslems, especially in North Africa and Near East.

D. Sea Power.

1. Importance of naval control of western Mediterranean, to assure safe communications with African colonies and, in war, transport of African troops to France.
2. Importance of naval or air power as a weapon in case of conflict with England.
3. Reluctance of France to accept naval ratio fixed by Washington Arms Conference, and to curb submarines in future wars.
4. Rapid development of military aviation as a partial substitute for battleship power.

E. Financial Interests.

1. Large French loans to, or investments in, foreign countries before war.
(*a*) French loans to Russia, cementing Franco-Russian alliance.
(*b*) French financial interests in Turkey.
2. Since the war.
(*a*) Bolshevist repudiation of debt as an obstacle to French recognition of Russia.
(*b*) Loans to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, as methods of promoting French political and military aims.
(*c*) Insistence on German reparation payments, necessary to defray reconstruction costs and maintain French credit.

III. ITALY

References:—# **C. Schanzer,** article in *Foreign Affairs,* March, 1924. # **Bowman,** ch. v. **T. Tittoni,** *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy.* Memoirs of Crispi, Giolitti, etc. Other references in Parts 3-6.

A. Imperialism.

1. Political, economic, strategic, historic bases.
2. Imperialist interests in northern Africa as a guiding principle in Italy's pre-war policy.
(*a*) Entry into Triple Alliance, after French seizure of Tunis (above).

(*b*) Agreements with other Great Powers, permitting Italian seizure of Tripoli (above).

3. In the Great War.
   (*a*) Hope of enlarging African possessions, acquiring Albania and obtaining share in Asia Minor, as inducements offered by Allies to obtain Italy's aid in war (above).
4. After the war.
   (*a*) Disappointment of Italian aspirations in Asiatic Turkey and Albania.
   (*b*) Imperialist policies of Mussolini.
      (i) Maintenance of political prestige of Fascisti as motive for aggressive policy.
      (ii) Desire to make Adriatic an "Italian lake."
      (iii) Desire to make Italy dominant power in Mediterranean.
         (*a*) Hence antagonism toward Greece.
         (*b*) Italo-Spanish entente as rival of France.
         (*c*) Possible bearings of this policy on relations with England.
      (iv) Russo-Italian agreement of 1923.
      (v) Declared purpose of developing present colonies.

B. Irredentism as One Reason for Italy's Break with Triple Alliance, Participation in Great War, Policy at Peace Conference, and Controversy with Yugoslavia over Fiume (above).

C. Defense.

1. Demand for strategic frontiers on the north, as safeguard against any possible Austro-German war of revenge.
2. Naval defense.
   (*a*) Importance of naval security to Italy.
      (i) Long coast line.
      (ii) Dependence on sea-borne imports (below).
   (*b*) Italian insistence on naval control of Adriatic Sea.
   (*c*) Limitation of Italian navy by Washington Arms Conference, 1921 (N.B. equality with France, and inferiority to Great Britain).
   (*d*) Importance of friendly relations with England or France.

D. Industrialism and Dependence on Imported Raw Materials (N.B. coal, oil, iron, raw cotton, wool, raw silk, timber) and food (N.B. wheat).

1. Necessity of such imports to support industrial population.
2. Dependence of such imports on good-will of naval powers.
3. Importance of commercial agreements with countries producing such materials.
4. Importance of obtaining markets for manufactured goods.
5. Italian proposals, since war, for international control of raw materials.

IV. JAPAN

References:—* **Bowman,** *The New World,* ch. xxxi. ‡ **Buell,** *The Washington Conference,* especially chs. i-iv, x. **Pooley,** *Japan's Foreign*

Policies. **Simpson** (Putnam Weale), *The Truth about China and Japan;* and *An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific.* **Ballard,** *Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan.* **Kawakami,** *Japan in World Politics,* and *Japan's Pacific Policy.* **Millard,** *Democracy and the Eastern Question.* **McGovern,** *Modern Japan.* **Hornbeck,** *Contemporary Politics in the Far East.* Compare references in Part 3-XII, XIII, XV-D.

A. Imperialism (above, Part 3).

1. Economic, nationalist, military, and political factors in Japanese imperialism.
2. Danger of antagonizing other nations—N.B. United States, British Dominions, China (compare B-3, 4, below).

B. "Surplus Population."

1. Meaning (compare Part 8, IV).
2. Necessity of industrialism.
3. Dependence on China, United States, etc., for raw materials and some foodstuffs.
4. Dependence on United States, China, India, etc., as markets for manufactures.
5. Emigration.
   (*a*) Difficulties arising from Japanese emigration to United States (see above, Part 2).
   (*b*) Hostile attitude of British Dominions toward Japanese immigration.
   (*c*) Favorable attitude of South American countries.
   (*d*) Extent of Japanese emigration to China, and Korea.

C. Militarism and Navalism (N.B. peculiarly powerful position of military and naval cliques under Japanese form of government.)

D. National Pride.

1. As an important factor in imperialism (above, A).
2. As a reason for resentment of racial discrimination in United States and British Dominions (above, B-5).

E. Insular Position.

1. Importance of sea-power.
   (*a*) Strength of navy.
   (*b*) Naval bases in Pacific.
   (*c*) Relations with other important naval powers.
2. Advantageous position for shipping and commerce.
3. Comparison with Great Britain.

F. Relation to Future Development of Asia.

1. Japanese conception of a "Monroe Doctrine for Asia."
2. Vital importance, for Japan, of future friendship, hostility, or subordination, of larger Asiatic peoples—China, India.
3. Japanese imperialist policy toward China as an obstacle to future friendship.
4. Alternative policy of encouraging a "pan-Asiatic" movement.
   (*a*) Such a movement discussed, but virtually non-existent at present.
   (*b*) Possible significance of such a movement.

V. RUSSIA

References:—**Korff,** *Russia's Foreign Relations.* **Dennis,** *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia.* **Rosen,** *Forty Years of Diplomacy.* **Witte,** *Memoirs.* **Isvolsky,** *Memoirs.* **Buchanan,** *My Mission to Russia.* **Paléologue,** *An Ambassador's Memoirs.* **Siebert,** *Entente Diplomacy.* **Marchand,** *Livre Noir.* **Laloy,** *Les Documents secrets.* **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (use index). **Welschinger,** *L'Alliance Franco-Russe.* **F. Tönnies,** *Der Tsarismus.*

A. Desire for Access to the Sea.

1. Historic policy, since reign of Peter the Great, of acquiring and holding "windows to the west."
   (*a*) Outlet on Baltic, acquired by conquests of Peter the Great.
   (*b*) Outlet on Black Sea, acquired by his successors.
   (*c*) Special importance of efforts to obtain Constantinople and access to Mediterranean.
   (*d*) Unsuccessful efforts in 20th century to gain outlet through Persia.
2. Effect of the Russian Revolution on this policy.
   (*a*) Loss of Baltic provinces and Finland, but adoption of commercial agreements giving Russia commercial access to sea through lost ports.
   (*b*) Failure to obtain Constantinople.
      (i) Non-fulfilment of Allies' promise to permit Russian annexation of Constantinople.
      (ii) Russian Bolshevist policy (shown at Lausanne Conference, see above, Part 6, VIII-D), of demanding closure of Straits to warships; Russian policy on this point no longer aggressive, but defensive.

B. Asiatic Expansion.

1. Early Russian expansion into Siberia.
   (*a*) Geographic and economic conditions favoring expansion.
   (*b*) Resemblance to American westward migration.
   (*c*) Permanent effect: Russia a factor in northern Asia and Far East, regardless of fluctuations of policy.
2. Imperialist expansion in 19th and 20th centuries.
   (*a*) Importance of economic penetration, military conquest, and political motives in this new expansion.
   (*b*) Conflict with Japanese interests in Korea and Manchuria, leading first to Russo-Japanese War, then to agreements permitting Russian control of northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.
   (*c*) Conflict with British interests in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, leading to Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 (above, Part 3, X).
3. Effect of Bolshevist revolution.
   (*a*) Repudiation of imperialist bargains with Japan and Great Britain.
   (*b*) Renunciation of privileges in Persia and Manchuria.
   (*c*) Renewed conflict with Japan, due to temporary Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia and northern Sakhalin.
   (*d*) Renewed antagonism toward England, due to Bolshevist propa-

ganda for revolt of Asiatic peoples against European imperialism and capitalism.

C. Relations Between Great Russian and Other Slavic Nationalities.

1. Significance of Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism, and Russification, before the Russian Revolution.
2. Separation of smaller Slavic nationalities (Poles, White Russians, and Ukrainians) from Russia, after the Revolution of 1917.
3. Difficulty of agreeing on a frontier between Russia and Poland satisfactory to both nations.
4. Federal reunion of White Russia and Ukrainia with Soviet Russia, and preservation of Great Russian predominance, in new form.
5. Irreconcilability of Great Russian traditions of dominance and Russification with tendency toward self-determination of small Slavic groups.
6. Significance of collapse of Pan-Slavism—temporary or permanent?

D. Need of Foreign Capital.

1. As one reason for alliance with France, 1892-1917.
2. As affected by Bolshevism.
   (*a*) Repudiation of foreign debt by Bolshevist government, 1918.
   (b) Later efforts of Bolshevist government to obtain foreign loans.
3. As a factor which will continue to influence Russian policy until Russia has reached a more advanced stage of economic development.

E. Bolshevist Principles Which Had Effect on Russia's International Relations After 1917.

1. International communist revolution.
   (*a*) Disappointment of hopes for speedy imitation of Russian example by other countries.
   (*b*) Continuance of agitation through Third International.
2. Self-determination of peoples.
3. Repudiation of debts and indemnities as outgrowths of capitalism.
4. Repudiation of "capitalistic imperialism."
5. Modification of these principles in practice (already shown in connection with above-mentioned factors, A, B, C, D).

VI. GERMANY

References:—* **Bowman,** *The New World,* ch. x. ‡ **Coar,** *The Old and the New Germany.* **Ströbel,** *The German Revolution and After.* **H. Kessler,** *Germany and Europe.* **M. P. Price,** *Germany in Transition.* **M. Wertheimer,** *The Pan-German League.* **Lichtenberger,** *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui.* Articles in *Foreign Affairs,* Dec. 1922, pp. 83 ff., March 1924, pp. 390 ff. On German policies before the war, the student may read **Gooch,** *History of Modern Europe,* ch. vi; **Earle,** *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway,* chs. iii. and vi; **Dawson,** *The German Empire,* II, chs. xv ff.; and, for more detailed study, works cited in Part 5, above. **Schmitt's,** *England and Germany,*

and **Seymour's,** *Diplomatic Background of the War,* chs. iv-v, are convenient presentations of the subject, but were published during the war, prior to post-bellum revelations, and should be supplemented with more recent works. **Gt. Britain,** Foreign Office, Handbooks on *German Opinion on National Policy. Imperial Germany,* by **B. von Bülow** (former German chancellor), and *The Kaiser's Memoirs,* by **William II,** are interesting because of their authors, but must not be read too credulously. For further research, consult references in Part 5 above, and bibliographies in **Gooch,** *op. cit.;* **Hayes,** *Modern Europe* (revised ed.), II, 721; **Hazen,** *Europe Since 1815* (revised ed.), II, pp. 1120, 1152, 1150.

A. Nationalism.

1. Relatively great importance of the German-speaking people, numerically, culturally, and geographically, in Europe.
2. German nationalism as the force behind Bismarck's wars of unification.
3. German nationalism as the psychological basis of German chauvinism (N.B., Pan-German propaganda) in period 1871-1918.
4. German nationalism as a latent force, suppressed by defeat, in post-war Germany, and an obstacle to any permanent dismemberment.
5. German nationalism and Austria.
   (*a*) Bismarck's exclusion of Austria from Germany.
   (*b*) Importance of Austro-German alliance, 1879-1918.
   (*c*) Agitation, after the war, for union of German-Austria and Germany.

B. Industrialism.

1. Remarkable industrial progress of Germany, 1871-1914, dependent on Lorraine iron, Westphalian and Silesian coal, imported cotton, imported grain, scientific technique, intelligent labor, efficient organization and salesmanship.
2. Effect of war and peace treaties on above factors (compare Part 8).
3. Germany's need of food supplies, raw materials, and markets as a vital factor in German foreign policy.

C. Imperialism.

1. Pre-war German imperialism (compare Part 3).
   (*a*) As an outgrowth of nationalism and industrialism.
   (*b*) As a cause of antagonism between Germany and Entente powers.
2. Collapse of German imperialism as result of defeat, 1918.
3. German industrial enterprises in Russia, South America, etc., after the war, without imperialist protection.

D. Militarism and Navalism.

1. Militarism as a characteristic feature of Prussian policy, before 1919.
2. Navalism as an acquired characteristic, adopted at end of 19th century, in response to growth of German imperialism, commerce, shipping and industry.
3. Reduction of German army and navy to impotence by peace treaty of 1919.
4. Survival of militarist sentiments among former Junkers and officers, opposed to republican regime.

E. The Hohenzollern Legend.

1. Tendency of reactionary minority in Germany to identify German prosperity and greatness, 1871-1914, with Hohenzollern monarchy and Prussian militarism.
2. Tendency of monarchist parties, since 1919, to couple extreme nationalism with monarchism.

F. Temporary Factors in German Policy.

1. Reparation payments (see Part 8).
2. Exclusion from League of Nations.
3. Occupation of Left Bank and of Ruhr.

VII. UNITED STATES

References:—# Policy declarations by Secretary **Hughes**, in *Foreign Affairs*, II, No. 2, Supplement, and in *Current History*, Feb. 1923, Jan. 1924, March 1924. * **Bowman**, *The New World, Supplement*, 1-77 (with bibliography). *These Eventful Years*, I, ch. 28. Other references Part 3-XII, XIII, XIV; Part 5-III, VIII, XXI; Part 6-III-C; Part 10-VII-C, X-C-5.

A. Traditional Policies.

1. Avoidance of "entangling alliances."
2. The Monroe Doctrine.
   (*a*) Circumstances which called it forth.
   (*b*) Its terms.
   (*c*) Essentially defensive character.
   (*d*) Subsequent "interpretations."
3. Freedom of the seas.
4. International arbitration.
5. Expansion on the North American continent, but non-participation in partition of Africa, Asia, and Pacific islands (prior to 1898).
6. Advocacy of "open door," especially in Far East.

B. Important Factors Modifying Recent Policies of United States.

1. Economic development of the United States (Compare Part 8).
   (*a*) Growth of industry, hence:
      (i) Increased insistence on "open door" for American manufactures in backward countries (N.B., China and Turkey).
      (ii) Contrariwise, demands of manufacturers for tariff protection in home market and in dependencies (*e.g.*, Porto Rico, Philippines, etc.)
      (iii) Increased demand for raw materials (oil, rubber, leather, vegetable fibres, nickel ore, tin, silk, wool, wood, etc.).
      (iv) Tendency toward economic imperialism.
   (*b*) Transition from debtor to creditor nation.
      (i) Necessity of borrowing foreign capital, and impossibility of making very extensive foreign investments, during period of rapid economic development before 1914.
      (ii) Sudden accumulation of capital during War.

(iii) Consequent increase of investments in foreign countries, involving interest of American investors in "the fate of governments and enterprises in all parts of the world."

(iv) Investments in backward countries,—one of the characteristic factors usually leading to imperialism.

(*c*) Increased consumption of imported tropical and subtropical foodstuffs (cocoa and chocolate, coffee, tea, fruits, sugar, molasses, etc.), and hence, increased interest in stable government in countries producing such commodities.

2. Imperialism (compare Part 3-XIV, XV-K).
3. Immigration (compare Part 2).
   (*a*) Tendency of immigrants to retain ardent interest in their former countries (*e.g.*, Irish-American interest in Irish independence, Greek-American interest in annexation of Smyrna by Greece, etc.); hence, difficulty of disinterested isolation from European affairs.
   (*b*) Opposition to Japanese immigration as a cardinal factor in development of hostility toward Japan, and cause of resentment in Japan.
   (*c*) Tendency toward drastic restriction of immigration.
4. Development of negro race-consciousness.
   (*a*) Education and other reasons for development of race consciousness in the United States.
   (*b*) Negro proposals for an independent negro state in Africa, and for a "Back to Africa" movement, not strongly supported at present, but significant as indications of influence of national self-determination doctrines on negroes.
   (*c*) Negro race consciousness as a factor making against American indifference to treatment of negroes in Africa.
5. Improved transportation and communication, diminishing cultural and economic isolation of America from other continents.
6. Propaganda for closer relations with "English-speaking nations."
7. Establishment of the League of Nations (below, Part 10).

C. United States and the Great War (compare Part 6-III-C).

1. President Wilson's endeavor to maintain neutrality, at the outset.
2. Failure of neutrality policy as an illustration of operation of above-mentioned factors (especially B, 1, 3, 5).
3. Disillusionment and reaction toward nationalist isolation, at close of war.

D. The Senate and the Peace Treaties (compare Part 6, VII-H).

1. Nature of the Senate's reservations to the treaty of Versailles.
2. Failure of the treaty, with reservations, to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification.
3. Wilson's unwillingness to accept the reservations.

E. American Policies Since the Rejection of the Versailles Treaty.

1. Adoption of separate peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary (see Part 6, topic VII-H).
2. The United States and the League of Nations (Part 10-VII-C).

3. United States and the World Court (Part 10-X-C-5).
4. The Washington Conference (compare Part 3-XII-J and XIII-G, and Part 6-VIII-A-4).
   (*a*) Significance as a departure from "isolation."
   (*b*) Significance for American relations with Great Britain and Japan.
5. The United States and the Near East (compare Part 6-VIII-D).
6. The United States and Latin America (compare Part 3, XIV).
7. American policy toward Russia.
   (*a*) Withdrawal of troops from Russia, and insistence on Japanese evacuation of Siberia.
   (*b*) Refusal to recognize Soviet Government.
8. Reparations and war debts (compare below, Part 8, VI).
   (*a*) Refusal to cancel war debts of Allies to United States.
   (*b*) Non-participation in negotiations regarding reparation total and payments from 1920 to 1923.
   (*c*) Proposal for expert inquiry into reparation question, Dec. 29, 1922.
   (*d*) Representation in London Conference, 1924.
   (*e*) Significance of America's position as creditor of Europe.

F. General Discussion.

1. Contrast between worldwide economic interests of United States and diplomatic policy of isolation.
2. Problem whether United States shall accept full participation in world affairs or endeavor to reëstablish isolation of New World.

PART EIGHT

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General References:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** *International Commercial Policies* (textbook with good bibliography). ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings in the Economics of War.* ‡ **Grunzel,** *Economic Protectionism.* ‡ **Walsh,** *History and Nature of International Relations,* ch. by Laughlin. **Duggan,** *League of Nations,* ch. by Glenn Frank. ‡ **Woolf,** *Empire and Commerce in Africa,* 3-20. **Viallate,** *Economic Imperialism and International Relations.* **F. W. Hirst,** *Political Economy of War.* **J. L. Garvin,** *Economic Foundations of Peace.* **Howe,** *Why War.* **Brailsford,** *War of Steel and Gold.* **Keynes,** *Economic Consequences of the Peace.* **Angell,** *The Great Illusion;* id., *Fruits of Victory;* id., *Arms and Industry;* etc. **J. H. Jones,** *The Economics of War and Conquest* (reply to Angell). **Coulton,** *The Main Illusions of Pacifism.* **Gide,** *Effects of the War on French Economic Life.* **Kobatsch,** *La Politique économique internationale.* **Tarlé,** *La Préparation de la lutte économique par l'Allemagne.* **H. Hauser,** *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World.* **Nearing,** *The American Empire.* **Bulkley,** *Bibliographic Survey of Contemporary Sources for the Economic and Social History of the War.* See also bibliographies in **Fisk and Peirce; Viallate;** *Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Social Sci.,* vol. CXII, 281 ff. *These Eventful Years,* ch. 82.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of Part Nine.

1. To suggest the importance of economic factors in international relations.
2. To show how wide are the differences of opinion on this subject.
3. To present some of the significant economic facts that have to be faced, no matter which theoretical viewpoint the student takes.

B. Importance of Economic Factors in Contemporary International Relations.

1. Growing influence of economic motives and economic controversies in diplomacy, under modern conditions of strenuous economic competition.
2. Vital effects of wars, treaties, tariffs, etc., on economic life.

C. Diversity of Opinion Concerning Fundamental Principles of Economic International Relations.

1. Existence of contradictory theories or viewpoints, notably, neo-mercantilism, free trade, internationalism (details below).

2. Conflict of theories as an obstacle to solution of international problems.
3. Tendency of public and political parties to concern themselves more with such theories than with ascertainable economic facts.

D. Preliminary Survey of Chief Conflicting Viewpoints.

1. The individualist or free-trade viewpoint.

References:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** *International Commercial Policies,* ch. iii. * *Encyc. Britannica,* article on "Free Trade," XI, 88 ff. * **Taussig,** *Free Trade, the Tariff, and Reciprocity,* ch. i. * **Ogg,** *Economic Development,* 82-9, 256-303. ‡ **Adam Smith,** *Wealth of Nations,* Book IV. **Gide and Rist,** *History of Economic Doctrines,* 27-32, 93-102, 163-5, 363-6. **W. Cunningham,** *Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement.* **Trevelyan,** *Life of John Bright.* **Morley,** *Life of Richard Cobden.* **Hobson,** *Cobden the International Man.*

(*a*) Primary aim—economic prosperity.

(*b*) Basic principles, as regards international relations.

(i) Economic unit—the individual, rather than the nation.

(ii) Specialization of labor—hence, freedom for individuals to engage in any industry offering largest rewards; hence, abandonment of any attempt to make nation self-sufficient.

(iii) Freedom to buy in cheapest market—hence, abandonment of all prohibitions, restrictions, or tariff duties on imports; hence, also, no need for political control of raw materials, if latter may be purchased freely.

(iv) Freedom to sell in dearest market—hence, abandonment of restraints or duties on exports; hence, also, desire for international free trade.

(*c*) Pacific tendency of such principles.

(i) Would emphasize economic interests of individuals, rather than of nations, and thus lessen international antagonism.

(ii) Would eliminate tariff wars and international struggles for raw materials.

(iii) Would promote mutual dependence and common interests, rather than rivalry and jealousy among nations.

(*d*) Brief historical sketch of the doctrine.

(i) Formulation of laissez-faire theories by Physiocrats, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other early economists.

(ii) Cobden, Bright and the "Manchester School."

(iii) Prevalence in period 1846-79, shown by lowering of tariffs in England and Europe; due partly to theories, partly to fact that Industrial Revolution occurred first in England, giving English manufacturers almost monopoly of certain industries (N.B., textiles and iron).

(iv) Reaction against free trade, since 1861 in U. S., since 1870's in Europe; due partly to spread of Industrial Revolution and resulting international competition in industries formerly monopolized by English; also due to agricultural development of Russia, America, and Australasia, resulting in demands for tariff protection of farmers; due also to development of steam transportation, facilitating international competition.

(v) Continued theoretical defense of free trade by many economists and political leaders.

2. The nationalist or neo-mercantilist viewpoint.

References:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** chs. i, ii, iv. **Gide and Rist,** *History of Economic Doctrines,* 264-90. ‡ *Encyclopædia Britannica,* "Protection." **F. List,** *National System of Political Economy,* Book III. **A. Wagner,** *Agrar- und Industriestaat.* **S. Patten,** *Economic Foundations of Protection.* **H. C. Carey,** *Principles of Social Science.* **Grunzel,** *Economic Protectionism,* 1-18, 125-34, 339-51. **Hobson,** *The New Protectionism.* **C. Boyd** (ed.), *Speeches of Joseph Chamberlain.* **A. Mackintosh,** *Joseph Chamberlain.*

(*a*) Primary aim—national security; prosperity secondary.

(*b*) Basic principles.

(i) Economic unit—the nation, not the individual (N.B., influence of nationalist sentiment, especially after 1848).

(ii) National self-sufficiency in agriculture, industry, raw materials, finance, shipping.

(iii) Patronage of home products, even though more costly than foreign goods—hence, protective tariffs.

(iv) Restraint of export of "vital" raw materials which might aid foreign competitors, either in peace or in war.

(*c*) Bearing on international relations.

(i) Stimulation of nationalism and its corollaries, imperialism and militarism.

(ii) Inevitability of tariff wars, international struggles for raw materials, and other economic conflicts among nations as fruits of neo-mercantilism.

(iii) Hostile view of foreign nations as economic rivals, rather than as customers.

(iv) Belief in national power as safeguard against war.

(*d*) Brief historical sketch.

(i) Mercantilism as the economic policy of early modern times, reflecting the growth and rivalry of national kingdoms under economic conditions leading to international competition for bullion, spices, wool trade, etc., rather than international specialization in industry.

(ii) Decline of mercantilism in 18th and 19th centuries, and rise of free trade (above, 1).

(iii) Rise of neo-mercantilism, a revival of mercantilist ideas with modern modifications, in 19th century, especially after 1870; due partly to nationalist sentiment, partly to political influence of farmers, manufacturers, and labor, partly to economic changes (see above, 1-*d*-iv), partly to theoretical writings (for example, Friedrich List, Gustav Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, Simon Patten, etc.).

(iv) Vigorous impulse given to neo-mercantilism by Great War and peace treaties.

3. Various internationalist viewpoints.

(*a*) Business internationalism.

References:—* **Beard,** *Cross Currents in Europe To-Day,* 244-6. * **Viallate,** *Eco. Imperialism,* ch. iv. ‡ **Culbertson,** *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs,* 75-87. **Pierre L'Espagnol de la Tramerye,** *The World-*

Struggle for Oil, esp. chs. iv-v. **Streit**, *Where Iron Is*. **D. S. Jordan**, "Interlocking Directorates of War," in *World's Work*, July 1913, p. 278. **Withers**, *International Finance*.

(i) Investments by capitalists of one country in public debts and business enterprises of other countries. For example: purchase of large interests in German industrial concerns by French capitalists, thus partially identifying French and German business interests; American foreign investments as shown by purchases of foreign securities listed on financial page of the daily newspaper; international interlocking directorates, as in munitions industry (compare further details, section V, below).

(ii) Importance of international syndicates in international business operations. For example: The Royal Dutch-Shell Combine, including British, Dutch, French, American, and other oil interests (compare below, section III); British-American Tobacco Co., etc.

(iii) International pools, price agreements, selling agreements, etc. For example: North Atlantic shipping pool; fixing of sulphur prices by agreement of Italian and American producers; etc.

(iv) International financial consortiums. For example: Consortium for loans to China.

(v) Tendency of such business internationalism to cut across the lines of national solidarity, as viewed by neo-mercantilists; likewise, of free trade, as viewed by individualists.

(*b*) International governmental coöperation.

References:—**J. A. Hobson**, *The Morals of Economic Internationalism*. **Hughan**, *International Government*, esp. 89-102. Compare other references, below, Part 10.

(i) International labor legislation as an instance of international action in economic matters (Part 10).

(ii) International agreements regarding copyrights, patents, currency, etc. (details unnecessary here; emphasize significance as an illustration of the point in question).

(iii) International regulation of certain waterways (*e.g.*, Danube, Vistula, Elbe, Oder, Rhine, etc.), and railways, as highways of international commerce (below, VII).

(iv) The mandate system (compare Part 3, XX, above) as an effort in direction of international regulation of economic imperialism in backward countries.

(v) Tendency of League of Nations to promote international agreements regarding tariff regulations, double taxation, bills of exchange, financial rehabilitation of bankrupt countries such as Austria, etc.

(vi) Desire of numerous publicists for extension of international coöperation, for instance, international agreements to prevent unfair business practices, international control of raw materials, etc.

(*c*) International tariff unions, reciprocity agreements, and commercial treaties as practical deviations from strict application

of either free trade or neo-mercantilist principles (compare details, section II, below).

(*d*) Workers' internationalism.

References:—**Postgate,** *The Workers' International.* Id., *The Bolshevik Theory.* **Hughan,** *International Government,* 137-49. **H. W. Laidler,** *Socialism in Thought and Action,* 283-307. **W. E. Walling,** *Socialists and the War.*

(i) Socialist emphasis on proletarian internationalism: "Workers of the world, unite!"

(ii) Socialist hostility (in theory, but not always in practice) to tariffs, concessions, economic imperialism, militarism, and war, as corollaries of capitalism.

(iii) Socialist contention that socialism would remove economic causes of war.

(iv) Tendency of trade unions, including socialists and many non-socialists, to unite in International Federation of Trade Unions.

4. Discussion.

(*a*) Incompleteness of survey—only a few of the more striking viewpoints included; existence of innumerable other viewpoints.

(*b*) Tendency of all above-mentioned viewpoints to undergo modification in practice, under pressure of economic realities, party politics, political sentiment, and private interest.

(*c*) Desirability of impartial study of economic facts as basis for any intelligent attitude.

II. INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF MARKETS

General References:—General references in I, above. Also: * **Taussig,** *Free Trade, the Tariff and Reciprocity,* ch. i. **Grunzel,** *Economic Protectionism,* 73-90. ‡ **Alexander Hamilton,** *Report on the Subject of Manufactures.* **Great Britain,** *British and Foreign Trade and Industry (1909),* Board of Trade, Cd. 4954 (1909). **Academy of Political Science,** IX, No. 2, *American Foreign Trade Relations;* X, No. 4, *American Economic Policies,* Part 3. **W. J. Ashley,** *The Tariff Problem.* ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings,* ch. lxvii. **C. E. Griffin,** *Principles of Foreign Trade.* **Nourse,** *American Agriculture and the European Market.*

A. Elements in the Problem.

1. Machine-production—hence, necessity of large-scale production for wide market, to make power-driven machinery profitable.

2. Capitalism—tendency of capitalists to reinvest profits in industry; hence, expansion of industry; hence, "surplus production," *i.e.,* production of more than local needs demand; hence, desire of manufacturers to obtain expanding foreign markets in addition to domestic market.

Suggestion: This abstract statement may be concretely illustrated by inquiring where the output of some local factory is consumed. Most urban communities contain factories producing goods to be sold, ultimately, in dozens of foreign countries.

3. Steam transportation—making export trade profitable even in bulky

goods; hence, increase of international trade and intensified competition of domestic and foreign producers.

4. Agricultural progress—opening up of new countries, introduction of agricultural machinery, and tendency toward large-scale production for world market, instead of "all-round" farming for local consumption; hence, intense competition, notably in wheat, cotton, meat, and wool.
5. Nationalism—hence tendency to regard nation as unit in international trade, and to demand protection of national government for producers.
6. Democratic politics—making protection a party issue, and facilitating operation of group interests on government, through votes, campaign contributions, etc.

B. Use of Tariffs to Protect Markets.

References:—***Fisk and Peirce,** chs. iv, v, vii, viii. **Taussig,** *Free Trade, the Tariff, and Reciprocity.* Id., *Tariff History of the United States.* **Percy Ashley,** *Modern Tariff History.* **T. E. G. Gregory,** *Tariffs, a Study in Method.* **U. S. Tariff Commission,** *Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties.* Id., *Colonial Tariff Policies.* **Kelly's** *Customs Tariffs of the World.* **W. H. Dawson,** *Protection in Germany.* **Higginson,** *Tariffs at Work.* **Meredith,** *Protection in France.* **Taussig,** *Principles of Economics.* **Seligman,** *Principles of Economics.* **Drage,** *Imperial Organization of Trade,* ch. iv. **Grunzel,** *Economic Protectionism,* 135-62, 303-17. **Seager,** *Principles of Economics.*

1. General survey of growth of protectionism in practice.
   (*a*) United States.
      (i) Early protectionist tendencies—Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures;* the Tariff of 1816; the "Act of Abominations" of 1828.
      (ii) The period of lower tariffs, 1833-61.
      (iii) Protective tariffs since the Civil War.
         Emergency tariff legislation of 1861 and 1864.
         High McKinley Tariff of 1890.
         Higher Dingley Tariff of 1897.
         Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909.
         Lower Underwood Tariff of 1913.
         Higher Fordney Tariff of 1922, with provision for future adjustment of rates by President with advice of Tariff Commission in order to "equalize the costs of production" in U. S. and abroad (see *Quar. Jour. Eco.,* Nov. 1922, 1-51).
      (iv) Influence of American protective tariffs (especially 1861, 1890, and 1897) as stimuli to protectionism in Europe.
   (*b*) Germany.
      (i) Tendency toward low tariffs, 1819-79, culminating in almost complete abandonment of protective duties.
      (ii) Agitation by manufacturers and landowners favoring protection.
      (iii) Bismarck's protective tariff of 1879, supported by iron and textile manufacturers and by landowners; opposed by exporters, seaports, and liberals generally.

(iv) Inauguration of tariff-bargaining by Caprivi, in 1890's, to secure better foreign markets for Germany's rapidly expanding manufactures.

(v) Tariff law of 1902, increasing protective duties; followed by new series of commercial treaties giving reciprocal tariff reductions.

(*c*) France.

(i) Anti-protectionist tendency under Second Empire. N.B., Cobden Treaty (1860) with England, granting reductions of tariff; similar treaties with other nations in 1860's; reduction of duties on raw materials and foodstuffs.

(ii) Protectionist policy of Third Republic; agitation by textile, iron, and agricultural interests; moderate protective tariff of 1881; increased rates on agricultural products, 1892; further increases on manufactures, 1910; revision, 1919, on account of currency depreciation.

(*d*) Russia.

(i) Tendency toward low tariffs, 1850-75.

(ii) Increases after 1877, resulting in gradual establishment of high protective tariff, chiefly for encouragement of Russian industries, for revenue, and for bargaining purposes.

(*e*) Great Britain.

(i) Adoption of free trade. N.B., Repeal of Corn Laws, 1846; Gladstone's free trade budgets.

(ii) Maintenance of virtual free trade, with tariff for revenue, by Great Britain, notwithstanding adoption of protective and preferential tariffs by British Dominions.

(iii) Defeat of protectionist "tariff reform" movements: Chamberlain's campaign in 1906; Baldwin's campaign in 1923.

(*f*) Other countries—protective tariffs adopted by most other countries.

(*g*) Discussion.

(i) Comparison of dates—low tariff tendency synchronous with early stages of Industrial Revolution; higher tariffs generally synchronous with later rapid development of machine-production, large-scale agriculture, improved transportation, and growth of nationalism and militarism in last quarter of 19th century.

(ii) United States, France, and Germany as leaders in the protectionist movement.

(iii) Tendency toward tariff rivalry, as indicated by foregoing dates; each country spurred on by tariff increases of others.

2. Protection of domestic markets.

(*a*) Nature of tariff protection—imposition of customs duties on imported goods, resulting theoretically in either:

(i) Virtual monopoly of domestic market by domestic producer, because imported goods, after payment of a "prohibitive" duty are too high in price; or

(ii) If duty is "moderate," encouragement of domestic producer, who is able to add the amount of the duty to the price of his goods.

(*b*) Chief arguments for protection of domestic market.

(i) Each country should be self-sufficient—"Every nation ought to endeavour to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply"—Alexander Hamilton.

(ii) Industrial nations should encourage agriculture and essential industries by tariff, in order to have secure domestic supply of food and war materials in case of war.

(iii) Industrially undeveloped countries need tariff protection for "infant industries," until they are sufficiently mature to compete with foreign producers (Friedrich List's argument for "educational tariffs").

(iv) Protection of industry beneficial to farmer because it increases urban markets for agricultural products, and because by stimulating industry it will ultimately result in lower prices.

(v) Protection necessary to maintain a high wage level, because without protection foreign competition would cause either reduction of wages or failure of domestic industries.

(vi) Protection is necessary to preserve a favorable balance of trade, by restricting purchases from foreign rivals.

(vii) Protective tariff is a convenient source of governmental revenue.

(viii) Protective tariffs benefit mankind because they foster economic development of all countries.

(*c*) Opposing arguments.

(i-ii) National self-sufficiency undesirable, because it would restrict increase of efficiency by specialization of labor; and impossible, because of uneven distribution of climate and natural resources (compare III, below).

(iii) Protection for infant industries is probably unnecessary and sometimes produces stagnation by removing stimulus of international competition, *e.g.*, relatively slow progress of French industry, despite protective tariff.

(iv) Protection increases prices paid by farmer (and all consumers) for manufactured products; similarly, agricultural protection increases cost of raw materials and foods, thus imposing a burden on industry.

(v) Protection not beneficial to wage-earners, because it increases prices and cost of living; efficient production and abundance of natural resources the true causes of high wages.

(vi) Favorable balance of trade an exploded fallacy of mercantilism; a nation must purchase foreign goods if it expects foreign nations to buy its exports; excessive surplus of exports by U. S. during war led to oversupply of gold, inflation, and exchange difficulties (compare below).

(vii) Protective tariff an undesirable method of raising revenue, because through increased prices of domestic as well as of foreign wares, public pays more than government receives; because of collection expense; because revenue is not proportioned to expenditure; because tax is not proportioned to ability to pay; etc.

(viii) Protective tariffs economically wasteful, because they foster inefficient industries.

3. Protection in colonial markets and backward countries.

Special Reference:—‡ *U. S. Tariff Commission, Colonial Tariff Policies,* especially 31-78.

(*a*) Increasing relative importance of colonies as markets for manufactures especially cotton goods, ironware, and certain kinds of foodstuffs. Colonies "offer a market for perhaps one-fourth of the manufactures exported by the industrial nations."

(*b*) Desire to obtain colonial markets as one of the chief motives for European imperialism (above, Part 3).

(*c*) Growth of protectionism shown by adoption of "preferential" and "assimilated" tariffs since 1892 in numerous colonial possessions.

(i) "Preferential tariffs" (protective duties on imported foreign goods, but lower rates or free admission for imports from mother-country). Examples:

United States' possessions—Philippines, Virgin Islands, Guam.
Some French colonies, notably French West Africa.
Some British colonies, notably the Dominions and some of West Indies.
Italian possessions.
Portuguese possessions (except Macao and Congo).
Spanish colonies (except Canaries and Spanish Morocco).

(ii) Tariff "assimilation" (free trade between colony and mother-country, while tariff of mother-country is applied to trade of colony with foreign nations). Examples:

United States—Porto Rico.
Japan—Formosa, Saghalin, Korea.
France—adopted as prevailing policy in 1892, applied to Algeria, Indo-China, Tunis, Madagascar, etc.

(iii) Importance of colonial possessions to which neither preferential nor assimilated tariffs are applied.

Colonies in central Africa (by international agreement).
India.
Most of British crown colonies.
Dutch East Indies.
Morocco (by Treaty of Algeciras).
Several others.

(*d*) Attempts of industrial nations to obtain tariff preference, or, failing that, low tariffs, in weak and backward nations.

(i) Preference—British and Russian attempts to obtain preference from Persia, before 1914; Russian tariff preference on Manchurian frontier of China; French tariff preference on Indo-Chinese frontier of China; Cuban and Brazilian preference to United States.

(ii) Low tariffs—insistence of industrial Great Powers on treaty restrictions preventing such nations as China and Turkey from establishing high protective tariffs.

(iii) The paradox of American policy—advocacy of tariff equality (open door) in China, Turkey, etc., but policy of tariff preference in Latin-American countries and in dependencies.

(*e*) General discussion.

(i) Tendency of most important colonies (India, Egypt, British Dominions, Philippines) and of backward nations (China, Turkey, Persia) to demand independent tariffs for protection of their own industries, instead of consenting to serve permanently as markets for mother-countries or Great Powers.

(ii) Difficulty of ascertaining effectiveness of preferential and assimilated tariffs, in relation to other factors, such as geographic proximity, salesmanship, banking services, investments, governmental influence, etc.

(iii) Evidence that trade does not always follow the flag (or the tariff)—the case of Canada.

(iv) Relatively small percentage of exports taken by a nation's own colonies, except in case of Great Britain.

(v) Problem—whether the additional margin of exports marketed in colonies as a result of tariff protection is worth the risks of international retaliation and antagonism.

4. Tariff-bargaining and foreign markets.

Special References:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** ch. xii. **Taussig,** *Free Trade,* chs. v-vi. **Gregory,** *Tariffs, a Study in Method,* chs. viii, x, xi. **J. Viner,** *Dumping, a Problem in International Trade.* **Hornbeck, S. K.,** *The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commercial Treaties,* 1-48. **Drage,** *Imperial Organization of Trade,* ch. iii. **U. S. Tariff Commission,** *Handbook of Commercial Treaties.*

(*a*) Tariff-bargaining as a result of tariff protection.

(i) The paradox of protectionism: each protectionist nation desires to protect its home market from foreign products, but is unwilling to have its own products excluded from foreign markets.

(ii) Consequence: "tariff-bargaining," that is, attempts to make advantageous bargains with foreign nations for reciprocal reduction of tariff duties.

(*b*) Methods of tariff bargaining.

(i) The German policy of tariff-bargaining, 1891-1914. Establishment of "general tariff" by law, with high rates; then offer of specific reductions ("conventional tariff") to other nations, in exchange for reduction of their duties on German manufactures; reduced rates established by special commercial treaties. Tendency of this method to cause retaliation and antagonism. Similar policies adopted by Russia, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland.

(ii) French system of 1892. Establishment by law of two tariffs, the maximum for nations not granting French goods most-favored-nation treatment (below), and the minimum for others. Adopted also by Norway.

(iii) Methods of the United States.

Reciprocity treaties granting reciprocal cancellation or preferential rebates of duties on specified articles. For example, Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854-65; Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, admitting Hawaiian sugar free; later reciprocity treaties with Cuba and Brazil.

Penalty method. Imposition of additional duties on imports from countries which discriminate against American exports. Provision in McKinley Tariff of 1890 for such "penalty" duties (actually applied against Colombia, Venezuela, Haiti). Provision in Dingley Tariff for similar penalties. Provision in Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 for maximum and minimum schedules, the former to be applied against countries discriminating against American goods (never applied). Provision in 1922 Tariff giving President power to impose retaliatory duties, not exceeding 50% ad valorem.

(*c*) "Tariff wars," a result of protective tariffs and tariff-bargaining.

(i) Russo-German tariff war of 1893. Occasioned by new Russian and German tariffs. Method: each imposed high surtaxes on imports from the other. Result: serious loss of trade, temporarily; but negotiation of treaty (1894), giving more favorable treatment of imports of Russian grain, flax, oilseed, and wool into Germany, and imports of German iron, cloth, and leather goods into Russia.

(ii) German-Spanish tariff war of 1894. Occasioned by Spanish rejection of tariff treaty. Application of German "autonomous" (maximum) tariff to Spain, and vice versa. Then surtaxes. Ended in 1899 by adoption of "most-favored-nation" principle (below).

(iii) German-Canadian tariff war, caused by Canadian grant of preference to Great Britain, 1897. Application of German maximum or general tariff to Canada. Imposition of 33% surtax on German goods by Canada. Termination 1910.

(iv) Franco-Italian tariff war, 1888-99. Occasion: denunciation of tariff treaty by Italy, and increase of duties on cattle by France. Application of maximum tariff and surtaxes by Italy; French retaliation by surtaxes on Italian wines, silk, butter, eggs, fruits, etc. Abandonment of surtaxes by Italy, 1889; by France, 1892; but maintenance of maximum tariffs until 1899. Important decrease of Franco-Italian trade during the dispute.

(v) Franco-Swiss tariff war, 1893-5. Refusal of Switzerland to make tariff concessions to France, unless France reduced duties on numerous manufactured articles. Imposition of maximum and surtaxes by Switzerland, and maximum by France. Termination, 1895, by mutual concessions.

(vi) General discussion of tariff wars as result of tariff bargaining; as economic loss; as cause of international antagonism.

(*d*) The "most-favored-nation" clause as a partial mitigation of tariff rivalry.

(i) General adoption of MFN clause in European commercial treaties since 1860.

(ii) Meaning of MFN clause. Each nation promises to extend automatically to the other all tariff reductions granted to any nation. Result: reduction of duty by any nation on any commodity, originally conceded as favor to another nation, is extended automatically to all powers having MFN treatment

(iii) Partial nullification of MFN principle by minutely detailed specialization of tariff duties so as to extend special favors to particular nations, for bargaining purposes, without really extending the favor to others. For example, German tariff applied a special rate to "large, dappled mountain cattle" (*i.e.*, Swiss cattle).

(iv) Unique policy of the United States. Special advantages conferred by U. S. on nations having reciprocity treaties are not automatically extended to all nations under MFN clauses, unless equivalent tariff reductions are made by them. "Most-favored-nation treatment implies and requires nothing more than the granting of opportunity to purchase, on the basis of reciprocal give and take, treatment identical with, or similar to, that accorded other States."

C. Other Methods of Securing Foreign Markets and Promoting Export Trade.

General references:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** chs. ix, xiii-xvi. **Grunzel,** *Economic Protectionism.* ‡ **Taussig,** *Free Trade, the Tariff, and Reciprocity,* ch. v.

1. Export bounties and drawbacks.

Special references:—* **Fisk and Peirce,** ch. ix. ‡ **Grunzel,** 200 ff, 229 ff, 250 ff, 318 ff. ‡ **Gregory,** *Tariffs,* 398-440.

(*a*) Purpose of export bounties and drawbacks—to enable domestic producers to compete in foreign markets on more favorable terms.

(*b*) Export bounties—premiums paid to producers of goods exported to foreign countries.

(i) Grant of export bounties on beet sugar by Austria-Hungary (1888), Germany (1891), France (1897), etc., as an illustration.

(ii) Tendency of other countries to retaliate by imposing "countervailing duties."

(*c*) Drawbacks—refunds of internal revenue or customs duties on goods exported abroad, or on raw materials or semi-finished goods used in production of articles for export.

(i) Special purpose—to relieve exporter of tariff burden on imported raw or semi-finished materials used in making goods for export, and thus enable him to sell goods cheaper in foreign markets.

(ii) Extensive use of drawbacks, by U. S., Canada, and other nations.

(iii) Recent tendency to accomplish same object by permitting free importation of materials used for later exports (U. S. Tariff Act of 1922).

(*d*) Effects.

(i) Tendency to make domestic price higher than world market price.

(ii) Tendency to stimulate international competition, and provoke retaliatory measures by foreign countries.

(iii) The Brussels sugar agreement of 1902, against bounties

on sugar, as an illustration of how such measures may stultify themselves.

2. Reduction of railway freight rates on goods destined for export.

Special Reference:—**Grunzel**, 163 ff, 229 ff.

3. Governmental aid to merchant marine (see below, VII-A).
   (*a*) Belief that possession of large merchant marine means lower shipping rates, prompt deliveries, and extension of export trade.
   (*b*) Great Britain as the classic example of a nation with large merchant marine and large exports; U. S. A. as a nation with few ships and large exports; France and Italy as nations which have encouraged shipping with small success; difficulty of drawing conclusion from these facts.

4. Financial aids to exports.
   (*a*) Government loans to foreign countries, to enable latter to purchase goods from lending country (*e.g.*, French loans to Poland, etc.).
   (*b*) Private loans for same purpose.
   (*c*) Concessions for railway building, etc., in foreign countries; materials usually obtained from concessionaire's country.
   (*d*) Extension of convenient credits to foreign purchasers through branch banks established in foreign countries.

5. "Dumping" and combinations of producers.

Special References:—**Viner**, *Dumping*. **Grunzel**, 220 ff. Also general references, Part 8.

   (*a*) Nature of "dumping"—exporting goods at less than normal price of similar goods in the exporting country.
   (*b*) Examples:
      (i) At one time the U. S. steel trust sold sheet steel in England at $22 a ton, and in U. S. at $32.
      (ii) Pre-war practices of German syndicates and cartels—*e.g.*, sale of iron, coal and coke in foreign countries at less than prices in Germany, and payment of a private export bounty to exporter by the syndicate or cartel.
   (*c*) Purposes.
      (i) To market margin or surplus necessary for economical large-scale production.
      (ii) To conquer new markets, or to defend old markets by discouraging competition.
      (iii) To limit quantity of goods available in the home market, and thus to maintain monopoly prices at home.

6. Political influence.
   (*a*) Use of political control of dependencies to secure orders for goods.
   (*b*) Use of political influence and diplomacy to secure favorable tariffs, government orders for munitions, etc., from foreign countries.

7. Consular and other governmental services.

Special references:—**Fisk and Peirce**, chs. xii-xv, and references there given.

   (*a*) The consular service:—its nature; duty of collecting commercial information and promoting business interests.

(*b*) Functions of commercial attachés and commercial agents.
(*c*) Collection of commercial information by Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the U. S., and similar departments in other countries.

8. National associations of private persons—chambers of commerce,

Special Reference:—**Fisk and Peirce,** ch. xvi.

National Foreign Trade Council, National Association of Manufacturers, American Manufacturers Export Association, etc.

9. Control of raw materials (see below, III).
(*a*) To secure plentiful supplies for domestic manufacturers.
(*b*) Occasional attempts, by prohibition of export, or export taxes, to prevent foreign countries from obtaining adequate supplies of raw materials.

D. Review and Discussion.

1. International rivalry for markets as a potent cause of enmity.
2. The problem of national economic solidarity.
(*a*) Argument against solidarity—tariffs and other measures mentioned above may benefit producer but injure consumer by raising prices.
(*b*) Argument for solidarity—indirect effects beneficial to entire nation.
3. Importance of party politics, lobbying, campaign contributions, pressure of powerful private interests, etc., in determining commercial policies of nations.
4. Complication of the economic problems of protection by considerations of national security and national sentiment.
5. Scientific study of effects of protective measures as a partial solution of the problem; embryonic condition of such study.

III. RAW MATERIALS

General References:—The most available general treatment for the use of students is: * **W. S. Culbertson,** *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations* (*The Annals* of Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., March 1924). **Gini,** *Report on the Problem of Raw Materials and Foodstuffs.* ‡ **Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson,* II, 409 ff. **Duggan,** *League of Nations,* 184 ff., 201 ff. **Eckel,** *Coal, Iron, and War.* **League of Nations,** *Report on Certain Aspects of the Raw Materials Problems.* **Manchester Guardian Commercial,** supplement "European Reconstruction," sec. 13, March 29, 1923. **Spurr,** *Political and Commercial Geology and the World's Mineral Resources.* **G. O. Smith,** *Strategy of Minerals.* **Mining and Metallurgical Soc.,** *Bulletin 151, Proceedings,* vol. XIV, no. 8. **U. S. Geological Survey,** *Mineral Resources of the U. S.* **Id.,** *Economic Limits to Domestic Independence in Minerals* (by **G. O. Smith**). **H. D. McCoskey and Burchard,** *Our Mineral Supplies.* **Council on Foreign Relations,** *Mineral Resources and Their Distribution.* **Cunningham,** *Products of Empire.* ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings,* ch. lxvi. ‡ **A. Wright,** *Romance of Colonisation.* **Gt. Britain,** Dominions Royal Comsn., *Final Report. . . . Natural Resources; Memo. . . . Food and Raw Material Requirements.* **Gt. Britain,** Imp. Mineral Resources Bureau, *Mineral Industry. . . . Statistical Summary,* and monographic reports.

Earle, "Raw Materials in Peace and War," *Jour. Amer. Bankers Assoc.*, Sept. 1923.

A. General Nature of the Problem.

Special Reference:—* **Culbertson**, 1-10.

1. Amazing increase in quantity and variety of raw materials required for industry, as result of stupendous growth of industry in last century.
2. The limited supply and unequal distribution.
   (*a*) Of minerals.
      (i) Total quantity of many important minerals limited—*e.g.*, coal, petroleum, iron, etc.
      (ii) Further limitation—some mineral deposits unsuitable for commercial exploitation because of poor quality, difficulty of extraction, remoteness from seaboard or from centers of consumption, etc.
      (iii) Commercially available resources very unevenly distributed.
   (*b*) Of vegetable and animal products.
      (i) Supply limited by conditions of soil and climate: *e.g.*, cotton, rubber, sugar, wheat.
      (ii) Supply further limited by value of land and labor: *e.g.*, unprofitability of raising grain in urbanized districts.
      (iii) Hence, uneven distribution of commercially profitable supplies.
3. The nationalistic attitude.
   (*a*) Nationalistic desire for self-sufficiency in time of war; hence, desire for control of raw materials of war, such as iron, coal, oil, etc.
   (*b*) Nationalistic desire for economic independence; hence, desire for territory including adequate supplies of chief raw materials and foodstuffs.
4. Acute and increasing international rivalry as the inevitable consequence of the foregoing facts.

B. More Detailed Survey of the Facts—Some Mineral Raw Materials.

1. Petroleum.

Special References:—* **Culbertson**, 162-73. **Foreign Affairs*, March 1923, 96-107. ‡ **Davenport and Cooke**, *The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations*. ‡ **L'Espagnol de la Tramerye**, *The World-Struggle for Oil*. ‡ **Delaisi**, *Oil, Its Influence on Politics*. ‡ **Earle**, "The Turkish Petroleum Co." in *Pol. Sci. Quart.*, June 1924, 265 ff. **Redwood**, *Petroleum*. **Garfias**, *Petroleum Resources of the World*. **Lidgett**, *Petroleum. The Oil Encyclopedia. Petroleum Yearbook. National Petroleum News*. British Dominions Year Book—*Oil: An Imperial Problem*. **Cronshaw**, *Petroleum* (Imperial Institute). **U. S. Dept. of State**, *Oil Prospecting in Foreign Countries*. **Id.**, *Restriction on American Petroleum Prospectors in Certain Foreign Countries*. **U. S. Fed. Trade Commission**, *Foreign Ownership in the Petroleum Industry*. **Great Britain**, Cmd. 1226 (1921), Correspondence Regarding Mandates, and Cmd. 675 (1921), the San Remo Oil Agreement, **Great Britain**, Imperial Institute, *Petroleum*, and Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, *Petroleum*.

(*a*) Importance of petroleum.

(i) Gasoline for automobiles, trucks, airplanes.

(ii) Fuel oil for ships, power plants, steam locomotives.

(iii) Kerosene for farm tractors, stoves, lighting.

(iv) Importance in war—fuel for battleships, submarines, airplanes, tanks, motor lorries.

(*b*) Exhaustibility of the supply.

(i) Increasing rate of world production.

1860	½ million barrels.
1870	5¾
1880	30
1890	77
1900	149
1910	328
1920	695
1922	842

Total 1860-1922—10,359 million barrels.

(ii) Estimated world reserves—60 or 70 billion barrels.

(iii) Reason for fear of shortage—about 1/7 of total world supply already used; estimated reserves will be exhausted in about 80 years at present rate of consumption, much sooner if rate continues to double every decade.

(iv) Unscientific character of such estimates.

(*a*) Only a small fraction of possible oil lands have been carefully prospected.

(*b*) All estimates of reserves very uncertain, especially those relating to oil shales.

(*c*) Future rate of consumption unpredictable.

(v) Political effect of fear of shortage—acute international rivalry, especially since the War, for possession of potential oilfields.

(*c*) Political distribution of the supply.

(i) United States.

Estimated reserves—10 billion barrels (12 to 14% of world).

Total production, 1860-1922—6,453 million barrels (62% of world).

Annual production, 1922—551 million barrels (65.5% of world).

Imports (chiefly from Mexico)—127 million barrels.

Exports, 1921—66 million barrels (58% of non-American consumption); 1923—95 million.

Chief source of supply for most other countries.

(ii) Mexico.

Estimated reserves—about 6 or 7% of world.

Annual production—185 million barrels (21% of world) 1922.

Production in Tuxpam fields decreasing, due to exhaustion of wells and influx of salt water.

Production in Tampico region increasing.

Source of supply for American and British refineries.

(iii) Russia.

Estimated reserves—about 8% of world.

Annual production—30 million barrels in 1922 (3½% of world) much less than in pre-war years.

Chief producing districts—Baku and Grosny districts in Caucasus region.

(iv) Persia.

Estimated reserves—large but unknown, perhaps equal to Mexico's.

Annual production, rapidly increasing to 18 million barrels in 1922 (2% of world).

Source of supply for Egypt, India, and England.

Cost of drilling and transportation as obstacle to exploitation.

(v) Dutch East Indies.

Estimated reserves—5 to 7% of world.

Annual production (1922)—19 million barrels (2% of world).

(vi) Rumania.

Reserves—?

Annual production, 1922—8½ million barrels (1% of world).

(vii) Other producers—smaller quantities (less than 1% of world production) are obtained in numerous other countries.

(viii) Other important but undeveloped oilfields.

Central and South America, estimated more than 20% of world reserves; especially Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Argentine, Ecuador, Bolivia; difficulties of prospecting and cost of laying pipe lines to coast as great obstacles to rapid development.

Mesopotamia (Irak), supposed to contain rich reserves, practically untouched, because of political difficulties and need of long pipe lines.

Sakhalien and various other fields not yet carefully prospected, or of minor importance.

(*d*) The great oil trusts.

(i) Standard Oil.

Dominating position in world oil business before War.

Dissolution by Supreme Court (1911) and reorganization as group of nominally independent Standard Oil Companies, obeying leadership of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Worldwide ramifications through subsidiary and affiliated companies in other countries.

(ii) Royal Dutch-Shell combination.

A combine formed in 1907, joining the Royal Dutch Oil Co. (a Dutch co. with oil wells in Dutch East Indies) and Shell Transport and Trading co. (British).

Worldwide interests, chiefly through subsidiary companies and affiliated companies—such as Roxana (U. S.), Shell Co. of California, Asiatic Petroleum, Caribbean Petroleum, Californian Oilfields, Turkish Petro-

leum, Jugo-Slav Petroleum, Mexican Eagle (cf. **Tramerye**, p. 75 ff).

International ownership of capital—by British, Dutch, French, and American stockholders, chiefly.

British control—Controlling interest British; head, Sir Henri Deterding, naturalized as a British citizen (1915).

Sources of supply—chiefly U. S., Mexico, Dutch East Indies.

Policy of obtaining concessions for potential oilfields in all parts of world.

(iii) Importance of political influence of great oil companies (cf. oil investigations by U. S. Senate, 1924).

(*e*) British oil policy.

(i) The naval need of oil.

Lord Fisher, the "oil maniac," and his advocacy of oil-burning ships.

Mr. Winston Churchill, and his policy of acquiring oilfields for the British navy.

(ii) The Anglo-Persian.

Concession for oil exploitation in Persia (excluding five northern provinces) obtained by Australian D'Arcy in 1901.

Establishment of Anglo-Persian Oil Co., 1909, to exploit this concession.

Purchase of controlling interest in this co. by British Government, 1913, to secure supply of oil for navy.

Worldwide interests of Anglo-Persian, through subsidiaries in British colonies, France, Spain, Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, Argentine, etc.

(iii) Turkish Petroleum Co.

Formation of Turkish Petroleum Co. in 1912 by English interests.

Agreement with German interests in 1914, making T. P. Co. a merger, (50% of stock held by Anglo-Persian, 25% by Royal Dutch-Shell, 25% by Deutsche Bank).

Provisional promise of Turkish govt., 1914, to grant concession for oil rights in Mesopotamia.

Elimination of German interests by War.

Support of T. P. Co. by British diplomacy after war.

San Remo Agreement, 1920, to sell 25% of stock to French (below).

Alleged offer, 1921, to admit Standard Oil to 20% share.

Uncertain validity of concession.

(iv) British Controlled Oilfields.

Established as Canadian corporation, 1918, controlled by British government.

Policy of obtaining concessions in Central and South America.

(v) Royal Dutch-Shell (see *d*-ii above).

Policy of coöperation between British diplomacy and

Sir Henri Deterding, chief of the Royal Dutch-Shell combine.

British control exercised through private stockowners rather than through government directly.

(vi) Post-bellum oil diplomacy.

The San Remo Agreement of April 25, 1920, promising France a share of 25% in Mesopotamia oil; "fifty-fifty" Anglo-French coöperation in obtaining oil rights in Rumania; coöperation in acquiring oil rights in Russia; Anglo-French companies to acquire concessions in French colonies (N. B. Algeria).

Conflict between Royal Dutch-Shell interests and Franco-Belgian interests in seeking Russian concessions at Genoa Conference, 1922.

Diplomatic support of above agreement and of Turkish Petroleum concession against American protests, 1920-21.

Unsuccessful attempt to insert recognition of Turkish Petroleum concession in Lausanne Treaty, 1924, balked by American opposition.

(*f*) United States oil policy.

(i) Open door in United States for foreign oil interests until 1920.

(ii) Wilson's opposition to real or alleged British concession-hunting in Mexico and Caribbean region, 1913-1920—non-recognition of Huerta, supposed to be tool of British oil interests; non-recognition of Tinoco (revolutionary president in Costa Rica), likewise supposed to favor British.

(iii) Agitation by American oil interests, geological experts, and senators, 1920-22, for action to prevent British monopoly of world's oil resources, in view of supposedly imminent exhaustion of U. S. domestic reserves; reinforced by oil requirements of U. S. Shipping Board and navy.

(iv) Legislation in 1920 to exclude from exploitation of U. S. public oil lands and Philippine public lands, citizens of countries which denied similar privileges to U. S. nationals (directed chiefly against Royal Dutch-Shell's extensive oil acquisitions in U. S.).

(v) Formal protests against San Remo Agreement, 1920-21; against Dutch refusal to admit Standard Oil into the Djambi fields (Dutch East Indies) 1921; against Turkish Petroleum concession (above).

(vi) Refusal of direct diplomatic support to specific interests, such as Chester concession in Turkey, but insistence on "open door" in general, for benefit of American oil companies.

(vii) Refusal to recognize Obregon Government in Mexico until it had agreed not to enforce Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution (1917) retroactively against American concessionaires.

(viii) Revulsion of popular feeling against oil diplomacy as result of Senate investigations in 1924.

(ix) Activity of Standard, Sinclair and Doheny oil interests in seeking concessions in Latin America, Turkey, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia, Russia, etc.

(*g*) Other aspects.

(i) Tendency toward establishment of national ownership of undeveloped oil resources—Russia, Mexico, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Turkey, Colombia, Ecuador, etc.

(ii) Unreality of discussions regarding oil resources of different political units, in view of worldwide interests and holdings of great international oil trusts—at least in time of peace; *i.e.,* defiance of national political boundaries by financial combinations.

(iii) Tendency to exaggerate importance of political or financial control of oil-wells in war; utilization of overseas oil resources impossible except to strongest naval power.

(iv) Contrast between popular fears of an impending oil shortage, and business policy of producing, selling, and exporting, as much oil as possible.

(v) Substitutes for petroleum—alcohol; "fixed" oil from coal, lignite, or oil shale; possibilities of large supplies, but need of cheaper processes of distillation to make such substitutes commercially useful.

2. Coal.

Special References:—* **W. S. Tower,** "The Coal Question" in *Foreign Affairs,* Sept. 1923, 100 ff. **12th International Geological Congress,** *Coal Resources of the World.* **Olivier,** *La Politique du Charbon.*

(*a*) Industrial importance—as chief source of artificial heat and power; for smelting mineral ores; firing lime, cement and brick kilns; byproducts such as ammonia, coal tar (for road surfacing, roofing, etc.), aniline dyes, etc.

(*b*) Military importance—chief high explosives (*e.g.,* TNT, picric acid, ammonium nitrate) obtained from coal; indispensability of coal in manufacture of guns and munitions and in industrial life upon which military effort depends.

(*c*) Unequal distribution of unused resources (estimates from *Coal Resources of the World*):

Europe, 784 billion metric tons (chiefly England and Germany); North America, 5,073 billion metric tons (chiefly U. S. and Canada); South America, 32 billion metric tons; Asia, 1,280 billion metric tons (chiefly China); Africa, 58 billion metric tons; Australia and Oceania, 170 billion metric tons; World total, 7,398 billion metric tons.

(*d*) Dependence of most countries on a few for coal production.

(i) Coal production, chiefly by U. S. (35% of world's coal production in 1922), Great Britain (21%), Germany (22%).

(ii) Dependence of France and Mediterranean countries on British and German coal; dependence of Canada, Caribbean lands, Central America, etc., on U. S. coal.

(*e*) Importance of geographic situation and cheap transportation facilities as conditions governing future development of coal resources.

(*f*) Examples of international rivalry for political ownership of coal deposits.

(i) French demand for Saar Basin in 1919.

(ii) French occupation of Ruhr basin, 1923.

(iii) Polish-German dispute over Upper Silesia, 1919-1922.

(iv) Japanese annexation of Korea and attempts to gain control over coal areas of northern Sakhalin, eastern Siberia, and China.

(v) Dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1919, over coal region of Teschen.

3. Iron.

Special References:—**C. K. Leith,** "The World Iron and Steel Situation" in *Foreign Affairs,* June 1923, 136 ff. **C. K. Streit,** *Where Iron Is, There Is the Fatherland.* **U. S. Geol. Survey,** *World Atlas of Commercial Geology,* Part 1, pp. 25 ff. **U. S. Geol. Survey,** *Bulletin 706* (1921). **Great Britain,** Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, *Iron Ore,* Part 6 (1922). **League of Nations,** *Raw Materials Problem.*

(*a*) Importance—as indispensable material for modern industry and warfare.

(*b*) Unequal distribution of iron resources (unmined).

Chief reserves of unmined iron:—Lake Superior district (U. S.), Lorraine "minette" ore field (France), Great Britain, Russia, Brazil, Sweden, Spain, China, Cuba, Newfoundland.

(*c*) Unequal distribution of present output.

(i) Percentage of world output of iron ore (1922): U. S. 46, Germany 5, Luxemburg 4, Great Britain 7, France 20, Spain 3, Sweden 6, China 1.5.

(ii) Percentage of world output of pig iron (1922): U. S. 54, Germany 13, Great Britain 10, France 10, Belgium 3.

(iii) Production of steel (1922): U. S. 35.6 million tons, Great Britain 5.9, Germany 9, France 4.5, world 63.7.

(*d*) Tendency of iron and steel industry to concentrate in great industrial centers, notably the Great Lakes region, northeastern England, and the Lorraine-Ruhr region.

(i) Advantage of large-scale operations.

(ii) Importance of neighboring coal supply ("iron goes to coal," because of transportation costs).

(iii) Importance of nearness or cheap water transportation to consuming centers.

(*e*) Importance in world politics.

(i) Tremendous economic power and political influence of great metallurgical industries—Stinnes in Germany; the de Wendel family and the Comité des Forges in France; the U. S. Steel; Armstrong, Vickers, etc., in Great Britain.

(ii) Power of iron and steel in war, as shown by Great War.

(iii) Examples of international rivalry for iron—Franco-German rivalry in Morocco; Franco-German contest after the war for domination of Lorraine-Ruhr industry, and British fear of a Franco-German iron monopoly; successful Japanese efforts to gain economic control of important Chinese iron mines.

4. Ferro-alloys (metals used as alloys in production of steel).
   (*a*) Chromite—used with iron to produce "chrome steel," for armor-plate, and other forms requiring special hardness.
      (i) Chief producers—U. S. (during the War), Rhodesia, India, New Caledonia, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Cuba, Russia (before the War), Turkey, Greece.
      (ii) Chief consumers—U. S., England, France, Germany, Norway.
      (iii) Dependence of U. S. on imports from Africa, New Caledonia, and Canada.
   (*b*) Manganese—used in open-hearth and Bessemer processes for steel.
      (i) Chief producers—India, Brazil, Egypt, Caucasus (Russia).
      (ii) Chief consumers—U. S. (imports from India and Brazil), Germany, Great Britain, France.
   (*c*) Nickel—used in specially tough steel, for machinery, propeller shafts, guns, etc.
      (i) Chief producers—Canada, New Caledonia.
      (ii) Chief consumers—U. S. (imports from Canada), England, Germany, France, Japan.
   (*d*) Tungsten—used in hardening steel; also in fiaments for electric lamps.
      (i) Chief producers—China, Burma, U. S., Bolivia, Portugal, Malay States, Indo-China.
      (ii) Chief consumers—U. S. (imports from China and Bolivia), Great Britain, Germany.
   (*e*) Vanadium—used in toughening steel for axles, locomotives, etc.
      (i) Chief producers—S. W. Africa, Peru (deposits owned by an American co.) and U. S.
      (ii) Chief consumers—U. S., England, Germany, France.
   (*f*) General discussion.
      (i) Importance of these ferro-alloys generally overlooked.
      (ii) Dependence of great steel-making countries on "backward" countries for their supplies, in most cases.
5. Fertilizers (and explosives).

Special reference:—**Curtis,** "Fertilizers: The World Supply" in *Foreign Affairs,* March 1924, 436 ff.

   (*a*) Nitrate—used to replace nitrogen taken from soil by non-leguminous plants; also as raw material for explosives.
      (i) Chief nitrate deposits—Chile, source of supply for U. S., Europe, Japan, Egypt, Australia, etc.
      (ii) Possible substitutes (more expensive than Chilean nitrate).
      Ammonium sulphate, obtained as by-product from coke ovens.
      Nitrate, obtained by atmospheric fixation.
   (*b*) Potash—chiefly used as fertilizer, but also for explosives, soap, glass, matches, photography, dyeing and tanning.
      (i) Chief deposits of easily available soluble forms—Stassfurt plain in Prussia (furnished 85% of world's supply in 1922), Alsace, and smaller deposits in Spain, Galicia, Abyssinia, U. S., India.
      (ii) World supply before war controlled by German Kali

Syndikat; since war, controlled by Germany and France, with possible American and Spanish competition.

(*c*) Phosphate—used in artificial fertilizers, incendiary bullets and smoke screens, matches, etc.

(i) Chief deposits—Western U. S. (enough for 1,000 years); French colonies (Algeria, Tunis, Morocco); Russia, British colonies, Oceania (Nauru island); Egypt (low grade).

(ii) Chief consumers—U. S. and western Europe.

6. Copper—chiefly used in electrical industry; also for brass and bronze; essential in war.

(i) Chief producers—U. S., Chile, Japan, Belgian Congo, Mexico, Spain.

(ii) Chief undeveloped reserves—Peru and Bolivia, Russia, Congo, Turkey.

7. Tin—chiefly used in tinplate for cans; also in tinfoil, solder, bronze, silk.

(i) Chief deposits—Malay Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, Siam, Yunnan (China), Nigeria, Australia, Transvaal, Congo, Cornwall (Eng.), Portugal, Bolivia.

(ii) Chief consumers—U. S., Great Britain, Germany, France.

8. Zinc—for galvanizing iron; making brass, etc.

(i) Chief producers—U. S., Australia, Upper Silesia (divided between Germany and Poland, 1922).

9. Lead—paints, storage batteries, glass, rubber, pipes, cable coverings, etc.

(i) Chief producers—U. S., Australia, Spain, Mexico.

(ii) Chief consumers—U. S., Great Britain, Germany, France.

10. Mercury (quicksilver)—used in mercury fulminate to detonate high explosives, also drugs and chemicals, cosmetics, mirrors, thermometers, etc.

(i) Chief deposits—Almaden (Spain), Idria (Italy), California, Peru.

(ii) U. S. resources of good quality approaching exhaustion.

11. Platinum—chemical industry, jewelry, dentistry.

(i) Chief producers—Russia (more than 90% before War), Colombia (chief producer after War, resources rapidly being depleted).

(ii) Chief consumers—U. S., England, France, Germany.

12. Aluminum—kitchenware, automobile and airplane parts, etc.

(i) Chief deposits of ore (bauxite)—South America and Africa.

(ii) Chief commercial production—U. S.

13. Sulphur—for sulphuric acid, fertilizers, refining petroleum, galvanizing steel, making paper pulp, chemicals, etc.

World supply controlled by U. S. and Sicily; smaller amounts produced by Japan, Spain, Great Britain.

14. Mica—indispensable in electrical industry for insulation; used in magnetos, in wireless condensers, etc.

Resources—mica very common, but industrially usable sheet mica very rare, chiefly found in India, Canada, U. S., East Africa, South America.

15. Other minerals, such as gold, silver, antimony, asbestos, arsenic, etc., may be looked up by students.

C. Some Strategic Vegetable and Animal Products.

References:—**U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,** *Yearbook.* **Int. Inst. of Ag.,** *International Year Book of Agricultural Statistics 1922.* **Von Engeln,** *Inheriting the Earth,* 283-304. **Culbertson,** 9, 21-6.

1. Cotton.

Special references:—* **Culbertson,** 95 ff. **Todd,** "The World's Crisis in Cotton," in *Foreign Affairs,* Dec. 1923, 232 ff. *Cotton Year Book. Statesman's Year Book. Encyclopædia Britannica,* XXX, 764 ff. **Great Britain,** Imperial Institute, *British Cotton Cultivation.* **J. A. B. Scherer,** *Cotton as a World Power.*

(*a*) Importance.

(i) Largest item in trade of Great Britain; largest single export of the United States.

(ii) Military use as an ingredient of explosives (guncotton, cordite).

(*b*) Limitations of supply.

(i) Can be grown only in tropical and subtropical regions, with proper conditions of rain and soil.

(ii) Cannot be grown profitably except where cheap labor is abundant and large-scale production well organized.

(*c*) Chief producers.

(i) United States—more than half of total for world; almost all of medium grade.

(ii) India—about one-fifth of world total; low grade (short fiber).

(iii) China—less than one-tenth of world; low grade.

(iv) Egypt—one-fifteenth of world; chief producer of finest grade.

(v) Brazil—small production but great potentialities.

(*d*) Dependence of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and many other countries on U. S. for more than half of their supply of raw cotton.

(*e*) Efforts of European powers to promote cotton-growing in their own colonies—without much success as yet.

(i) British Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, with official encouragement; small production in Uganda, Nigeria, Mesopotamia, West Indies, Australia, etc.; larger supplies from Egypt and India; average of 5% obtained from British possessions and over 60% from U. S., 1911-22.

(ii) France—Association Cotonnière Coloniale—hopes of raising large quantities by irrigation in French West Africa and Indo-China; small production now.

(iii) Germany—hopes of supply from Mesopotamia and German colonies in Africa, thwarted by War.

(iv) Russia—considerable supplies raised in Caucasus and Turkestan, temporarily checked by War and revolution.

2. Rubber.

Special references:—**Culbertson,** 22, 35, 149 ff., 154 ff. **Whitford,** "The Crude Rubber Supply," in *Foreign Affairs,* June 1924, 613 ff. **Great Britain,** Cmd. 1678 (1922) and 1756 (1922) reprinted also in **U. S. Dept. of Com.,** *Trade Information Bulletin, no. 49.*

(*a*) Rapid growth and importance of rubber industry—elastics, waterproofs, rubber bicycle and automobile tires, hard rubber goods, etc.

World production: 1905— 62,000 tons.
1910— 70,500 "
1915—158,700 "
1920—360,000 "

(*b*) Sources of supply—latex or milk of rubber trees or rubber vines.

(i) Before 1914—chiefly from wild rubber trees in Congo and Brazil.

(ii) Since 1914—chiefly from plantations in southeastern Asia and adjacent islands; wild rubber only 5% in 1923-4.

(iii) Dominating position of British—69% of rubber plantations in British colonies (Malay Peninsula, Ceylon, etc.), 29% in Dutch East Indies, partly under British financial control; 2% in French Indo-China.

(iv) Possibility of growing rubber in many other tropical lands (Philippines, Latin America).

(*c*) Dependence of U. S.

(i) 77% of world's raw rubber imported by U. S., chiefly from British colonies.

(ii) About 3% of plantation acreage owned by American capital.

(iii) Attempt of British Government in 1922 to control prices and restrict output.

(iv) Partial frustration of British policy by refusal of Dutch Colonial Office to coöperate in restricting output.

(v) Alarm of some American manufacturers, resulting in official investigation of possibility of growing rubber in Philippines and Latin America.

(vi) The obstacle to such a solution: lack of adequate cheap labor supply; expense of founding plantations.

3. Hemp and jute.

Special references:—* **Culbertson,** 21, 22, 58ff. **Philippine Commission,** *Reports,* 1907, Pt. 1. *Encyclopædia Britannica.*

(*a*) Manila hemp—used for rope—made from a plantain tree grown almost exclusively in Philippines.

(*b*) Jute—cheap but strong fibre, used for commercial wrapping and sacking, grown almost exclusively in India.

(*c*) Sisal—from henequin, grown in state of Yucatan (Mexico); raw material for 80% of world's binder twine; 90% exported to U. S. for manufacture; governmental control, price-fixing, and restriction of production begun in 1922; may be grown elsewhere (Africa, East Indies, etc.), but it takes 6 or 7 years to get first crop.

4. Vegetable oils.

Special reference:—**Culbertson,** 25.

(*a*) Importance—to provide cheaper substitutes for butter and animal fats; rapidly growing use for soap, butter substitutes, cooking, etc.

(*b*) Coconut oil—extracted from dried meat of coconut (copra); produced chiefly in East Indies and Philippines.
(*c*) Palm oil and palm kernel oil—produced in Africa chiefly; manufactured chiefly by Germany before the War; by Great Britain and U. S. since.
(*d*) Peanut oil—produced chiefly by France from West African peanuts before the War; by Japan, China, and Philippines since.
(*e*) Linseed oil (from flaxseed)—produced in many countries; imported by U. S. from Argentine, Canada, etc.
(*f*) Olive oil—Spain, Italy, and other Mediterranean countries.
(*g*) Cottonseed oil—produced chiefly by U. S.

5. Hides and skins (for leather).
(*a*) Production—by great cattle-growing countries such as Argentina, U. S., Russia (before the War), India, Canada, etc.
(*b*) Position of U. S.—large imports of hides and skins and leather to supplement domestic supply.

6. Timber and wood pulp.

Special reference:—**Zon and Sparhawk,** *Forest Resources of the World.*

(*a*) Immense consumption for building, heating, industry, wood pulp (paper).
(*b*) Inadequate supplies of industrial nations—depletion of forests in U. S., conservation in U. S. and Europe.
(*c*) Immense forest resources of tropics, Canada, Russia, and other less densely settled countries.
(*d*) The Canadian wood pulp question—dependence of U. S. paper manufacturers on Canadian supply; recent legislation in Canada to curtail export of pulp wood and favor paper industry in Canada.

7. Foodstuffs (see below, IV).
8. Other agricultural products (may be investigated by students).

D. The Problem of Nationalistic Control of Raw Materials.

General references:—* **Culbertson,** chs. i, viii-ix. See also references at head of this section (III).

1. Reasons for nationalistic control.
(*a*) Danger of being dependent on other countries for raw materials in case of war—*e.g.,* Germany's difficulties during War because of lack of cotton, copper, rubber, oil, etc. (see 4-*b, e, f,* below).
(*b*) Popular nationalistic sentiment; belief that it is better for the nation to have political ownership of sources of supplies, instead of being dependent on foreigners (see 4-*e,* below).
(*c*) Desire of particular groups of producers, in some cases, to obtain governmental subsidies, protection, or encouragement, by appealing to above-mentioned popular motives.

2. Some methods of nationalistic governmental control.
(*a*) Import duties to encourage domestic production—applicable only to commodities of which there is a possible domestic supply: examples, manganese, tungsten, mica, quicksilver, wool.
(*b*) Export duties to check exportation of raw materials to other countries.

British export tax on palm kernels from British West Africa.
India's export taxes on jute, hides, and skins.
Export tax on tin ore from Malay States (British).

(*c*) Restrictions and embargoes.
Canadian restrictions on export of pulp wood.
German prohibition of import of Chilean nitrate during War.

(*d*) Government or quasi-public monopolies—to fix prices, conserve resources, or hamper competitors.
Control of potash by monopolistic Kali Syndikat in which Prussian government is partner.
Control of phosphate of Nauru Is. by British, Australian and New Zealand governments.
Japanese government monopoly of Formosa camphor production.

(*e*) Governmental restriction of output to regulate prices.
British law ("Stevenson Restriction Act") to regulate output and prices of rubber, 1922.

(*f*) "Nationalization" of unexploited resources.
Mexican nationalization of undeveloped oilfields.
Public ownership of certain oilfields in U. S. for naval use.

(*g*) Diplomatic efforts to obtain concessions for raw materials.
British diplomatic support of oil companies (above, B-1-*e*).

3. Importance of nationalistic attitude toward raw materials in recent international relations.

(*a*) The war stimulus—desire of each nation to obtain secure supply of war materials for future conflicts.

(*b*) The peace negotiations.
Insistence of French on obtaining Lorraine iron and Saar coal.
Bitter contests for rich mineral regions—Silesia, Teschen, etc.

(*c*) Post-bellum diplomacy.
French seizure of chief German coal mines (the Ruhr basin).
Diplomatic controversies over Mesopotamian, Mexican, East Indian, and other oilfields.
Quiet efforts of Japan to obtain concessions for iron and coal in China, Siberia, Sakhalin.

4. Some criticisms of nationalistic control.

(*a*) Control by above-mentioned methods sometimes successful, sometimes futile, in immediate purpose.

(*b*) Impossibility, for most if not all nations, of obtaining all essential raw materials within their own borders.
(i) U. S. A. dependent on imports of Mexican sisal (important to farmers for binding twine), Indian jute, Japanese silk, British crude rubber, British and Bolivian tin, Russian and Colombian platinum, Canadian and French colonial nickel, Chinese antimony, Canadian asbestos, Cuban and Turkish tobacco, Australasian and South American wool, Indian and Russian manganese, New Caledonian and Rhodesian chromite, Peruvian vanadium, etc.—some of these not replaceable by substitutes.

(ii) British Empire.

Important agitation in recent years for protection and development of Empire's resources, with greater self-sufficiency as aim.

British Empire the chief source of supply for nickel, cobalt, asbestos, mica, diamonds, jute, palm nuts and palm kernels, plantation rubber, gold.

British Empire could be self-sufficient also in wheat, meat, butter and cheese, wool and many other agricultural products.

British Empire could only with great difficulty develop adequate British supplies of cotton, tobacco, camphor, etc.

British Empire also dependent on foreign countries for copper, quicksilver, platinum, sulphur, vanadium, nitrate, potash, phosphate, etc., of which adequate natural deposits are not found in Empire.

(iii) Other countries much more dependent on foreign supplies than U. S. and Great Britain.

(*c*) Unprofitability of exploiting inferior or relatively inaccessible domestic sources of a raw material, if cheaper or better supplies can be obtained abroad—examples:

Greater expense of working low-grade quicksilver ore in U. S. than of importing Italian or Spanish product.

Use of Canadian coal on Pacific coast of U. S., because of cheaper transportation, although U. S. exports coal to eastern Canada.

Importation of Swedish iron ore by U. S., because of quality, although U. S. is greatest iron-producer of world.

Slow progress made by British and French colonies attempting to develop production of cotton in competition with highly organized American competition.

(*d*) Error of assuming that producers will necessarily sell to their fellow-countrymen more cheaply than to foreigners.

Sale of U. S. steel to foreign countries at lower price than to American consumers.

Example of German syndicates, limiting domestic supply and maintaining high domestic prices, while exporting surplus at low prices.

(*e*) Error of assuming that political sovereignty over land containing raw materials will give economic control of such materials.

Large proportion of Mexican oilfields controlled by American and British capitalists.

Impossibility of profitably smelting Lorraine (French) iron ore without Ruhr (German) coal and coke.

Much of Canadian nickel ore output controlled by International Nickel Co. (U. S.)

Tungsten ores of China, Burma, etc., shipped to Germany for smelting, and therefore controlled by Germany, before the War.

Germany's inability to obtain raw materials from German colonies during War, because of Britain's naval supremacy.

(*f*) General tendency of producers to sell for highest price and of

consumers to buy at cheapest—a fundamental obstacle to nationalistic control.

(*g*) International enmity as an inevitable result of attempts at nationalistic control.

E. Internationalist Tendency of Private Business Organizations Dealing with Raw Materials, in Contrast with Nationalistic Political Tendency. Examples:

1. Business internationalism of great oil trusts (see above, B-1-*d*).
   (*a*) The Royal Dutch-Shell combine, including British, Dutch, American, and French investors, and exploiting oil in all parts of world.
   (*b*) The Turkish Petroleum, with capital stock divided among English, French, Arabs, and Americans.
2. Internationalism of great metallurgical combines.
   (*a*) The Stinnes combine, primarily German, but associated by interlocking directorates with certain French, Dutch, and other mining and metallurgical interests, and with mining ventures in Argentine, Russia, etc.
   (*b*) Close association of French syndicates owning Lorraine iron mines with German coal and metallurgical interests, before the War, indirectly during the War, and after the War.
3. Control of nitrate prices by the Chilean Nitrate Producers Association, including Chilean, British, Jugoslav, and German owners of Chilean nitrate mines.
4. Control of aluminum prices by agreement of French, English, American and German companies before the War.
5. Regulation of sulphur output and prices, and division of market, by agreement of American and Sicilian producers, with central control office in London.
6. Tendency toward Anglo-American combination in tobacco industry.

F. Some Attempts to Solve the Problems of Nationalistic Control and International Rivalry in Raw Materials.

1. Secretary Hoover's proposal—American consumers of foreign raw materials should be allowed to form common purchasing agencies, so that united economic power of buyers would counterbalance power of producers (*N. Y. Times*, March 17, 1924).
2. The "open door" for raw materials.
   (*a*) The policy of the U. S. Government—to demand that American companies be allowed to obtain concessions for exploitation of raw materials in other countries on same terms as foreign companies.
   (*b*) Proposal of the First Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce at London, 1921—All export duties on colonial raw materials should be levied equally on all purchasing countries, including the mother-country; and all other restrictions on the free movement of raw materials abolished.
   (*c*) Recommendation of the Provisional Economic and Financial Committee of the League of Nations—". . . raw materials produced in one country being in many cases essential to the economic

life of other States should not, unless in exceptional cases, be the object of restrictions or of differential regulations of such a nature as to injure the production of such States or to impose on them a systematic inferiority. . . ."

(*d*) Open door principle in A and B mandates.

(*e*) Some existing practices contrary to these principles.

(i) Differential duties, bearing more heavily on foreign countries than on Great Britain, on tin ore, hides, palm kernels, and some other products produced by British colonies.

(ii) Regulations against grant of oil concessions to foreigners in some British colonies and numerous other countries.

(iii) Tendency of Great Powers to regard certain backward countries as spheres of influence in which other nations should not seek concessions.

Opposition of U. S. to proposed British oil concessions in Central America.

Opposition of British to the Chester Concession.

Opposition of Japan to foreign economic enterprises in Manchuria, etc.

(iv) Favoritism shown to fellow-nationals in award of concessions by colonial officials.

3. Free trade in raw materials.

(*a*) Franco-Italian proposal at Peace Conference (not adopted)—"In order to put an end, so far as possible, to international rivalries in the search for raw materials, to suppress many of the causes of the economic conflicts that endanger the world's peace, and to offset the natural inequalities arising from the geographical distribution of resources throughout the world, the Allied and Associated countries agree that henceforth the raw materials of industry shall be entirely free of both import and export duties."

(*b*) Continued advocacy of this principle by free-traders.

4. International regulation of distribution of essential raw materials.

(*a*) Apportionment of coal, oil, etc., among Allies during the War by inter-allied councils as a practical instance of application of this principle.

(*b*) Desire of many internationalists that apportionment of raw materials among nations which need them should be controlled by the League of Nations or by international commissions.

G. Review and Discussion.

1. Contradictory tendencies in the present age.

(*a*) Toward intensified nationalistic rivalry for raw materials.

(*b*) Toward practical international control through capitalist combinations.

2. Discussion of principles.

(*a*) The principle that each nation has exclusive right to control raw materials found or produced in its territory.

(*b*) The principle that the rest of the world has a right to demand proper development of essential resources; that natural resources are the heritage of all mankind.

(*c*) The principle that national self-sufficiency is desirable.
(*d*) The principle that national self-sufficiency is unprofitable, impossible, or inexpedient.

IV. FOOD AND POPULATION PROBLEMS

General References:—* **Culbertson,** 113-24, ‡ 191-211, 256-80. **J. R. Smith,** *The World's Food Resources.* **T. H. Middleton,** *Food Production in War.* **Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.,** *Annals, "The World's Food."* **Int. Inst. Ag.,** *International Year Book of Agricultural Statistics 1922.* **U. S. Dept. Ag.,** *Yearbook.* **Gini,** *Report on the Problem of Raw Materials and Foodstuffs.* **Cox,** *The Problem of Population.* **Solano,** *Labour as an International Problem.* **Iwas,** *International Labor Legislation.* ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings,* 14-21. ‡ *Geographical Review,* XIII, 282, XIV, 315.

A. Fundamental Importance of Food Supply.

1. The peril of an inadequate food supply—lower standards of living; famines.
2. "Surplus population" (to be considered below) one of the chief justifications of war, conquest, and migrations.
3. Desirability of sufficient food supply in war.

B. Population and "Surplus Population."

1. Comparative statistics of population densities (may be prepared by students from any good atlas, encyclopedia, *Statesman's Year Book,* or *World Almanac*).
2. Popular belief that countries with very dense population are "overpopulated" and that "surplus population" must overflow into colonies or "underpopulated" countries.
3. Popular belief that countries with high birth rates will become "overpopulated"; hence, need for birth control.
4. Criticism of the idea of "surplus population."
   (*a*) Density of population not an indication of surplus population, since manufactures, shipping, and finance enable dense populations to obtain not only sufficient imports of food, but more luxuries than purely agricultural lands enjoy—example of England, Belgium, Holland, New York City.
   (*b*) Lack of industrial and commercial development, rather than lack of land area, as the factor limiting the population of a civilized nation.
   (*c*) Emigration not necessarily an indication of "surplus population," but a proof that economic opportunities are supposedly better in other countries; hence, "overpopulation" a relative term, often meaning "underdevelopment."
   (*d*) Some examples.

   England, densely populated, sending emigrants to U. S. and colonies, but not fully utilizing the agricultural land in England.

   China and India, suffering from "overpopulation," and rapidly increasing in population, but with rich natural resources undeveloped and primitive industrial methods.

Japan, supposedly overpopulated, clamoring for "outlets," but leaving a considerable amount of agricultural land in Japan uncultivated, and sending very few emigrants to South American countries where immigrants are welcomed—"surplus population" a political slogan rather than an economic fact.

Germany, complaining of surplus population in the 1880's, when emigration was considerable, but, after industrial development, importing Polish laborers in 20th century.

C. The Distribution of Food.

1. Great inequality of nations in agricultural resources in relation to population.
2. Actual production of foodstuffs determined largely by profit motives, dependent on world market prices, transportation facilities, etc., rather than by principle of producing as much as possible on all available land.
3. Dependence of nations upon each other for foodstuffs.
   (*a*) Fallacy of assuming that a nation which exports grain is self-sufficient, and vice versa.
   (*b*) The position of the United States.
      (i) Able to export grain, meat, dairy products, fruits, etc.
      (ii) Dependent on other countries for coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, olive oil, sugar, certain kinds of fish, nuts, figs and dates, certain fruits, etc.
   (*c*) The position of Great Britain.
      (i) Able to export fish, beer and ale, etc.
      (ii) Dependent on imports of grain, dairy products, meat, potatoes, etc., to supplement domestic production, and of tropical products.
   (*d*) France.
      (i) Exports about 2 billion francs (1922) of fruits, dairy products, and other foodstuffs.
      (ii) Imports almost 5 billion francs (1922) of wine, cereals, coffee, etc.
4. Nationalistic efforts of U. S., Germany, France, and other countries to stimulate agriculture, with a view to becoming "self-sufficient," by means of protective tariffs on food; as contrasted with British repugnance to duties on food (compare II, above).

D. Economic Aspects of Immigration, in Relation to Food and Population.

1. Immigration attracted primarily by wages, political and social conditions, not by food supply or unoccupied land.

   Tendency of European immigrants in the U. S. to enter industry and congregate in urban centers.

   Reluctance of immigrants to take up farms or ranches in sparsely settled agricultural regions of South Africa, Australia, South America.
2. Importance of immigration to manufacturers in countries with high wage levels—immigration as a reservoir of cheaper labor and stimulus to industrial expansion.

3. Anti-immigration policies of labor organizations in U. S., and opposition to Asiatic immigration in U. S. and British Dominions, determined primarily by fear of lower wages, secondarily by race feeling.
4. Theory that scarcity of land is a basic factor in wages; high wages prevalent in sparsely settled countries because laborers can (theoretically) take up farms if offered low wages.
5. International commerce and international competition as factors making for equalization of wage conditions; tendency toward international labor legislation as a result; possible future effect of such equalization on immigration.

V. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

General References:—* **Grunzel,** 77-100. * **Viallate,** 55-63. **Hobson,** *The Export of Capital.* **Withers,** *International Finance.* **Overlach,** *Foreign Financial Control in China.* **Friedman,** *International Finance.* **Luxemburg,** *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals.*

A. Meaning of "The Export of Capital"—Some Form of Investment in Foreign Countries or Loan to Foreigners or Foreign Governments, but Rarely Implying the Direct Transfer of Money from Lender to Borrower.

B. Some Forms of Export of Capital.

1. Direct loans from one government to another—example, the war loans of almost 10 billion dollars extended by U. S. government to Allied governments.
2. Purchase of a government's securities (national, provincial, or municipal bonds) by private citizens of another country.
3. Purchase of ordinary industrial or other business securities (stocks and bonds) by private citizens of another country.
4. Purchase of land or other property in one country by citizens of another.
5. Extension of commercial credits by banks of one country to customers in another country.

C. Gigantic Growth of Foreign Investments.

1. British—total British investments in colonies and foreign countries in 1913 estimated at almost 20 billion dollars; increasing at rate of 1 billion a year.
2. French—total foreign investments in 1913 about 8 billion dollars; annual increase, about ½ billion.
3. Germany—total foreign investments in 1914 about 9 billion dollars; annual increase about 200 million; much of this confiscated by Allies.
4. United States.
   (*a*) Before the War—foreign investments in U. S. about 4 billion; private American investments in Canada, Mexico, etc., possibly 2 billion.

(*b*) Effect of the War—repayment of about 2½ billion dollars owed to foreign investors (*i.e.*, purchase of industrial securities from foreigners); purchase of foreign securities at rate of about 1 billion a year; governmental loans of about 11 billions to Allies; U. S. suddenly transformed from borrowing nation to chief money-lender of world.

D. Some Economic Reasons for the Growth of Foreign Investments.

1. "Over-saving"—tendency toward accumulation of capital by capitalists (and small investors) more rapidly than it can be re-invested in domestic industry at existing rates of interest or profit.
2. Possibility of investing this "surplus capital" at higher rates of interest, or for larger profits, in colonies and relatively undeveloped countries.
3. Desire of capitalists, in some cases, to escape heavy taxation in their own country by investing in other countries.
4. Desire of manufacturers, in some cases, to escape high tariff duties of other countries by founding branch factories in such countries.
5. Desire of banks, manufacturers, or government, in making foreign investments, to promote export trade by enabling borrowing country to buy more.
6. Desire to obtain raw materials, by establishing plantations or opening mines, which necessitate investment.
7. Theoretical necessity of maintaining balance of trade—if a nation exports much more than enough to pay for its imports (including shipping charges, tourist expenditures, immigrants' remittances, interest on foreign debts, etc., as "invisible items"), it must export capital or it will have an increased supply of money, tendency toward "inflation," perhaps higher prices, unfavorable exchange rates.

E. Some Political Aspects of Foreign Investments.

1. Use of loans for ulterior purposes.
   (*a*) To cement politico-military alliances—French loans to Russia before the War; French loans to Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., since the War.
   (*b*) To acquire control over backward countries—American "dollar diplomacy" in Central America; French loans to Morocco before establishment of protectorate; Japanese loans to China during War in return for concessions.
2. The withholding of loans as a political weapon.
   (*a*) Refusal of diplomatic recognition to a revolutionary government as a form of financial boycott—reluctance of bankers to lend money to an unrecognized government.
      American non-recognition of the Obregon Government.
      Allied non-recognition of Russian Bolshevik government.
   (*b*) Power of French minister of finance to exclude foreign securities from quotation on Paris Bourse for diplomatic reasons—*e.g.*, exclusion of Bagdad Railway bonds before War.
   (*c*) Somewhat similar negative control of loans in other countries, for political purposes.

3. Political effect of foreign investments on the investing country.
   (*a*) Tendency of investors to sympathize with countries to which they have lent money—example, during Great War, large loans by American banks to Allies as a factor in promoting pro-Ally sentiment in U. S.
   (*b*) Desire of investors that governments to which they have lent money shall be preserved against revolution, or restored, if overthrown, so that investments will not be lost—*e.g.*, hostility of French investors to the Bolshevik government in Russia, which repudiated foreign debts. Professor Beard's statement, ". . . the United States, through the investment of capital, has become a silent partner in the fate of every established order in the world." (*Cross-Currents*, 246.)
   (*c*) Tendency of investments in backward countries to involve the investing nation in imperialism and international rivalry.

F. The Problem of Protecting Foreign Investments.

1. Origin of the problem.
   (*a*) Frequent non-payment of interest, or repudiation of debt, or confiscation of foreign property, especially by backward and unstable countries such as Mexico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Morocco, etc.
   (*b*) Nationalistic belief that an investor may call upon his own government to intervene in such cases and protect his investment.
2. The practice of intervention.
   (*a*) Mild diplomatic intervention.
      (i) Refusal of diplomatic recognition to revolutionary governments until they promise to pay debts—U. S. and the Obregon Government.
      (ii) Frequent diplomatic protests regarding default on foreign debts or injury to foreign property—Great Britain and Mexico.
   (*b*) Armed intervention—the British in Egypt (1882), U. S. in Haiti and Dominican Republic, etc.
   (*c*) Establishment of political or financial control by creditor nation over debtor nation—same illustrations.
   (*d*) In a few cases, establishment of international financial control—in China, in Austria.
3. Some problems raised by intervention.
   (*a*) Expense of military intervention.
   (*b*) Political character of intervention, leading to establishment of virtual protectorates, expansion of empire, resistance by the country subjected to control.
   (*c*) Tendency of armed intervention to arouse jealousy of other powers and provoke international conflict—example, U. S. opposition to European intervention in Venezuela.
   (*d*) Impossibility or failure of armed intervention in many cases, and hence large amount of defaulted debts.
      (i) Failure of U. S. to collect war debts from former Allies, except Great Britain.
      (ii) Refusal of Soviet Russia to repay or recognize foreign debts.

(iii) Large amount of defaulted loans held by British investors—Russia about 11,000, Honduras 145, Mexico 30, Confederate States (Civil War), 60 million dollars, including interest; total about 11,725 millions.

4. Some proposed solutions.
   (*a*) The Drago Doctrine—no armed intervention for collection of debts.
   (*b*) The Hague Convention of 1907—no use of force to collect debts, unless debtor government has previously rejected arbitration.
   (*c*) International protection of investments and joint intervention if necessary.
   (*d*) Abandonment of the whole principle of nationalistic protection; investors to take their chances, subject to laws of the country in which they invest, without appeal to any other government (cf. provision of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 that foreigners receiving mineral concessions must accept Mexico's laws and renounce right of appeal to outside governments).
5. The special problem of concessions.

Special references:—‡ **Culbertson,** 99-113; ‡ **Earle,** *Bagdad Railway,* 67-84.

(*a*) Nature of a concession.

(i) Special contract made between a government (usually a backward government) and a capitalist or syndicate, conferring on the latter (the "concessionaire") the right to build a railroad, exploit oilfields, develop mines, cut timber, establish plantations, or conduct some other business enterprise, with extraordinary privileges not usually granted to private business.

(ii) Such special privileges granted either because they are necessary to attract capital for the development of the country, or because the government is weak and corrupt and therefore unable to insist on fair terms.

(*b*) A typical concession—the Bagdad Railway Concession.

(*c*) Problems arising from concessions.

(i) More or less exclusive and monopolistic character of concessions—usually exclusive rights in a certain large area.

(ii) Hence, bitter international rivalry for concessions in backward countries—conflict over the Bagdad Railway Concession, jealousy regarding the Chester Concession, etc.

(iii) Problem of protecting native labor against exploitation.

(iv) Problem of conservation—tendency toward ruthless exploitation of natural resources in backward country.

(v) Problem of filibustering—tendency of concession-seekers to finance revolutions and put puppets in power.

(*d*) Some proposals.

(i) Woodrow Wilson's principle—European capitalists to be welcome in Latin America as investors, not as concessionaires.

(ii) Policy of Secretary Hughes—American interests to be allowed to bid for concessions in backward countries on equal terms.

(iii) Joint international action to secure opportunities for all—Mining and Metallurgical Society of America.

VI. REPARATION, WAR DEBTS, AND EXCHANGES

General References:—* **Beard,** *Cross-Currents in Europe,* ch. iv. **Bass and Moulton,** *The Balance Sheet of Europe.* **Institute of International Education,** *Syllabus No. XIII.* **Bogart,** *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War.* **International Conciliation,** Nos. 182, 184, 193, etc. ‡ **World Peace Foundation,** Vol. V, Nos. 1, 2, 3; VI, Nos. 4, 5. **Keynes,** *Economic Consequences of the Peace.* ‡ **Keynes,** *A Revision of the Treaty.* **Keynes,** *Monetary Reform,* ch. 3. ‡ **Moulton and McGuire,** *Germany's Capacity to Pay.* ‡ **Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* II, chs. 42-43. **Baruch,** *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty,* 13-76. **Tardieu,** *The Truth About the Treaty.* **Angas,** *Reparations, Trade, and Foreign Exchange.* **Angas,** *Germany and Her Debts.* **Street,** *Rhineland and the Ruhr.* The Dawes Report (in *Current History,* May 1924, 263 ff.). **Fisk,** *Inter-Ally Debts.* **Walter,** *Modern Foreign Exchange.* **Cross,** *Domestic and Foreign Exchange.* **Cassell,** *Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914.* **Lehfeldt,** *Restoration of the World's Currencies.* **Boggs,** *The International Trade Balance.* ‡ **Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton,** *Readings,* chs. xxiv-xxi. ‡ *These Eventful Years,* I, chs. 19-20. **H. G. Moulton,** *The Reparation Plan.* **L. Pasvolsky and H. G. Moulton,** *Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction.* (For additional material, especially official documents, consult bibliographies in *Foreign Affairs.*)

A. Origin of the Problem.

1. The staggering burden of war expenditures.
   (*a*) Unprecedented costliness of the War of 1914—total estimated direct cost, 186 billion dollars; estimated indirect cost, 150 billions.
   (*b*) Inability of belligerents to defray War costs by current revenues; hence, huge War debts.
2. Unbalanced budgets after the War.
   (*a*) Causes.
      (i) Demobilization and reconstruction expenses.
      (ii) Rampant militarism—large naval and military expenditures.
      (iii) Economic depression and inflated currencies.
   (*b*) Result—continued increases of national debt in many European countries.
3. Popular misunderstanding of economic facts.
   (*a*) Desire to escape or shift the cost of the War.
   (*b*) Popular expectation, in Allied countries at close of War, of large indemnity from Germany.
   (*c*) General ignorance of economic facts regarding currency, exchange, etc.
   (*d*) Tendency of politicians to cater to, and even foster, popular demands, regardless of economic possibilities.

B. The War Debts.

1. War debts owed to U. S.—about 4¼ billion dollars owed by Great Britain, 3⅓ billion by France, 1⅔ billion by Italy, smaller amounts by other Allies, total 10 billions, not including accrued interest.

2. War debts owed to Great Britain—about 557 million *l.* by France, 476 by Italy, 561 by Russia; total, 1¾ billion *l.* (about 8¾ billion dollars).
3. War debts owed to France—about 3½ billion francs by Belgium, 5 billion by Russia; total, 11 billion francs (about 2⅕ billion dollars at par).
4. The problem of repayment.
   (*a*) Agreement of Great Britain, Feb. 1923, to pay her debt to U. S. in 62 annual instalments, with reduced interest.
   (*b*) Inability of other debtor nations, at present, to pay principal or interest on their foreign debts; general tendency to regard these debts as paper obligations which will never be fully redeemed.
   (*c*) Repeated proposals of Great Britain and France that war debts be reduced or cancelled as part of a general settlement involving reduction of reparation claims (see below).
   (*d*) Agitation of numerous economists, financiers and others in U. S. for cancellation of war debts owed to U. S. by Allies.
   (*e*) Official policy of the U. S.—not to cancel war debts, but to make agreements for repayment at reduced interest (which has the effect of partial cancellation or reduction).

C. Reparation Claims.

1. Before the conclusion of peace.
   (*a*) An indemnity as one of German war aims, during the War.
   (*b*) Reparation of damage done in invaded areas as one of Allied war aims, as voiced in President Wilson's speeches.
   (*c*) The armistice terms.
      (i) Formal promise of the Allies (Lansing note to Germany, Nov. 5, 1918) to base treaty on Wilson speeches, with following modification regarding reparation—"compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air"—*i.e.,* invaded regions, sinking of ships, bombardment of towns.
      (ii) The reparation clause in the armistice—"Reparation for damage done" (article XIX).
   (*d*) Popular agitation, especially in France and England, during the Peace Conference, for large reparations.
2. The treaty terms.
   (*a*) The conflict of views at the Peace Conference.
      (i) The American view—that a total amount should be fixed, limited strictly to material damage done, and within Germany's capacity to pay.
      (ii) The British view—that pensions to wounded or invalided soldiers and dependents, and allowances to families of mobilized men, should be included.
      (iii) The French view—that as much as possible be obtained.
   (*b*) Provisions of the Versailles treaty.
      (i) Inclusion of pensions and allowances.
      (ii) Postponement of decision as to total amount due; this amount to be decided by Reparation Commission.

(iii) Provision for delivery by Germany of bonds on account:
Class A—20 billion gold marks.
Class B—40 billion gold marks.
Class C—40 billion gold marks.
Total: 100 billion gold marks.

(iv) Method of payment—to be decided later by Reparation Commission.

(*c*) Criticism of these terms.

(i) Inclusion of pensions as a violation of the armistice agreement?

(ii) Economic and political unwisdom of failing to fix a total within Germany's estimated capacity to pay.

(iii) Difference of opinion as to Germany's capacity to pay—estimates made at Peace Conference varied from 00 (American) to 800 (French) billion gold marks.

3. Apportionment of the German indemnity—Spa agreement among Allies (July 1920): France to receive 52%, British Empire 22, Italy 10, Belgium 8, other Allies 8, of total German reparation payments.

4. Fixing the total.

(*a*) Decision of the Supreme Council, Jan. 1921—Germany to pay 226 billion gold marks (about 55 billion dollars' in 42 years.

(*b*) Decision of Reparation Commission, April 27, 1921—Germany liable for total of 132 billion gold marks (about 33 billion dollars).

(*c*) London Agreement, May 1921, between Germany and Allies—Germany to deliver 50 billion gold marks in A and B bonds; additional C bonds amounting to 82 billions to be issued when Germany seems able to carry interest charges (as interest was deferred, the total present value of all these bonds would be about 65 instead of 132 billion gold marks).

(*d*) Later proposals.

(i) German proposal—total to be 50 billion gold marks.

(ii) British offer to reduce total British claims for repayment of loans by Allies and for reparation, to the amount demanded by U. S. in repayment of British debt (above).

(iii) French proposal to cancel C bonds (reducing indemnity to 50 billions) if U. S. and Great Britain would cancel French debts to them; refusal to reduce reparation total, unless France received 26 billion gold marks net over amounts needed to repay debts to Great Britain and U. S.

(iv) Anglo-American proposal, 1923, for expert investigation of Germany's capacity to pay; French refusal to allow experts to modify total.

5. Actual German reparation payments.

(*a*) Diplomatic wrangling between Germany and Allies, 1920-24, over schedules of current payments, and repeated modification of Allied demands.

(*b*) Collapse of German currency and cessation of cash payments in 1922.

(*c*) Cessation of wood and coal deliveries (required as part of reparation) at end of 1922.

(*d*) Total payments to end of 1923.

Estimated at 8,411 million gold marks by Reparation Commission.

Estimated at almost 56 billion by German government (this figure including several items not included in reparation payments).

Large percentage of this total obtained by Allied confiscation of German property abroad, by transfer of Saar mines to France, by transfer of German public property in ceded territories, and by delivery of goods.

Small percentage paid in cash—about 2 billion gold marks.

6. Occupation of the Ruhr.
   (*a*) Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Annex II, paragraphs 17-18; cited as legal sanction by French, denied by British.
   (*b*) The occupation of the Ruhr district, Jan. 11, 1923, by French and Belgian troops.
   (*c*) Economic importance of the Ruhr.
   (*d*) Failure of passive resistance by Germans.
   (*e*) The Micum agreements.
   (*f*) Effect on Germany—depreciation of the mark; stimulation of reactionary nationalism; increased poverty of middle class and workers.
7. The Dawes Report.
   (*a*) Investigation of reparation question by expert committee, as result of proposal by Secretary Hughes.
   (*b*) Recommendations of the Dawes committee.

   (i) German payments to begin at 1 billion gold marks, gradually increasing to 2½ billion in fifth year, and possibly rising still higher (additional increases to be determined by an "index of prosperity").

   (ii) These payments to be obtained from an 11-billion mark mortgage on German railways, 5-billion mortgage on industries, transport tax, and budget surplus.

   (iii) A bank of issue to be created in Germany, to issue uniform and stable currency; reparation payments to be deposited in this bank and transferred to Allies by an Allied Committee.

   (iv) Foreign loan of 800 million gold marks to be raised by Germany, to stabilize currency.

   (v) "Fiscal and economic unity" of Germany necessary for above requirements; popular interpretation of this phrase to mean abandonment of French economic control of Ruhr basin, but not necessarily evacuation of French troops.

   (*c*) Recommendations of Dawes committee not concerned with total amount which Germany is required to pay, but only with amount she can pay from year to year.
   (*d*) Attitude of Germany and Allies toward Dawes report.
8. The London Conference of August 1924.
   (*a*) Agreements for putting Dawes Plan into effect.
   (*b*) Agreement for evacuation of Ruhr.
9. Reparation questions since the London Conference.

D. The Economic Mechanism of International Payments—Exchanges.

1. Normal international exchange.
   (*a*) Bills of exchange, the normal method of international payments—illustration: Jones in U. S. pays debt to Smith in London by paying an American bank in dollars for bill of exchange (or cable order) which entitles Smith to receive equivalent amount in English money from English bank.
   (*b*) Amounts sent out from one country usually balanced against amounts received, so no gold need be shipped except in payment of difference between total receipts and total payments.
   (*c*) If more money is being received than paid, the exchange rate of the country's currency rises enough to cover cost of shipping gold from debtor countries, or to make transfer of funds to debtor countries by bankers profitable.
   (*d*) A country's currency falls below par in exchange value because of:
      (i) A large excess of imports over exports (including such "invisible items" as interest payments on foreign debts, shipping charges, tourist expenditures, etc.).
      (ii) Low discount rates on loan money, leading to transfer of money by banks to other financial centers where higher discount rates may be obtained.
      (iii) Insufficient gold reserves to back paper currency; hence fear that paper cannot be fully redeemed in gold.
      (iv) Decreased purchasing power of inflated currency ("quantity theory").
      (v) Political unrest, causing same fear.
   (*e*) Predominance of "sterling exchange" before the war—*i.e.*, use of exchange bills on London for pounds sterling for many transactions among other countries, because of stability of English exchange and convenience of dealing with large London banks.
   (*f*) International confidence, political stability, and close-knit international banking system as conditions necessary for smooth operation of this system of international exchanges.
2. Effect of the War.
   (*a*) Violent but temporary shock in exchange rates due to outbreak of War.
   (*b*) Large gold shipments to U. S. and gradual increase of exchange value of dollar (*i.e.*, falling of European exchange rates), due to heavy purchases of American supplies by Allies.
   (*c*) Further decline of exchange rates of certain European countries after War, accelerated by large issues of paper money, budget deficits, import surpluses, and unstable political conditions—Problem for student: compare present exchange rates (given by daily newspaper) with par values, observing which countries have sunk lowest, and attempting to explain their plight.
   (*d*) Rivalry of New York with London as world's chief money market and partial substitution of "dollar exchange" for "sterling" as favorite medium for international transactions.

3. Relation of exchange to reparation and war debt problems.
   (*a*) German reparation payments.
      (i) Decline of mark exchange due to excess of German payments abroad for reparation, food, and raw materials, over German receipts for exports; aggravated by inflation of currency, political instability, and uncertainty of future.
      (ii) Necessity of loan to Germany, to restore stable currency and exchange, so that Germany may resume payments (Dawes Report).
      (iii) Large future cash payments possible only by large increase of German exports, since supply of gold in Germany is small.
      (iv) Increase of German exports means increased competition with Allied exporters in world markets.
      (v) Alternative—acceptance of German industrial securities in payment of reparation, or reinvestment of reparation payments in Germany, so that there will be smaller net transfer of wealth out of Germany. (But see **Moulton.**)
   (*b*) Allied debts to United States.
      (i) U. S. loans to Allies greater than their gold reserves.
      (ii) Fear of some financiers and economists that payment of debts to U. S. would further raise exchange value of dollar, and therefore increase difficulty of selling American exports (since European purchasers would have to pay more in their currency to give American exporters same return in dollars).
      (iii) Impossibility of payment unless U. S. either imports more than it exports, or makes large foreign investments.

VII. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

A. Shipping.

References:—* **Grunzel,** 231-50. * **Fisk and Peirce,** ch. 18. **Jones,** *Government Aid to Shipping.* **Jones,** *British Merchant Shipping.* **Benson,** *The Merchant Marine.* **Drage,** 260-85. **Acad. Pol. Sci.,** *American Foreign Trade Relations,* 89 ff. **U. S. Shipping Board,** *Report on the History of Shipping Discriminations and on Various Forms of Government Aid to Shipping.* Statistics in *World Almanac* or encyclopedia. Further references in **Fisk and Peirce.**

1. Nationalistic reasons for desiring a large national merchant marine.
   (*a*) To "save" freight charges (that is, to pay freight to fellow-countrymen instead of to foreigners).
   (*b*) To promote national export trade (because of more favorable treatment of national commerce; also, theory that trade follows the flag).
   (*c*) To promote carrying trade and reëxport business.
   (*d*) To possess sufficient auxiliary vessels for naval use in war.
2. Mercantilist policies in early modern times—British Navigation Acts.
3. Modern forms of government aid to shipping.
   (*a*) Direct financial aid to private shipping companies.
      (i) Subsidies to lines carrying mail—Great Britain, Germany, France, U. S., etc.

(ii) Subsidies for construction or operation of ships—France, Japan, Italy, etc.; small success of French subsidy policy.

(*b*) Indirect aid.

(i) Restriction of coastwise traffic to ships registered under national flag—practised by France and many others; not by Great Britain or Germany.

(ii) Preferential railroad rates for certain shipping lines.

(iii) Preferential rates, or remission, of port and canal duties.

(iv) Exemption of ship-building materials from customs duties.

(v) Admission of foreign ships to national registry.

(*c*) U. S. shipping policy.

(i) Early mail subsidies.

(ii) The Shipping Act of 1916 and the Shipping Board during the War.

(iii) Jones Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

(iv) Failure of Ship Subsidy Bill of 1922.

(*d*) Relative standing of maritime nations in total tonnage.

	Millions of Tons	
	Pre-War	1922
British	18.7	22
American	7.9	17
German	5	1.9
French	2.2	3.8
Japanese	1.5	3.6

B. Freedom of the Seas and Waterways.

References:—* **Fisk and Peirce**, 266-8. **Potter**, *The Freedom of the Seas*. **Ogilvie**, *International Waterways*. **Baker**, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, II, ch. xlv. **Temperley**, *History of the Peace Conference*, II, 92-112. **Angell**, *The World's Highway*. Further bibliographies in **Fisk and Peirce** and **Ogilvie**.

1. Freedom of the high seas.

(*a*) Importance of general principle, established in modern times, that the open ocean is a free highway for ships of all nations.

(*b*) Limitation of freedom of seas in war time—contraband and blockade.

(i) Declaration of Paris, 1856.

(ii) Hague Conventions.

(iii) Declaration of London.

(iv) Ineffectiveness of these rules in the Great War—the British blockade and the German submarine policy.

(v) President Wilson's advocacy of freedom of the seas.

(vi) Failure of the peace conference to settle the question.

(*c*) National jurisdiction over inland waters and over coastal waters within 3-mile limit; U. S. negotiations for extension of jurisdiction to 12 miles for enforcement of prohibition.

2. Straits and canals.

(*a*) Importance of certain straits and canals for international commerce—Dardanelles and Bosphorus, Dover, Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, Great Belt and Little Belt; Kiel Canal, Suez Canal, Panama Canal.

(*b*) Status of such straits and canals.

(i) Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

Absolute control by Turkey in early modern times.

Open to merchant vessels by treaties, 1774, 1829.

Provisions of Lausanne Treaty, 1923.

(ii) Collection of tolls by Denmark on ships passing Great Belt and Little Belt, ended by international agreement, 1857.

(iii) Freedom of other straits above-mentioned, but potential domination by coast fortifications.

(iv) Panama Canal—construction, administration and fortification by U. S.; provision of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for equal treatment of all nations; exemption of U. S. coastwise traffic from canal tolls, adopted 1912, repealed in 1914 as contrary to treaty; extent to which the canal is used by American and non-American ships.

(v) Suez Canal—construction by a private company financed chiefly by French capital under concession from Egyptian government, expiring in 1968; purchase of large block of shares by Britain; neutralization by treaty of 1888 providing that the canal shall "be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag"; tolls collected by company; large percentage of traffic British.

(vi) Kiel Canal—constructed by Germany, primarily for naval reasons; provisions of Versailles Treaty that canal shall be open to vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany, on terms of entire equality.

(*c*) Problem: whether one power should have the right to dominate such straits and canals.

3. Rivers.

Special reference:—**Chamberlain,** *Régime of International Rivers.*

(*a*) Control of most rivers by country through whose territory they flow.

(*b*) Partial internationalization of some rivers.

(i) Danube—establishment of European Commission in 1856; gradual extension of its jurisdiction; provisions of Versailles Treaty (articles 346-353).

(ii) Rhine—open to all nations and controlled by international commission under Convention of Mannheim, 1868; terms of Versailles Treaty (articles 354-362).

(iii) Internationalization of other German rivers by Versailles Treaty (articles 331-345).

(iv) Some other rivers open to international commerce (*e.g.,* Amazon) or to ships of riverain states (*e.g.,* St. Lawrence).

(*c*) Problem: should all rivers giving commercial access to more than one country be internationalized?

4. Ports.

(*a*) Economic importance of control of ports.

(*b*) Establishment of a few "free ports" before the war.

(*c*) The peace settlement—Danzig; free zones in German ports for Czechoslovakia.

(*d*) Problem: how to secure adequate port facilities for landlocked states.

C. Railways.

References:—‡ **Baker,** II, ch. xlv. **Pratt,** *Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest.*

1. Importance of railways for international trade.
2. Control of most railways by nation through whose territory they pass.
3. Control of many railways in backward areas such as Turkey and China by concessionaire companies.
4. Provision of Versailles Treaty for transit of Allied commerce over German railways on same terms as German or other commerce; lack of reciprocity; similar terms for other defeated powers.
5. Problem: how to reconcile national control with international importance and utilization of railways.

D. Air Traffic.

References:—‡ **Baker,** ch. xlvi.

1. Probable future importance of commercial air traffic among nations.
2. Provision of Versailles Treaty for free air transit over Germany.
3. General convention of 1920 recognizing national sovereignty over air above each country, with free passage for innocent craft in peace.

E. Telegraphic, Cable, and Wireless Communications.

References:—‡ **Culbertson,** 240-251. **Baker,** II, ch. xlvii. *Foreign Affairs,* Dec. 1922, pp. 144 ff.

1. Great importance for shipping and export business; for news business; for naval and military purposes.
2. British supremacy, with German competition, in international cable and wireless control before 1914; dependence of U. S. on British and German cables.
3. The peace settlement: unsuccessful American opposition to Allied confiscation of German cables; surrender of German cables to Allied and Associated Powers jointly; future status to be settled.
4. The Yap controversy (above, Part 3, XIII-F) as an instance of international rivalry.
5. Rivalry of powers for rights to land cables and erect wireless stations in China, etc.
6. Problem: probable future development of international control.

VIII. REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

A. Vital Significance of Economic Factors in International Political Relations, and of International Political Relations in Economic Life.

B. Conflict Between Spirit of Intense Economic Nationalism and Actual Development of International Interdependence and International Regulation.

C. Importance of Bringing Full Knowledge of Facts to Solution of International Economic Problems.

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PART NINE

PROBLEMS OF DIPLOMACY

General references:—The most useful general account for students is **DeWitt C. Poole,** *The Conduct of Foreign Relations under Modern Democratic Conditions.* The following are also valuable for information or points of view:—**P. B. Potter,** *Introduction to the Study of International Organization,* parts II and VI. **E. A. Walsh** (ed.), *History and Nature of International Relations.* **J. Bryce,** *International Relations.* **W. Lippmann,** *Stakes of Diplomacy.* **C. D. Burns,** *International Politics.* **Heatley,** *Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations.* **G. Young,** *Diplomacy Old and New.* **Kennedy,** *Old Diplomacy and New.* **E. Satow,** *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice.* **J. Matthews,** *The Conduct of American Foreign Relations.* **P. S. Mowrer,** *Our Foreign Affairs.* **F. Neilson,** *How Diplomats Make War.* **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* III, ch. viii. **B. L. Von Mackay,** *Die moderne Diplomatie, ihre Entwicklungsgeschichte und ihre Reformmöglichkeiten.* **A. S. Hershey,** *Diplomatic Agents and Immunities.* **U. S. Dept. of State,** *Diplomatic List* (monthly). Much illustrative material may be found in memoirs of diplomats, for example, *Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page.* See also special references below.

I. INTRODUCTORY: THE ORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMACY

Special references:—* **Poole,** 1-40. ♯ **Potter,** 71-137. **Satow.**

A. Sovereign States as the Units of Diplomacy (compare Part 1, I-A).

1. Sovereignty.
2. The doctrine of equality.

B. Direction of Foreign Policy Ordinarily by Executive Branch of Government, with More or Less Control by Legislative Branch.

C. The Diplomatic and Consular Services.

II. SECRECY VS. PUBLICITY

Special references:—* **Poole,** 93-107. ♯ **Beard,** *Cross-Currents,* 1-7. **Gooch,** "Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy," in *Jour. of the British Inst. of International Affairs,* Jan. 1923. **H. E. Barnes,** "Assessing the Blame for the World War," in *Current History,* May, 1924. **P. Reinsch,** *Secret Diplomacy.* **R. S. Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* I, pt. 1, ch. ii. **Myers,** "The Control of Foreign Re-

lations," in *Am. Pol. Sci. Review,* Feb. 1917. **E. D. Morel,** "Giolitti's Bill to Abolish Secret Diplomacy," in *Foreign Affairs,* Jan. 1921. **Mowrer,** 222-237.

A. Prevalence of Secret Diplomacy.

1. Diplomatic archives not usually open to public until many years after events have occurred.
2. Universal policy of governments to publish most treaties and some diplomatic correspondence, shortly after the event, but to withhold documents and information which might interfere with negotiations.
3. Movements of troops and warships often secret.
4. Many important facts about military and naval preparation, necessary for an accurate estimation of probabilities of success in war, usually withheld from public.
5. Governments themselves often ill-informed (U. S. and secret treaties).
6. Problem—would complete publicity be possible? expedient?

B. Reasons for Secrecy.

1. Some information derived through spies and other secret or confidential agencies.
2. Some negotiations considered to be too delicate for popular debate.
3. Danger of misunderstanding, or excitement, or uncompromising attitude, on the part of the people.
4. Danger of offending other nations, if frank popular discussion is permitted.
5. Danger that neither side will compromise, if its yielding is to be discussed in the press and perhaps interpreted as sign of weakness.
6. Natural inclination of diplomats and officials to enjoy esoteric character of their functions.

C. The Agitation Against Secret Diplomacy.

1. Influence of organizations such as Union of Democratic Control in England, against secret diplomacy.
2. Wilson's declaration in Fourteen Points speech—"I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."
3. Continuation of agitation since the war, and widespread popular feeling that "secret diplomacy" is wrong.
4. Desire of press to obtain as much news as possible.

D. Arguments of Opponents of Secret Diplomacy.

1. Secret diplomacy undemocratic.
2. Secret diplomacy dangerous.

(i) Danger of secret alliances, understandings, and ententes, such as British secret promise to defend French coast, Aug. 2, 1914. (*Cf.* Part 5.)

(ii) Danger of aggressive action under veil of secrecy, as in case of inter-Allied secret treaties, signed during Great War, for dismemberment of enemy countries. (*Cf.* Part 6.)

3. Secret diplomacy immoral.

(i) Dishonesty of secret promises contrary to public declarations.

(ii) Selfish greed and disregard of others' rights often masked by secrecy.

E. Discussion of Problem.

III. PRESS, PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION

Special references:—* **Poole,** 30-4, 170-4, 184-9. *These Eventful Years,* I, ch. 17. ‡ **Lowell,** *Public Opinion in War and Peace,* chs. ii-v. **W. Lippmann,** *Stakes of Diplomacy,* ch. xv. ‡ **Lippmann,** *Liberty and the News.* ‡ **Lippmann,** *"Test of the News"* in *New Republic,* supplement, Aug. 4, 1920. ‡ **Lippmann,** *Public Opinion.* ‡ **Mowrer,** 124-139. **Burns,** ch. vi. **Neilson,** chs. ix-xi. ‡ **Bryce,** *Modern Democracies,* ch. xv. **Angell,** *The Press and the Organization of Society.* **Higham,** *Looking Forward: Mass Education through Publicity.* **B. Russell,** *Free Thought and Official Propaganda.* **L. M. Salmon,** *The Newspaper and Authority.* **E. D. Martin,** *The Behavior of Crowds,* ch. i. **L. Perla,** *What Is National Honor?* **C. E. Schieber,** *American Sentiment Towards Germany 1870-1914.* *Encyclopædia Britannica,* "Propaganda," XXXII, 176 ff. **Campbell Stuart,** *The Secrets of Crewe House.* **G. Demartial,** *La Guerre de 1914: Comment on mobilisa les consciences.* **E. H. Reisner,** *Nationalism and Education.* **Zimmern,** *Nationality and Government,* chs. v-vi. **T. Alexander,** *The Prussian Elementary Schools.* **J. L. Langdon-Davies,** *Militarism in Education.* **Partridge, G.,** *The Psychology of Nations,* pt. 2, chs. v-vi. **Martin,** *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston.* **M. Wertheimer,** *The Pan-German League.* Compare Part 6, VI-C.

A. The Press and International Relations.

1. Tremendous power of the daily and periodical press in molding public opinion.
2. Increasing attention given to foreign affairs by larger journals.
3. Indifference of most smaller journals and of reading public.
4. Some defects of the press.

(*a*) Rumors and errors.

Numerous premature reports of death of Kaiser, of Lenin, of Villa.

Premature news of armistice in Nov., 1918.

Premature announcement of mobilization in German press, 1914.

Frequent rumors introduced with the phrase, "A high official informs me"; "It is semi-officially stated that. . ."; "I have it on good authority that. . . ." Use of such formulas to advance views of foreign offices.

(*b*) Sins of omission.

Deliberate suppression of news in some cases, and censorship in war time.

Normal tendency of press to print matter that has "news value" or "human interest" and to suppress less interesting, but perhaps more important news.

Inevitable ignorance regarding secret diplomacy.

Accounts of outbreak of war in 1914 as an illustration of incompleteness of information offered by press.

(*c*) Prejudice and partisanship.

Frank partisanship of most newspapers and many magazines.

Tendency of correspondents of newspapers to introduce partisanship into news dispatches by choice of adjectives, by introductory "interpretation" of the news, by sarcasm, by omitting facts contrary to their own or editor's views.

Influence of cartoons in giving prejudiced and distorted view of news.

(*d*) Influence of business interests.

Coloring and selection of news by news agencies.

Editors' fear of printing news which will antagonize readers, diminish circulation, or alienate advertisers.

Occasional interference of financial backers, owners, or advertisers, with editorial policy.

B. Other Agencies of Information and Misinformation.

1. Government publications.

(*a*) Publication of treaties and of some diplomatic notes as a regular practice of most governments—value of U. S. *Treaty Series; Foreign Relations; British and Foreign State Papers;* British *Command Papers;* French *Yellow Books,* etc.

(*b*) Tendency of governmental publications, especially in war, to distort the facts.

(i) Sins of omission, examples:

Incompleteness of *German White Book,* which purported to contain the truth about the outbreak of the Great War, but omitted incriminating documents.

Publication of innocuous agreement by France and England in 1904, but non-publication of secret articles regarding Egypt and Morocco (see above, Part 3).

Non-publication of secret treaties defining war aims by Allies during Great War.

(ii) Exaggerations.

Italian note to Turkey, Sept. 28, 1911, claiming that economic development of Tripoli was "a vital interest of the very first order" to Italy.

German official statements since the Peace Conference, exaggerating Germany's inability to pay reparations.

Official communiqués regarding "victories."

(iii) Errors.

Premier Giolitti's statement (Dec. 5, 1914) that Austria proposed attack on Serbia in August, 1913 (really July, 1913, see Pribram, *Secret Treaties,* II, 176).

Error of date in French *Yellow Book* concerning outbreak of Great War.

(iv) Deliberate misrepresentation.

German official statement in *White Book* of 1914 that France had attacked Germany.

Napoleon's untruthful bulletins regarding battles, etc.
Bismarck's modification of the Ems telegram.

(*c*) Contrast between unfairly selected and scanty documents published during the war, and later publications such as the Russian documents, the *Grosse Politik* series (German official documents), and the Austrian documents.

2. Politicians and statesmen.
   (*a*) Tendency of all public speakers to exaggerate, overstate, oversimplify the facts.
   (*b*) Tendency to appeal to emotion and prejudice by means of catchwords, slogans, and "oratory."
   (*c*) Tendency to tell the public what it wants to hear and to avoid unpleasant facts.
   (*d*) Distortion of facts by personal and partisan views.
   (*e*) Occasional deliberate falsification by unscrupulous politicians.
3. Military and naval officers.
   (*a*) Tendency of some officers to give unduly pessimistic views of international relations, in order to emphasize need of increased armaments.
   (*b*) Psychological effect of continual planning for war with any possible opponent; tendency of officers to speak and think as if war were imminent—example, Bernhardi.
   (*c*) False impressions thus created, often unintentionally.
4. Private organizations.
   (*a*) Importance and diversity of organizations.
      (i) Army and Navy Leagues, National Security League, and their counterparts in foreign countries, agitating for increased armament.
      (ii) Pacifist and antimilitarist organizations.
      (iii) Missionary propaganda, relating to colonies, Turkey, China, etc.
      (iv) Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico; Council of Foreign Bondholders, and similar organizations of powerful economic interests.
      (v) Political parties.
   (*b*) Injustice of condemning all such "propaganda"; necessity of propaganda in formation of public opinion.
   (*c*) Importance of knowing the special interests or ulterior motives, if any, which an organization represents, before giving credence to its propaganda.
5. Attempts to use schools, colleges, and universities as agencies of propaganda.
   (*a*) Important function of educational institutions in laying foundations for future public opinion by supplying general views and principles to rising generation.
   (*b*) Tendency of most teachers to inculcate patriotism; but of some to teach pacifism.
   (*c*) Tendency of politicians and of public, in some cases, to insist on teaching of nationalism, glorification of past wars, perpetuation of traditional national enmities.
6. Foreign propaganda agencies.

(*a*) American propaganda against German autocracy during Great War.
(*b*) British, French, German propaganda in U. S. during the War.
(*c*) Circulation of pamphlets and news bulletins by foreign agencies such as French Bureau of Information in U. S. even in peace times.
(*d*) Propaganda, chiefly by speeches, as a function of foreign ambassadors.
(*e*) Worldwide Bolshevik propaganda.
(*f*) Importance of remembering that foreign propaganda is conducted chiefly to serve the interests of the government conducting it.

C. Psychological and Other Obstacles to Intelligent Public Opinion.

1. Lack of accurate information.
   (*a*) Secrecy of much diplomacy (above).
   (*b*) Incompleteness and inaccuracy of press information (above).
   (*c*) Distortion of facts by propaganda (above).
   (*d*) Difficulty of knowing what to select from vast amount of governmental and private publications, good and bad, on international relations; especially on economic aspects.
2. Popular indifference to accurate information; tendency to ask for opinions rather than facts.
3. Lack of sufficient education, particularly in foreign languages, recent history, and economics, on the part of the majority of the common people, to afford a basis for intelligent opinion on complicated international affairs.
4. Inferior mentality of some, and mediocre mentality of many, as an insuperable obstacle to intelligent comprehension of international relations.
5. Tendency of ill-informed persons to over-simplify foreign problems, through ignorance of details.
6. Fondness for catchwords and slogans:—"democracy," "autocracy," "no entangling alliances," "Huns," "Hang the Kaiser," "Gott strafe England," "Yellow Peril," etc.
7. Emotionalism—tendency to be swayed by likes and dislikes, by excitement, anger, fear, and pride, regardless of facts and logic.
8. Herd instinct—tendency of human beings to think and feel what their neighbors think and feel, especially in time of warlike excitement.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

Special references:—* **Poole**, 41-55, 143-69, 170-97, 61-63. * **McBain and Rogers**, *New Constitutions of Europe*, ch. vii. ‡ **W. Lippmann**, *Stakes of Diplomacy*, chs. i-ii, xv-xvi. * **Walsh**, 13-21. **R. W. Seton-Watson** and others, *The War and Democracy*, ch. vi. ‡ **Heatley**, 51-68 and appendices. **Burns**, ch. vi. **Chow**, *Le Contrôle parlementaire de la politique étrangère*. **J. Barthélemy**, *Démocratie et Politique étrangère*. **P. Q. Wright**, *Control of American Foreign Relations*. **Foster**, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, chs. xii-xiii. **Mowrer**, 100-111. **Young**, *Diplomacy Old and New*. **Ponsonby**, *Democracy and Diplomacy*. **Ponsonby**, *Parliament and Foreign Policy*. Other publications of **Union for Democratic**

Control, especially nos. 1, 3, 19b, 46b, etc. **G. L. Dickinson,** "Democratic Control of Foreign Policy" in *Atlantic Monthly,* Aug. 1916. **Myers,** "The Control of Foreign Relations" in *Am. Pol. Sci. Review,* Feb. 1917. **Lodge,** "Foreign Relations of the United States," in *Foreign Affairs,* June 1924. **E. S. Corwin,** *The President's Control of Foreign Relations.*

A. Parliamentary Control.

1. Struggle for parliamentary control of foreign policy, originally between parliaments and monarchs, now chiefly between parliaments and cabinets.
2. Advantages and disadvantages of entrusting foreign policy to a president or a cabinet.
   (*a*) Advantage of having one man or a small body to represent the nation, act as spokesman, take prompt action in emergencies, conduct negotiations.
   (*b*) Danger of delay, partisan strife, and inexpert opinion if foreign policy is controlled largely by legislature.
   (*c*) Danger of excessive secrecy, or personal ambition, or rash judgment, or unrepresentative policies, if foreign relations are controlled by president or cabinet.
3. Parliamentary control in European practice.
   (*a*) Almost universal rule that negotiations are conducted by cabinet, particularly by premier and foreign minister.
   (*b*) Almost universal practice of allowing ministry to keep delicate negotiations secret.
   (*c*) Provisions in many constitutions giving legislature sole right to declare war and peace.
   (*d*) Communication of much secret information to legislatures in secret sessions or committee meetings, especially in France.
   (*e*) Agitation for parliamentary control in England (The Union of Democratic Control).
   (*f*) General result—foreign affairs conducted as a rule by cabinets, without much interference with details by parliaments, but occasional overturns of cabinets by parliaments.
4. Congressional control in American practice.
   (*a*) Conduct of negotiations, drafting of treaties, and appointment of diplomatic representatives by President (and his subordinate, the Secretary of State).
   (*b*) Declaration of war by Congress.
   (*c*) Ratification of treaties and confirmation of diplomatic appointments by Senate.
   (*d*) Inevitable friction between President and Senate.
      (i) John Hay's statement, "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall, but one thing is certain, it will never leave the arena alive."
      (ii) Washington's friction with Senate (**Wright,** op. cit., 361).
      (iii) Wilson's controversy with Senate over Treaty of Versailles.
      (iv) Reasons for such chronic friction.

(*e*) Large area of discretion left to President—negotiations, use of naval and military forces for "demonstrations" not technically regarded as war, decision on policies which may lead to war.

5. Indirect parliamentary or congressional control of foreign policy through power of Parliament or Congress to refuse to pass legislation necessary to carry out treaties or agreements—*e.g.*, necessity of legislation by German Reichstag to fulfil Dawes Plan.

B. Direct Popular Control.

(*a*) Certain treaties subject to approval by popular referendum in Switzerland.
(*b*) Proposal for compulsory referendum before declaration of war.
(*c*) Practical difficulties of direct popular voting on foreign affairs.
(*d*) Advantages.

C. Indirect Popular Control—the Question of Votes.

1. Desire of politicians to secure election or reëlection; hence adoption of foreign policies which will win votes.
2. Theoretical advantage of this fact, from democratic viewpoint.
3. Practical limitations.
   (*a*) Frequent reversal of policy by politicians after election.
      (i) Wilson's reëlection in 1916 on peace platform: "He kept us out of war."
      (ii) Harding's failure to create "association of nations."
      (iii) Lloyd George's election (1918) victory as advocate of big indemnity, and his later advocacy of reduced indemnity.
   (*b*) Tendency of voters to be swayed by emotion, prejudice, partisanship, ignorance, etc. (above, III-C).
   (*c*) Confusion of issues in elections (below, V).

D. Limitations Imposed by Tradition and Conservatism.

1. Importance of traditional and historic policies in controlling views of politicians and people alike, examples:
   (*a*) The Monroe Doctrine.
   (*b*) Washington's Farewell Address and "no entangling alliances."
   (*c*) Britain's historic policy of "splendid isolation" as a barrier to Continental alliances.
   (*d*) Traditions of the American Revolution as an obstacle to any "English-speaking alliance."
   (*e*) French policy of the Rhine frontier.
2. Permanent officials in foreign offices, nominally under control of the non-permanent foreign minister, but often actually very influential in maintaining traditional policies.

E. Secrecy of Diplomacy as an Obstacle to Popular Control (above, II).

V. DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS

Special references:—* Poole, 152-4, 175-80. * Hayes, *Modern Europe*, II, 853-862. * Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, Bk. 4, ch. iii. ‡ Mowrer,

112-123. **C. R. Fish,** *American Diplomacy,* chs. 36-8. **W. Hines,** "Peace Agencies and Politics" and **Wickersham,** "The Senate and Our Foreign Relations" in *Foreign Affairs,* Dec. 1923. **H. C. Lodge,** "Foreign Relations of the United States" and **E. M. House,** "America in World Affairs," in *Foreign Affairs,* June, 1924. Also general references above and references for topic IV above.

A. Reaction of Foreign Relations on Domestic Politics.

1. In elections—candidates may be elected or defeated by margin of voters whose choice is determined by foreign policy, although domestic policies may be more important.
   (*a*) Republican victory of 1920, in which League issue helped to assure victory for high tariff, altered labor policy, and other domestic policies.
   (*b*) Lloyd George Coalition victory in British elections of 1918 due largely to question of reparations, yet decisive also for domestic policies for four years.
2. In European cabinet crises—cabinets often overturned on questions of foreign policy, although domestic policies are thereby disturbed.
   (*a*) Overthrow of Briand cabinet by Poincaré in 1922, solely on matter of foreign policy.
   (*b*) German cabinet crises since 1919 largely due to foreign policy.
3. In danger of war.
   (*a*) Great activity of advocates of larger armament.
   (*b*) Overshadowing of domestic by foreign policy.
4. In war.
   (*a*) Almost complete subordination of domestic to war policies.
   (*b*) Tendency toward party truce—in European countries.
      (i) "Union sacrée" of all parties in France during Great War.
      (ii) Party truce, and later Coalition, in England during Great War.
      (iii) Temporary reconciliation of hostile parties even in Germany and Russia at outbreak of war in 1914.
5. Reaction of foreign affairs on domestic problems, hence indirectly on politics.
   (*a*) Creation of heavy financial burdens by wars and armaments; hence, increased importance of finance and tax measures in domestic politics.
   (*b*) Creation of economic problems by wars or international crises which disturb foreign markets and exchanges; hence, effect on domestic politics.
      (i) Expansion of European demand for American agricultural products during Great War, and later contraction, resulting in hardship for farmers, and, indirectly, "Farmers' Bloc" in Congress.
      (ii) Unemployment's effects on post-war British politics.
   (*c*) In the United States, reaction of European crises and wars on immigrant population and problem of Americanization.
      (i) Example—German sympathies of German-Americans during Great War.
      (ii) Nationalistic agitation of Italian, Polish, Czech, Greek,

etc., minorities in United States during Great War and Peace Conference.

(iii) Consequent intensification of movement for "Americanization," "100% Americanism," etc.

B. Reaction of Domestic on Foreign Policies.

1. Foreign policies of United States determined by President and Congress, in whose election domestic issues such as tariff, labor, taxes, trusts, etc., have played important, sometimes decisive, rôles.
2. Foreign policies of European governments determined by cabinets in whose choice domestic politics may have been deciding factor.
3. Discontent with heavy taxes sometimes a cause of radical modification of foreign policy.
   (*a*) Discontent of British taxpayers in 1913-14 an important reason for British efforts to conciliate Germany and British proposal of limitation of navies.
   (*b*) Heavy taxes after Great War a reason for British grant of "independence" to Mesopotamia and Egypt, to save military expense.
4. Conservatism and radicalism.
   (*a*) Frequent, almost universal, identification of radicalism and socialism in domestic affairs with pacifism and internationalism; hence, tendency of conservatives to regard the latter as "socialistic" and "revolutionary."
   (*b*) Similar association of conservatism and monarchism with nationalism and militarism; hence, tendency of liberals, radicals, and socialists to oppose nationalism and militarism as "reactionary," "autocratic," "undemocratic."
   (*c*) Problem: is there any essential connection between socialism and internationalism, democracy and peace, autocracy and war?

C. Foreign Relations Planks in Party Platforms (comparison of Democratic, Republican, and Progressive platforms may be assigned as a research topic).

VI. DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE

Special references:—* **Poole**, 35-9. ‡ **Potter**, 317-35. **Sir E. Satow**, *Diplomatic Practice*, II, 1-211, and *International Congresses*. **Temperley**, VI, 563-5. **Hicks**, *The New World Order*, ch. xiv. **Sir M. Hankey**, *Diplomacy by Conference*, also printed in *Round Table*, XI, 287-311.

A. Historical Background—to 1914.

1. Development of modern diplomacy chiefly as a system of bilateral negotiations conducted by ambassadors and ministers.
2. Occasional meeting of international peace conferences—Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Paris, Berlin, etc.
3. Metternich's attempt to make frequent conferences of the Great Powers a dominating factor of European diplomacy.
4. Occasional conferences to deal with special subjects, continuing the tradition of "the concert of Europe," for example:

London Conference on Luxemburg, 1867.
London Conference on Black Sea, 1871.
Berlin Conference on Near East, 1878.
Berlin Conference on Africa, 1884-5.
1899 Hague Conference.
1906 Algeciras Conference.
1907 Second Hague Conference.
1909 London Conference on maritime law.
1913 London Conference on Near East.
1914 Failure of proposals for conference on Serajevo incident.

B. Increased Tendency to Use Conference Method During and Since the War.

1. During the war:
   The Inter-Allied Conference of Paris, 1917.
   The Supreme War Council.
2. Diplomacy by conference as a notable feature of the post-bellum period.
   (*a*) The Peace Conference.
   (*b*) The League Assembly, League Council, and subsidiary conferences.
   (*c*) The International Labor Conference.
   (*d*) The "continuation conferences" of premiers and of ambassadors.
   (*e*) The Washington Conference on Arms and the Far East.
   (*f*) The Genoa Economic Conference.
3. Advantages of diplomacy by conference.
   (*a*) Avoidance of mechanical difficulties of coding, cabling, and decoding instructions to and reports from ambassadors.
   (*b*) Direct conduct of negotiations, in important conferences, by heads of states instead of diplomatic representatives with less authority.
   (*c*) Possibility of simultaneous negotiations among a number of states in conference, contrasted with bilateral nature of ordinary diplomatic intercourse.
   (*d*) Conferences as a means of bringing statesmen into intimate relations of cooperation, frankness, conciliation (but sometimes conflict).
4. Some criticisms of diplomacy by conference.
   (*a*) Large conferences unwieldy—*e.g.*, Genoa Conference; Peace Conference.
   (*b*) Conferences successful only if agenda are carefully prepared and participants desirous of agreement.
   (*c*) Tendency of frequent conferences of Premiers since the War to consume time of governmental leaders, and discuss many subjects but agree on few.
   (*d*) Public expects results. Hence tendency of statesmen to announce achievement of agreement "in principle" when there is really no agreement.

VII. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND EFFICIENCY

Special references:—* **Poole,** 20-8, 73-82. ‡ **Mowrer,** 312-348. ‡ **National Civil Service Reform League,** *Report on the Foreign Service.*

G. Hunt, *The Department of State of the United States, Its History and Functions.* **U. S. Dept. of State,** *History of the Department of State* (1901); *A Short Account of the Department of State.* **Id.,** *The Department of State: personnel and organization.* **Swiggett, G. L.,** *Training for Foreign Service.* **J. B. Moore,** *Principles of American Diplomacy.* **G. Young,** *Diplomacy Old and New.* **Ward and Gooch,** *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* III, ch. viii. **Satow,** *Diplomatic Practice,* Bk. II.

A. Aristocrats or Democrats.

1. Diplomacy as an aristocratic profession; virtual monopoly of higher offices in European diplomacy by noblemen until very recent times.
2. The movement in England for equal opportunities of advancement, as a step toward democratization of the foreign service.
3. Growth of democratic government as a factor opposed to aristocratic diplomacy.
4. Spread of republicanism, and abolition of numerous monarchical courts, as a factor making for more democratic diplomacy.
5. Democracy in the American foreign service.
   (*a*) Absence of any titled aristocracy in America, but tendency to appoint wealthy men as ambassadors and ministers.
   (*b*) Need of private fortune to supplement inadequate salaries.
   (*c*) Aristocratic social functions of ambassadors in European capitals.

B. Amateurs or Experts.

1. European preference for experts.
   (*a*) General European practice of appointing to important posts men who have had considerable experience in subordinate diplomatic positions.
   (*b*) Large number of European diplomatists who have made diplomacy a life career.
   (*c*) Recent tendency to employ financial, geographical and other experts as advisers or as delegates to special conferences.
2. Predominance of amateurs in American diplomacy.
   (*a*) The spoils system, and resulting appointment of ambassadors and ministers who frequently have had no diplomatic experience.
      (i) Contrast with the European practice.
      (ii) Alleged advantages—greater harmony between the Administration and its foreign representatives; ability and prestige of amateurs such as Walter H. Page.
      (iii) Alleged disadvantages—diplomatic inexperience and ignorance as handicaps in dealing with trained diplomatists.
      (iv) Importance of legation and embassy secretaries and attachés, who supply some of the experience and technical knowledge which ambassadors or ministers may lack.
   (*b*) Presidents and secretaries of state—as a rule in recent times amateurs in diplomacy.
   (*c*) The Department of State.
      (i) Importance as source of instructions to representatives abroad; clearing house for reports of the latter; chief source of advice for President and Secretary of State.

(ii) Tendency of the Department in recent times to employ increasing number of expert assistants.

(iii) Inadequate salaries, political control, and insecurity of office as obstacles to efficiency.

(*d*) Proposed reforms of American foreign service.

(i) Increased salaries for diplomatic representatives and State Department officials.

(ii) Improvement and extension of examination and merit system, to secure more permanency of career and equal opportunity for advancement.

(iii) Emancipation of the foreign service from the spoils system.

(iv) Better organization of Department of State.

(v) Increased facilities in universities or special schools of foreign service for training of future diplomatists.

VIII. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMACY

Special references:—* Poole, 55-9. ‡ Fisk and Peirce, *International Commercial Policies,* chs. xiii-xv and bibliography there given.

A. Significance of Economic Factors in Modern International Relations (see Part 8, above).

B. Diplomatic and Quasi-Diplomatic Economic Services.

1. Economic-diplomatic functions of presidents, premiers, secretaries of state, ambassadors and ministers—negotiations regarding reparations, war debts, and loans; commercial treaties; concessions and economic spheres of influence.
2. The consular service—tendency of leading nations to improve and extend consular services, in order to promote trade.
3. Increasing number of trade advisers, trade commissioners, commercial attachés.
4. The problem of organizing and coördinating such services most effectively; wide range of methods and systems employed by different countries.

IX. GENERAL DISCUSSION

A. Importance of Diplomacy.

1. As the means of contact between governments.
2. As the means of protecting citizens abroad.
3. As the means of protecting and extending foreign trade and investment.
4. As the means of realizing political aspirations.
5. As a means of preventing international conflict.

B. Changing Conditions of Diplomacy.

1. Growth of democracy, making diplomacy less a matter of court intrigue, and more a matter of politics.

2. Growth of the press and publicity, making diplomacy less a matter of personal charm and secret bargaining, and more a matter of mass psychology.
3. Improved communications (especially telegraph, cable, and wireless) facilitating speedy transmission of instructions from home government and reports from ambassadors, and hence enhancing the political factor and diminishing the personal factor.
4. Increasing tendency to deal with important matters by conference or through the League of Nations, instead of through ambassadors and ministers.
5. Increasing volume and technicality of diplomatic work, due to growth of international economic relations, increased foreign travel, elaboration of international law, establishment of multifarious international organizations and agreements; hence, increasing tendency to employ specialists and experts, and to relegate technical problems to technical conferences.

C. Some Limitations of Diplomatic Statesmanship.

1. Restriction by historic policies and traditions (above, IV-D).
2. Restriction by public opinion and politics (above IV, V).
3. Restriction by doctrine of sovereignty; necessity of obtaining voluntary consent of other nations for most international agreements.
4. Difficulty of securing harmony amidst clash of opposing national interests—rival territorial aspirations, conflicting imperialist aims, controversies over concessions and raw materials, etc.
5. Danger that diplomacy will be overruled by "yellow press," popular excitement and "military necessity" in crises.

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PART TEN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, THE LEAGUE, AND THE WORLD COURT

General references:—**J. W. Hughan,** *International Government.* **P. M. Brown,** *International Society.* **C. D. Burns,** *International Politics.* **R. S. Bourne** (ed.), *Towards an Enduring Peace.* **S. P. Duggan** (ed.), *League of Nations.* **F. C. Hicks,** *The New World Order.* **P. B. Potter,** *Introduction to the Study of International Organization.* **H. W. V. Temperley** (ed.), *History of the Peace Conference of Paris,* II, 21-31, VI, 426-582. **E. Krehbiel,** *Nationalism, War and Society.* **F. S. Marvin,** *Evolution of World Peace.* **J. A. Hobson,** *Towards International Government.* **L. S. Woolf,** *International Government.*

I. BASIC ELEMENTS IN THE PROBLEM

A. National Sovereignty.

Special references:—* **Hicks,** ch. i. * **Potter,** 3-20. **Duggan,** 161-183. **Willoughby,** *Nature of the State,* ch. ix. **W. W. Willoughby and C. G. Fenwick,** *Types of Restricted Sovereignty.* **H. J. Laski,** *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty.* **Oppenheim,** *International Law,* Part I, ch. i, sec. i; **Lawrence,** *International Law,* 47 ff., 115 ff.; or other textbooks on international law and political theory.

1. Juristic development of the theory of national sovereignty and independence.
2. National sentiment as a potent stimulus to the theory of absolute sovereignty.
3. Absolute national sovereignty as a limit on development of international organization.
   (*a*) Non-coercive and relatively ineffective character of international law, in a world of sovereign states obeying no superior; contrast with other forms of law.
   (*b*) Tendency of nationalists to repudiate proposals for international organization as attacks on sovereignty.
4. Some criticisms of the doctrine of sovereignty.
   (*a*) Difficulty of applying principle of absolute sovereignty to actual status of states (see Part 1, I-A).
   (*b*) Contention that concept of national sovereignty is unreal, since in actual life we obey many limited sovereignties—private organizations, religious authority, economic control, local government, etc.
   (*c*) Contention that since economic life and culture are partly international, sovereignty should also be partly international, partly national.

B. The Tendency Toward Internationalism.

Special references:—* Krehbiel, 141-5. ‡ Hayes, *Modern Europe*, II, 679-87. Burns, *International Intercourse*. Woolf. Hobson. Other references given above.

1. Internationalism of commerce and finance and labor agitation (Part 8), reflected in international management of international means of communication, international labor legislation, agreements concerning copyrights, industrial property, etc. (below, IV, and VIII).
2. Cultural internationalism—science, education, literature, art, music, travel, religion.
3. Military and naval internationalism—substitution of military alliances for military self-sufficiency, by most Great Powers, before 1914, and close military cooperation during Great War.
4. Humanitarian internationalism—necessity of international cooperation to deal with disease, drugs, white slave traffic, etc. (below, IV).
5. Political internationalism—similarity of many political institutions, of many political issues, of some political parties (notably Socialism).
6. Legal internationalism—tendency toward development of international law and justice (below, IX, X).
7. Governmental internationalism—development of many forms of international cooperation by governments in recent times (below, IV).
8. Pacifist internationalism—tendency to seek in internationalism the remedy for war.

C. The Problem of International Organization as the Result of Conflict and Compromise Between A and B.

II. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE AND POLITICAL COOPERATION

Special references:—* Hughan, 30-41, 107-110. * Hayes, *Modern Europe*, II, 679-82. ‡ Hicks, 23-33. ‡ Potter, 417-437. W. A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*. Satow, *International Congresses*. R. Doré, *Essai d'une bibliographie des congrès internationaux*. A. P. Higgins, *The Hague Peace Conferences and other International Conferences*.

A. Nature of the Concert of Europe—Coöperation of European Great Powers Without Any Formal Obligations or Covenant.

B. Origins.

1. The Concert as a continuation, in an informal manner, of the Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance.
2. The traditional unity of Christendom as a basis of the Concert.
3. The homogeneity of European civilization as a basis of the Concert.
4. Desire to prevent general war by dealing unitedly with disturbances of status quo, especially in Near East.

C. Methods.

1. Irregular international conferences, including Great Powers and sometimes smaller powers, to deal with crises or specific subjects, *e.g.*—

(*a*) Berlin Congress of 1878 to deal with Near East.
(*b*) Berlin Conference of 1884-5 to deal with central Africa.
(*c*) Algeciras Conference of 1906 to deal with Morocco.
(*d*) London Conference of 1912-13 to deal with Balkan Wars.

2. Occasional joint diplomatic intervention by Great Powers, examples:
   (*a*) Joint notes to Turkey regarding treatment of Christians.
   (*b*) Joint declaration in 1912 forbidding Balkan nations to annex Turkish territory.
3. Joint armed intervention, examples:
   (*a*) Joint expedition to suppress Boxer uprising.
   (*b*) Joint naval demonstration to prevent Montenegro from annexing Scutari in 1913.
4. Treaty guarantees of neutrality, or international status for certain regions.
   (*a*) International guarantee of Belgium's neutrality.
   (*b*) International neutralization of Congo basin.

D. Conspicuous Services of the Concert.

1. Prevention of war in numerous cases.
   Crisis after Peace of San Stefano, 1878.
   Morocco crisis of 1905.
   Balkan crisis of 1912-13.
2. Development of international cooperation along certain lines (see below, IV).

E. Weakness of the Concert.

1. Inability to prevent numerous wars—Crimean War, Austro-Prussian War against Denmark, Seven Weeks' War, Franco-Prussian War, Russo-Turkish War, Spanish-American War, Boer War, Tripolitan War, Balkan Wars, Great War.
2. Tendency to disregard justice and interests of weak nations in effort to preserve peace among Great Powers by selfish compromises—example: Berlin Congress of 1878.
3. Inability to act quickly for prevention of conflict—the 1914 crisis.
4. Lack of continuous conference and of administrative organs.
5. Inherent difficulty of attempting to preserve harmony while militarism, imperialism, nationalism, and secret diplomacy were rampant and generally regarded as legitimate.

F. The Balance of Power within the Concert.

1. Meaning of the Balance of Power.
2. Reasons for British desire for Balance of Power, before the War.
3. Argument for the Balance of Power as a safeguard of peaceful Concert.
4. Danger of the Balance of Power—rivalry, suspicion, and panicky anxiety, as between rival coalitions.
5. Outbreak of the Great War in 1914 as proof of the instability and peril of a Balance between armed coalitions.

G. Small Powers and the Concert.

H. The Concert Since the War.

1. Disruption of the old Concert by the War.
2. The League of Nations as a more inclusive and stronger Concert (below).
3. Continuation of close relations and conferences among Allies as an attempt to perpetuate a concert within the Concert.

III. THE CONCERT OF AMERICA—THE PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCES

Special references:—* **Harley,** 15-17. **J. B. Lockey,** *Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings* (with bibliography). ‡ **J. Barrett,** *The Pan-American Union.* ‡ **J. H. Latané,** *From Isolation to Leadership,* ch. viii. **Latané,** *United States and Latin America.* **Robertson, W. S.,** *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States.* **D. Y. Thomas,** *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine.* **G. Stuart,** *Latin America and the United States.* **J. B. Moore,** *Principles of American Diplomacy.* Also references in Part 3, XIV.

A. Origin and Development.

1. Secretary Blaine's plan for a conference, 1881.
2. The First Conference of American States (Washington, 1889) and the creation of a Bureau of American Republics.
3. The Second Conference (Mexico City, 1901) and the treaty for compulsory arbitration of financial claims.
4. The Third Conference (Rio de Janeiro 1906) and the extension of the treaty.
5. The Fourth Conference (Buenos Ayres, 1910) and the Pan-American Union.
6. The Fifth Conference (Santiago, 1923) and the treaty for postponement of war until after investigation and report by an international commission.
7. Pan-American financial and scientific conferences.

B. Service in Promoting Solidarity and Preventing Conflicts.

C. Desire of Numerous Publicists that the Conference Should Develop into a Stronger Union, an American League of Nations.

D. Suspicious Attitude of Some Latin-American Governments Toward U. S.—an Obstacle to Solidarity.

E. Relation to League of Nations.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR NON-POLITICAL PURPOSES—TO 1920

References:—* **Poole,** 83-90. * **Hughan,** 89-102. ‡ **Potter,** 267-88. ‡ **Hicks,** 188-97. **Woolf,** *International Government.* **Reinsch,** *Public International Unions.* **Sayre,** *Experiments in International Administration.* **Chamberlain,** *Régime of International Rivers.* **League of Nations,** *Handbook of International Organizations.* **P. Bruneau,** *Le rôle du haut commandement au point de vue économique.*

A. General Causes.

1. Growing intimacy and complexity of international business and social relations, especially since development of steam and electricity in 19th century.
2. Necessity of some degree of joint regulation of international public utilities such as rivers, railways, telegraphs, etc.
3. Necessity of joint action to protect certain forms of property, trade marks, patents, patent rights, copyrights.
4. Necessity of joint action to control social evils such as slave trade, narcotic drugs, infectious and contagious diseases, etc.
5. Necessity for joint action in miscellaneous other matters, such as postal service, monetary exchanges, common weights and measures, collection and dissemination of international information regarding agriculture and other subjects.

B. Variety of Methods.

1. International bureaux or offices for collection and distribution of information, without other administrative functions. Example—International Institute of Agriculture.
2. International conferences, bureaux, or commissions to propose measures for concerted or uniform action by separate national governments. Example—International Labor Organization (below, VIII).
3. Genuine international administration by means of permanent international bureaux, offices, or commissions, executing international agreements, sometimes making and administering rules, transacting regular business, collecting and disbursing funds, etc. Example—International Postal Union.

C. Some Significant Types of Cooperation.

1. International administration of territory.
   (*a*) Unsuccessful and unimportant condominiums in Samoa, New Hebrides, etc.
   (*b*) Temporary joint sovereignty of Allied and Associated Powers over Memel, former German colonies, and other ceded territories, after War.
   (*c*) Tangier, Danzig, and the Saar Basin.
   (*d*) The mandates, as instances of national administration under international supervision.
   (*e*) Relatively small extent and poor results of international territorial administration.
2. International regulation of public utilities.
   (*a*) Waterways.
      (i) International commissions for control of certain rivers (N. B., Danube and Rhine).
      (ii) International commission to control passage of warships through Dardanelles and Bosphorus (1923).
      (iii) Proposals for extension of international control over other strategic straits, canals, and rivers.
   (*b*) International regulation of certain railways.

(*c*) Communications—postal and telegraphic.
(i) Importance and success of Universal Postal Union.
(ii) Less extensive functions of International Telegraphic Union and Wireless Telegraphic Union.

3. Humanitarian reforms.
(*a*) Sanitary Union and sanitary councils for special regions.
(*b*) Opium Commission.
(*c*) Prison Congress.
(*d*) Union for Repression of White Slave Traffic.
(*e*) Conferences for suppression of slave-trade and liquor traffic in Africa.
(*f*) International Labor Organization.

4. Financial administration.
(*a*) International commissions for financial control of certain backward countries at various periods—Greece, Turkey, Egypt, China, etc.
(*b*) Financial assistance and control of Austria and Hungary by League (after 1920).
(*c*) Reparation commission.
(*d*) Movement for closer economic coöperation to regulate currencies and exchange.

5. Scientific.
(*a*) Various public international unions on technical subjects—Geodetic Union, Council for Exploration of the Sea, Association of Seismology, Hydrographic Union, etc.
(*b*) The League's Committee on Intellectual Coöperation.

6. Commercial.
(*a*) The Sugar Commission as an interesting type.
(*b*) Union for Protection of Industrial Property.
(*c*) Customs unions.
(*d*) Inter-allied commissions for control of wheat, shipping, oil, etc., during the Great War.
(*e*) Commercial importance of international control of postal and telegraphic service, waterways, etc.

D. Discussion.

1. Advantage of taking non-political subjects out of international political controversy, by confiding them to special conferences of non-political experts.
2. Distinction between such subjects and controversial political affairs not a difference of importance or value; for example—postal service important yet non-controversial as contrasted with a "political" subject, such as the debt of some small country, which may be controversial though relatively small in economic importance.
3. Remarkable success of international administration in some subjects (*e.g.*, Universal Postal Union, Danube Commission, etc.) which have been taken out of politics, as compared with poor results in territorial questions (*e.g.*, Tangier) involving political rivalry.
4. Provision of Versailles Treaty for transfer of all international bureaux and commissions to direction of League of Nations (see VII, below).

V. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION

References:—‡ **Hicks,** 280-93. ‡ **Potter,** 289-314. ‡ **Krehbiel,** 126-40. **League of Nations,** *Handbook of International Organizations.*

A. Large Number and Great Diversity of Unofficial or Private International Organizations.

B. Some Outstanding Examples.

1. Red Cross.
2. International Chamber of Commerce.
3. Socialist Internationals.
4. International trade union federation.
5. Interparliamentary Union.
6. International business organizations such as Standard Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell combination (above, Part 7).
7. Religious organizations such as Roman Catholic Church, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A.
8. Press agencies.
9. Olympic games.
10. International Institute of Bibliography.

C. Discussion.

1. Such organizations as a denial of national isolation.
2. Pacifist argument that private internationalism points way to public internationalism.
3. Historical development of private internationalism due to same general cause as public international cooperation, namely, increasing intimacy of international communications, commerce, and cultural relations.

VI. FEDERATION, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

A. The Development of Federalism.

Special references:—* **Hughan,** ch. ii. **Potter,** 438-51. **J. B. Scott,** *The United States of America, A Study in International Organization.* **Carnegie Endowment,** *Autonomy and Federation within the Empire.* **Rowell,** *The British Empire and World Peace.* Also references under I-A.

1. The idea of federalism as a voluntary delegation of certain attributes of sovereignty to a joint authority.
2. Antiquity of federalism—ancient Greek confederacies.
3. Success of federalism on a restricted scale.
   (*a*) The modern Swiss Confederation as the outgrowth of a medieval defensive league.
   (*b*) The United Provinces of the Netherlands.
   (*c*) The United States—Articles of Confederation, Constitution, and ultimate triumph of federalism over state sovereignty.
   (*d*) Establishment of federal governments in Latin America, following example of the U. S.
   (*e*) Central American Federation.

(*f*) Germany—Holy Roman Empire, Germanic Confederation, North German Confederation, German Empire, and present federal republic, as an example of federal development.

(*g*) Contemporary tendency toward federalism in British Empire, as result of Dominion self-government.

4. International alliances as cooperative groups less closely integrated.
5. Federalism in non-political affairs.
   (*a*) Illustration of federal principle in A. F. of L. and other labor organizations, and employers' organizations.
   (*b*) Federal Council of Churches.
   (*c*) Practise of federalism in multifarious other private organizations.

B. Plans for International Federation.

Special references:—* **Duggan,** 18-49 (chapter by Hayes). **Hicks,** 66-78. ‡ **Krehbiel,** 232-41. **Hughan,** 152-159. **Phillimore,** *Schemes for Maintaining General Peace.* **Bourne,** *Towards an Enduring Peace.* Bibliography in **Hicks.**

1. Sporadic proposals for international federation before 19th century.
2. Failure of peace plans after Napoleonic wars.
3. Development of organized pacifism in 19th century.
4. Large number and variety of plans advocated during Great War.
5. The League of Nations (below).
6. The Borah plan for outlawry of war, and other plans advocated since the establishment of the League of Nations.
7. Similarities and differences.
   (*a*) General agreement in seeking to substitute peaceful settlement of disputes for war.
   (*b*) Difference of opinion between advocates of judicial, diplomatic, and political settlement of disputes.
   (*c*) Wide range of opinions as to nature and extent of federal authority.
   (*d*) Difference of opinion as to equality of states.
   (*e*) Tendency of many plans to ignore fundamental causes of conflict.

VII. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A. Adoption of the League Covenant.

Special references:—* **World Peace Foundation,** vol. VII, nos. 3-4 *(Handbook on the League of Nations 1920-1924).* ‡ **R. S. Baker,** *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* I, 213-339. **House and Seymour,** *What Really Happened at Paris,* ch. 17. **Temperley,** II, 21-31; VI, 426-461. **G. L. Dickinson** (ed.), *Documents Relating to Peace Proposals.* **International Conciliation,** Nos. 131, 134, and Special Bulletin April 1919. **World Peace Foundation,** II, special number by D. P. Myers; VII, no. 1. Also references under B and C below.

1. Advocacy of a League during the War and Armistice period.
   (*a*) By President Wilson, Lord Grey, and other statesmen.
   (*b*) By the League to Enforce Peace, the League of Nations Union, and other private organizations.
   (*c*) By British Labor and the Inter-Allied Labor Conference of Feb. 1918.

2. The Covenant prior to the Peace Conference.
   (*a*) The British draft (Phillimore report).
   (*b*) Revision of the Phillimore report by House and Wilson.
   (*c*) Preparation of rival projects by Smuts, Cecil, the French government, etc.
3. The negotiations at Paris.
   (*a*) Modification of Wilson's draft, before the Conference, by inclusion of mandatory system and Council (suggested by Smuts plan) and of guarantee of equal rights for racial and religious minorities.
   (*b*) Preparation of the Hurst-Miller composite Anglo-American draft.
   (*c*) Modification of the Hurst-Miller draft by the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference.
   (*d*) Wilson's battle against attempts to sidetrack the Covenant.
   (*e*) Further modification of the Covenant, in response to criticisms by Republican leaders.
      (i) Inclusion of Monroe Doctrine.
      (ii) Provision for withdrawal.
      (iii) Exclusion of domestic questions from League's control.
   (*f*) Failure of French proposal for international general staff.
   (*g*) Inclusion of Covenant in the peace treaties.
4. Discussion.
   (*a*) The Covenant as an international compromise resulting from many plans.
   (*b*) Woodrow Wilson's leading rôle as champion, but not sole author, of the Covenant.

B. The Establishment and Operation of the League of Nations.

Special references:—* **World Peace Foundation,** *Handbook on the League of Nations;* also vol. II, special no. (**D. P. Myers,** "The Conciliation Plan . . ."), III, no. 6; IV, no. 1; V, 4 supplement (chart). **International Conciliation,** nos. 131, 134. ‡ *These Eventful Years,* I, ch. 18. **Hughan,** 170-253. **Brown,** ch. xi. **Temperley,** VI, 563-582. **Foley** (ed.), *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations.* **Pollock,** *The League of Nations.* **R. Williams,** *The League of Nations Today.* **Buxton and Conwil-Evans,** *Oppressed Peoples and the League of Nations.* **I. Fisher,** *League or War.* **Levermore,** *League of Nations Year Books.* **H. A. Gibbons,** *America's Place in the World,* ch. xiii. **League of Nations,** *Official Journal; Monthly Summary, Treaty Series,* and other official publications. * **Kellor,** *Security Against War.*

1. Establishment and membership.
   (*a*) Establishment by exchange of ratifications of treaty of Versailles, Jan. 10, 1920.
   (*b*) Gradual enlargement of membership.
      (i) "Original members"—32 members of Peace Conference, excepting United States, Ecuador, and Hedjaz.
      (ii) Admission of most other states which had been neutral in war—chief exceptions Afghanistan, Mexico.
      (iii) Admission of defeated nations—Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary.
      (iv) Inclusion of India, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Canada as separate members, and later admission of Irish Free State.

(v) Total membership in 1924—55 nations.

(vi) States remaining outside the League—United States, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Mexico, Ecuador, Afghanistan, Hedjaz, and a number of very small states (Monaco, Andorra, etc.), and semi-independent countries such as Egypt, Iceland, and Nepal, and protectorates such as Morocco.

(*c*) Provision for admission of new members (article 1).

(*d*) Agitation for inclusion of United States, Germany, and other non-members.

2. Framework of the League.

(*a*) The Covenant as the Constitution of the League.

(i) The Covenant as a treaty agreement among governments, rather than a constitution adopted by popular vote.

(ii) The Covenant as a statement of general principles, requiring subsequent interpretation and amplification, and permitting considerable elasticity in application.

(iii) Method of amendment (article 26).

(iv) Numerous amendments proposed, and several adopted by Assembly and Council (N. B., proposals to amend articles 10 and 16).

(v) Non-effectiveness of amendments until ratified by members of Council and majority of members of Assembly, as a legal consequence of nature of Covenant; and as a protection for Great Powers against more numerous small members.

(*b*) Assembly.

(i) Membership—all members of the League.

(ii) Equality of all members in voting power (cf. 1-*b*-iv above).

(iii) Meetings—annual since 1920.

(iv) Functions.

(v) Importance as forum for public discussion of general international problems.

(*c*) Council.

(i) Membership—4 Great Powers as permanent members, and 6 (originally 4) non-permanent members elected by Assembly.

(ii) Meetings—at frequent intervals, from 1 to 3 months.

(iii) Functions.

(iv) Importance as executive organ; as bulwark of interests of Great Powers; as agency for settlement of numerous specific problems and crises; as formal embodiment of Concert principle.

(*d*) Secretariat.

(i) International and expert character of personnel.

(ii) Functions.

(iii) Importance as information bureau; as staff to prepare agenda for League; as agency for developing "the international mind"; as nucleus for growth of international administrative cooperation.

(*e*) Technical organizations.

(i) Economic and financial organization.

(ii) Communications and transit organization.

(iii) International health organization.
(*f*) Committees—wide range of work.
(*g*) International Labor Organization (below, VIII).
(*h*) Permanent Court (below, X-C).

3. The League and the preservation of peace.
(*a*) Article X as a guarantee against aggression.
(i) Wilson's emphasis on article 10.
(ii) Elimination of the provision for self-determination, at the Peace Conference, making the guarantee more rigid than Wilson originally intended.
(iii) Sharp criticism and widespread popular misinterpretation of article 10 in U. S.
(iv) Practical ineffectiveness of article 10.
Polish seizure of Vilna.
Italian seizure of Corfu.
Non-applicability to French seizure of Rhur.
(v) Proposals for modification or interpretation of Article 10.
The Cecil plan for regional treaties of guaranty.
Canadian proposal to amend article 10.
The Shotwell plan for outlawry of aggressive war.
(*b*) Arbitration of justiciable disputes, and the World Court (see X below); international law as basis for art. 13.
(*c*) Investigation of non-justiciable disputes by Council or Assembly (article 15).
(i) Aaland Islands dispute.
(ii) Upper Silesia.
(iii) Polish-Lithuanian boundary dispute.
(iv) Albanian dispute with Greece and Yugoslavia.
(v) Bulgarian protest regarding border bands.
(vi) Reference of Corfu dispute to Conference of Ambassadors.
(vii) Mosul.
(viii) Inaction of Council regarding Reparation, Ruhr, and other controversies growing out of peace treaties, which were held to fall outside the League's jurisdiction.
(*d*) Penalties for resort to war without arbitration or investigation (article 16).
(i) The economic boycott.
(ii) Expulsion of the covenant-breaker.
(iii) Council to recommend what armed force shall be used.
(iv) Repugnance of small and non-European states to compulsory armed intervention or economic boycott (cf. Canadian proposal to amend article 10, above.)
(v) Tendency of Council in practice, so far, to interpret articles 10 and 16 in such a way as to avoid any attempt to apply boycott or armed intervention, for example, in case of Corfu incident.
(*e*) Provision of Covenant for application of this system to non-members.
(*f*) Right of any member to bring any dangerous circumstance before Council or Assembly for discussion (article 11).
(*g*) The Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

adopted by League Assembly, Oct. 2, 1924, and signed by ten member states (*Current History*, Nov. 1925).

(i) Aggressive war declared "an international crime."

(ii) Provision for Committees of Arbitration in addition to existing machinery of League and Permanent Court.

(iii) Definition of aggression.

(iv) More elaborate provisions regarding sanctions to be applied against aggressors.

(v) Plan for international conference on reduction of armaments, to be held June 15, 1925.

(vi) The problem of disputes arising out of "domestic" questions.

(*h*) Discussion.

(i) Greater importance of public sentiment, moral and diplomatic pressure, and opportunity for discussion, than of the letter of the Covenant, in practice, 1920-24.

(ii) Exclusion of most questions arising out of peace settlement, especially the reparation question, from League's jurisdiction, as an almost inevitable consequence of inclusion of neutral states in League; and as a reason for popular lack of confidence in League.

(iii) Success of League in settling numerous minor conflicts as a possible augury of greater services.

(iv) Nationalism, imperialism, militarism as fundamental obstacles to preservation of peace by League.

(v) Non-inclusion of United States, Germany, and Russia, as a source of weakness, deterring League from grappling with important conflicts of interest.

4. The League and armaments (compare Part 4, above).
   (*a*) Article 8 of Covenant.
   (*b*) Service of the League in collection and publication of information regarding armaments.
   (*c*) Adoption of naval ratios by Washington Arms Conference, apart from the League.
   (*d*) Efforts of the League to extend the Washington agreement to other powers (the naval conference of 1924) and to land armament.
   (*e*) Preparation of draft treaty of mutual guaranty and regional disarmament.
   (*f*) Effort to establish a treaty for suppression of arms traffic.
   (*g*) The Geneva Protocol of Oct. 2, 1924, and the plan for an international conference on reduction of armaments, to be held at Geneva, June 15, 1925.
5. Humanitarian functions (articles 23-5).
   (*a*) Restriction of opium traffic.
   (*b*) International warfare against disease.
   (*c*) Convention on white slave traffic.
   (*d*) Committee on intellectual cooperation.
   (*e*) Measures against slavery.
   (*f*) Relief of refugees and repatriation of prisoners.
   (*g*) Promotion of Red Cross.

(*h*) Labor legislation (see VIII, below).
(*i*) Provision of Covenant for transfer of all existing and future international bureaux and commissions to the direction of the League.

6. Economic functions (articles 23-4).
   (*a*) League committee and conferences on freedom of communications and transit—importance for international commerce, especially since creation of many new customs barriers by small states.
   (*b*) Financial rehabilitation of Austria, Hungary, Albania.
   (*c*) Agitation of some internationalists for League control of reparation problem, raw material apportionment, all colonies, etc.
   (*d*) See also Mandates (Part 3, XX) and Labor Organization (VIII, below).
7. The League and backward peoples.
   (*a*) The mandate system (see Part 3, XX).
   (*b*) Proposals for extension of League supervision to other colonies.
   (*c*) The League as a forum in which nations like Persia, China, etc., may voice grievances.
8. The League and diplomacy.
   (*a*) Tendency to substitute parliamentary methods for old-style diplomacy.
   (*b*) Tendency to substitute world alliance for old-style alliance groups.
   (*c*) Prohibition of secret treaties (article 18) but inability to abolish all secret diplomacy.
   (*d*) Prohibition of treaties inconsistent with Covenant.
   (*e*) Power of Assembly to recommend revision of existing treaties.
9. The League and minorities—the League as guarantor of treaties safeguarding equal rights of religious, racial, and linguistic minorities (see Part 6, VII-G).
10. The League as an administrative agency.
   (*a*) Supervision of government of Saar Basin and Danzig.
   (*b*) Supervision of mandates.
   (*c*) Humanitarian and economic administrative functions (above, 6, 7).
   (*d*) Provision of Covenant (article 24) for transfer of all international bureaux and commissions to League direction.
   (*e*) Potentialities.
11. Importance of League as means of expressing and developing international public opinion.

C. United States and the League of Nations.

Special references:—* **World Peace Foundation,** VII, no. 1 (**M. Hudson,** *American Coöperation with the League of Nations*); IV, no. 6 (**P. B. Potter,** *The Myth of American Isolation*); III, no. 4 (*The United States Senate and the Treaty*). ‡ **International Conciliation,** no. 135 (**Finch,** *The Treaty of Peace in the U. S. Senate*). ‡ **Temperley,** VI, 391-425. **Latané,** *From Isolation to Leadership,* ch. xi. **Gibbons,** *America's Place in the World,* chs. iv and xiii. **H. C. Lodge,** "Foreign Relations of the United States" and **E. M. House,** "America in World Affairs," in *Foreign Affairs,* June 1924. **Foley,** *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations.* **T. H. Dickinson,** *The United States and the League.* **Angell,** *America and the New World State.* Also general references for Part 10 and references for VII-A, B, above.

1. Non-partisan agitation for a League, prior to the Peace Conference.
2. Growth of Republican opposition to Wilson at the close of the War.
3. Rejection of the Covenant by the Senate.
   (*a*) Division of opinion in the Senate—"irreconcilables," "mild reservationists," and pro-Wilson Democrats.
   (*b*) Nature of the Senate "reservations."
   (*c*) Failure of reservationists to gain two-thirds majority in Senate.
   (*d*) Non-ratification of the treaty.
   (*e*) Reasons for the Senate's action.
4. The League in the 1920 elections.
   (*a*) Advocacy of League by Democrats.
   (*b*) Republican position.
      (i) Condemnation of League in platform.
      (ii) Manifesto of "31 Republicans" favoring election of Harding as means of entering League.
      (iii) Harding's pre-election promise of an "association of nations."
   (*c*) Republican victory.
      (i) As a "referendum" on the Covenant.
      (ii) Value as referendum impaired by fact that domestic issues such as tariff had much influence on vote.
5. The policy of isolation.
   (*a*) Growth of popular belief in "isolation."
      (i) Disillusionment regarding war aims of Allies.
      (ii) Reaction from wartime altruism.
      (iii) Conviction that American historical traditions favored isolation.
   (*b*) Popular isolationism as an example of popular ignorance of historical and economic facts (see Potter, *The Myth of American Isolation*, and also Part 7, VII).
   (*c*) Popular isolationism as a factor impelling Republican party to abandon .advocacy of a League with reservations, and adopt extreme aloofness toward Europe.
   (*d*) The Harding-Hughes policy of aloofness, 1921-1923.
      (i) Refusal to answer communications from League, Mar.-Aug., 1921.
      (ii) Opposition to transfer of various international agencies to League.
      (iii) Refusal to ratify conventions regarding opium, white slave traffic, arms traffic, etc.
      (iv) Protests regarding mandates.
      (v) Inaction regarding World Court, until 1923 (below, X).
      (vi) Non-participation in European conferences except through "observers."
6. The Washington Arms Conference (see also Part 7, VII-E-4).
   (*a*) As a partial abandonment of "isolation."
   (*b*) As a successful attempt to deal with problems which the League had been intended to handle.
   (c) As an unsuccessful experiment in the direction of substituting a conference system or "association of nations" for the League.
7. Growth of American coöperation with the League.

(*a*) Increasing prominence of American citizens, not officially representing U. S., in the League's activities.
Large number of Americans in secretariat, International Labor Office, and various committees and conferences of League.
Elihu Root as a member of commission to draft World Court statute.
J. B. Moore as a judge of the World Court.
N. H. Davis as president of commission on Memel.
J. Smith, Jr., as League commissioner in Hungary.
(*b*) Private American financial support for League activities.
Participation in League loan to Austria.
Rockefeller Foundation's contributions to Health Organization.
(*c*) Official and quasi-official governmental participation.
Official participation in International Hydrographic Bureau.
Conference on Transit and Communications ("observer" 1923).
Conference on Customs Formalities ("observer" 1923).
Conference on Obscene Publications ("consultative" delegate, 1923).
Committee on Opium ("consultative" delegate, 1923, and participation in conference on revision of opium treaty).
Committee on Traffic in Women and Children ("consultative" delegate, 1923).
Public Health Committee (official representative, 1924).
Conference on Sera (representative, 1921).
Anthrax committee ("consultative" delegate, 1921).
And other technical conferences.
(*d*) Treaties with mandatory powers securing same treatment as League members in mandates.
With Japan, 1922.
With France, 1923, 1924.
With Belgium, 1923, 1924.
(*e*) President Coolidge's view that the League is a fact with which the U. S. must deal.

8. Growth of pro-League agitation in United States.
(*a*) League of Nations Non-Partisan Association.
(*b*) The Bok Peace Award.
(*c*) Other organizations.

9. The League issue in the 1924 elections.
(*a*) Republican platform—opposition to League but endorsement of Permanent Court and of humanitarian coöperation.
(*b*) Democratic platform—provision for referendum on League; failure of Baker's attempt to include straight League plank.
(*c*) Result of elections.

10. General discussion of United States' relation to League.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

References:—* **World Peace Foundation**, VII, nos. 3-4 (*Handbook on the League of Nations*). **Temperley**, * II, 32-9; * VI, 462-80; I, 205-20.

Hicks, 236-9, 254-5, 270-9, 286-9. **Reinsch,** *Public International Unions,* 420. **Woolf,** *International Government,* 285-304. **B. E. Lowe,** *International Protection of Labor.* **U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,** *Historical Survey of International Action Affecting Labor.* **Feis,** "The Eight Hour Day Convention" in *Political Science Quarterly,* Sept. and Dec. 1924. **G. A. Johnston,** *International Social Progress.*

A. International Character of the Labor Problem.

1. International industrial competition—hence, fear of industrialists in each country that foreign competitors will undersell them if standards of labor are raised above those of other countries.
2. Internationalism of trade union, Socialist, and Communist movements.
3. General similarity of labor legislation in most civilized countries.
4. On the other hand, differences of economic and political conditions, making uniformity difficult.
5. Close relationship between labor conditions and immigration.

B. International Coöperation Regarding Labor Legislation Before 1914.

1. Occasional international conferences on labor legislation.
   (*a*) Private conferences of 1880's as precursors of official conferences.
   (*b*) Rôle of Switzerland as leader in movement for international labor legislation and conferences.
   (*c*) Official Berlin Conference for Labor Protection, 1890—discussion but no important action.
   (*d*) Zurich and Brussels conferences of 1897.
   (*e*) Paris Conference of 1900 and creation of unofficial International Association for Legal Protection of Labor, and International Labor Office.
   (*f*) Berne conferences of 1905-6.
      (i) Conventions on white phosphorus matches and night work for women.
      (ii) Rejection of British proposal for international commission to supervise enforcement.
   (*g*) Berne Conference of 1913.
2. Numerous bipartite treaties for mutual coöperation.
3. Relatively slow progress of international cooperation in labor legislation before the war, due to:
   (*a*) Great technical difficulties of framing conventions to apply to diverse conditions.
   (*b*) Lack of strong support by governments.
4. Position of the United States.
   (*a*) Non-acceptance of Berne conventions.
   (*b*) Uncertainty as to whether federal government's treaty-making power can override reserved power of states over labor legislation, under the Constitution.

C. The "Labor Charter" in the Treaty of Versailles (art. 427).

1. Reasons for its adoption.
2. The nine principles.

3. Recognition that uniform adherence to rigid standards is not immediately practicable.

D. The International Labor Organization Created by the Treaty of Versailles.

1. Membership—members of the League; also Germany.
2. Organization (articles 387-426 of treaty).
   (*a*) General Conference—representatives of capital, labor, and government of each country.
   (*b*) International Labor Office.
3. Relation to League.
4. Purpose and powers.
5. The General Conference—meetings and achievements.
   (*a*) Washington Conference, 1919.
      (i) Admission of Germany and Austria.
      (ii) Draft conventions and recommendations, especially 8-hour day convention.
   (*b*) Genoa Conference, 1920.
      (i) Conventions and recommendations on maritime labor.
      (ii) Creation of Permanent Joint Maritime Commission.
   (*c*) Geneva Conference, 1921.
      (i) Conventions and recommendations on agricultural labor; also on use of white lead and on weekly rest for workers.
      (ii) Commission on anthrax.
   (*d*) Geneva Conference, 1922.
      (i) Increased membership of Governing Board—32.
      (ii) Decision to make study of unemployment crises.
      (iii) Decision to collect statistics on emigration.
   (*e*) Geneva Conference, 1923.
      Recommendations for improvement of inspection of labor conditions.
   (*f*) Geneva Conference, 1924.
6. International Labor Office at work.
   (*a*) Growth of staff.
   (*b*) Importance as permanent organization to which complaints regarding non-enforcement of international conventions may be referred.
   (*c*) Importance as agency of research and information.
7. Significance of International Labor Organization.
   (*a*) Success in promoting progressive labor legislation in many countries, notwithstanding great technical difficulties.
   (*b*) Tendency to develop statistical research on labor problems.
   (*c*) Tendency to develop administrative and quasi-administrative functions.
   (*d*) The General Conference as a word labor parliament.

IX. INTERNATIONAL LAW

References:—* **Hughan,** ch. iii. ‡ **Potter,** ch. xii. ≠ **Hicks,** chs. vii-ix. ‡ **J. B. Moore,** *International Law and Some Current Illusions.* ≠ **Brown,** ch. iii. **Oppenheim,** *International Law.* **Hyde,** *International Law.* **Hall,**

International Law. **Lawrence,** *International Law.* **Garner,** *International Law and the World War.* Or other textbooks and treatises on international law. Further bibliography in works cited.

A. Origin.

1. Earlier codes and theories influential in formation of modern international law.
   (*a*) Roman law, especially *jus gentium.*
   (*b*) Medieval commercial codes, feudal law, civil and canon law and theories of natural law.
   (*c*) English common law and equity.
2. Rise of international law in 17th century as a response to existing conditions.
   (*a*) Need of rules for intercourse of nations as power of papacy and Holy Roman Empire declined.
   (*b*) Need of law to abate frequency and savagery of warfare.
   (*c*) Need of principles to settle disputed status of multitudinous small and quasi-independent states.
   (*d*) Desire of new national states for recognition of their absolute sovereignty as basis of new legal relationships.
3. Importance of early modern treatises, especially Grotius.

B. Development.

1. By treatises of jurists and theories regarding general principles of law.
2. By usage and common consent.
3. By precedents and judicial decisions, both of national courts and international tribunals.
4. By treaties.

C. Content (a rough general sketch).

1. Rules regarding nature of states in general and their jurisdiction, rights and duties; also regarding special status of a few states such as Belgium, Switzerland, Congo, etc.
2. General rules regarding relations between states in time of peace.
   (*a*) Diplomatic representatives and their immunities.
   (*b*) Nature and validity of treaties, conventions, protocols, etc.
   (*c*) Nature of conferences, commissions, etc.
3. Laws of warfare.
   (*a*) Restrictions on methods of warfare.
   (*b*) Rights of belligerents.
   (*c*) Rights and duties of neutrals.
   (*d*) Protection of civilians.
   (*e*) Protection of private property on the high seas.
4. Rule of international law that certain questions such as immigration and tariffs, which are fruitful causes of international conflict, are "domestic" questions.
5. Lack of international law for regulation of many international business dealings, monopolies, unfair practices, etc., which cause frequent conflicts.
6. Private international law, concerning relations of private individuals among themselves.

D. The Problem of Codification.

1. Lack of an authoritative code; hence necessity of relying on custom and on private and semi-official treatises, with wide differences of opinion regarding content and rules.
2. Need of periodic revision and removal of ambiguities and disagreements in certain departments of international law, such as maritime rights of neutrals in time of war.
3. Proposal for international official codification of international law, advocated by a number of jurists.
4. Possibility of further elaboration of international law by decisions of courts and arbitral tribunals, by action of unofficial bodies such as Institute of International Law, International Law Association, International Maritime Law Association, etc., and by international agreements for codification of certain parts of the law, such as the laws of war, the law of international communications, the law on narcotic drugs, etc.
5. Practical work of League of Nations in promoting negotiations of treaties which contribute toward agreement on various subjects of international law.

E. Enforcement and Sanctions.

1. Limited applicability of much international law.
   (*a*) Treaties not binding on non-signatories, examples:
      (i) Inapplicability of Hague Conventions on laws of warfare, in Great War of 1914, because not all belligerents were bound by the conventions.
      (ii) Probable difficulty of putting into effect the Washington poison gas treaty, unless signed by all belligerents.
      (iii) Refusal of Great Britain in 1914 to be bound by Declaration of London regarding maritime warfare, which had not been ratified by British Government.
   (*b*) Theory that right of national self-defense, or fundamental alteration of conditions, may be pleaded as justification for abrogating or violating treaty rules.
2. Dependence on enforcement by individual states as an inherent weakness of international law.
   (*a*) National sovereignty as the basis of existing international law.
   (*b*) Hence, lack of any international sovereign authority to enforce law (N.B. lack of sovereignty even in League of Nations; enforcement of Covenant entrusted to members of League acting as independent sovereign states).
   (*c*) Contrast between this condition, sometimes described as "international anarchy," and enforcement of laws within a nation by authoritative courts.
3. Reasons for general observance of international law except in extraordinary cases.
   (*a*) Fundamental necessity for observance of rules if nations are to live in society.
   (*b*) Human tendency to respect "law" and usage, rather than incur moral condemnation.

(*c*) Reciprocal action by other states as a benefit obtained by respect of law.

(*d*) Fear of retaliation, reprisals, boycott, or even, in extreme cases, military chastisement at the hands of other nations.

X. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ARBITRATION, AND THE WORLD COURT

References:—**World Peace Foundation,** IV, no. 3 (*The Permanent Court*); * V, no. 5 (*America and the Permanent Court*); VI, no. 1 (*The World Court*); * VI, no. 6 (*Work of the Permanent Court,* by **Hudson**); VII, no. 2 (*Hearings on the Permanent Court*). **International Conciliation,** no. 157 (*The Draft Scheme . . .*); * no. 197 (**J. B. Moore,** *The Permanent Court*). * **Hughan,** 61-87, 183-5. ‡ **Temperley,** VI, 481-499. ‡ **Potter,** chs. 14-16. ‡ **Hicks,** chs. 11-12, app. 6. **Brown,** ch. vii. **J. B. Moore,** *International Law and Some Current Illusions.* **J. B. Moore,** *History and Digest of International Arbitrations.* **W. Schucking,** *The International Union of the Hague Conferences.* **J. B. Scott,** *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.* **J. B. Scott,** *The Hague Court Reports.* Additional bibliography in **Hicks, Potter,** and other works cited. * **Kellor,** *Security Against War,* Part III.

A. General Aspects of Problem of International Justice.

1. Lack of agreement on some principles of international law (above).
2. Lack of authority to enforce international law (above).
3. Prevalence of militarism, aggression, and war.
4. Hence, disregard of rights of weak.
5. The issue in principle—rule of force vs. the rule of justice.
6. The issue in practice—cost of armaments and war vs. restriction of national aspirations by rules of law and justice.
7. Means of promoting international justice.
   (*a*) Codification of international law (above).
   (*b*) Arbitration (below).
   (*c*) The World Court (below).
   (*d*) Mediation (below).
   (*e*) Commissions of inquiry (below).
   (*f*) Restraint of militarism by League or agreements for limitation of armaments (above, Part 4).

B. Arbitration and the Hague Court.

1. Nature of arbitration—peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitrator or commission selected by disputants and acting not by virtue of superior authority but at their request.
2. Antiquity of practice of international arbitration.
3. Decline of arbitration in early modern times, 1500-1800.
4. Revival of arbitration in 19th century.
   (*a*) Some notable cases of arbitration.
      (i) Jay Treaty of 1794.
      (ii) Alabama claims.
      (iii) Delagoa Bay case.
      (iv) Venezuelan boundary case.
      (v) Behring Sea case.

(*b*) Increasing number of arbitration treaties.

5. The Hague Conferences.
   (*a*) First Hague Conference and creation of Permanent Court of Arbitration.
      (i) Provision for permanent lists (panels) of judges eligible to act as arbitrators.
      (ii) Choice of judges from such lists to form special court for each case.
      (iii) Defects.
         Lack of continuity.
         Lack of obligatory jurisdiction.
         Complexity and expense of system of creating court.
      (iv) Salutary effect on public opinion.
   (*b*) Second Hague Conference.
      (i) Improvement of convention regarding Permanent Court of Arbitration.
      (ii) Unsuccessful project for Court of Arbitral Justice, blocked by Great Powers' opposition to small powers' demand for equality of nations in choosing judges.
      (iii) Unsuccessful project for International Prize Court (not ratified).
      (iv) Effect in stimulating movement for arbitration and international court.
6. The Hague Court of Arbitration in operation.
   (*a*) Successful settlement of 18 cases, 1900-1924.
   (*b*) Unwillingness of powers to submit numerous disputes to the Court.
   (*c*) Inadequacy of the system.
7. Arbitration treaties after the Hague Conferences.
   (*a*) Large number of arbitration treaties adopted after 1899.
   (*b*) Exclusion of questions affecting national honor, independence, and vital interests from obligatory arbitration, except in a few of the many arbitration treaties.
8. Advocacy of arbitration as a United States policy.
   (*a*) Settlement of important Anglo-American disputes in 19th century by arbitration.
   (*b*) McKinley's message of 1897.
   (*c*) Instructions to delegates to first Hague Conference.
   (*d*) Root's instructions to delegates to 2nd Hague Conference, and Roosevelt's desire for a genuine international court.
   (*e*) Conclusion of numerous arbitration treaties.

C. The World Court (Permanent Court of International Justice).

1. Establishment.
   (*a*) Article 14 of Covenant.
   (*b*) Drafting of plan by commission of jurists, including E. Root, at request of League Council, 1920.
   (*c*) Adoption of statute by Council and Assembly of League, 1920.
   (*d*) Signature of protocol by 47 nations; ratification by most of these.
   (*e*) Election of judges (Sept., 1921) and opening of court (Jan. 1922).
2. Nature and powers of court.

(*a*) Choice of judges by Assembly and Council of League as a solution of problem which wrecked the 2nd Hague Conference's project.
(*b*) Judicial character.
(i) 9-year term for judges as a provision making for impartial attitude, development of judicial traditions, and substitution of juristic for diplomatic decisions.
(ii) Legal basis for decisions (article 38 of statute).
(*c*) Accessibility to all states (decision of Council, May, 1922).
(*d*) Problem of jurisdiction.
(i) Elimination of original provision for obligatory reference to Court of all justiciable disputes between members of League.
(ii) Signature of additional optional protocol for compulsory jurisdiction of Court in certain kinds of cases, by 16 states (to 1924).
(iii) Automatic jurisdiction of Court over certain cases specified in various treaties.
(iv) Purely voluntary nature of jurisdiction with above exceptions.
(v) The Geneva Protocol of 1924 (below).

3. Relation of the Court to the League.
4. Work of the Court.
(*a*) Adjudication of international disputes.
(*b*) Advisory opinions to League.
5. United States and the World Court.
(*a*) American advocacy of such a court as a prominent factor in bringing the World Court into existence.
(*b*) American non-participation in establishment of Court, and policy of ignoring its existence until 1923, as result of Republican opposition to League.
(*c*) President Harding's proposal to participate in Court, with reservations, 1923.
(*d*) Opposition to Court by irreconcilable wing of Republican party.
(*e*) Plank supporting Harding proposal in Republican platform of 1924.
6. The provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1924 (above, VII-B-3-*g*) for extension of obligatory jurisdiction of the Court, and for arbitration committees.

D. Mediation and Inquiry.

1. Mediation and "good offices."
(*a*) How mediation differs from arbitration or judicial decision.
(*b*) Practical utility of mediation in important conflicts which cannot easily be solved by courts of law.
(i) Roosevelt's mediation in Russo-Japanese War.
(ii) Roosevelt's mediation in Morocco Crisis of 1905-6.
(iii) Wilson's attempt to mediate in 1916.
(*c*) Covenant's recognition of "friendly right" to bring disputes to attention of League as an attempt to promote mediation by League.
2. Commissions of Inquiry.
(*a*) Success of commission of inquiry in Dogger Bank Case.

(*b*) Provision of Hague Convention of 1907 (article 9) recommending commissions of inquiry.
(*c*) The "Bryan treaties" providing for compulsory submission of disputes to commission of inquiry, and delay of hostilities for a year, pending report.
(*d*) Pan-American agreement of 1923 for compulsory investigation before war.
(*e*) Obligatory reference of non-justiciable disputes to Council of the League, as a commission of inquiry, under Covenant (see above, V-B-3 and also VII-B-3-*g*).

E. General Discussion.

1. Limitations of judicial settlement of international disputes.
   (*a*) Judicial settlement limited largely to legal questions, excluding vital interests, national honor, and independence.
   (*b*) Tendency of judicial settlement to maintain status quo by upholding existing rights.
   (*c*) Reluctance of Great Powers to accept compulsory jurisdiction of any court, even in "justiciable" questions.
2. Mediation and inquiry.
   (*a*) As the only peaceful method (excepting ordinary diplomacy) for dealing with the really vital conflicts which cause wars, but are not of a legal or "justiciable" nature.
   (*b*) As a means of altering the status quo.
   (*c*) Success in practice, in numerous important cases.
   (*d*) Limitation—valuable only in so far as nations are willing to curb their own ambitions in the interest of justice and peace.
3. Fundamental importance of public opinion as the principal force making for peaceful settlement of disputes.

XI. DISCUSSION AND GENERAL REVIEW

A. Certain Fundamental Realities of International Relations (Part 1) as Basis of International Organization.

1. Geographic.
2. Economic (Part 8).
3. Cultural.

B. Important Obstacles to International Organization.

1. Competitive nationalism (Part 2).
2. Uncontrolled imperialism (Part 3).
3. Aggressive militarism (Part 4).

C. Cost of International Disorganization.

1. Crises and wars in recent history (Parts 5-6).
2. Clash of present national policies, making for future crises and wars (Part 7).
3. Retardation of economic progress (Part 8).

D. Reconstruction of Diplomacy to Mitigate Disadvantages of International Disorganization (Part 9).

1. Open diplomacy.
2. Democratic diplomacy.
3. Economic diplomacy.
4. Diplomacy by conference.
5. Limitations of diplomacy.

E. International Organization (Part 10).

1. As a fact.
2. As a possible remedy for some international problems.

F. The Role of Public Opinion.

1. Importance as the driving force behind governmental policies.
2. Ignorance and prejudice as factors aggravating international problems.
3. Need of knowledge and intelligence in solution of international problems.

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Explanatory Note:—For the convenience of students and librarians, books cited in the *Outline* under the topics to which they pertain, are here listed alphabetically, each with full title, publisher, and date. * Textbooks to be purchased by students or provided by reference library, for required reading. ‡ Other books used for required reading, but less indispensable. † Other useful works which should be included in libraries of small or moderate size. Students should not regard these marks as indications of the relative scholarly value of the books; many of the most valuable reference works are unmarked, as they are not ordinarily at the command of small libraries.

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